World Society Foundation

Decentering

European

Studies

Hélène Ducros, Nicole Shea, Christian Suter,

Patrick Ziltener, Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach,

and Sergio Aguilar (Editors)

Scholars gather here from places ranging from East Asia to South

America to write about Europe from their respective disciplinary, national,

and geographic perspectives. Looking in from the “Global South” and

Europe’s peripheries, they investigate an array of topics along three

axes—the construction of Europe from its so-called margins, the European

Union seen through an external gaze, and comparative policymaking. ey

use their diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds to analyze ideas,

images, and visions of Europe, while relying on various theoretical and

methodological orientations to scrutinize European institutions, structures,

dynamics, policies, and integration and disintegration processes.

Sponsored by the World Society Foundation, the volume exemplies

open participation. It enhances inclusion where exclusion has been the norm,

disrupting the established order in the creation of knowledge about Europe

by altering its center of gravity. It emerges out of a commitment to inject

European Studies with voices seldom heard and facilitate the diusion of

expertise from less-represented regions and intellectual traditions. e

improved visibility of Europeanists from the “Global South,” “Global East,”

or generally the “non-West” is essential for the discipline to advance and

remain sensible and relevant. It is this critical engagement from Europe’s

outsides or edges—Europe’s “beyond”—that can propel Europe into nding

answers to its contemporary struggles.

Decentering European Studies:

Perspectives on Europe from its Beyond











Decentering European Studies

Perspectives on Europe from its Beyond

Hélène Ducros, Nicole Shea, Christian Suter, Patrick Ziltener,

Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach, and Sergio Aguilar (Editors)

Decentering European Studies

Perspectives on Europe from its Beyond

Marília/University Workshop

São Paulo/Academic Culture

2025

Aﬃliate publisher:

Academic Culture is the publishing imprint of UNESP Publishing

University Oﬃce is the publishing imprint of UNESP - Marília campus

CIP – Cataloging-in-Publication

D292 Decentering European studies : perspectives on Europe from its beyond / Hélène Ducros ... [et al.]

(editors). – Marília : Oﬁcina Universitária ; São Paulo : Cultura Acadêmica, 2025.

173 p. : ill.

Support: World Society Foundation

Includes bibliography

ISBN 978-65-5954-651-0 (Printed)

ISBN 978-65-5954-652-7 (E-book)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7

1. Europe – Study and teaching – Developing countries. 2. European Union - Inﬂuence. 3.

Borderlands. 4 Comparative government. 5. Medical policy. 6. Knowledge – Political aspects. I.

Ducros, Hélène. II. Shea, Nicole. III. Suter, Christian. IV. Ziltener, Patrick. V. Meier-Dallach, Hans-

Peter. VI. Aguilar, Sergio. CDD 327.4

Telma Jaqueline Dias Silveira – Librarian – CRB 8/7867

https://stock.adobe.com/br - Arquivo "AdobeStock_280601659". Acesso em 09/05/2025.

is work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0

International License.

Director

Dra. Ana Clara Bortoleto Nery

Vice-Director

Dra. Cristiane Rodrigues Pedroni

Editorial Board

Mariângela Spotti Lopes Fujita (Presidente)

Célia Maria Giacheti

Cláudia Regina Mosca Giroto

Edvaldo Soares

Franciele Marques Redigolo

Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira

Marcos Antonio Alves

Neusa Maria Dal Ri

Renato Geraldi (Assessor Técnico)

Rosane Michelli de Castro

Reviewer

Catherine Guisan

Visiting Associate Professor, Department of

Political Science, University of Minnesota (USA)

Cover image

Front and back cover image: "Europa" by Mark

Garrett https://www.markmgarrett.com/

Book ﬁnanced by

World Society Foundation

https://www.worldsociety.ch/

Câmpus de Marília

Contents

Preface

The World Society Foundation: History and Practice 7

C S, P Z, 

H-P M-D

Introduction

Institutional Collaboration for Multiple Border Crossings 19

H D

Part I

Constructing Europe from its Margins

Introduction 27

A F  O E

1 The Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in

Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century 29

O E

2 Constructing the Idea of Europe through Turkish Media

Coverage of the 2016 EU-Turkey Refugee Deal 47

A F

Part II

The European Union: Impact and Understanding Seen from its

Outside and Periphery

Introduction 65

E P, M U,  S A

3 Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s

Europeanization 67

E P

4 Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group 87

M U

5 European Union’s Military Operations: The Use of an Adaptive

Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order 111

S A

Part III

Policy Reach: Focus on Health and Comparative Methods

Introduction 133

Q C, L D,  J X

6 Integrated Care Reforms: Comparing Policies and Strategies in

China and Norway 135

Q C, L D,  T C

7 Poverty Risk and the Integration of Long-Term Care in Healthcare

Policy in Germany and China During the COVID-19 Pandemic 157

J X  W D

Preface

e World Society Foundation

History and Practice

Christian SUTER 1, Patrick ZILTENER 2, and

Hans-Peter MEIER-DALLACH 3

e aim of this preface is twofold. First, we trace the historical roots of the concept

of “world society,” as it pertains to the funding behind this book and the motivation of

the World Society Foundation (WSF) to bring together researchers from various parts of

the globe to write about Europe from their respective regional perspectives. Because Peter

Heintz, the founder of the WSF, was especially inﬂuential in shaping the Foundation’s

approach to the making of a global society through research funding, we focus on his

work. Second, we delve into the Foundation’s funding activities over the last forty years.

In this respect, the present volume is well inscribed in the Foundation’s historical mission.

rough its ﬁrst “Writing Lab for Global South Scholars,” of which this book is a result,

the World Society Foundation has developed a new funding tool guided by the conviction

that such a novel sponsoring pursuit will provide researchers from the Global South (and

the Global East) better access not only to resources within the Foundation but also beyond.

In support of its core purpose of strengthening research on and from a world society while

also promoting a diversity of voices in scholarship, the World Society Foundation brought

these diﬀerent perspectives into a dialogue, in particular through the regular activities of the

writing lab. is preface, therefore, serves to situate this edited volume within the historical

context of the Foundation’s philosophy and past research funding activity. In line with these

past practices, the Foundation has gathered here researchers from diﬀerent parts of the

world and diverse cultural, historical, and academic contexts, who emanate from an array

of disciplines and rely on a variety of theoretical and methodological bases to address topics

relevant to an understanding of contemporary Europe.

From “International System” to “World Society”

Long before the notion of “globalization” went viral in the 1990s, scholars used

diﬀerent analytical approaches to demonstrate that binding the notion of “society” to

the concept of nations based on states and placing the nation at the center of sociological

 Christian Suter, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, christian.suter@unine.ch.

 Patrick Ziltener, University of Zurich, Switzerland, ziltener@soziologie.uzh.ch

 Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach, World Society Foundation, Zurich, Switzerland, hp@culturprospectiv.ch

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p7-17

SUTER, Christian, ZILTENER, Patrick, and MEIER-DALLACH, Hans-Peter

analysis was untenable and even misleading. Certainly, the conceptualization of the world

as an “international system” has had a long tradition in academic disciplines such as

political science, international relations, and international law. However, the dominant

perspectives have approached the international system as a simple consequence of the

incidental interaction of its independent units, echoing the concept of the market in

mainstream economics. us, the concept of “world society,” which emerged in sociology

in the 1960s and early 1970s, has gone beyond the “global interaction system of national

societies/nation-states” (GISN) model.

Before the 1970s, only a few social theorists had developed a “beyond the GISN”

perspective on the world. e idea of a “world society” was ﬁrst mentioned by an expert in

international law, George Schwarzenberger, in his book Power Politics. Schwarzenberger,

who had earned his PhD at the London School of Economics with a thesis on e

League of Nations and World Order, held a position at the London Institute of World

Aﬀairs. Addressing the rule of law of peace (and war), i.e., the creation, functioning, and

transformation of international rules, Schwarzenberger adopted a sociological perspective

on international law to uncover the power politics that operated behind international

rules. While the ﬁrst edition of Power Politics (1941) was subtitled “An introduction to

the study of international relations and post-war planning” and, therefore, still reﬂected

a traditional international relations perspective, this subtitle was changed in the second

(1951) and third (1963) editions to “A study of international society” and “A study

of world society,” respectively. Drawing on Ferdinand Tönnies’s distinction between

“society” and “community,” Schwarzenberger argued that the international system had to

be conceptualized as a society, rather than as a community:

[...] modern international society is a reality for the reason that in groups co-exist

within it which are both interdependent and independent of each other [...] e

bond that holds world society together is not a vague community of spiritual

interests. It is power. (Schwarzenberger 1951, 251).

It is no coincidence that Scharzenberger, a German emigrant whose Jewish family

had been forced to leave Germany for political reasons, conceptualized world society by

turning to a pronounced interdisciplinary approach that combined international law and

international relations with sociology.

A second impetus for global thinking in the 1960s-1970s goes back to Wilbert E. Moore,

former president of the American Sociological Association (ASA). In his presidential address

at the 1965 ASA convention, Moore (1966, 475) called upon to develop “global sociology,”

a “sociology of the globe, of mankind,” in the face of the “growing ubiquity of similar

problems and similar solutions in the world of events.” He traced global thinking back to

a “grand tradition” that included thinkers such as Polybius and Ibn Khaldun and assumed

the unity of humankind. Since Antiquity, the metaphor of humankind as one “body” had

been used frequently, e.g., in Seneca’s “membra sumus corporis magni” (“we are members

of a large body,” cf. Motto 1955). As a student of Talcott Parsons, Moore believed that “we

must rediscover super-systems” (Moore 1966, 482).

Preface

A third decisive development of the 1960s and early 1970s was the rise of various

“world models” in the context of increasing global ecological risks and the boundaries

placed on the planet by a dominant resource-intensive, growth-based development path,

which had been pursued by most countries but in particular by those of the Global

North. In his introduction to a special issue of the UNESCO International Social Science

Journal focused on world society, Peter Heintz (1982a, 11) noted an increased interest

within the scientiﬁc community for the topic of “world society,” which he explained

as resulting from the construction of world models, in particular economic, resource-

oriented, and international relations models. e two most important world models,

the ﬁrst Club of Rome publication on “Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al. 1972) and

the “Latin American” counter model published by the Argentine Bariloche Foundation

(Herrera et al. 1976) received considerable public attention across the globe. Based on

computer simulations and focused on the interactions among selected global problems

(such as population density, waste, environmental deterioration, famine, poverty, and

criminality), the Club of Rome’s publications presented a fundamental critique of

(resource-intensive) economic growth and pointed to the risks of a general collapse of the

international system in the absence of a move to a more sustainable development model.

is global catastrophe scenario was criticized as neo-Malthusian by the proponents

of the Bariloche model who emphasized in their social sciences-based counter-model the

importance and impact of socio-structural factors such as global disparities, inequality, and

over-consumption (in the Global North). Heintz, who had established the social sciences

department at the Bariloche Foundation in the 1960s, maintained close contacts and

research collaborations with researchers there, including with the creators of the “Latin

American” world model. Although Heintz was not part of this group, his structural-

theoretical, developmental-sociological approach, with its focus on global stratiﬁcation,

institutionalized power, and prestige, was closely related to the Bariloche model perspective.

As they interrogated world society, these three early initiatives had quite diﬀerent

impacts on research agendas in the social sciences and on the public debate about global

issues. Schwarzenberger remained an “outsider,” as his interdisciplinary approach was

neither adopted nor further developed in international law, while the world models’

perspectives have had a profound inﬂuence and contributed to linking development,

global inequalities, and the environment more explicitly. In eﬀect, it can be said that

supporters of these models initiated, some 50 years ago, an eco-developmental agenda for

global sustainability that is still robustly shaping today’s public debate.

Peter Heintz’s World Society Concept: Global Stratification,

Development, and Tensions

Peter Heintz started using the concept of “world society” in the early 1970s. By 1966,

he had been appointed as a full professor of sociology at the University of Zurich, where

he had established the Sociological Institute, which became, under his guidance, one of

SUTER, Christian, ZILTENER, Patrick, and MEIER-DALLACH, Hans-Peter

the most important centers of empirical social research in Switzerland. Heintz had studied

economics and social sciences in Zurich, Paris, and Cologne, and spent years in South

America from 1956 to 1965 after receiving his habilitation under the leadership of René

König at the University of Cologne. As an expert for UNESCO, he had contributed to the

institutional development of sociological research and teaching in several South American

countries, notably at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in

Santiago de Chile and at the Bariloche Foundation in Argentina. is experience in the

Global South strongly inﬂuenced his work once he returned to Europe, as can be seen not

only in his macro-sociological, developmentalist (structural-theoretical) approach and his

emphasis on intercultural and comparative analyses but also in his interest in sociological

teaching and public sociology (see Heintz 1960).

Heintz formally introduced the concept of “world society” in 1972 through two

contributions targeted at the general public; indeed, he was interested in reaching beyond

the limited scholarly audience of sociologists and academics. e ﬁrst article, entitled

“e world society and its citizens,” was published (in German) in the weekend edition

of the liberal, center-left Basel-based newspaper National-Zeitung am Wochenende (Heintz

1972c). Two years later, he wrote a similar article, “e structural transformation of world

society from the perspective of sociology,” for the broader public of the University of

Zurich magazine (Heintz 1974). Hence, he had already been using the term for a few

years when he published in 1977 his ﬁrst scientiﬁc publication explicitly addressing the

topic of world society (Heintz and Obrecht 1977).

Until then, Heintz had still used terms such as “international system” or “international

system of development stratiﬁcation” in his scientiﬁc writings, for instance in his

1972 analysis of “Switzerland’s position in the structure of the international system: A

sociological analysis,” (Heintz 1972a) or in the volumes “A macrosociological theory of

societal systems: With special reference to the international system” (Heintz 1972b) and

“e future of development” (Heintz and Heintz 1973), which constituted two of his

most important scientiﬁc publications in that period. He then also started developing

a global approach that went beyond the international systems perspective, emphasizing

instead the structural and institutional foundations of the international system and its

impact on the national and local levels. His assumption was that

e notion of structure, i.e. institutionalized power and prestige, implies a

diﬀerential distribution of chances, or even a distribution governed by diﬀerent

laws for diﬀerent regions, as for instance, for the region of the developing countries

and for that of the highly developed nations. e structure of the international

system is thus conceived of as representing the distribution of nations’ chances to

realize the values of development (Heintz 1972a, 81).

Heintz also increasingly examined the topic of world society in his teaching, for

example through university seminars he conducted from 1976 onwards, as well as a

lecture series “On the sociology of world society.” He also disseminated the concept

Preface

through international conferences in Zurich, e.g., at the Report on World Society and

Educational Code symposium in January of 1976. Four years later, in November 1980,

he organized an international seminar on Diversity and Change of World Society Images

at the University of Zurich; several papers presented at that conference were published in

1982 in a special issue of UNESCO’s International Social Science Journal (no. 34/1, 1982)

under the title “Images of world society. Emerging global understanding and praxis.” His

research program at that time was quite ambitious, as he aimed to develop “a sociological

code for the description of world society and its change.”

At the center of Heintz’s world society concept lies the notion of global stratiﬁcation,

more precisely an “international system of development stratiﬁcation,” which is

characterized by a multi-dimensional and multi-level structure (of local, subnational,

national, regional, and global levels) embedding individuals, organizations and institutions,

and states into a comprehensive social reality (Suter 2005). Heintz conceptualized world

society as a hierarchically structured international development system shaped by the

unequal positions of individual nations on interrelated stratiﬁcation dimensions such as

income, education, urbanization, industrialization, and tertiarization. Heintz’s structural-

theoretical, developmentalist conceptualization of world society considerably diﬀers from

other world society or global society approaches developed in the 1970s, such as Niklas

Luhmann’s systems model (Luhmann 1982; Stichweh 2000), Ulrich Beck’s (2009) world

at risk approach, John W. Meyer’s neo-institutionalist world polity approach (Meyer

1980; Meyer et al. 1997), or Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974) world systems theory.

While the world systems theory relies primarily on global economic interactions and the

world polity approach is based on political and institutional factors, Heintz emphasized

the diﬀusion of global cultural values, norms, and societal institutions as the principal

integrating forces of world society (for a more detailed discussion of the various world

society approaches, see Bornschier and Lengyel 1990, Wobbe 2000, Bornschier 2002,

Greve and Heintz 2005, Bauer 2014, Wittmann 2014, Suter and Ziltener 2024).

Heintz considered that the primary factors of integration and stability in world society

are a consensus on the value of social and economic development and the existence of

mobility channels permitting and regulating access to hierarchical positions within

the multidimensional stratiﬁcation system. Structural and anomic tensions constitute

crucial aspects of this approach, as they are caused by incomplete status conﬁgurations

or imbalances in the positions held by social actors, whether the latter are individuals

or nation states. According to Heintz, structural and anomic tensions occur across

diﬀerent system levels within world society, that is, across global, national, regional,

organizational, and individual levels. In the 1960s and early 1970s, he predicted that

increasing contradictions and tensions within world society would result in a general

deﬁcit of legitimacy and in increasing tendencies toward disintegration.

In his late work, before his untimely death in 1983, Heintz focused on codes and

images to describe world society and the structure and evolution of political regimes at

the periphery (Heintz 1982b). Although he did not produce a speciﬁc “Zurich school”

out of his research, Heintz inspired students, collaborators, and colleagues to further

develop the concept of world society in the twenty-ﬁrst century. World Society and Social

SUTER, Christian, ZILTENER, Patrick, and MEIER-DALLACH, Hans-Peter

Structure, containing 38 contributions, is an example of this follow-up work (cf. Hischier

et al. 1980). e most prominent of Heintz’s students has been Volker Bornschier, who

served as president of the World Society Foundation in the 1980s and 1990s. Bornschier

analyzed the (negative) impact of foreign investment dependence on economic growth

and development at the periphery of the world economy (see Bornschier and Chase-

Dunn, 1985); he also focused on state-building processes, processes of convergence

and divergence in institutional orders, and societal models at the core of world society

(Bornschier 1996). Other themes included the role of socio-cultural factors such as

generalized trust and social capital for political and economic development (Bornschier

2004). Many other works by scholars who were students and collaborators of Peter Heintz

are worth mentioning, in particular Georg P. Müller’s (1988) world data handbook,

Christian Suter’s (1992, 1999, 2012) analysis of global sovereign debt cycles and regime

change in Latin America, and Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach’s research on post-socialist

transformation in Eastern Europe (Meier-Dallach and Juchler 2001).

Pros and Cons of a “World Society” Approach

In a short, but remarkable text in Johan Galtung’s Festschrift in 1980, Heintz critically

reﬂected on the pros and cons of studying world society and developed four main

arguments in favor of such endeavor. First, he argued that studying world society entails

a concern with the “only truly global society,” whereas national societies are, in structural

terms, not global, even when they might be socially deﬁned as such. Second, for Heintz,

studying world society means to address a topic common to all social scientists, regardless

of the region or culture to which they belong. is commonality is rooted in the idea that

everyone can consider herself/himself to be a member of a (loose) worldwide community

of social scientists. ird, Heintz advanced that studying world society is innovative, even

at a time when the scale of study was modest, since this topic had been “highly neglected”

by social scientists at that point. Fourth, studying world society entails understanding

a “very particular type of society,” which promises to be highly productive for further

theory building. is particular type of society was characterized by Heintz (1980, 97) as

a stateless, highly complex society without identity, i.e., a society that is not perceived as

such by most of its members.

Among the reasons not to approach the world as a world society, Heintz mentioned

the following four arguments. First, he noted that there had been little to no demand

for knowledge on world society; he added, that there seemed to be no social problem

related to world society that required sociological knowledge and analysis. Second,

Heintz mentioned that only a small, globalized elite (made up of foreign policymakers

and managers of multinational corporations) might be interested in research ﬁndings

on world society; moreover, research results might strengthen the power of these elites,

which would hardly be in the interest of sociology. ird, for Heintz, studying world

society would be to pretend to be able to overcome the structural limitations of one’s

own perspective, which is always inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc place and position someone

Preface

occupies in society. Fourth, Heintz (1980) argued that data on world society were lacking;

moreover, these data, like governmental statistics or media news, might be quite biased.

In conclusion, Heintz (1982a, 20) called for an exploration of the “possibilities of

shaping world society on the basis of solid knowledge shared by diﬀerent groups,” in

spite of “strong social and cultural forces” preventing such an exploration. For him,

“a meaningful world society could only result from a commonly shared knowledge

revealing action spaces and making people true participants in this society; without, of

course, by any means denying the continued existence of antagonistic interests.” It is

striking that several arguments advanced by Heintz ﬁfty years ago are still valid, such

as his characterization of world society as a stateless, highly complex society without an

identity. Other aspects discussed by Heintz have fundamentally changed, for instance,

his observation that no social problem seems to be related to world society. Already the

wave of rapidly increasing economic globalization that characterized the world between

the 1980s and the early 2000s was related to the emergence of several severe global social

problems (such as increasing global inequalities and social stratiﬁcation, or increasing

global migration). e subsequent multiple global crises—ﬁnancial, economic, political,

military, sanitary, social, environmental, etc.—that have marked the years since 2008 and

contributed to a considerable fragmentation challenging today’s world demonstrates the

persistence and relevance of global social problems and the ongoing necessity of applying

a world society approach.

Forty Years of Research Funding by the World Society Foundation

A review of the Foundation’s forty years of research funding reveals an extensive thematic,

theoretical, and methodological approach, as well as a wide disciplinary and regional

diversity in the research supported, echoing the emerging structural transformations and

changing images of world society over the past decades. When Heintz established the

World Society Foundation in 1982, it was an important step toward strengthening and

institutionalizing research on world society. e Foundation, now in its forty-third year

of activity as a “world observatory” on global change has supported social sciences scholars

and scientiﬁc research all over the world to reinforce the investigation into the various

processes of global integration, disintegration, (re)structuring, and (re)conﬁguration.

In doing so, the Foundation has supported approximately 700 researchers from nearly

50 countries worldwide through various instruments, but in particular through the

sponsorship of research projects and international conferences. Over the last few years,

the Foundation has mainly promoted international conference sponsoring. rough this

reorientation, the Foundation’s board has intended to give better access to marginalized

researchers (from the Global South and peripheral regions of Europe), who have been

markedly underrepresented in the distribution of project grants. Within the framework

of its conference sponsoring activity, the WSF has placed a special focus on topics of

particular interest for countries of the Global South, such as the emergence of a rapidly

growing middle class there (see Suter et al. 2020) or the increasing relationships among

SUTER, Christian, ZILTENER, Patrick, and MEIER-DALLACH, Hans-Peter

non-core Global South countries (see Ziltener and Suter 2022), which traditionally have

been neglected in the scholarship produced in core countries.

e Foundation also established the World Society Foundation Research Paper

Award and, in collaboration with Nicole Shea, founded the WSF Writing Lab for Global

South scholars; it has also supported (open access) publications on various world society

topics, in particular for Global South scholars. e output of this funding has been

substantial, as can be seen in the numerous conference presentations, journal articles,

books, edited volumes, and special issues published by the supported researchers. e

Foundation has also established its own book series in “World Society Studies,” in

which results of outstanding research projects and conference papers have been featured.

Detailed information on the Foundation’s past and current activities, as well as access to

electronic versions of papers, chapters, and books of supported research, are available on

the Foundation’s website at www.worldsociety.ch.

World Society as a Code Guiding the Foundation

Within the context of increasing globalization—in particular in the ﬁelds of

economic relations, communication, and global risks—research in the social sciences

and public debates on global issues have considerably intensiﬁed over the past decades.

Various concepts describing a so-called world society and diﬀerent perspectives have

developed since the 1960s and contributed to improving our understanding of global

transformations. Heintz insisted on the importance of world society as the most

comprehensive unit of analysis and a fundamental concept in social science. However, his

approach, unlike Luhmann’s systems theory and Wallerstein’s world-systems approach, is

not a closed and coherent theory but rather a general (sociological) code that can be used

to better describe and understand events, structures, and processes occurring at the global

level of world society. Heintz also indicated that every individual member of world society

adopts a code or an image of this society to get oriented. e socialization process thus

emphasizes immediate neighborhoods and loyalties to the family, the local community,

and the nation. However, most individuals have, according to Heintz (1982a, 12), a

“rather vague, unstructured, poor and inconsistent image of world society” and mostly

behave with regard to the wider world “as members of national or subnational societies.”

e World Society Foundation has carried on Heintz’s heritage by funding research

activities to reach a better understanding of global structures and transformations. Four

basic principles have guided the practices and research funding of the Foundation: First,

its global and transnational mission regarding research funding has led it to support

research all over the world, most of the funding allocated having gone to researchers

outside Switzerland and Europe. Second, the Foundation has been guided by a multi-

and cross-disciplinary perspective in its support of all the disciplines, in particular in the

social sciences and humanities, that address world society issues. ird, the Foundation

has relied on a broad theoretical and methodological orientation in its choices for

grant recipients. Fourth, the Foundation has focused on encouraging and supporting

Preface

researchers from the Global South (or peripheral regions in the Global North) in order

to hear the voices of those who generally have had limited access to research funding and

publication opportunities in academic journals. ese guiding principles are reﬂected in

the present book. Here, looking in from the Global South and the margins of Europe

through diﬀerent angles, scholars from diverse cultural backgrounds and theoretical

and methodological orientations analyze ideas, images, and visions of Europe, as well as

European institutions, structures, dynamics, policies, and integration and disintegration

processes.

Note: A longer version of this chapter appears in Suter, Christian, Patrick Ziltener, and

Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach. 2024. “Fifty Years of Research on World Society: e Zurich

‘World Observatory’.” In After Globalization: e Future of World Society, edited by

Christian Suter and Patrick Ziltener. Lit. https://lit-verlag.de/isbn/978-3-643-80409-9/

References

Babones, Salvatore. 2018. “Sovereignty in the Millennial World System.” In e Return of

Geopolitics (World Society Studies 2018), edited by Albert J. Bergesen and Christian Suter.

Lit.

Bauer, Julian. 2014. “From Organisms to World Society: Steps toward a Conceptual History of

Systems eory, 1880–1980.” Contributions to the History of Concepts 9 (2): 51–72.

Beck, Ulrich. 2009. World at Risk. Polity Press.

Bornschier, Volker. 1996. Western Society in Transition. Transaction.

Bornschier, Volker. 2002. Weltgesellschaft: Grundlegende soziale Wandlungen. Loreto.

Bornschier, Volker. 2004. Culture and Politics in Economic Development. Loreto.

Bornschier, Volker, and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 1985. Transnational Corporations and

Underdevelopment. Praeger.

Bornschier, Volker, and Peter Lengyel. 1990. “Introduction: Notions of World Society.” In World

Society Studies Vol. 1, edited by Volker Bornschier and Peter Lengyel. Campus.

Greve, Jens, and Bettina Heintz. 2005. “Die ‘Entdeckung’ der Weltgesellschaft: Entstehung und

Grenzen der Weltgesellschaftstheorie”. In Weltgesellschaft: eoretische Zugänge und empirische

Problemlagen (Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Sonderheft Weltgesellschaft), edited by Bettina

Heintz , Richard Münch and Hartmann Tyrell. Lucius & Lucius.

Heintz, Peter. 1960. Cursos de Sociologia. Andrés Bello.

Heintz, Peter. 1972a. Switzerland’s Position in the Structure of the International System: A

Sociological Analysis. Bulletin of the Sociological Institute of the University Zurich.

Sociological Institute of the University Zurich.

Heintz, Peter. 1972b. A Macrosociological eory of Societal Systems: With Special Reference to the

International System. Vol. I and II. Huber.

Heintz, Peter. 1972c. “Die Weltgesellschaft und ihre Bürger.” National-Zeitung am Wochenende,

July 8.

SUTER, Christian, ZILTENER, Patrick, and MEIER-DALLACH, Hans-Peter

Heintz, Peter. 1974. “Der heutige Strukturwandel der Weltgesellschaft in der Sicht der

Soziologie.” Universitas 29 (5).

Heintz, Peter. 1980. “e Study of World Society: Some Reasons Pro and Contra.” In Social

Science–For What? Festschrift for Johan Galtung, edited by Hans-Henrik Holm and Erik

Rudeng. Universitetsforlaget.

Heintz, Peter. 1982a. “A Sociological Code for the Description of World Society and its Change.”

International Social Science Journal 34 (1): 11–21.

Heintz, Peter. 1982b. Die Weltgesellschaft im Spiegel von Ereignissen. Rüegger.

Heintz, Peter, and Suzanne Heintz. 1973. e Future of Development. Huber.

Heintz, Peter, and Werner Obrecht. 1977. “Structure and Structural Change of World Society.”

International Review of Community Development 37 (18): 1–18.

Herrera, Amílcar O., Hugo D. Scolnick, Graciela Chichilnisky, Gilberto C. Gallopin, and Jorge

E. Hardoy. 1976. Catastrophe or New Society? A Latin American World Model. IDRC.

Hischier, Guido, René Levy, and Werner Obrecht, eds. 1980. Weltgesellschaft und Sozialstruktur:

Festschrift zum 60: Geburtstag von Peter Heintz. Rüegger.

Luhmann, Niklas. 1982. “e World Society as a Social System.” International Journal of General

Systems 8 (3): 131–38.

Meadows, Donella, Denis Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III. 1972. Limits

to Growth.: A Report of the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind. Universe

Books.

Meier-Dallach, Hans-Peter, and Jakob Juchler, eds. 2001. Postsocialist Transformation and Civil

Society in a Globalising World. Nova Science Publishers.

Meyer, John W. 1980. “e World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State.” In Studies of the

Modern World-System, edited by Alfred Bergesen. Academic Press.

Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. omas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. “World Society

and the Nation-state.” American Journal of Sociology 103:144–81.

Moore, Wilbert E. 1966. “Global Sociology: e World as Singular System.” American Journal of

Sociology 71 (8): 475–82.

Motto, Anna Lydia. 1955. “Seneca, Exponent of Humanitarianism.” e Classical Journal 50 (7):

315–18.

Müller, Georg P., and Volker Bornschier. 1988. Comparative World Data: A Statistical Handbook

for Social Science. Campus/Johns Hopkins University Press.

Schwarzenberger, Georg. 1951. Power Politics: A Study of International Society. 2nd ed. London

Institute of World Aﬀairs.

Stichweh, Rudolf. 2000. Die Weltgesellschaft: Soziologische Analysen. Suhrkamp.

Suter, Christian. 1992. Debt-Cycles in the World-Economy: Foreign Loans, Financial Crises, and

Debt Settlements, 1820–1990. Westview.

Suter, Christian. 1999. Gute und schlechte Regimes: Staat und Politik Lateinamerikas zwischen

globaler Oekonomie und nationaler Gesellschaft. Vervuert.

Suter, Christian. 2005. “Research on World Society and the Zurich School.” In e Future of

World Society, edited by M. Herkenrath, C. König, H. Scholtz, and T. Volken. Intelligent

book production.

Preface

Suter, Christian. 2012. “Debt Crises in the Modern World-System.” In Routledge Handbook

of World-Systems Analysis, edited by Salvatore J. Babones and Christopher Chase-Dunn.

Routledge.

Suter, Christian, Hanspeter Stamm, and Ulrich Pﬁster. 1990. “External Debt of the Periphery:

A Recurrent Problem of World Society.” In World Society Studies. Vol. 1, edited by Volker

Bornschier and Peter Lengyel. Campus.

Suter, Christian, Subramaniam Madheswaran, and B.P. Vani. 2020. e Middle Class in World

Society: Negotiations, Diversities and Lived Experiences. Routledge.

Suter, Christian, and Patrick Ziltener, eds. 2024. After Globalization: e Future of World Society

(World Society Studies). Lit.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. e Modern World System I. Cambridge University Press.

Wittmann, Veronika. 2014. Weltgesellschaft: Rekonstruktion eines wissenschaftlichen Diskurses.

Nomos.

Wobbe, eresa. 2000. Weltgesellschaft. Transcript Verlag.

Ziltener, Patrick, and Christian Suter, eds. 2022. African-Asian Relations: Past, Present, Future

(World Society Studies). Lit.

Introduction

Institutional Collaboration for

Multiple Border Crossings

Hélène DUCROS 1

is book is to be appreciated not only based on its content but also as a process

entailing multi-scalar collaborations. In 2020, the Council for European Studies (CES),

then homed at Columbia University, US, and the World Society Foundation (WSF),

headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, came together intending to sponsor a group of

scholars from the “Global South” to attend the Annual Conference of Europeanists in

Iceland. e goal of the partnership was to deliberately bring into European Studies

scholars who often lack the opportunity to share their research at major international

conferences because they reside outside Western Europe or North America. e program

was built on the premise that the diversiﬁcation of voices and the decentering of the

production of knowledge about Europe could only enhance our understanding of Europe

and the seeking of solutions to its problems. It was also expected that the scholars able to

partake in the conference would have the opportunity to craft or strengthen their own

networks with other Europeanists from all parts of Europe and the world. However,

because of pandemic-related health risks and limitations on traveling, the conference, like

many others around the world at the time, was postponed for an indeterminate duration.

Rather than stalling the program, this impediment led us to reinvent the project and

transform it into a year-long digital writing workshop, using Zoom to come together

“in person.” Under the leadership of Nicole Shea, then Executive Director of CES, and

Christian Suter, President of the WSF since 2008, this virtualization permitted even those

scholars who would not have been able to come to the conference because of timing or

distance—in spite of funding from WSF being granted—to fully participate, thereby

expanding the anticipated geographical reach of the program.

Model for Institutional Cooperation and Individual Collaboration

e WSF-CES Writing Lab was thus born to virtually gather fellowship recipients

from the Global South—and ultimately also from those countries within Europe that have

been marginalized in the ﬁeld of European Studies—to participate in a joint publication

project. It was envisioned that scholars selected for the program would work together on

 Hélène Ducros, Xavier University of Louisiana, New Orleans, LA, USA, helene@alumni.unc.edu.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p19-24

DUCROS, Hélène

an edited collection to be published as a book under the academic and editorial guidance

of Drs. Nicole Shea and Hélène Ducros. Hundreds of applications were reviewed, and

only a small group of researchers were retained, as their respective proposals for chapters

seemed promising and represented an array of world regions.

Since we understood early on that an edited volume built around people rather

than topics would be diﬃcult to render coherent, the group worked in sub-groups

by general aﬃnities, whether coming from the humanities or social sciences, to create

thematic convergences. erefore, beyond the publication output and the template for

successful institutional cooperation it oﬀers, the CES-WSF Writing Lab is conceptualized

as a collective knowledge production process. It is designed as a participatory space for

crafting lasting bridges not only across disciplines but also across geographies and scholarly

traditions that rarely intersect for reasons of distance and funding, as well as because of

established exclusionary patterns and general inward-thinking in Western academia. As

a result, the writing lab contributes to enhancing inclusiveness in European Studies and

developing cross-continental collaborative practices in the ﬁeld. As such, it expands the

scope of the discipline, supporting the diﬀusion of research conducted by scholars at

higher education institutions located outside Western Europe and North America and

highlighting Europeanists who generate knowledge about Europe from without the

Global North, in a reversal of established patterns of scholarly production.

“Global South” and Decentering

e ﬁrst conundrum we met was how to deﬁne our purpose and scope. Although

we used the term “Global South” in our call for proposals, we were fully aware of its

drawback and paradoxical connotation for a project that seeks to precisely do away with

the Euro-centric organization of knowledge. It also became clear to us that some of the

scholars we were looking to include did not actually recognize themselves as being part of

this “Global South” and, vice-versa, that some scholars we had not anticipated including

attached themselves to the concept. e debate about how to name the non-Western

world is not one in which we sought to directly engage, leaving it instead to the selected

scholars to tackle in their discussions and writing if they wished.

In the 1950s, Alfred Sauvy (1952) used the term of “ird World” based on the

idea of the French “ird Estate,” describing a population with aspirations but no

power—“this ird World, ignored, exploited, despised like the ird Estate, also wants

to be something … Like the ird Estate, the third world has nothing and wants to

be something”—and demanding a reaction from the European political class. Replaced

later by a language roped into linear and Western-centric theories of development,

the terminology of “development and underdevelopment” came about. Deriving

from this social construction, the categorization of countries according to their level

of “development,” from underdeveloped to developed, emerged, further vehiculating

processes of inequality that reinforced Western values and practices. Today, these terms

have mostly been replaced, for example in the language used by international organizations,

Introduction

by strictly economic rankings from “high income” to “low income” countries, with

the consequence that these categories leave out many indicators, failing to capture key

dimensions of human lives. Also to be noted is that the notion of ird World has often

stuck in the linguistic habits of those very people initially represented under the term,

who might use it more readily than “Global South,” as we noticed in discussions with

the writing lab’s fellows. Some prominent scholars—among others, Patrick Bond—have

further pointed to the imperfection of the “Global South” semantics and favored the

term empire or periphery to designate the non-Western world, inscribing it in a historical

power system. Others have reﬁned the notion of “capitalism’s peripheries,” which is

also recruited when explaining global power inequalities (Aalbers, Rolnik, and Krijnen

2020). Overall, the literature has highlighted that the term “Global South” “clearly fails

to capture the diversity—and extreme inequality—that exists within the Global South,

let alone the complexity of its links with the Global North” (Williams, Meth, and Willis

2009, 366) and increasingly with a “Global East.”

What this discussion markedly demonstrates is that terms such as “Global South” or

“the West” do not represent mere geographical areas but instead are intertwined with a

slew of historical, political, economic, social, and spatial conditions. e terms themselves,

whether “ird World,” “developed/underdeveloped/developing,” or “Global South” are

situated within a speciﬁc approach to spatial and economic history, according to which

the world has been imagined as constituted of diﬀerent spheres based on particular values

and ethos of modernity and democracy. In their “southern critique,” Mary Lawhon and

Yaﬀa Truelove (2020) diﬀerentiate between the South as a region and as a metaphor,

while Emma Mawdsley, Elsje Fourie, and Wiebe Nauta (2019) investigate South-South

relations in Where is the South? away from the nation-state, using instead an intersectional

transversal perspective in analyzing state relations, all the while emphasizing the need

to dislodge a static mode of thinking about scale. is idea has also been taken up by

others promoting a multi-scalar approach and eﬀort to decolonize postcolonial thinking,

considering “ethnocentrism and sociocentrism as transideological and multiscalar

phenomena” (Lopes de Souzas 2019).

Our call for proposals explicitly targeting “Global South” researchers, we were

somewhat surprised to receive a good number of applications from colleagues in eastern

Europe or the peripheries of Europe, which made us question our conceptualization of

geographic inclusion. e fact is that scholars from these areas of the world seemed to

perceive themselves as being part of a “Global South” by elimination, simply because they

did not think of themselves as belonging to the “Global North,” from which they found

themselves excluded, as the simplistic North-South binary vision of the world has carved

no space for them. Consequently, we expanded our program range to indeed include

those projects emanating from what has been coined the “Global East.” is “black hole”

comprises “all those societies that fall somewhere between North and South – too rich

to be in the South, too poor to be in the North” and “encompasses those societies that

took part in what was the most momentous global experiment of the twentieth century:

to create communism” (Müller 2018, 1). Hence, countries of Eastern and Central

Europe oﬀer a unique liminal context to study visions of Europe from what I would

DUCROS, Hélène

call a European “internal outside” or an “excluded inside”—or at least discounted in

many ways. Like others before, we moved beyond geographic descriptors to envisage

these internal peripheries in terms of new epistemologies of marginality, rather than

mere location. us, we extended invitations to scholars from eastern Europe to join the

writing lab, based on the understanding that the “Global East” ﬁlls the void left by the

all too simple Global South-Global North dichotomy and provides an additional bridge.

e discussion about what best terms are to be used to encompass and critique the

unevenness in power relations and economic capacity across the world is not new. And

we do not claim to bring here convincing answers in this debate. However, through our

project, we have attempted to focus on enhancing inclusion where exclusion has been

the norm in order to remedy some of the defects of the world order in the production

of knowledge about Europe, however this world order is labeled. We also adopted the

idea that to the “southern turn” in social science a necessary “eastern turn” should be

embraced in Europe, as some scholars have invoked it, past economic debates and towards

increasingly cultural and social concerns. For example, Oren Yiftachel, questioning

European universalisms, has proposed that more emphasis be given to a “southeastern

perspective,” an important shift that was the topic of an event held at University College

London in 2019, “eoriSE: debating the southeastern turn in urban theories,” where

presenters argued that both the “‘southern’ and ‘eastern’ perspectives are crucial to

challenge dominant paradigms, theories, and epistemologies that sustain global power

structures of knowledge production.”

The Writing Process

e Digital Writing Lab consisted in regular meetings where writing conventions

were discussed and practiced in the elaboration of chapters for the present book. Along

the way, we found that diﬀerences in writing (and researching) cultures could become

a hurdle in the production of standard book chapters. Our challenge, as editors, was

to preserve those voices we valued and wanted to hear more of in the discipline while

abiding by the expectations of global academic presses. For this reason, we could not

retain all the chapters that were submitted to us through the writing lab, but we hope that

these scholars nonetheless beneﬁtted from participating in the fellowship and that they

ultimately found a ﬁtting outlet for their work.

e seven chapters that comprise the book have been divided into three parts:

“Constructing Europe from its Margins,” “e European Union: Impact and

Understanding Seen from its Outside and Periphery,” and “Policy Reach: Focus on

Health and Comparative Methods.” Each part starts with a short text that was written

collaboratively by the authors whose chapters appear in that section of the book. is

exercise in collaborative writing was one more way to encourage scholars who might

be located on each side of the world to work together at producing a text and to make

explicit the linkages that exist between their respective research ﬁelds, in spite of linguistic

Introduction

diﬀerences and professional hierarchies (some fellows were full professors, while others

were PhD candidates).

Part I introduces Filiz Anlam (Turkey) and Oksana Ermolaeva (Russia, currently

a scholar-at-risk outside Russia) as they delve into diﬀerent ways in which the idea of

Europe has been constructed from the margins of Europe. While Filiz focuses on how

the Turkish media has created diﬀerent versions of Europe through images and texts,

Ermolaeva addresses how the very contours of Europe were locally negotiated on the

ground historically at the border between Russia and Karelia, a northern region at the

intersection of Russia, Finland, and Sweden. In the harsh environment of the northern

frontier, borders in and out of an ill-deﬁned “Europe” were in fact demarcated by nature,

which dominated border control operations and the organization of a two-way ﬂow of

people and goods.

In Part II, “e European Union: Impact and Understanding Seen from its Outside

and Periphery,” Edina Paleviq (Montenegro), Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar (Brazil), and Mare

Ushkovska (Macedonia) zoom in on the European Union and how the shaping it has

eﬀected on diﬀerent societies and political systems has been received. Paleviq’s chapter

on the Europeanization of Montenegro illuminates how the EU’s strict rules have shaped

accession to the Union in that country and the actors involved, while Ushkovska focuses

on the Visegrad countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary—to

explain the social sources of EU-skepticism there, beyond the shortcut view that only

political populism is to blame. Aguilar looks at EU military operations historically,

creating a classiﬁcation to explain how he sees the EU adapting to security uncertainties

across the world.

Finally, in Part III, Qun Cui and Lisheng Dong (with Tom Christensen) and Jia

Xu and Weidong Dai turn to solution-seeking through policy work and comparative

methods. “Policy Reach: Focus on Health and Comparative Methods” oﬀers two chapters

comparing speciﬁc dimensions of health policy reform in China and two countries in

Western Europe. e focus on health came naturally, as the writing lab went on at the

height of the COVID-19 pandemic. e comparison with China was also prompted

by the global public health context, at a time when the world was looking at the ways

in which China was trying to curb the coronavirus rapid contagion rate. Qun Cui

and Lisheng Dong (in collaboration with Tom Christensen from Norway) compared

healthcare reforms in China and Norway to highlight how some features of integrated care

are facilitated or hindered by the social, economic, or political context. e last chapter,

by Jia Xu and Weidong Dai, both from China, compares the relationship between the

risk of falling into poverty and access to healthcare in Germany and China, with a focus

on the COVID-19 pandemic response. Here too, the authors show that vastly diﬀerent

societies may yield very diﬀerent prospects and health outcomes for patients but also that

they may converge in unexpected ways that it can be reciprocally useful to study.

While a wide array of topics are tied together in this book, it is most important to

us to dwell on the context of production, the fellows involved, the collaborative process,

and the purpose of the project by which this book came about. We remain committed

DUCROS, Hélène

to injecting European Studies with voices seldom heard and to facilitate the sharing of

knowledge produced from less-represented regions and intellectual traditions in the ﬁeld.

e enhanced visibility of scholars from the so-called “Global South,” “Global East,” or

generally “non Western-Europe or North America” seems key to us for the discipline to

advance and to remain sensible and relevant. It is this critical engagement from Europe’s

outsides or margins—Europe’s “beyond”—that can propel Europe into solving its many

problems in the twenty-ﬁrst century.

Acknowledgement: We are grateful to the many reviewers who helped us improve

this volume along the way. Special thanks to Catherine Guisan for her invaluable advice.

References

Aalbers, Manuel B., Raquel Rolnik, and Marieke Krijnen. 2020. “e Financialization of

Housing in Capitalism’s Peripheries,” Housing Policy Debate, 30(4): 481-485, DOI:

10.1080/10511482.2020.1783812.

Lawhon, Mary, and Yaﬀa Truelove. 2020. “Disambiguating the southern urban critique:

Propositions, pathways and possibilities for a more global urban studies.” Urban Studies,

57(1):3-20. https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098019829412.

Lopes de Souzas, Marcela. 2019. “Decolonising postcolonial thinking: Ethnocentrism and

sociocentrism as transideological and multiscalar phenomena.” ACME: An International

Journal for Critical Geographies, 18(1):1–24.

Mawdsley, Emma, Elsje Fourie, and Wiebe Nauta, eds. 2019. “Where is the South? Global,

postcolonial and intersectional perspectives.” In Researching South-South Development

Cooperation: e Politics of Knowledge Production. London: Routledge. https://www.

academia.edu/44875780/Where_is_the_South_Global_postcolonial_and_intersectional_

perspectives?source=swp_share.

Müller, Martin. 2018. “In Search of the Global East: inking between North and South.”

Geopolitics 25 (3): 734–55. doi:10.1080/14650045.2018.1477757.

Sauvy, Alfred. 1952. “Trois mondes, une planète.” L’Observateur, August 14, nº 118:14.

Yiftachel, Oren, Faranak Miraftab, Catalina Ortiz, and Chandrima Mukhopadhyay. 2019.

“eoriSE: debating the southeastern turn in urban theories.” https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/

development/events/2023/nov/theorise-debating-southeastern-turn-urban-theories-0.

Williams, Glyn, Paula Meth, and Katie Willis. 2009. Geographies of Developing Areas: e Global

South in a Changing World, London: Routledge.

PART I

Constructing Europe from its

Margins

Introduction

Anlam FILIZ 1 and Oksana ERMOLAEVA 2

Echoing historical interpretations that reveal how human mobility entails gradual

transition from “Europeanness” to non-European worlds, the chapters in Part I analyze

shifting symbolic constructions of “Europe” and their imprints on human materiality

and landscapes. Anlam Filiz and Oksana Ermolaeva position themselves at opposing

geographic standpoints, at the margins of Europe’s Southern and Northern borders, thus

contributing to the building of multiple and contested conceptualizations of European

liminal, transitory spaces.

Part I starts with an analysis of understudied historical processes of border-making

in Northern Eurasia. Focusing on persistent factors of state-building inherited from the

Russian Empire by the Soviet Union, but also on regional geography, Oksana Ermolaeva’s

chapter uptakes an environmental historical approach to reconstruct the evolution of the

Russian/Soviet imperial border in the Northern European region of Karelia. From an

early-modern abstract entity deﬁned by treaties to a heavily militarized barbed-wire fence

that eliminated most possibilities of movement for people and commodities, the border

is shown to embody the political and ideological divide between “East” and “West.” From

this historical account of border crossing in the northern regions, the analysis shifts to the

European Union’s southeastern borders in the contemporary era. Analyzing how a certain

image of Europe has been shaped from a place that has historically been excluded from

the European project, Anlam Filiz draws from the Turkish written press to demonstrate

that an agreement between Turkey and the European Union regarding the refugee ﬂow to

European countries from Turkey has been a major conduit for emerging imaginations of

Europe grounded in the North-South divide.

In support of the main theme of the book, these two chapters decenter Europe by

revealing an array of processes by which diﬀerent notions of Europe have been deﬁned

through human mobility and circulated in and out of Europe. Methodologically,

Ermolaeva’s and Filiz’s respective chapters are further tied as they rely on non-European

primary sources: rare administrative archival records and accounts by eighteenth,

nineteenth, and early twentieth century oﬃcials, as well as contemporary media articles.

 Anlam Filiz, Turkish-German University, Istanbul, Turkey, anlamﬁliz@gmail.com.

 Oksana Ermolaeva, Complutence University of Madrid, Spain, ksana27@yahoo.com.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p27-28

FILIZ, Anlam and ERMOLAEVA, Oksana

Where the two chapters contrast is through the time-periods they address, together

providing a temporal depth to an understanding of the continuities and ruptures between

past and present in the emergence of imaginings of Europe and “Europeanness.”

1 e Environment in (B)order-

Making and Border Crossing

in Russian Karelia from the

Eighteenth to Early Twentieth

Century

Oksana ERMOLAEVA1

Abstract: For some time before the COVID-19 pandemic, borders seemed to lose importance,

although it was still clear that the world remained highly bordered. In Europe, the reestablishment

of strict border controls in response to the pandemic resulted in increased pressures on the

environment, the resurgence of global neo-imperialism, and stricter governance of energy resources.

e object of this chapter is to explore the historic entanglement between the environment and

international border-making by examining the strategies used to bring order to these frontier

zones—a process I call “(b)order-making.” e chapter is based on research on Karelia, a North-

Western borderland between the European Union and Russia. Of current geopolitical signiﬁcance

to Finland, Sweden, and Russia, Karelia has constituted a complex space where geopolitical

considerations have prevailed over environmental concerns.

At the Crossroad of a Challenging Physical Geography and

Geopolitical Context

As the longest national frontier in the world, the Russian border extends through a

great variety of environmental and climatic zones, from the Arctic tundra to forests and

steppes. It separates Russia from twelve countries, traversing some 20,000 kilometers

across eight time zones (Werth 2021, 623-44) with altitudes ranging from below sea

level to heights of over 5,000 meters. In this physical context, Karelia has long been a

watershed between the East and European West, as it has also constituted one of the

oldest religious and cultural divides on the Eurasian continent. Karelia’s ﬁrst international

demarcation originates in the 1323 Noteborg Treaty between the Catholic kingdom of

Sweden and the Orthodox principality of Novgorod. Until 1809, Karelia remained a

contested region in the many Russo-Swedish wars, and its external border with Finland is

currently the longest Russian border with the EU: 798 kilometers.

Based on the most salient elements of its landscape, Karelia is often called a “land of

lakes, forests, and marshes” (Entsiklopedicheskyi slovar Brockhausa I Efrona 1899, 24).

 Oksana Ermolaeva, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain, ksana27@yahoo.com.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p29-45

ERMOLAEVA, Oksana

Indeed, on most of its territory, the Karelian Republic oﬀers an undulating plain showing

pronounced marks of glacier activity, and the land’s wavy surface reveals traces of ancient

mountains. More than 49 percent of the area is still wooded (the main tree species being

pines and ﬁr), and 23 percent of its surface is covered with water: over 60,000 lakes, 27,000

rivers, and approximately 6,500 swamps. Karelia’s climate is temperate continental with

some maritime features. Temperatures and precipitations respectively average –8.3°C and

48mm in January and 13.3°C and –80mm in July (Federation Council of the Federal

Assembly of the Russian Federation). roughout its history, Karelia has been the site

of extensive population movements—some voluntary and temporary, others coerced

and permanent—with legal and illegal trade becoming a permanent feature of cross-

border contacts. Moreover, cultural anthropologists and historians have considered that

the region has played an important role in the process of Finnish identity-building (Paasi

1996, 6-23).

In past centuries, multiple obstacles arose in the successive attempts at delimiting

a clear and stable international border for Karelia. In examining diﬀerent dimensions

of border-making in the region, this study ﬁrst focuses on the environment to account

for the demanding physical and climatic features of the region, which had an eﬀect on

mapping the early modern border and controlling it during later periods. Second, the

chapter deﬁnes environmental entanglements in the Russian imperial attempts to control

transborder traﬃcking from the eighteenth to early twentieth century and explains the

active involvement of local community networks in using the borderline to ﬁt their needs.

ird, this research analyzes the changes and continuities in border control strategies and

illegal cross-border encounters in the region caused by the shift from the Russian Empire

to the Soviet Empire, focusing in particular on the role of nature.

Comparing the role of the environment in (b)order-making projects and border-

crossing patterns in the Karelian territory in imperial and Soviet Russia adds to the

scholarship in “environmentally oriented” Russian/Soviet border studies. In the last

two decades, international scholars have inclined toward a more nuanced treatment of

imperial legacies in the Soviet context, focusing on “persistent factors,” which include

imperial ideas and myths, as well as population management techniques, which the

Bolsheviks inherited from the Russian Empire upon their accession to power in 1917

(Lieven 2000; Hirsch 2005; Lohr 2012; Rieber 2015). e Russian Empire also left

behind lengthy porous frontiers, relative economic backwardness, and cultural alienation

in peripheral areas, the latter ﬁnding themselves having more in common with the states

neighboring them than with the imperial center (Rieber 2015). us, this chapter builds

on this history to contextualize some of these ﬁndings and approaches within the speciﬁc

environmental and cultural contours of the Karelian borderland.

Beyond the scope of previous studies devoted to the North-Western Russian imperial/

early Soviet borders, the chapter also seeks to expand research on the diplomatic intricacies

of border demarcations (Rupasov and Chistikov 2007), border operations, and cross-

border traﬃcking of peoples and goods (Katajala 2012; Selin 2016), as well as on the

changing conceptualizations of the early modern border between Russia and Sweden

(Kokkonen 2011, 66-71; Tolstikov 2015, 31-55; Katajala 2017, 177-190) and cross-

e Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in

Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century

cultural transborder inﬂuences during imperial/Soviet times (Vihavainen et al. 1999;

Ilukha 2012; Vitukhnovskaya 2006, 2021). Scholarly pursuits have provided useful

insights into the northwestern borders within the framework of the Barents region’s

colonization (Olsson 2016), the circumpolar interstate encounters and rivalry over

borders and indigenous transborder communities (Zaikov and Nilesen 2012), and the

rival imperial/national/political projects targeting the populations in the northwestern

borderlands (Vituhnovskaya 2006, 2021). However, existing works on the economy of

border control in Karelia have generally overlooked long-term impacts of the natural

landscape in (b)order-making and border control (Bazegsky 1998; Agamirzoev 2012;

Chernyakova and Chernyakov 2016). us, the current study diﬀers from the existing

scholarship because it introduces the environmental dimension and incorporates it as a

main factor of analysis.

Exploring Historical Transborder Practices Through the Archives

is study draws on a wide array of published and unpublished sources—primarily

from the National Archives of Karelia—including a variety of pre-revolutionary collections

from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century. Materials

from the Olonets viceroyalty board (1784-1796), Olonets gubernia administration

(1801-1922), the city of Padansk Chancellory (1776-1779), and the Archangelsk

customs administration illustrate changing economic border regimes and the role of

the environment in illegal cross-border transactions. To explore border controls and

transborder practices during the early Soviet period (1920s), this research makes extensive

use of the following:

• correspondence between the GPU AKSSR (Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie

Avtonomnoi Karelskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki [State Political

Administration of the Autonomous Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic]) and

Karelian customs institutions;

• reports on the “situation with the contraband,” composed both by the GPU and

customs administrators; and

• contraband legal cases ﬁled during the 1920s against the local borderland

peasantry, stored in the archives of the Karelian District Customs Inspection

Department.

Out of this large volume of documents, records of legal actions against the local

population in particular have never before been analyzed. Additionally, this study relies

on materials from the manuscripts collection of the Scientiﬁc Historical Archive (at the

St-Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and the Russian

State Archives of Economics.

ERMOLAEVA, Oksana

An Early Modern Border: A Civilizational Divide in a Contact Space

In Karelia—and in the Russian Northwest in general—natural borders emerging

out of the local landscape played an important role in the early formation of contested

external and internal administrative frontiers. Located along the dividing line between

the Atlantic and Arctic oceans, borders in that region were largely inﬂuenced by the split

of a vast watershed into several water basins that laid the ground for some of Karelia’s

administrative units (Granitsy i kontaktnye zony 2008). Regarding the international

frontiers in the region, the ﬁrst oﬃcial border between Russia and Sweden was demarcated

as a result of the Orekhovetskii (Noteborg) peace treaty in 1323. is treaty divided ethnic

Karelians between, on one side the Western Karelians, who today constitute a regional

and cultural subgroup of ethnic Finns, and on the other side the Eastern Karelians, who

nowadays comprise the population of the Karelia and Tver regions (Utkin 2003). For

centuries, inaccuracies in border demarcation served as a pretext for both Russian and

Swedish territorial claims, border violations, and interstate violence, which subsisted even

after peace treaties were signed.

In 1595, a new treaty established the boundaries of villages on both the Swedish and

Russian sides according to ﬁshing water lines. Following the later Treaty of Stolbovo (1617),

the Russo-Swedish border was set in reference to taxation (based on which villages paid

taxes to Korela/Kexholm, which belonged to Sweden, and which villages paid taxes to the

Olonets region, which belonged to Russia). However, adjustments were made after this

treaty. Indeed, only then did a long “border line”—a border in the modern sense—arose.

Several hundred kilometers of border were thus cut through the forests in the early 1620s.

e new border spread from the Gulf of Finland to the shore of Lake Ladoga, at the latitude

of modern day North Karelia. is border was physically maintained by “borderland

peasants” on both sides (Kokkonen 2011, 68). Maintenance consisted in the removal of

tree growth from the clearing and was placed under the supervision of Swedish and Russian

border commissars throughout the 1600s. In these border zones, the local peasantry had to

control cross-border traﬃc, and local municipalities were allowed to settle border conﬂicts

independently (Kokkonen 2011, 67). A number of successive treaties would ensue to

further settle the border. For example, under the Treaty of Uusikaupunki (Swed. Nystad),

concluded in 1721, the border was drawn straighter and more linear in shape, as it was

made to simply cut through villages, individual farms, parishes, and local entities, without

consideration for local or regional conditions (Kokkonen 2011, 69). Later on, additional

treaties (in 1809 and 1917) reinstituted the border as it had existed under the 1617 treaty.

In spite of these various treaties, for centuries, the Russo-Swedish border, including

its Karelian strip, remained barely marked in the landscape. Border markers and border

posts were used to show the oﬃcial boundary as it had been ratiﬁed not only through

the treaties, but also via certain religious rites. No matter the kind of marking, the border

always allowed the free passage of people and goods in both directions (Kokkonen 2011,

67; Katajala 2017, 188). For example, according to the 1595 agreement, the eastern

border was marked only at its most signiﬁcant points, generally within reach of major

thoroughfares, so as to make it quite clear to passersby where the border ran in the district

e Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in

Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century

and what usufructuary rights existed there. Most of the markers consisted of natural

features that stood out in the landscape, such as rock faces, large boulders, bodies of water

(rivers, lakes, springs, or pools), watershed areas, and sometimes even peatlands. All these

were highly suitable as border markers, as they could not be interfered with by human

action (i.e., moved or destroyed) (Kokkonen 2011, 67).

In 1617, records account for possibly two major border markers separating the

Swedish from the Russian territory. e ﬁrst one was the Varashev’s Stone (Variskivi),

which rose from the waters of Ladoga Lake near the village of Manssila. However, when

the border was redrawn in 1721, that marker lost signiﬁcance (Sudakov 2003). e

second marker, which stood on an old trade route along the beach of Ladoga Lake in

the village of Virtelä, would be seriously damaged later in the eighteenth century. It was

not before the nineteenth century that new border markers (pogranichnye stolby) were

installed, set at regular intervals in attempts to make the border distinctly visible in the

boreal cover. Despite periodic attempts to mark the administrative border in the course

of the nineteenth century, by the beginning of the twentieth century most sections of the

border had become invisible again to local residents, with trees and bushes growing over

them. Archival sources from the late 1920s recount massive unauthorized transborder

passages by peasants across the “fence” (izgorod) that had been installed near some parts of

the Soviet-Finnish border in Karelia earlier in the nineteenth century (NARK. F. P-378.

Op. 4. D. 25/568. P. 220).

Scholars working on the early modern history of this Northern border have described

it as a “sieve-like frontier.” Indeed, starting in the thirteenth century, the Karelians were

actively involved in trading with the West, through the water routes of Ladoga Lake,

as well as from the Eastern shore of the Gulf of Bothnia. By the seventeenth century,

petty trade (raznosnaya torgovlya) with Finland provided a major source of income for

the majority of borderland populations in Russian Karelia (Katajala 2007). However,

populations on each side of the border faced diﬀerent material conditions—with people

on the Finnish side faring much better economically—which resulted in a rather one-

way (from Russia to Finland) transborder ﬂow of peddlers. In Swedish Finland, these

transient characters sold a typical assortment of box trade. Residents of the Kem District

(Northern Karelia), for example, imported tobacco, meat, and hemp and exported fox,

beaver and ermine furs, silver, tea, and coﬀee (Chernyakova and Chernyakov 2016). e

enormous volume of cross-border trade had tremendous importance in local life, so much

so that the head of the Olonets viceroyalty, Gavrila Derzhavin, became concerned with

estimating its scale as early as 1860 (Derzhavin 1860).

Seasonality and Imperial Control from the Late 1700s to the Early

Twentieth Century

e ﬁrst border guards and customs posts along the Russo-Swedish border in Karelia

were established in the eighteenth century, ﬁrst on the Swedish side (in 1723) and then

on the Russian side, reﬂecting the spirit of eighteenth century mercantilist economic

policies. e ﬁrst experiment with the systematic presence of a military guard occurred

ERMOLAEVA, Oksana

with the closing of Sweden’s eastern border by the Swedish government in 1770–1772,

which led to the installation of a regular guard post, as part of the so-called “Plague

Chain,” during the plague pandemics in Russia. It was subsequently removed in 1772,

when information reached Sweden from St. Petersburg that the plague was no longer

considered a threat in Russia (Kokkonen 2011, 70). In 1782, Catherine the Great

addressed an order to the governors-general in borderland regions “On the establishment

of a chain of customs border posts and guards” to eliminate the clandestine smuggling

of goods (Semyonov 1859, 63). After that date, the administration of Russian Karelia—

Arkhangelsk and Olonets Governor-General Timofei Tutolmin―launched a project to

create customs posts along the entire Russo-Swedish border strip in Karelia. is line

extended for 500 verst (about 550 km) from the Swedish Lapland border to the village

of Porosozero, located at the intersection of the Viborg and St. Petersburg provinces.

Controlling the border in the context of a diﬃcult terrain became a challenge for imperial

authorities, because it required controlling passages not only on land but also on multiple

water paths.

e area adjacent to the border on the Russian side included 40 lakes, while on the

Finnish side this number reached 47, with uncountable rivers cutting across the border.

ese lakes and rivers, heavily packed with large stones, oﬀered dangerous but navigable

ways for the local peasantry to get to and across the border (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D.

1/12). Semen Annenkov, an active member of the statistical committee of the Karelian

Olonets province in 1886, wrote that

e landscape of this border space is generally mountainous, covered with forests

and dotted with wetlands, lakes, and swamps, endowing this country with a harsh,

gloomy character. It is impossible to describe all transborder routes, as in winter

their directions through frozen marshes and lakes depend entirely on the decisions

of the travelers, who become unaccountable (Annenkov 1886).

Based on observations made in both summer and mid-winter during two consecutive

border inspection expeditions (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D. 1/12), summary reports

identiﬁed that the main challenge in controlling the border was the blocking of local

land trails and water routes leading to Sweden. Solutions were proposed (NARK. F. 2.

Op. 61. D 1/12. P. 16). For example, after his 1782 summer expedition, Pyotr Yablonsky,

an Assistant Customs Director from St. Petersburg (Unter-Zollner), recommended the

installation of an elaborate chain of 26 customs outposts (tamozhennye zastavy), which

would be located at a discrete distance from the border. However, his proposal did not

include the provision of convenient tracks leading to these border posts (NARK. F. 2.

Op. 61. D 1/12. P. 40a). Later, in 1785, when deciding on the location of the customs

chain between the “Swedish Kingdom and Russian Karelian Guberniya,” the Olonets

viceroyalty board inclined towards a much more expedient “mid-winter” project, which

had been proposed by the Olonets zemstvo Court Assessor Major Ivan Skornyakov after

his own expedition. His project envisioned the installation of controls at the border itself.

As a result of various reports, the customs chain that was implemented in 1785-1786

e Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in

Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century

consisted of one customs station, two customs outposts (tamozhennye zastavy), and eleven

border outposts (strazhi) (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D 1/12. P. 39). Customs outposts were

border stations that operated permanently. ey were complemented by smaller but more

numerous border outposts (strazhi, or storozhevye zastavy) with staﬀ usually ranging from

two to four. When equipped with horses, these outposts were sometimes called verkhovye

strazhi. However, in Karelia, it was more common to use boats, although some stations

located in marshy areas operated only in winter when the water was frozen and boats were

thus not in use (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D 1/12. L. 29-39).

e principle of expediency, kazennyi interes, became a major factor not only in the

customs planning and installation, but also in providing customs chain outﬁtted with

staﬀ and vessels. e only way for customs oﬃcer to control waterways was to inspect

them by boats, which the peasantry also used widely for illegal border crossings. In

response to recommendations about avoiding “unnecessary expenses,” the Viceroyalty

Board refused to block several popular waterways that led directly to the border and

were actively used by local people for unauthorized crossings (NARK, F. 2. Op. 61, D.

1/12. P. 38). While boats used at the outposts were generally few and old, in Northern

Karelia, rowers were recruited among the local peasantry, providing them with an

income, which alleviated the necessity for the residents of these settlements to engage

in illegal cross-bordering for business.

Long before the customs chain was installed, people resisted border crossing regulations

in the area. As early as the 1770s, an extremely remote and under-staﬀed isolated customs

station was located 200 verst from the border, near the village of Yushkozero of Panozero

pogost (church yard), in the Olonets viceroyalty of Northern Karelia. Unable to force

peasants to abide by the new regulations and to pay crossing fees, the customs guards

robbed and beat the people they caught (NARK. F. 652. Op. 3. D. 5). A Customs Head

Manager responded to multiple complaints from peasants about administrative abuses

by noting that

“With the spaces along local borders being uncovered by the outposts of this

customs, in summer time they travel through the lakes, marshes, and rivers, and

their route is even easier in winter: they manage to pass through large masses of

snow and almost unpassable forests, so in every location of this border strip, the

peasants have ample places to hide from us” (NARK. F. 652. Op. 3. D. 2/23.

L. 28).

Frequent “border regime” issues broke out into open strife. For example, people who

reported to authorities that their neighbors were engaged in contraband had their houses

looted or burned (Kapusta 2000, 46). In winter 1776, to address the problem of customs

ineﬀectiveness, a corporal who was dispatched with three soldiers to inspect peasant

traders travelling from Novgorod to Archangelsk reported that peasants “turned into the

forest through their secret paths three verst before the Yushkozero, and our repetitive

eﬀorts to catch them from the forestry ambushes failed” (NARK. F. 652. Op. 3. D. 5).

ERMOLAEVA, Oksana

After the customs chain installation, the local peasantry continued to cross the border

en masse. In the summer, these peasants travelled through hidden forest pathways and

marshes, or they skillfully maneuvered their small wooden boats through river stones.

During the winter, when lakes and rivers froze, it was impossible to control the countless

convenient transborder routes people used by carts or simple skies (snegostupi) (Arkhiv

SpbIIRAN. Coll. 15. D. 285. L. 103). erefore, seasonality remained a crucial factor

in cross-border encounters. Sometimes, “watery” or “icy” landscapes not only provided

varying transborder aquatic routes but also divided the populations across neighboring

provinces. For example, the famous Egyptinkorpi swamp (stretching from the Kuopio

Province in Finland deep into Russian Karelia) could not be navigated during the summer

months, temporarily shutting down a popular transborder connection (Annenkov 1886).

Some areas adjacent to the border became fully unpassable oﬀ-season, temporarily erasing

transborder paths and in eﬀect “shutting” down the border (NARK. F. P - 689. Op. 1.

D. 8/81. P. 123).

Paradoxically, some villages located further away from the border, such as Svinaya

Gora, were important sites for customs or border guard outposts in one unrealized border

project, based on mid-summer border inspection (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D 1/12. P. 40).

Until the end of the 1920s, these outposts remained major “contraband settlements”

(NARK. F. P-382. Op. 1. D. 21/466). Beginning at the end of the eighteenth century and

into the nineteenth century, the provincial administration would attempt to strengthen

the sections of the Russian-Swedish border that were unprotected, but local budget

constraints unavoidably hampered these eﬀorts (NARK, F. 396, Op. 1. D. 29. Pp. 32-

58). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a high-ranking prosecutor in the Olonets

Governorate administration became greatly concerned with the inability to control heavy

contraband traﬃc and proposed to position a strategic chain of border outposts, so “the

smugglers would only have few daylight hours to cross the border through overgrown

trails and marshlands.” However, his plan was never approved by the governorate for

implementation, most probably because it was too costly (Arkhiv SPbIIRAN. Collection

115. D. 285. P. 208).

e 1809 Friedrichsham Peace Treaty, concluding the Finnish War (1808-1809)

between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Russian Empire, added ceded eastern Swedish

provinces to the latter. To the Grand Duchy of Finland were also added the Russian

eighteenth century conquests of parts of Karelia and Savonia (also known as Old

Finland) in 1812, as Viborg County. is situation lasted until 1917 and transformed

the previous external border in Karelia into an administrative dividing line. Most

customs institutions were dismantled at that time (PSZ RI. Vol. XXX. № 22838. P.

1808). By the middle of the nineteenth century, only the Archangelsk administration’s

customs oﬃces still functioned in Northern (Belomorsk) Karelia (Agamirzoev 2003,

8), and their functions were actually strengthened in order to better detect and detain

revolutionaries, propagandists, and unreliable elements of all kinds after the Polish

uprising of 1830, which had signiﬁcantly raised imperial concerns over border security

in general (NARK. F. 589. Op. 1. D. 1/1; 1/ 2).

e Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in

Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century

Still, contradictory imperial regulations on transborder trade with the Grand

Duchy of Finland (1809-1917) remained in place, as customs and border outposts

were ineﬀective in handling an unimpeded ﬂow of peddlers from Eastern Karelia to

Finland who refused to obey the legal regulations of trade (korobeiniki) (NARK. F.

277. Op. 1. D. 30/23. P. 2-4). Legislations included a January 1824 order strictly

limiting border crossings to established border and customs outposts, as did an order

from June, 12, 1830, on trading at Finnish fairs. e latter order also banned trade

without permits. In reality, however, in Karelia, Finns welcomed peddlers, sometimes

even hiding them from the police in spite of the threat of court sentences and heavy

ﬁnes (Bazegsky 1998). Moreover, illegal inﬂows of Finnish goods increased signiﬁcantly

in winter, when rugged Karelian boreal forests and marshes froze (Agamirzoev 2019).

In 1898, Konstantin Djakonov, a manager at the Soroka customs outpost (zastava), in

his letters to the head of Archangelsk customs, complained that “the local police oﬃcers

do nothing, considering that this is a secondary issue and none of their concern. And

again, what can one constable (yruadnik) do in Karelia if all of Karelia uses Finnish

contraband?” (NARK. f. 277. Оp. 1. D. 30/23. P. 2-4).

“Mastering Nature” in Soviet Border-Making: Political Divides,

Imperial Legacies, and Northern Encounters

e shift from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union had a tremendous eﬀect on

how state borders were conceptualized and secured. Concerns over security in protecting

the socialist project from capitalist encirclement led to a number of radical changes in

the management of border controls. Before the revolution of 1917, the Division of the

Separate Border Guards Corps (Otdelnyi korpus pogranichnoi strazhi) of the Russian

Empire had come under the control of the Department of Customs Duties and Fees,

headed by the Ministry of Finance oﬃcials. is change of jurisdiction made border-

making the responsibility of an economic agency. However, at the very beginning of the

establishment of Soviet authority, Felix Dzerzhinsky, the Chairman of the All-Russian

Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), proclaimed that “the border is a political divide,

and a political body must protect it.” erefore, starting in 1920, the protection of the

Soviet border came under the governance of a Special Division of the Cheka, which was

renamed in September 1922 as the State Political Administration (GPU). At the same

time, the Border Guards of the USSR (Pogranichnye voiska SSSR) were placed under the

aegis of the NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Aﬀairs).

When Finland gained independence from Russia in 1917, its 1245.6 kilometer-long

border with Russian Karelia was conﬁrmed as a boundary between two sovereign states

(NARK. F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 6/ 27. P. 74). However, as with all other Soviet borders, the

turmoil of the civil war meant that the demarcation line was porous, almost unguarded,

and open to frequent violations. In the Finnish historiography, the conﬂict over the

territories of Eastern Karelia has been deﬁned as plagued with multiple “wars for kindred

peoples” (heimosodat), which were fought between 1918 and 1922. Inspired by Finnish

ERMOLAEVA, Oksana

nationalistic ideology, Finnish right-wing radicals and nationalist activists sought to unite

the Finno-Ugric peoples in Finland, Russia, and Estonia by expanding Finland’s borders

to the east. As a consequence of these military operations, a large part of the borderland

population of Northern Karelia ﬂed to Finland in attempts to save their lives amidst the

chaos and atrocities generated by the war. According to some estimates, out of the 12,479

Karelian refugees (karbezhentsy) who left Russian Karelia in 1921-1922, 11,239 went to

Finland (Repukhova 2015, 3243-3253), which amounted to six percent of the Russian

Karelian population in the 1920s. A total of 6,000 to 8,000 Karelians returned home, and

approximately 5,000 remained in Finland (Takala 2016, 137-138). e establishment of

the national Soviet republic (Karelian Labor Commune) in 1920 (later renamed as the

Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) as a neighbor of “bourgeois” Finland

opened a new page in the history of the embattled northern frontier.

Like in all their early initiatives that sought to control and transform the natural

environment, the Soviets lacked human and ﬁnancial resources when operating in the

Karelian region. In their descriptions of the geographical obstacles facing border control,

the Soviet GPU and customs administrators stressed the extreme length of the border

(1,320 km), prevailing harsh climatic conditions, and rugged terrain combining water,

marshes, and boreal forests (NARK. F. Р-690. Op. 1. D. 27. P. 78). ey noted that

by 1927, the border remained invisible, concealed under the cover of heavy forest

growth (NARK. F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. P. 74). e need for regular on-site inspections

was a challenge for border control mid- and high-ranking Soviet oﬃcials, who had to

innovate as a result. In the 1920s, the majority of customs and border guard outposts

were located in remote border villages. e border controllers complained that they

lacked the necessary transportation infrastructure. Moreover, winter inspections could

only occur by horseback on frozen rivers and lakes through a system of tract-country

and water communication ways (NARK. F. Р-544. Op. 2. D. 4/68. Р. 83). In 1922,

in spite of its length, the Karelian part of the Soviet-Finnish border featured only nine

customs outposts, each with a staﬀ of two to four oﬃcials, and a general customs oﬃce

in Petrozavodsk (ibid). e deployment logic of customs institutions along the Finnish

land border almost duplicated that of the imperial project, leaving long strips of the

border completely unguarded and ample space for unauthorized border crossings. us,

the switch to a new political administration overseeing the border initially did not change

much in practice. e shift was merely bureaucratic.

Soviet administrators tended to generally miscalculate the impact of the harsh climate

and problematic terrain in large-scale border policy. For example, the repatriation of

Karelian refugees after the 1923 amnesty disregarded local conditions in favor of Soviet

security concerns. Instead of implementing the initial plans of organizing the transfer of

refugees through the Beloostrov border crossing and customs (on the Karelian Isthmus),

Northern Karelian border crossing sites were used, since those were closer to the refugees’

former homelands. However, these border posts could not process large inﬂux of

repatriates and collapsed. In 1924, at a temporarily customs outpost (tampost) in Olanga,

groups of 30-40 refugees had to wait their turn for days in freezing cold without any

medical assistance. ese repatriations put a heavy physical and psychological strain not

e Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in

Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century

only on the refugees but also on the customs oﬃcers and border guards (NARK. F. P-380.

Op. 1. D. 1/1. P. 10-17).

roughout the 1920s, Soviet administrators continued to report that is was

completely impossible to control illegal border crossings and mass smuggling. Moreover,

these numerous hidden transborder paths through boreal forests and across waterways

were only known to local people and changed with the seasons (NARK. F. P-378,

Op. 4, D. 6. Р. 29. Р. 65). In 1927, according to GPU KASSR reports, all inhabitants

of borderland villages, including teenagers, were in one way or another engaged in

smuggling. Contraband circulated along the unprotected parts of the border, usually in

winter, transported by cart or sleigh (NARK. F. P- 378. Op. 4. D. 1/1. P. 10-17). A large

share of these goods was then traded at smuggling bases and barter stations (hutora) on

the Finnish side.

In front of environmental and logistical impediments, the only measures able to counteract

smugglers remained limited to “periodic raids by border patrols, planning ambushes along

the most likely illegal border crossing routes, irregular searches in villages suspected of

housing contraband or identiﬁed in intelligence provided by informers” (NARK. F. Р-690.

Op. 1. D. 27. P.79). When smugglers failed, it was most often only after they had crossed

the border coming in from Finland, as there was a greater chance of being intercepted by

the GPU along well-worn tracts leading from the border to the villages (NARK. F. Р-382.

Op. 1. D. 24/539. P. 22). However, the yearly volume of conﬁscated contraband remained

relatively insigniﬁcant along the Karelian border, especially in comparison with that in the

marine districts of Murmansk and the Karelian Isthmus (NARK. F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27.

P. 79). is disparity can be explained by the level of poverty on both sides of the lengthy

and remote Karelian Soviet-Finnish border. Also, Soviet control over transborder trade in

Murmansk and at the Karelian Isthmus was diﬃcult because smugglers were much better

equipped and mobile than law enforcers there.

It is in this historical context that after 1917, a new professionalized cross-border

network arose. Replacing the traditional informal smuggling peddlers (korobeiniki) a

new category of “border people” emerged in the Russian Northwest. ese were self-

exilés and expatriates, some of them trained ideologically and militarily. In parallel, the

peasants living at the edges of the Karelian borderland continued to engage in regular

massive border crossings for trade purposes, most of the time successfully evading Soviet

border outposts and customs institutions. ey took advantage of the inhospitable and

challenging environment using unique survival traditions inherited from their ancestors.

In the face of the harsh climatic conditions and isolation, which were aggravated by delays

in regular food and commodities deliveries, persistent housing shortages, and unsuitable

living and working conditions, border guards and custom oﬃcials often lost morale or

fell ill (NARK. F. Р-690. Op. 1. D. 27. P. 55). As a result, throughout the 1920s, while

the appeals from the central government for “combatting contraband” became more

pressing, local Karelian customs oﬃcials and border guards were unwilling to address the

problem seriously and preferred to send fake or blank reports that denied the existence of

contraband traﬃcking at their respective locations.

ERMOLAEVA, Oksana

At the end of the 1920s, the New Economic Policy (NEP) that had been implemented

in 1921 was replaced by a Stalinist command economy. e eﬀects on the border were the

emergence of stricter security measures, an increased number of border guards, and the

dismantlement of most existing customs institutions. In the following decade, massive

repression operations were aimed at “cleansing” border zones as part of a broad militaristic

mobilization strategy in preparation for future wars (Takala 2016; Repukhova 2017), and

only few counterintelligence agents remained.

From the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union: Continuity in Border

Control Failure

Russian territorial borders remained vague or nonexistent until the late nineteenth

century (Werth 2021, 623-44). Imperial authorities struggled in controlling the

border, in particular because of the environment. eir bureaucratic ineptitude and

underﬁnancing were met with local indigenous practices and knowledge about the

regional landscape and its seasonal transformations. But even when they did take the

environment into account, as the Yablonsky’s project did, Russian imperial bureaucrats

opted for the most expedient border controls. ey disregarded border inspection reports,

discounting the local environment and natural landscape as a factor in illegal cross-border

trade, which remained a necessity for the local population to subsist. An important shift

from Russian imperial to Soviet attempts to regulate and discipline the border ﬁt into a

wider ideological context of ruptures and continuities within broad Russian/Soviet state-

building projects. What made the Russian Communist experiment unique and radically

diﬀerent from traditional market capitalism was that political economy had a pivotal

role in the aspirations to simultaneously reshape the environment and human beings

(Weiner 2000; Josephson et al. 2013). Communist infusion in revolutionary practices led

to an approach to the environment that combined technocratic statism and militaristic

modernization, which led to ecocide during the time of “High Stalinism” (Bruno 2017).

“Classical” Soviet border protection during that time was meant to fully isolate

populations to “seal” them oﬀ from the outside world. Although this model was

eventually enforced through brutal repressive measures from the mid-1930s on, before

then the country’s newly established North-Western borders remained non-functional

for a combination of ﬁnancial and environmental constraints. Local Soviet republican

administrators (the heads of the GPU KASSR and customs oﬃcials) admitted they

could not overcome the challenging northern landscape and climate and prevent illegal

transborder trade with the meager resources they had. As this chapter demonstrates,

despite new, “politicized” border protection policies, Soviet border controllers

continued to rely on past imperial arrangements, thus creating “continuity in failure,”

reinforced by severe budget constraints, bureaucratic ineptitude, and local communities

that successfully exploited diﬃcult physical terrains. As a result, until the 1930s, the

geographical and climatic characteristics of the border strip remained a major factor

inﬂuencing the operational modalities of the border and the speciﬁcs of cross-border

e Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in

Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century

economic interactions. ese characteristics contributed to the implementation of a

unique border regime in which state power was dispersed and border control regulations

were replaced with survival practices by all who participated in (b)order-making, whether

controllers or local population.

If we consider the level of control at the frontier as a barometer of Bolshevik power in

the borderlands during the 1920s, the latter was extremely weak, reﬂecting acute regime

insecurity. After that time, this state of aﬀairs became unacceptable under the context of

Stalinist securitization. Hence, starting in the second half of the 1930s, the Soviet regime,

apart from engaging in mass scale deportations from the Soviet Karelian borderland areas,

paid greater attention to stiﬀening border controls. It did so by increasing the number

of border guards, organizing mobile military patrols and supplying them with highly

trained German shepherd dogs, and instituting a highly restricted border zone, which was

illuminated at night by powerful searchlights. Additionally, the number of Soviet border

guards went from 70,822 in December 1932 to 86,559 in August 1937 (Pogranichnye

voiska 1973).

Still, well into the twentieth century, the environment continued to be a factor in the

ways in which borders were contested, fought for, and administered in the USSR. For

example, Karelian environmental conditions heavily impacted the “Winter War” between

the Soviet Union and Finland, which lasted from November 1939 to March 1940. In

this ﬁght, too, the border area continued to be a major challenge, as Soviet tanks simply

could not operate in the harsh terrain pocked with basalt outcroppings and extensive

marshlands that turned into “a frozen hell” during the winter months. As a result, the

Red Army paid a heavy death toll, with its principal battles fought in extremely severe

long-lasting frosts, in many cases at forty degree below zero centigrade (Kilin 2012, 23).

It was only in February 1940 that Soviet forces managed to penetrate the Finns’ defensive

Mannerheim Line across the Karelian Isthmus. Changes in the border during the Winter

War, as well as during the Second World War (called the “Continuation War” in Russia),

entailed cartographic modiﬁcations and large-scale population movements in 1940, 1941,

and 1944. Modiﬁcations in territorial lines prompted the installation of new control

devices—such as electric fences—to detect smuggling, refugees, or defectors. From

1945 onwards, most sections of the border were completely closed to all forms of traﬃc,

including cross-border tourism and transport. During the Cold War, successful illegal

border crossings from the Soviet Union to Finland still occurred, as people continued to

use the environment to their beneﬁt, proving that the idea of a totally “sealed” border

remained a chimera even at that time (Laine 2014; Scott 2023).

Today, European border areas are still at the forefront of an “East vs. West” divide,

reﬂecting much anxiety in interstate relations on the continent. In 2015-2016, asylum

seekers travelling to Northern Norway and Finland through the Russian Federation

caused the Finnish government to fear for its border security (Piipponen and Virkkinen

2017, 518-533), resulting in the temporary closing of two border crossing points for

anyone not Finnish, Russian, or Belarusian. At the height of the European “migration

crisis,” over 5,000 asylum seekers entered Norway and 1,700 entered Finland through

the three Northernmost border crossing points from Russia (Piipponen and Virkkinen

ERMOLAEVA, Oksana

2017, 530). As recently as the winter of 2023, the wave of migrants from Asia, the Middle

East, and Africa coming into Finland was considered by oﬃcials there to be the result of

deliberate policies by Russia. In the context of deteriorating interstate relations between

Russia and Finland and the latter’s accession to NATO, the border was completely closed

on the Finnish side. In both these cases, the peak number of people crossing over the

border occurred in winter, with a majority of migrants choosing to cross the border

on bicycles. ese waves of migrants impacted international geopolitics and interstate

relations, proving again an ephemeral, ineﬃcient, and unpredictable border control in

this northern region at the margins of Europe. Past border regimes can help in a critical

understanding of not only transnational diplomatic systems but also environmental

entanglements on the edges of modern Europe.

References

Agamirzoev, Karen. 2003. Neizvestnye stranitsy tamozhennogo dela na severo-zapade Rossii I v

Karelii v 1918-1945. Kostomuksha.

Agamirzoev, Karen. 2019. Odysseya nadvornogo sovetnika Djakonova. Kostomuksha.

Agamirzoev, Karen. 2012. “Protivostoyanie Yushkozerskoi tamozhni I krestyan-korobeinikov vo

vtoroi polovine XVIII veka.” Tamozhennye chtenia. Rossia v menyayschemsa mire: vozmozhnosti

I vizovi: Sbornik materialov vserossiiskoi prakticheskoi konferentsii s mezhdunarodnym uchastie,

no. 1: 99-110.

Bazegsky, Dmitry. 1998. “Ekonomicheskie svyazi Belomorskoi Karelii i Severnoi Finlandii

(Kainuu) vo vtoroi polovine XIX – nachale XX veka.” Dissertation, Petrozavodsk.

Bruno, Andy. R. 2017. e Nature of Soviet Power: An Arctic Environmental History. Cambridge

University Press.

Chernyakova, Irina, and Oleg Chernyakov. 2016. “Neizvestnaya karta kak istochnik o sostoyanii

rossiysko-shvedskoi granitsy v kontse XVIII veka.” In Rossia I strany Severnoi Evropy: ﬁzicheskie

I simvolicheskie granitsy: sborbik statei V Kirkenesskogo mezhdunarodnogo seminara istorikov.

Petrozavodsk.

Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. http://council.gov.ru/en/

structure/regions/KR/

Granitsy i kontaktnye zoni v istorii i kulture Karelii i sopredelnykh regionov. Gumanitarnye

issledovania. 2008, no. 1. Petrozavodsk.

Hirsch, Francine. 2005. Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet

Union (Culture and Society after Socialism). Cornell University Press.

Josephson, Paul, Nicolai Dronin, Ruben Mnatsakanian, Aleh Cherp, Dmitry Efremenko, and

Vladislav Larin. 2013. An Environmental History of Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Kapusta, Ludmila. 2000. “Yushkozerskaya tamozhennaya zastava v poslednei chetverti XVIII

veka.” In Belomorskaya Karelia: Istoria, Perspektivy, Razvitia. Petrozavodsk.

Katajala, Kimmo. 2012. Imagined, Negotiated, Remembered: Constructing European Borders and

Borderlands. LIT Verlag Münster.

e Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in

Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century

Katajala, Kimmo. 2007. “Cross-Border Trade in Karelia from the Middle Ages to the October

Revolution 1917.” In e Flexible Frontier: Change and Continuity Finnish-Russian Relations,

edited by M. Lähteenmäki. University of Helsinki.

Katajala, Kimmo. 2017. “Line, Zone or Sieve?: Conceptualizing the 1617 Russo-Swedish Border.”

Nordic and Baltic Studies Review. no. 2: 177-190.

Kilin, Yuri M. 2012. “Soviet–Finish War 1939–1940 and Red Army’s Losses.” Proceedings of

Petrozavodsk State University. Social Sciences & Humanities 126 (5): 21–24.

Kokkonen, Jukka. 2011. “Searching Back the Old Border: e Border between Russia and

Sweden in the Early Modern Period.” Trudy Karelskogo nauchnogo tsentra RAN (6): 66–71.

Laine, Timo. 2014. Torakoita ja panssarivaunuja- Silminnakijana hajovassa neuvostoimperiumissa.

Helsinki: Tammi. https://www.ﬁnlandiakirja.ﬁ/ﬁ/timo-laine-torakoita-ja-panssarivaunuja-

da2569

Lieven, Dominic. 2000. e Russian Empire and its Rivals. London: John Murray.

Lohr, Eric. 2012. Russian citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union. Harvard University Press.

Paasi, Anssi. 1996. Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: e Changing Geographies of the

Finnish-Russian Border. Wiley-Blackwell.

Pogranichnye voiska SSSR. 1973. 1918–1928: Sbornik dokumentov I materialov. Nauka.

Piipponen, Minna and Joni Virkkinen. 2017. “Asylum Seekers and Security at the Northern

Finnish-Russian Border: Analyzing the “Arctic Route Episode” of 2015-2016.” RUDN

Journal of Economics. no. 4: 518-533.

Repukhova, Oksana. 2015. “Repatriatsia bezhentsev v Kareliy v 1920-kh godakh d kontekste

mobilizatsionnoi podgotovki.” e World of Scientiﬁc Discoveries/V Mire Nauchnykh

Otkrytiy [Repatriation of Refugees to Karelia in the 1920s in the Context of Mobilization

Preparation].

Repukhova, Oksana. 2017. Pogranichnyi regim v Karelii v 1920-1930 kh godakh. Petrozavodsk:

PetrSU Publishing House.

Rieber, Alfred. 2015. Stalin and the Struggle for Supremacy in Eurasia. Cambridge University Press.

Rupasov Aleksandr, and Aleksandr Chistikov. 2007. Sovetsko-ﬁnlyandskaya granitsa. 1918-1938:

Ocherki istorii. St. Petersburg.

Sudakov, Vladimir. 2003. “Varashev kamen.” Rossiya I strany Severnoi Evropy: iz istorii

prigranychnykh otnoshenyi v XVI—XX vv.: materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi

konferentsii. Petrozavodsk: 83-89.

Takala, Irina. 2016. “‘Border Locked!’ Special Aspects of State Terror in the Karelian Border

Region of the 1920s-First Half of the 1930s.” Revue d’Histoire Nordique, no. 19: 103-127.

Tolstikov, Alexander. 2015. “From Mezha and Rån to Rubezh and Gränsen: Conceptualizing the

Russo-Swedish Border in the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period”, no. 19: 31-55.

Utkin, Nikolai. 2003. Rossia — Finlandia: “Karelʹskii vopros.” Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia.

Vitukhnovskaya, Marina. 2006. Rossiyskaya Karelia I Karely v impersjoi politike, 1905-1917.

Moscow: Norma.

Vihavainen, Timo, E. N. Kalʹšikov, and S. B. Koreneva, eds. 1999. Rossija i Finlândija v XVIII–

XX vv.: speciﬁka granicy = Evropejskij dom Russia and Finland in the 18th–20th Century:

Speciﬁcs of the Border. Institut Finlandii v Sankt-Peterburge

ERMOLAEVA, Oksana

Weiner, Douglas. 2000. Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Soviet

Russia (Russian and East European Studies). University of Pittsburgh Press.

Werth, Paul W. 2021. “Russia’s Borders in East and West.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and

Eurasian History 22(3): 623-44.

Zaikov, Konstantin, and Jan Nilesen. 2012. “Norvezhsko-rossiiskoe pogranichje: ot obschikh

okrugov k pomorskoi zone.” Arktika I Sever, no. 5: 1-14.

Archival sources

Arkhiv Spb IIRAN (Scientiﬁc Historical Archive, St-Petersburg Institute of History of Russian

Academy of Sciences). Collection 115 (Manuscript collection, 1501-1918).

Pre-Soviet period

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F.2. Olonets gubernia administration

(1802-1919). (Olonetskoe gubernskoe pravlenie)

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. 652. City of Padansk Chancellory

(1774-1796). (Kanzelyaria prigoroda Padanska)

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. 277. Sorokskaya Customs outpost of

the Arkchangelsk Customs (1869-1919). (Sorokskaya tamozhennaya zastava Arkhangelskoi

tamozhni).

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). 589. Warden of the border guard of the

Kem border district. (Nadziratel pogranichnoi strazhi Kemskoi distantsii. 1854-1856.)

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. 396, Op. 1. D. 29. Pp. 32-58. F. 396.

e Olonets Viceroyal Administration (1784–1796).

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. P-380. Op. 1. D. 1/1. P. 10-17). Fond

P-380. Olanga Temporary Customs Post (1924).

Soviet period

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. P-378. Op. 4. D. 25/568. P. 220 F.

P-378. Kem’ Customs (Kem’sky tamozhennyi post, 1915 – 1935).

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. Р-544. Op. 2. D. 4/68. Р. 83). Fond

P-544. e Tulivaara Customs Post (1921–1931).

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. P-378. Op. 4. D. 25/568. P. 220. F.

P-378. Kem’ Customs (Kem’sky tamozhennyi post, 1915 – 1935).

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. P- 382. Petrozavodsk Customs of the

Karelian District Customs Inspection Governorate) (Petrozavodskaya tamozhnya karelskogo

rayonnogo tamozhennogo inspekorskogo upravlenia.

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. P- 690. Council of the Ministers of the

Republic of Karelia (Sovet Ministrov RK) (1922-1994).

National Archives of the Republic of Karelia (NARK). F. Р-689. Presidium of the Supreme

Council of the Republic of Karelia (Prezidium Verkhovnogo soveta RK. 1921-1994)

e Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in

Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century

Secondary sources

Annenkov, Semen. 1886. “Topograﬁchesko-statisticheskoe opisanie pogranichnoi cherty

Petrozavodskogo I Povenetskogo uezdov s Finlyandiei.” Olonetskyi sbornik: Materialy dlya

istorii, geograﬁi, statistiki I etnograﬁi of the Olonetz region, no. 2. http://heninen.net/raja/

kuvaus.htm

Derzhavin, Gavriil Romanovich. 1860. “Podennaya zapiska, uchinennaya vo vremya obozrenya

Olonetskoi gubernii pravitelem Olonetskogo namestnichestva Derzhavinym.” In Zapiski

Gavriila Romanovicha Derzhavina. 1743–1812. Izdanie russkoi besedy.

Entsiklopedicheskyi slovar Brockhausa I Efrona. 1899. Vol. XXVIIА (54). St. Petersburg:

Semenovskaya tipolitograﬁa (I. A. Efrona). https://runivers.ru/lib/book3182/10186/

Semyonov, Aleksandr. 1859. Izuchenie istoricheskikh svedenii o Rossiyskoi vneshnei torgovle I

promyshlennosti s polovini XVII stoletia po 1856 g. St. Petersburg: Tipograﬁia I. P. Glazunova I

kompanii.

e Complete Collection of the Laws of the Russian Empire (PSZ RI). 1830–1885. Assembly 1

(1649–1825). In the printing house of the Second Branch of His Own Imperial Majesty’s

Chancery.

2 Constructing the Idea of

Europe through Turkish Media

Coverage of the 2016 EU-Turkey

Refugee Deal

Anlam FILIZ 1

Abstract: is chapter tracks how seven Turkish-language news media have covered the EU-Turkey

“Refugee Deal” announced in 2016. Using media content as a lens to understand how the idea

of Europe is constructed in its periphery, the study identiﬁes themes in the portrayal of Europe,

at once pictured as a place of refuge but also as an immoral bargainer betraying its own values.

Engaging in the ways in which Europe and the European Union are often conﬂated in Turkish news

media, the study shows that while Europe frequently appears as a haven of progressive values―a

place of comfortable living that refugees want to reach at all cost, risking even death―the European

Union is regularly represented as an unethical political entity that excludes non-white populations.

As an alternative to the conventional approach used by scholars in European studies who examine

non-Europeans as constructed “Others,” this research focuses on the representation of Europe from

its margins by positioning the Turkish media as an actor in the shaping of a global image of Europe.

us, this shift encourages a reconceptualization of actors in the peripheries and outside of the

continent as actively contributing to the construction of a global vision of Europe.

Changing Representations of Europe

Images of Europe have been constructed by actors within the continent, but also

by those located at its peripheries and outside of Europe. e very idea of Europe has

developed in opposition to an “Other” when Europeans came together to ﬁght Muslims

and Ottomans and as they colonized the Americas (Chin 2017). However, the idea of

a coherent European identity weakened in the course of the twentieth century, ﬁrst in

the aftermath of both world wars, then when the continent received large numbers of

immigrants (Pagden 2002, 1). Nonetheless, the founding of the European Union revived

an idea of unity, although the United Kingdom recently leaving the Union and the

inconsistent responses to the “refugee crisis” among EU countries have shattered this

harmonious image.

Turkey is considered to be at the margins of Europe (Keyder 1993, 2006), not only

because it is geographically situated at the edge of the continent but also because it has

long been construed as a proximate cultural “Other” through which a European identity

 Anlam Filiz, Turkish-German University, Istanbul, Turkey, anlamﬁliz@gmail.com.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p47-61

FILIZ, Anlam

has been formed (Robins 2003). Whether Turkey is part of the Global South or the Global

North is also debated, for example by Stephen Haug (2021) who places Turkey at the

boundary of the two spheres. While a member of the OECD, an organization consisting

mostly of wealthy Global North countries, Turkey opposes the Global North’s dominance

of the world; it is “both Southern and Northern or neither Southern nor Northern”

(Haug 2021, 2020). Focusing on how a European identity is constructed there brings

close attention to how various actors at the margins of the continent, precisely because

of their liminal position, have challenged images of Europe created at its core and thus

have actively contributed to the reshaping of Europe. is chapter adds to the literature

on Europeanness by placing these peripheral actors at the center of European studies.

It analyzes an image of Europe constructed through the coverage of the 2016 “Refugee

Deal” in the media in the Turkish-language by examining articles published in seven news

sources with diﬀerent political leaning between 2016 and 2018. rough a qualitative

document analysis that involves a reﬂective thematic analysis (Morgan 2022), the chapter

identiﬁes themes related to the image of Europe. is research helps reconsider European

image-building as an active, ongoing process involving actors located outside the usual

center of the continent. is imagining has been produced not only in relation to the

exclusion of Europe’s “Others” from its imagined unity, but also in connection to how

these “Others” have constructed Europe’s image.

The 2016 EU-Turkey Deal

In the ten years following the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, 6.6 million

Syrians sought refuge internationally (UNHCR n.d.). e United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described this situation as “the world’s largest

refugee crisis in decades” (n.d.). As the crisis grew, large numbers of Syrians and other

nationals ﬂed to Turkey to in turn seek asylum in Europe. To end this ﬂow, the European

Commission established a joint action plan with Turkey in October 2015. Consequently,

the European Union (EU) and the Turkish state declared in March 2016 that they had

made an agreement to “end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU” (Council

of the EU 2016). According to this agreement, formally known as the “EU-Turkey

Statement” and frequently referred to as the “EU-Turkey Refugee Deal,” Turkey was to

prevent unauthorized migration to the EU from within its territory, and the EU gained

the right to send back “irregular migrants” who came through Turkey (Council of the EU

2016). In return, Turkey would receive ﬁnancial assistance to sustain the lives of asylum

seekers within its own borders. Moreover, Turkish citizens would beneﬁt from certain visa

liberations, and the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU would be accelerated (Council

of the EU 2016). On the one hand, many Europeans understood this agreement, made

in the context of the “European Refugee Crisis,” as a necessary step to protect European

borders. On the other hand, various pro-migration activists, academics, and journalists

regarded it as a “dirty deal,” since the agreement aimed at keeping “unwanted migrants”

outside Europe in return for monetary and political beneﬁts to Turkey. e situation of

Constructing the Idea of Europe through Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016

EU-Turkey Refugee Deal

Syrian refugees in Turkey thus came to reﬂect the tension between the values framed as

European values and the reality of European politics. e idealized image of Europe as

a haven of human rights was indeed challenged in major ways in the aftermath of the

Syrian Civil War.

Constructing the Idea of Europe

Scholars have shown that the idea of Europe has been unstable throughout its

history and constantly reshaped (Chin 2017; Pagden 2002; van der Dussen and Wilson

1995). is reshaping has been evident in the ways in which the various meanings of

Europeanness have been varied and contested. As Oriane Calligaro (2017) has shown,

even the Council of Europe’s and EU’s conceptualization of European culture have been

at odds. Europeanness has been celebrated as a glue binding the EU, yet the meaning

of Europe is not the same for all member states. It is rather continuously negotiated

(Calligaro 2013). In fact, Europeanness has been constructed from multiple perspectives,

including “moral universalism, post-national universalism, cultural particularism and

pragmatism” (Delanty 2002, 345). In particular, researchers have analyzed varying images

of Europe in relation to the EU, describing the EU—commonly perceived to be founded

on European unity—as “a fragile construction” (Guibernau 2011, 31).

ere have been an array of obstacles in the creation of a coherent European identity

uniting the peoples of the EU, including economic diﬃculties and diﬀering opinions

about the role of European “elites and the masses” (Guibernau 2011, 41). In their article

comparing Bulgarian and British children’s idea of Europeanness and the relationship

between understandings of Europe and the EU, Slavtcheva-Petkova and Mihelj (2012)

demonstrated that the meanings children attribute to Europe varied depending on their

own political context. British children tended to deﬁne Europe in geographical terms

rather than as a political entity and were more likely to deﬁne themselves as European than

Bulgarian children were (ibid). Half a decade after Slavtcheva-Petkova and Mihelj’s study,

Great Britain voted to exit the EU in what came to be known as the Brexit referendum.

“Anti-immigration and anti-establishment sentiments” among lower-class British citizens

(Hobolt 2016, 1259) and “Britons’ weak sense of European identity” (Carl et al. 2018)

were identiﬁed as some of the reasons leading to the exit vote. Brexit shows that even in

core EU countries, people have diﬀerent understandings of Europeanness and attitudes

toward the Union. As populism has been rising across Europe, the legitimacy of the EU

continues to be questioned throughout the continent (McNamara 2019).

Scholars have analyzed how the idea of Europe has been negotiated in the presence

of such diﬀerences and obstacles. However, omas Risse (2005), for example, shows

that such national diﬀerences do not necessarily hinder the formation of an overarching

idea of Europeanness. For him, Europeanness is rather merged into national identities.

e diversity within Europe is also recognized and praised. Moreover, the “unity in

diversity” discourse of the EU has been implemented to strengthen European cohesion

in various projects such as the European Landscape Convention (Sassatelli 2009). e

FILIZ, Anlam

idea of a common European heritage has also been mobilized to form a united identity

(van der Waal et al. 2022). Nevertheless, scholars have warned that various constructions

of Europeanness that do not take into consideration the multicultural and multiethnic

composition of Europe runs the risk of manufacturing an exclusionist, white, Christian

community (Amin 2004). e selectiveness of European identity-building is reﬂected,

for example, in European memory politics (Sierp 2020). For instance, the idea of

Europeanness is built on memories of “the Holocaust and National Socialism as well

as Stalinism,” but Europe is reluctant to remember its colonial and imperial past (Sierp

2020, 686). However, the formation of the EU and relatedly of a European identity are,

in fact, intertwined with this past. Indeed, several European states had colonies when

the European Economic Community was founded (Sierp 2020, 687-688). As Aline

Sierp (2020) argues, recognizing this past would not necessarily be destructive for the

idea of Europe but could help build a strong “European political identity” instead (699-

700). Similarly, Margriet van der Waal and colleagues (2022) ask if European heritage

construction can be imagined as “a space of exchange, ﬂow and entanglement where

Europeanness is deﬁned as inclusive and pluralistic” rather than as “an exclusive and

singular identity” (163). In her article questioning how the EU has built a European

identity in relation to how it diﬀerentiates itself from countries in its periphery—including

Turkey—Bahar Rumelili (2004) also shows the potential for creating a European identity

that diﬀerentiates itself from the Other but does not position the Other as its antinomy.

erefore, the current diversity within the EU, enhanced by a history of migration and

Europe’s relationships with actors outside of its core, makes analyzing constructions of the

idea of Europe at its margins a fruitful task.

Researching the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal

When examining various aspects of the Refugee Deal, scholars have analyzed the

legal basis and implications of the agreement (Lehner 2019), its eﬀects on EU-Turkey

relations (Paçacı Elitok 2019), its utilization in international politics (Demiryontar

2021), and the validity of framing Turkey as a “Safe ird Country” where refugees can

be resettled (Şimşek 2017). Anchored in but shifting the focus away from this legal and

political framework, this chapter builds on media analysis scholarship to analyze how the

deal has been covered in the Turkish media and understand how the idea of Europe has

been constructed in its periphery through this coverage. Scholars have analyzed media

representations to unearth how social issues have been shaped by the media, which

themselves reproduce or challenge existing power relations. Indeed, the production and

reception of media discourses are situated in their political, material, and social contexts

(Hall 2006). Within media representation studies, the way migrants and migration

policies have been represented has drawn particular attention (Bradimore and Bauder

2012; Danso and McDonald 2001; Fryberg et al. 2017; Gale 2004; Kavaklı 2018;

KhosraviNik 2009; Musolﬀ 2015). While these representations stem from the public’s

attitudes toward migrants and oﬃcial policies, they also in turn inﬂuence attitudes

Constructing the Idea of Europe through Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016

EU-Turkey Refugee Deal

and regulations (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Fryberg et al. 2017; Kavaklı

2018; Poynting et al. 2001) in a feedback loop eﬀect. While past studies have mostly

concentrated on the eﬀects of media representations in the very country in which these

media are based, this chapter goes an extra step to focus instead on how representations

in the Turkish media have challenged certain understandings of Europe and contributed

to the reformulation of the idea of Europe generally and elsewhere.

Researchers have analyzed the media coverage of the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal in diﬀerent

contexts. Futák-Campbell and Pütz (2021), for example, point to the changing discourses

about refugees in German media to explain Germany’s shift from a willingness to receive

Syrian asylum seekers at the beginning of the crisis to its approval of the EU-Turkey

Refugee Deal, which limits the number of asylum seekers accessing Germany. Kavaklı

(2018) examined how the agreement between the EU and Turkey has been covered in

the Turkish online press by analyzing what prominent “actors” and “frames” appeared

in three popular Turkish newspapers within four months of the EU-Turkey Statement

(266). For Kavaklı (2018), the deal has been framed in terms of:

1. “Visa liberation,” which has been promised to Turkey by the EU;

2. e idea that the deal did not adequately help refugees;

3. Legal and ethical problems inherent to the agreement;

4. e idea that the agreement was harmful to Turkey; and

5. e diﬃculty of implementing the agreement.

us, Kavaklı’s study shows the framing of the deal in relation to its eﬀects on refugees

and on Turkey. ese studies have anticipated that media discourses shape public opinion

and policy-making and contribute to understanding the speciﬁc ways in which the media

inﬂuence the political climate. is chapter utilizes this scholarship but shifts the focus to

consider media coverage as a site where an image of Europe is created.

Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal

Drawing on Turkish-language media products published between 2016 and 2018,

this research identiﬁes themes in articles produced before and after the declaration of the

deal in March 2016. e selected media are wide-ranging in terms of political leaning,

whether on the left, in the center, or on the right. is choice gives rise to a wide range

of perspectives:

1. Cumhuriyet is a long-established newspaper founded in 1924 that is read by a

secular audience and is known for its oppositional columnists and news pieces

(Mert Elmas and Paksoy 2020, 187; İnce and Koçak 2018, 1976);

2. Diken is an independent online “non-mainstream critical news outlet” (Ertuna

2023, 545) whose name literally means “thorn.” Its founder describes the mission

of the journal as “being the thorn in the [Turkish] media” (Simavi n.d.);

FILIZ, Anlam

3. NTV.com.tr is a private (Doğuş Media Group) news website owned by the TV

channel NTV. It is one of the most visited news websites in Turkey, with almost

10 million visitors per month in 2018 (Alp and Turan 2018, 9);

4. Sabah is a privately owned (Turkuvaz Holding) newspaper, known to have close

ties to the Turkish government (Mert Elmas and Paksoy 2020, 187; İnce and

Koçak 2018, 1976);

5. Sözcü is a privately owned (Estetik Yayıncılık A.Ş. [joint stock company]),

nationalist-leaning newspaper that is one of the most widely read newspapers

in Turkey and publishes some oppositional news pieces (Mert Elmas and Paksoy

2020, 187; İnce and Koçak 2018, 1976);

6. Habertürk.com is a privately owned (Ciner Group) internet news medium

connected to a TV channel; and

7. T24 is an independent online “non-mainstream critical news outlet” (Ertuna

2023, 545).

For each source, I conducted online searches using keywords in Turkish that included

the name of the news source along with the following words and phrases: “European

Union,” “refugee,” and “agreement.” Included in the study were 46 online news and

opinion pieces from Cumhuriyet, 67 from Diken, 25 from NTV.com.tr, 29 from Sabah,

58 from Sözcü, 24 from Habertürk.com, and 73 from T24, all published between 2016

and 2018. Placing the articles in relation to the socio-political context of publication,

recurring themes were identiﬁed. is qualitative method, based on the interpretation

of the researcher, is advantageous in this case in that it provides a deep understanding of

the texts in relation to the context in which they were produced. Diﬀerent lenses can be

used to address the emerging conceptualizations of Europe in this media coverage, such as

disunity and inconsistency in Europe, as reﬂected in the multiplicity of opinions among

Europeans regarding the agreement at stake and the changes in European policy toward

migrants. Michael Patton (1990) places interpretation, and thus the creation of meaning,

at the center of qualitative analysis. He points to the role of qualitative studies in going

beyond exploring an issue and “extending and deepening the theoretical propositions

and understandings that have emerged from previous ﬁeld studies” (193-194). Using a

qualitative approach to document analysis and utilizing reﬂexivity to identify themes,

I did not start with pre-existing codes in mind but let the themes emerge as I read the

documents closely and repeatedly (Morgan 2022, 73). I concentrated on the content that

portrayed Europe, using interpretation and “subjectivity [of the researcher as] a resource»

(Morgan 2022, 73). In this study, only articles that went beyond factual information

and instead reported an assessment of or provided an evaluation of the agreement were

analyzed to unveil how the media treated 1) the role of both the European Union and

Turkey in ﬁnalizing the deal and 2) the consequences of the deal for Europe, Turkey, and

displaced populations. Several themes emerged:

Constructing the Idea of Europe through Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016

EU-Turkey Refugee Deal

1. Europe as a destination;

2. e agreement between Turkey and the EU as immoral “bargaining;” and

3. Betrayed “European values.”

Europe as a Destination Continent

e theme of ﬂeeing to Europe emerged frequently in conjunction with the

conceptualization of Europe as a continent that asylum seekers want to reach even at the

risk of death. For example, an article on the news website of the TV channel connected

to NTV (2017a) published after the deal was signed explained that asylum seekers found

alternative ways to reach Europe, such as the maritime route from North Africa to Italy

and Spain. While the article referred to a “journey to hope,” it also mentioned that the

agreement had made it diﬃcult for all asylum seekers to ﬂee to Europe through Turkey. e

news source Diken often formulated its headlines to convey asylum seekers’ unwillingness

to be held in Turkey and their demand to stay within European countries: “Refugees are

in resistance: no to Turkey!” (Diken 2016a). e rejection of the EU-Turkey deal was

a recurrent theme in Diken as well. For instance, one article (Diken 2016b) featured

powerful imagery by the Demirören News Agency and information previously conveyed

by the British Daily Telegraph to describe how one Afghan and two Pakistani asylum

seekers had ﬁled a complaint with the European Court of Justice asking to invalidate the

agreement between Turkey and the EU. One photo in particular showed children and

protesters holding banners written in English:

• “Don’t send back to Turkey;”

• “Help us no back to Turkey;”

• “We want not war;”

• “Freedom;”

• “No Turkey;” and

• “Better to die here than go back to Turkey” (Diken 2016b).

In yet another picture, readers saw a close-up of a sleeping baby wearing a hat where

the words “no Turkey” appeared (Diken 2016b).

The EU as an Immoral Bargainer

After meeting with representatives of the EU in Brussels to discuss the agreement,

the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu, stated that the agreement

constituted a “Kayserian bargain” (Cumhuriyet 2016a). is expression refers to the

Turkish city of Kayseri, a place where traders bargained over merchandise historically.

is vocabulary suggested that the Turkish team had gotten what they wanted after

FILIZ, Anlam

skillful negotiations—possibly at the expense of the interests of the EU. Hence, following

Davutoğlu’s comment, the Turkish media frequently deﬁned the negotiations leading

to the EU-Turkey Statement as a “bargain-making” endeavor (pazarlık). However, in

contrast to Davutoğlu’s praise about the negotiations, opposition media have used that

same phrase to criticize the agreement and suggest that the EU in fact had the upper

hand over Turkey and that the deal was nothing more than a “bargain for embarrassment”

(Cumhuriyet 2016b). Other media also deployed the phrase to point to the unequal power

relationship between Turkey and the EU in the deal-making process. e negotiations

have been described as resulting from Turkey having the “courage of ignorance,” and a

journalist insisted that the real bargainer from Kayseri was in fact Brussels (Topçu 2016).

e media have also discussed how this unequal relationship played out in the outcomes

of the negotiations. Sözcü, for example, published an interview with Şükrü Elekdağ, a

Turkish politician and former diplomat, in which he warned of the diﬃculties awaiting

Turkey as a consequence of the agreement (Dündar 2016). In particular, the politician

evoked that the funds the EU is to pay to Turkey would not suﬃce to manage a refugee

ﬂow of about 3 million Syrians into Turkey. Moreover, the promises made by the EU,

such as visa exceptions for Turkish people, have also been described as extremely diﬃcult

to fulﬁll, if not impossible (Dündar 2016).

e immoral position of the EU has also been noted in terms of the exclusionary

consequences on non-white populations. Elekdağ even compared the current situation

to the Nazi era. He conceived of the deal as “the relapse of the abhorrent European

disease called racism” and likened “the hatred towards Muslims and Turks in Germany” to

“the [hatred] against Jews during the Nazi era” (Dündar 2016). us, Elekdağ presented

the deal not only as a political decision but as a symptom of racism that prevented

Syrians—mostly non-white and Muslim—from leaving Turkey and kept them at bay at

the borders of the EU. e media cited international experts who found the agreement

to be unlawful, such as Elizabeth Ferris (from Georgetown University), who referred to

the agreement as a ﬁasco violating the law and an illustration of Ankara's and Berlin's

failing morality (T24 2016). Likewise, Habertürk cited Amnesty International Refugee

Rights coordinator Volkan Görendağ, who posited that the deportation of refugees back

to Turkey was unlawful (Timurhan 2016).

Betraying “European Values”

e Turkish news media have focused on how the Turkey-EU Deal has challenged the

loyalty of the EU towards its own foundational principles, which are frequently framed

as “European values,” including in the ﬁelds of refugee rights and legal ethics. Cumhuriyet

cited Turkey’s then main opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who declared that not

only did the agreement turned Turkey into a buﬀer zone, but that it also caused Europe to

violate “its own values and rules” (Cumhuriyet 2016c). An article on NTV (2017b) drew

on the Turkish version of the German news outlet Deutsche Welle to cover discussions

about a planned agreement between Libya and the EU, comparing it to the EU-Turkey

Constructing the Idea of Europe through Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016

EU-Turkey Refugee Deal

Deal and citing the suggestion of Oxfam, a collection of charity organizations ﬁghting

poverty, that such an agreement would contradict “the core values of Europe” (NTV

2017b). Sabah mentioned that a member of the European Parliament for Portugal, Ana

Gomes, said that, as a European, she felt “ashamed of the EU’s refugee policy” and that

the way in which the EU had handled the crisis “betrayed Europe’s foundational values”

(Sabah 2018).

A Self-Contradicting Europe

In its review of articles produced by media outside the EU about the Turkey-EU refugee

agreement, this chapter reveals how a certain image of Europe has been constructed that

both reinforces and contradicts the idealization of the continent as a defender of human

rights. News coverage about asylum seekers trying to ﬂee to European countries presents

Europe as a place to be. Yet, in discussions regarding “European values,” Turkish-language

media tend to construct the EU as ambivalent and inconsistent. e reluctance of the

EU to let asylum seekers come to Europe through legal means and to protect their rights,

as well as the failure of the EU’s bureaucracy to fulﬁll its obligations toward Turkey, were

frequently used to criticize the EU for not upholding European values.

e Turkish media showed how the EU in fact had betrayed its own values, echoing

news pieces about the “bargain” to depict the negotiations leading up to the agreement.

In the deal-making process, the EU appeared on the one hand to neglect the rights of

asylum seekers and on the other hand to mislead Turkey in believing that it would beneﬁt

from the deal. As a consequence, critical journalists have presented the agreement as

antithetical to the image of Europe as a champion of human rights. However, at the same

time as these Turkish media condemned EU policies, they also supported the ideals of

Europeanness. ese two facets in media coverage demonstrated not only that the idea of

“Europe” and the EU have become intertwined but also that Europe has emerged as an

idealized haven for human rights that fails its own ideals in practice. In contrast, Turkey

was shown to embody some of these ideals because it has protected refugee rights and

hosted the largest number of asylum seekers in the world. us, although people have

regularly risked their lives to reach Europe as a place to build a good life, the continent

has also been associated with immorality and deceitfulness.

e liminal position Turkey holds in relation to Europe enables such ambivalent

depictions. As scholars have shown (Ahıska 2003; Ahıska 2010; Heper 2006; Keyder

1993; Rumelili 2008), Turkey’s identity has been constructed and negotiated in relation

to Europe both as it has striven to be a part of Europe and as it has sought to diﬀerentiate

itself from Europe. Even as the contours of Turkey’s Otherness in relation to Europe

have been continuously reconstructed in relation to political developments (Ertuğrul and

Yılmaz 2017), this position remains a deﬁning feature of the relationship between the

two entities. at Europe is both an object of desire and of criticism is reﬂected in the

Turkish media’s simultaneous praise for European values and criticism of the EU for not

upholding these values. A similar ambivalence exists towards the deal in the European

FILIZ, Anlam

media. For example, in their analysis of the coverage of the refugee crisis in the Greek,

German, and British press, Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti (2016) ﬁnd that the 2016 EU-

Turkey Deal was one of the leading topics in European media in 2016 and show that the

interpretation of the deal as a necessary agreement indicates skepticism against Turkey in

relation to whether the agreement will actually be implemented. Similar to the way the

deal was covered in the Turkish media, in the European press the deal was often framed

as “controversial,” and its legal basis was questioned (Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti 2016,

273-275). Sharp criticisms of European migration politics similar to those in the Turkish-

language coverage of the deal can be found in European media as well. Deutsche Welle, for

example, quoted Imogen Sudbury from the International Rescue Committee labelling

the deal as “a stain on EU rights record” (Wesel 2021). e Turkish case shows how such

globally echoing criticisms of EU migration policy were constructed in the periphery of

Europe through local frameworks such as the expression of “bargaining.” is critical

depiction from the margins of Europe helped emphasize the transactional nature of the

agreement and provided a critical approach to the deal.

Constructing the Idea of Europe from its Periphery

When referring to the “Refugee Deal,” the Turkish-language news media have

constructed Europe as a place where human rights are at once protected and violated,

also framing the negotiation process as “a bargain” in which both sides have neglected the

rights of the displaced. Europe has been depicted as having failed its idealized image and

humanistic principles. Due to its bureaucratic ineﬃciency, the EU has been described

as lacking adequate planning in implementing the agreement, while Turkey has been

portrayed as having been deceived by a seemingly cunning EU, for example when it

comes to the level of compensation it would receive, which many in the Turkish media

deemed to be insuﬃcient in return for such large sacriﬁces.

e ways in which Europe has been deﬁned from its periphery demonstrates not only

that the very idea of Europeanness is not static but also that its core is challenged precisely

by its periphery. Indeed, this conceptualization of what it means to be “European” shifts

according to diﬀerent perceptions of Europe, and these perceptions are inﬂuenced by the

political contexts from which they emanate. Turks have long been perceived as “Other”

in Europe, and this perception has helped Europeans unite. Turkey applied for EU

membership in 1987, but the process has still not reached a conclusion. In eﬀect, Europe

has excluded Turkey institutionally and discursively, although it remains a candidate for

EU membership. Yet, from its peripheral position, Turkey has induced some questioning

and shaping of the very idea of Europe (Morozow and Rumelili 2012), challenging various

assumed binaries such as Global South/Global North, East/West, and center/periphery. e

critical coverage of the 2016 Turkey-EU Deal by Turkish language-media parallels Turkey’s

role as an external challenger of Europe in the political arena (Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva

2022). Turkey has, for example, questioned the legitimacy of European political presence

in Africa and the Balkans on ethical grounds (Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva 2022, 1824).

Constructing the Idea of Europe through Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016

EU-Turkey Refugee Deal

Turkey’s peripheral position might well be the source of its ability to pose such challenges.

Contrasting with the institutional memory politics of the EU that is shaped by an amnesia

of the colonial and imperial past of Europe (Sierp 2020), Turkey recalls Europe’s colonial

history as it disputes European politics (Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva 2022). Such voices

from the margins of Europe could help reevaluate the idea of Europe and whether an

inclusive Europeanness can be imagined that does not build itself on imagining the actors

outside of its core as potential threats (Rumelili 2004).

Note: All translations from Turkish are by the author.

References

Alp, Hakan, and Erkan Turan. 2018. “Gelenekselden Dijitale Medyanın Dönüşümü Çerçevesinde

CNNTÜRK ve NTV İnternet Sitelerinin Karşılaştırmalı Analizi.” [Comparative Analysis of

CNNTÜRK and NTV Internet Sites in the Framework of Transformation from Traditional

to Digital Media] Turkish Studies 13(29):1-18.

Amin, Ash. 2004. “Multi-Ethnicity and the Idea of Europe.” eory, Culture & Society, 21 (2):

1-24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276404042132.

Aydın-Düzgit, Senem, and Gergana Noutcheva. 2022. “External Contestations of Europe:

Russia and Turkey as Normative Challengers?” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 60:

1815–1831. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13380.

Boomgaarden, Hajo G., and Rens Vliegenthart. 2009. “How News Content Inﬂuences Anti-

Immigration Attitudes: Germany, 1993–2005.” European Journal of Political Research 48 (4):

516–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01831.x.

Bradimore, Ashley, and Harald Bauder. 2012. “Mystery Ships and Risky Boat People: Tamil

Refugee Migration in the Newsprint Media.” Canadian Journal of Communication 36 (4):

637-661. https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2011v36n4a2466.

Calligaro, Oriane. 2013. Negotiating Europe: EU Promotion of Europeanness since the 1950s.

Palgrave Macmillan.

Calligaro, Oriane. 2017. “Which Culture(s) for Europe? e Contrasting Conceptions of the

Council of Europe and the European Union from 1949 to the Present Day.” Cambio. Rivista

Sulle Trasformazioni Sociali, 7(13):67–83. https://doi.org/10.13128/cambio-21914.

Carl, Noah, James Dennison, and Geoﬀrey Evans. 2018. “European but Not European

Enough: An Explanation for Brexit.” European Union Politics, 20 (2): 282–304. https://doi.

org/10.1177/1465116518802361.

Chin, Rita. 2017. e Crisis of Multiculturalism in Europe: A History. Princeton University Press.

Council of the EU. 2016. EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. March 18. https://www.

consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/pdf.

Cumhuriyet. 2016a. “Davutoğlu: Kayserili Pazarlığı Yaptık.” [Davutoğlu: We Made a Kayserian

Bargain] March 9, 2016. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/494604/davutoglu-

kayserili-pazarligi-yaptik.html

FILIZ, Anlam

Cumhuriyet. 2016b. “Utanç Pazarlığında Anlaşma Sağlandı: Sığınmacılar Üç Gün Sonra

Türkiye’de.” [An Agreement has been Reached in the Bargain of Embarrassment: Refugees

will be in Turkey in three Days]. Cumhuriyet. March 18. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.

tr/haber/turkiye/500399/utanc-pazarliginda-anlasma-saglandi-siginmacilar-uc-gun-sonra-

turkiyede.html

Cumhuriyet. 2016c. “Kılıçdaroğlu: Parayı Biz Verelim Onlar Alsın.” [Kılıçdaroğlu: Let Us Give

the Money and they Take [the Refugees]] Cumhuriyet. March 11. http://www.cumhuriyet.

com.tr/haber/siyaset/495926/kilicdaroglu-parayi-biz-verelim-onlar-alsin.html

Danso, Ransford, and David A. McDonald. 2001. “Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the

Print Media in Post-Apartheid South Africa.” Africa Today 48(3):115–37.

Delanty, Gerard. 2002. “Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and

Particularism.” Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3(3):345-359.

Demiryontar, Birce. 2021. “Accession conditionality and migration diplomacy: Turkey’s dual

identity in migration policy negotiations with the EU. ” European Politics and Society

22(1):88-103.

Diken. 2016a. “Mülteciler Direnişte: Türkiye’ye Hayır!” [Refugees are in Resistance: No to

Turkey!] Diken. April 5. http://www.diken.com.tr/multeciler-geri-donmek-istemiyor-

turkiyeye-hayir/.

Diken. 2016b. “AB ile Türkiye Arasındaki Mülteci Anlaşması Mahkemeye Taşındı” [e Refugee

Agreement between the EU and Turkey was Brought to Trial]. Diken. June 14. http://www.

diken.com.tr/ab-ve-turkiye-arasindaki-multeci-anlasmasi-mahkemeye-tasindi/.

Dündar, Uğur. 2016. “Türkiye mülteci toplama kampına dönüşecek!” [Turkey will Turn into a

Refugee Concentration Camp!] Sözcü. March 26. https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/yazarlar/

ugur-dundar/turkiye-multeci-toplama-kampina-donusecek-1153947/.

Ertuğrul, Kürşad, and Öznur Akcalı Yılmaz. 2017. “e Otherness of Turkey in European

Integration.” Turkish Studies 19(1):48–71. doi:10.1080/14683849.2017.1396895.

Ertuna, Can. 2023. “Whose Voice Resonates?” A Study on the News Content of Four Alternative

Digital-native News Websites in Turkey” OPUS– Journal of Society Research 20(55):533-

549.

Fotopoulos, Stergios, and Margarita Kaimaklioti. 2016. “Media Discourse on the Refugee Crisis:

On what have the Greek, German and British Press Focused?” European View 15(2):265-279.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-016-0407-5.

Fryberg, Stephanie A., Nicole M. Stephens, Rebecca Covarrubias, et al. 2017. “How the Media

Frames the Immigration Debate: e Critical Role of Location and Politics.” Analyses of Social

Issues and Public Policy, June, 96–112.

Futák-Campbell, Beatrix, and Mira Pütz. 2021. “From the ‘Open door’ policy to the EU-Turkey

deal: media framings of German policy changes during the EU refugee ‘crisis’” International

Relations 36(1):1-22.

Gale, Peter. 2004. “e Refugee Crisis and Fear: Populist Politics and Media Discourse.” Journal

of Sociology 40 (4):321–40.

Guibernau, Montserrat. 2011. “Prospects for a European Identity.” International Journal of

Politics, Culture, and Society 24(1/2):31–43.

Constructing the Idea of Europe through Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016

EU-Turkey Refugee Deal

Hall, Stuart. 2006. “Encoding/ Decoding.” In Media and Cultural Studies: Keyworks, edited by

Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner, Revised Edition, 163–73. Blackwell

Publishing.

Haug, Sebastian. 2021. “A irdspace approach to the ‘Global South’: insights from the margins

of a popular category.” ird World Quarterly, 42(9):2018–2038. https://doi.org/10.1080/014

36597.2020.1712999.

Heper, Metin. 2006. “Turkey between East and West.” In e Convergence of Civilizations:

Constructing a Mediterranean Region, edited by Emanuel Adler, Federica Bicchi, Beverly

Crawford and Raﬀaella Del Sarto. University of Toronto Press.

Hobolt, Sara B. 2016. “e Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent.” Journal of

European Public Policy 23 (9):1259-1277, doi: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1225785.

İnce, Mustafa, and Mevlut Can Koçak. 2018. “Rus Savaş Uçağının Düşürülmesi İle İlgili

Yayınlanan Haberlerde Söylem Ve İdeoloji.” [Discourse and Ideology in the News about

the Downing of the Russian War Plane] İnsan Ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi

7(3):1969-1999. https://doi.org/10.15869/itobiad.441803.

Kavaklı, Nurhan. 2018. “e Coverage of EU-Turkey Refugee Deal in Turkish Online Press.” e

Turkish Online Journal of Design, Art and Communication 8(2):266-275.

Keyder, Çağlar. 1993. “e Dilemma of Cultural Identity on the Margin of Europe. ” Review

(Fernand Braudel Center) 16(1):19–33.

Keyder, Çağlar. 2006. “Moving in from the Margins? Turkey in Europe.” Diogenes 53 (2):72-81.

KhosraviNik, Majid. 2009. “e Representation of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Immigrants

in British Newspapers during the Balkan Conﬂict (1999) and the British General Election

(2005).” Discourse & Society 20(4):477–98.

Lehner, Roman. 2019. “e EU-Turkey-’deal’: Legal Challenges and Pitfalls.” International

Migration 57 (2):176-185.

McNamara, Kathleen R. 2019. “When the Banal Becomes Political: e European Union in the

Age of Populism.” Polity 51(4):678–688.

Mert Elmas, Şeyda, and Alaaddin F. Paksoy. 2020. “Türk Basınında Suriyeli Sığınmacı Kadınların

Temsili.” [Representation of Syrian Asylum Seeker Women in e Turkish Press] Türkiye

İletişim Araştırmaları Dergisi nº35: 184-210. https://doi.org/10.17829/turcom.733985.

Morgan, Hani. 2022. “Conducting a qualitative document analysis.” e Qualitative Report

27(1):64-77.

Morozov, Viatcheslav, and Bahar Rumelili. 2012. “e External Constitution of European

Identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-Makers.” Cooperation and Conﬂict 47 (1): 28–48.

Musolﬀ, Andreas. 2015. “Dehumanizing Metaphors in UK Immigrant Debates in Press

and Online Media.” Journal of Language Aggression and Conﬂict 3(1):41–56. https://doi.

org/10.1075/jlac.3.1.02mus.

NTV. 2017a. “Sığınmacılar Avrupa’ya Ulaşmak İçin Hangi Rotaları İzliyor?” [Which Routes do

Refugees Follow to Reach Europe?] June 20. https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/siginmacilar-

avrupaya-ulasmak-icin-hangi-rotalari-izliyor,plTxpU-KZk6Kxw7lHﬀu7g.

FILIZ, Anlam

NTV. 2017b.“Malta’daki AB Zirvesi’nin Gündemi Yine Mülteciler ve Brexit.” [e

Agenda of the EU Summit in Malta is again Refugees and Brexit] February 3.

https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/maltadaki-ab-zirvesinin-gundemi-yine-multeciler-ve-

brexit,vZO74DIiFESDFWgoe3bM_Q.

Paçacı Elitok, Seçil. 2019. “MiReKoc Working Papers ree Years on: An Evaluation of the

EU-Turkey Refugee Deal”. April. https://mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/

Mirekoc_Elitok_2019_Report_reeYearsOn-AnEvaluationOfeEU-TurkeyRefugeeDeal.

pdf.

Pagden, Anthony. 2002. “Introduction.” In e Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European

Union, edited by Anthony Pagden. Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University

Press.

Patton, Michael. 1990. Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods. Sage Publications.

Poynting, Scott, Greg Noble, and Paul Tabar. 2001. “Middle Eastern Appearances: ‘Ethnic

Gangs’, Moral Panic and Media Framing.” Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology

34 (1): 67–90.

Risse, omas. 2005. Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European

integration. Journal of European Public Policy 12 (2): 291–309. https://doi.

org/10.1080/13501760500044033.

Robins, Kevin. 2003. “Interrupting identities: Turkey/Europe.” In Questions of cultural identity,

edited by Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. Sage.

Rumelili Bahar. 2004. Constructing identity and relating to diﬀerence: Understanding the

EU’s mode of diﬀerentiation. Review of International Studies 30 (1): 27-47. doi:10.1017/

S0260210504005819.

Sabah. 2018. “‘Mülteci Politikasından Utanç Duyuyorum.’” [‘I am Ashamed of the Refugee

Policy’] Sabah. February 22. https://www.sabah.com.tr/avrupa/2018/02/22/multeci-

politikasindan-utanc-duyuyorum.

Sassatelli, Monica. 2009. Becoming Europeans: Cultural Identity and Cultural Policies. Palgrave

Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230250437_7

Sierp, Aline. 2020. EU Memory Politics and Europe’s Forgotten Colonial Past. Interventions

22(6): 686–702. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2020.1749701.

Simavi, Harun. n.d. “Bu Gazete…” [is Newspaper…] Diken. https://www.diken.com.tr/bu-

gazete/.

Slavtcheva-Petkova, Vera, and Sabina Mihelj. 2012. “Europe – a Default or a Dream? European

Identity Formation among Bulgarian and English Children:” Ethnicities 13(5):565–83.

Şimşek, Doğuş. 2017. “Turkey as a “Safe ird Country”? e Impacts of the EU-Turkey

Statement on Syrian Refugees in Turkey.” Perceptions XXII(4):161-182.

T24. 2016. “Türkiye - AB Mülteci Anlaşması Fiyasko, Hukuk İhlal Ediliyor; Ankara ve Berlin

Ahlaken Kaybetti.” [Turkey-EU Refugee Agreement is Fiasco, e Law is Violated; Ankara

and Berlin have Failed Morally] T24. May 1. https://t24.com.tr/haber/turkiye--ab-multeci-

anlasmasi-ﬁyasko-hukuk-ihlal-ediliyor-ankara-ve-berlin-ahlaken-kaybetti,338574.

Timurhan, Gökhan. 2016. “‘Avrupa Birliği sorumluluktan kaçtı.’” [‘e European Union is

Avoiding Responsibility’] www.haberturk.com. April 11. https://www.haberturk.com/

gundem/haber/1223031-avrupa-birligi-sorumluluktan-kacti.

Constructing the Idea of Europe through Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016

EU-Turkey Refugee Deal

Topçu, Elmas. 2016. “Kayseri Pazarlığı Değil, Cahil Cesareti.” [Not a Kayseri Bargain but

Courage of Ignorance] Diken. March 20. http://www.diken.com.tr/kayseri-pazarligi-degil-

cahil-cesareti/.

UNHCR. n.d. “Syria Emergency.” UNHCR e UN Refugee Agency. Retrieved May 27, 2021,

from https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html.

Van der Dussen, Jan, and Kevin Wilson, eds. 1995. e History of the Idea of Europe. Routledge.

Van der Waal, Margriet, Van Weyenberg, Astrid, and Sabine Volk. 2022. “Introduction: Heritage

and the making of ‘Europe’.” Journal of European Studies 52(3-4):163-169. https://doi.

org/10.1177/00472441221115859.

Wesel, Barbara. 2021. “Turkey migration deal a ‘stain on EU rights record.’” Deutsche

Welle. March 17. https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-migration-deal-a-stain-on-eu-rights-

record/a-56903392.

PART II

e European Union

Impact and

Understanding Seen from its

Outside and Periphery

Introduction

Edina PALEVIQ 1, Mare USHKOVSKA 2, and

Sergio AGUILAR 3

e ways in which the European Union interacts with its member states and the

countries outside the bloc as a supranational political power can be analyzed at diﬀerent

levels: internal, regional, and global. In this book that aims to decentralize knowledge

production about Europe, this section assembles works by Global South/Global East

authors to incorporate perspectives and expertise from outside the EU. e three chapters

that follow add value by presenting diverse external perceptions of Union politics and

functioning and by casting new light on issues the EU has had to face recently.

Since the 1990s, the EU has sought to play a more assertive role in global aﬀairs

and has come to be recognized as an important actor in the international community.

However, as its goals have expanded, so have challenges. Central to these contemporary

concerns are the integration of the bloc, the enlargement process, and the role of the EU

in European and international security. e authors in Part II tackle these interconnected

issues from multiple angles and illustrate how the EU’s internal cohesion impacts its

external inﬂuence by addressing the eﬃcacy of the EU’s conditionality in the enlargement

process, the dynamics and challenges of the transference of power from national to Union

institutions, and ﬁnally the evolution of EU’s military operations and missions overseas.

Edina Paleviq examines the eﬀectiveness of EU conditionality in Montenegro’s EU

accession process, arguing that, after almost two decades, “Europeanization” has failed

at producing successful results beyond the mere norm adoption phase. Mare Ushkovska

then discusses contemporary internal EU dynamics, explaining the dissonance that

exists among EU member states in the ﬁnal stage of European integration by a clash of

worldviews among the populations of member states. Finally, Sergio Aguilar considers

the reality of EU peace operations, arguing that the Union constantly adapts its overseas

engagement in response to changes in both internal and external environments and the

challenges these contexts pose.

e three chapters in this section present diverse methodological approaches. Paleviq

combines a normative and empirical process, as she tests the EU’s external demands

(rule adoption) through the content of rules and laws in the judicial sector and freedom

of expression, at the same time as she discusses routine issues visible in the media and

 Edina Paleviq, Andrássy University Budapest, Hungary, edina.paleviq@andrassyuni.hu.

 Mare Ushkovska, International Balkan University, Skopje, Macedonia, mare.ushkovska@yahoo.com.

 Sergio Aguilar, Sao Paulo State University (UNESP), Brazil, sergio.aguilar@unesp.br.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p65-66

PALEVIQ, Edina, USHKOVSKA, Mare, and AGUILAR, Sérgio

reports by non-governmental organizations about implementation. Ushkovska uses the

quantitative descriptive method and interpretative quantitative method to analyze social

patterns and attitudes inside member states that may be associated with contemporary

Euroskepticism. Finally, Aguilar grounds his qualitative analysis on insights from

complexity theory and quantitative data to discuss how EU military operations and

missions respond and adapt to changes in their operating environment.

is part of the book addresses the EU from three interconnected perspectives: as a

bloc (focusing on internal dynamics and cohesion), as a normative power (considering its

inﬂuence on candidate states), and as a player in the international security system (analyzing

its inﬂuence as a global power). Importantly, these chapters explore EU policy processes

based on their outcomes, rather than on their proposed commitments. Furthermore,

together they address an array of internal challenges: the lack of enlargement credibility

in the EU; the sources of contemporary internal contestations about the EU’s values,

multiculturalism, and immigration policy; and the diﬃculties the EU has encountered in

accomplishing its ambitions in the international security ﬁeld.

e topics covered provide useful insights, as the chapters navigate through the EU

political and social context and emphasize dynamics that operate not only within the

EU but also in its relation with its outside and periphery. e three chapters capture

up-to-date accounts of some of the latest developments in conditionality, integration,

and military actions abroad. In addition, they provide wide-ranging sub-themes relating

to the public’s distrust toward the EU, the lack of consensus among EU member states,

values and policy priorities in the European project, the credibility of EU projects, and

the capacity of the EU to make a diﬀerence abroad. Finally, the authors in this part of the

book oﬀer a diverse knowledge base that is balanced and informative in their attempt to

shed light on the EU from an outside.

3 Confronting Rule Adoption and

Implementation in Montenegro’s

Europeanization

Edina PALEVIQ 1

Abstract: Montenegro is a frontrunner in the EU accession process, and yet it is stagnating and

even backsliding in terms of democracy and the rule of law. A question arising is whether the

EU’s conditionality―under its new methodology, known as the “new approach”―regulating the

EU accession process eﬀectively strengthens democratic institutions there. is chapter argues

that so far this approach has not worked successfully in Montenegro beyond the norm adoption

phase for three main reasons: a lack of clarity about EU conditionality, the presence of long-ruling

elites, and a speciﬁc national political culture. rough Europeanization theories, this research

tests two areas in rule of law promotion: judiciary reform and freedom of the press. Based on a

normative approach, the content of rules and laws in the judicial sector and freedom of expression

are studied to challenge the EU’s external demands (rule adoption) empirically, by discussing

the regular obstacles mentioned in the media and in reports by non-governmental organizations

(implementation). In particular, the political and social context in which these dynamics operate is

emphasized. Conclusions show that, while EU conditionality has brought an undeniably positive

change in Montenegro and has successfully led to the adoption of new laws, implementing

democratic institutions remains arduous since political elites overshadow integration. At the same

time, checks and balances have eroded in the face of unpunished abuse of power. e study speaks

to debates on Europeanization and ways to strengthen the rule of law along with EU standards in

candidate member states and provides useful solutions to the failures of EU conditionality.

Montenegro is a small European, Mediterranean country located on the Balkan

Peninsula, which does not often appear at the forefront of international news, except in

2017 when US President Donald Trump inconsiderately pushed past former Montenegrin

Prime Minister Duško Marković at a NATO Summit. With an area of 13,812 square

kilometers and approximately 650,000 inhabitants, Montenegro was part of the former

Yugoslavia before the latter was dismantled in 1992. at year, Montenegro, Serbia, and the

Kosovo province joined to become the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was further

renamed in 2003 as Serbia (at the time, it included Kosovo, until that country declared

its independence in 2008) and Montenegro. When in 2006 Montenegro became a fully

independent state following a referendum, its government started to gear its foreign policy

towards EU integration and full Union membership. Today, Montenegro is considered

to be part of the “Western Balkan” (WB) countries, which includes Montenegro, Serbia,

 Edina Paleviq, Andrássy University Budapest, Hungary, edina.paleviq@andrassyuni.hu.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p67-85

PALEVIQ, Edina

Kosovo, the Republic of North Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina―all

countries that hold a perspective for EU accession but are not yet EU members. In 2003,

at a summit in essaloniki where the government representatives of the EU member

states came together, the WB countries received assurance from the European Council that

membership was on the horizon for them. However, over two decades have passed since the

EU accession process has started in those countries. Moreover, over the years, the European

Commission (EC) has proposed a number of enlargement methodologies for the WB, so

that the credibility of an imminent EU membership is slowly diminishing in the region.

e Copenhagen criteria, established by the European Council in June 1993, outline

the necessary conditions for countries to become EU members. ese criteria are divided

into three main categories: political policy, economic policy, and acceptance of the acquis

communautaire. e political criteria are focused on institutional stability, as to guarantee

democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.

e economic criteria demand the presence of a functioning market economy and the

capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Acceptance

of the acquis communautaire involves the ability to take on the obligations EU membership

entails, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. e

acquis thus represents the main body of EU conditionality, as set by the Copenhagen

European Council in June 1993. It includes all rights and obligations that are binding on

all EU member states, contained in the primary law of the EU treaties, secondary law—all

legal acts, such as regulations and directives—and the judgments of the Court of Justice, as

well as all international treaties on EU matters. e acquis is divided into up to 35 diﬀerent

“chapters” for the purpose of membership negotiations between the EU and a candidate

country (33 for Montenegro). e progress made in the accession process is measured by the

number of chapters that have been opened and provisionally closed. A chapter is “opened”

when the European Commission (EC), together with a candidate country, scrutinizes each

policy ﬁeld with respect to the conditions lined up under that particular chapter. When

the EC deems that the conditions have been met, the chapter can be “closed,” which is

an indicator of success for government oﬃcials in the candidate country. EU oﬃcials in

the Directorate General for Enlargement and desk oﬃcers working in EU delegations

in candidate countries monitor the implementation progress in each negotiation chapter

throughout the year. eir evaluations are published by the EC as annual reports to show

both improvements and remaining shortcomings in each candidate country. Furthermore,

even when chapters are fully closed, membership is not necessarily guaranteed, as closed

chapters may be reopened in the course of negotiations. Strictly speaking, the contents

of the acquis aim at the “core goals” of Europeanization, such as the strengthening of

democracy and the rule of law. e latter especially constitutes a key conditionality imposed

on candidate countries.

In the WB, EU enlargement and the power of the EU to bring about transformation

there or within the Union itself have increasingly been questioned. Although the WB

countries have taken robust steps towards EU integration, there has been no concrete

indication about when any of them could access membership. is stagnation has been

two-sided and based on various factors. On the one hand, the EU has lacked the ambition

Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s Europeanization

to make the changes necessary for new members to join. is shortcoming does not come

as a surprise, since the Union has been marked by many crises in recent years, such as the

ﬁnancial and economic crisis, the migration and refugee crisis (Hobolt 2018), the rise of

populism (D’Alimonte 2019) and Euroscepticism, EU disintegration (Rosamond 2019),

and more recently the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. us, among other issues, the

capacity of the Union and its institutions to accept new members is likely to remain

a problem in itself. On the other hand, the enlargement process has been hampered

by the inability of the WB countries to meet the accession criteria set by the EU. And

since “the EU is politically not ready to enlarge, while the prospective candidates are

politically not ready to accede” (Economides 2020, 2), a dilemma has arisen, bringing

uncertainty and raising doubts among decision-makers in the WB, with a number of

them even turning their backs on the European path and preparing for other alternatives.

In particular, powerful non-Western third party actors such as Russia, China, Turkey, and

the Gulf states have been increasingly present in the region to support WB countries in

various spheres, from economics to religion (see Prelec 2020). ese circumstances may

lead to changes in the balance of power among international actors and in geostrategic

stability. While conditionality has been a long-standing aspect of EU accession processes,

it is considered “new” in the context of this study due to its evolving application and

the increasing emphasis on speciﬁc policy areas such as the judiciary and freedom of

expression in recent years. is evolution reﬂects a more nuanced and rigorous approach

tailored to address contemporary challenges in candidate countries.

e main challenges currently facing the EU are the backsliding of democracy and the

rule of law and human rights violations in parts of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE),

especially in Hungary and Poland (see Kapidžić 2020). is slipping back of democratic

ideals has taken place despite the fact that the EU, through heavy conditions, induced

various reforms and transformed the CEE accession candidates into modern EU member

states (Gateva 2016). EU conditionality constitutes a set of rules and norms set by the

EC for candidate countries to implement as a pre-condition to membership. ese rules

and norms are key instruments through which the EU has sought to foster the promotion

of human rights, democratization, and “good governance,” as well as improve democratic

reforms, the market economy, and legal structures in candidate countries. e relapse in

democratic values has been observed in the CEE but also WB countries. e eﬀects of EU

conditionality on candidate states have been criticized in both CEE (Dallara 2014; Magen

and Morlino 2009) and WB countries. Researchers have argued that promoting the rule

of law has only led to superﬁcial reforms in the WB (Elbasani and Šabić 2018) and that

formal and informal political leaders have continued to control the state and maintained

their private economic interests and grip on political power (Kmezić 2017; Dallara 2014).

Building on these critiques about WB countries in general, this chapter assesses the

eﬀectiveness of EU conditionality in Montenegro, focusing in particular on the eﬀectiveness

of the EU’s “new approach” in strengthening the rule of law. is new methodology, which

prioritizes chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom, and

security)—known as the “fundamental chapters” for their critical role in the accession

process—mandates that these chapters be the ﬁrst to be opened and the last to be closed in

PALEVIQ, Edina

EU accession negotiations. Montenegro currently ranks higher than all other WB countries

in meeting EU accession standards, thus providing a signiﬁcant case study for evaluating the

impact of these reforms. is chapter engages in the ways in which this new strategy might

strengthen the rule of law in Montenegro but argues that, so far, conditionality has not

worked successfully beyond the norm adoption phase. In reality, institutions and legislations

have been harmonized, in line with EU norms, in areas such as the rule of law, human

rights, and freedom of expression, but major problems have emerged in implementation.

At fault are a lack of clarity in EU demands but also a lack of genuine dedication to reforms

on the part of Montenegrin political leaders, who do not have a sincere and principled

commitment to Europeanization, which they use instead as a pretext for political gain.

ese leaders have indeed beneﬁtted from their long-ruling presence, which has created a

speciﬁc national political culture that hinders the implementation and internalization of

EU values and norms across Montenegrin society.

e WB countries that expect EU accession are often lumped together in the

literature on Europeanization, but there has been a dearth of studies speciﬁcally

devoted to Montenegro’s accession process. Moreover, scholars have undertheorized the

relationship between the eﬀort of the EU to strengthen democracy and the rule of law

through its conditionality and implementation in the WB candidate countries. is study

focuses on Montenegro as the front-runner in the accession process to test two areas in

the promotion of the rule of law: judiciary reform under Chapter 24 and freedom of

expression under Chapter 23 of the acquis communautaire (acquis), i.e., the negotiation

chapters. Chapter 24 covers diﬀerent dimensions of organized crime—such as human

and drug traﬃcking—terrorism, borders and Schengen-based rules, migration, asylum,

judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, and customs and police cooperation.

Chapter 23 covers the judiciary, the ﬁght against corruption, and fundamental rights—

including freedom of expression and the rights of EU citizens. For negotiations about

EU accession to begin, candidate countries must show that these freedoms and rights are

present domestically. e areas covered in chapters 23 and 24 are also usually reviewed

in the European Commission progress reports, where the rule of law performance

lag—which measures the fundamental aspects of institutions such as the independence

of the judiciary, the ﬁght against corruption and organized crime, and the freedom of

expression—is regularly highlighted. By focusing on Montenegro, this chapter also

contributes to the discussion on Europeanization and the strengthening of the rule of law

along EU standards in other new candidate member states. It paves the way for further

research on the credible future of EU enlargement. Indeed, analyzing the experience of

Montenegro independently from that of other WB countries provides useful solutions to

the failures of EU conditionality overall.

Drawing from two Europeanization theories, namely rationalist institutionalism

(which sees Europeanization as driven by the EU) and constructivist institutionalism

(which sees Europeanization as driven by candidate states), this study highlights the gap

between rule adoption and implementation to show that there is a lack of commitment

on both the EU’s and Montenegro’s side; this gap has caused stagnation in Montenegro’s

integration process. Furthermore, the demonstration combines two methodological

Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s Europeanization

threads. First, based on rationalist institutionalism, the normative approach is used

to analyze the content of the rule of law in both the judicial sector and freedom of

expression to test the EU’s external requirements for rule adoption. Second, based on

constructivist institutionalism, the chapter empirically evaluates the ways in which rules

are implemented and internalized through an examination of national media content and

reports by non-governmental organizations on the integration process.

A Conceptual Analysis

e term “Europeanization” was ﬁrst used in the 1980s and since then has usually

described the impact of European integration and governance on EU member states

(Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Treib 2014). Since the 1990s, when the EU began to

promote general principles of political order such as democracy, human rights, and a

functioning rule of law in post-communist countries (Lavenex 2004, 695), the concept

has gained popularity among Europeanists. e transfer of EU general principles has led

to the further use of the concept of Europeanization within candidate countries and the

rise of a separate sub-ﬁeld in Europeanization research. is new realm of inquiry has

entailed an examination of the EU’s inﬂuence on national domestic politics in candidate

(and potential candidate) countries and of the instruments the EU uses to promote rule

compliance there.

us, the concept of Europeanization has been used to measure the inﬂuence of the

EU on domestic politics in both member states and candidate countries. At times, it has

also been understood as a short cut for modernization (Hood 1998). In this sense, it is

the outcome of transformation processes that is being measured in a particular country’s

policies or institutions. Moreover, Europeanization has also been described as the process

of rule adaption and a framework for domestic interactions in individual countries. In line

with these approaches, Europeanization is understood here as a politically driven process

in which EU institutions, rules, and policy-making inﬂuence domestic legal systems,

institutional mechanisms, and the formation of a collective cultural identity in EU

candidate states. One core requirement of Europeanization rests on the commitment to

adopt the acquis. While full implementation and enforcement of the acquis occur during

the accession negotiations, national government bodies must demonstrate a willingness

to align their policies with EU criteria as part of the candidacy process.

During the previous enlargements of 2004 and 2007, EU conditionality brought

about great progress in the eﬀectiveness of governance in CEE countries. Nevertheless,

problems such as corruption and organized crime came to light after some countries

gained membership. For example, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession highlighted the

challenges of ensuring sustained rule of law reforms, as both countries faced signiﬁcant

diﬃculties in addressing corruption and the lack of judicial independence, which persisted

post-accession. ese hurdles led the EU to implement the Cooperation and Veriﬁcation

Mechanism (CVM) to monitor and support reforms by providing a structure for the

continuous evaluation of progress made on these issues. is new tool underscored the

PALEVIQ, Edina

importance of maintaining rigorous oversight even after formal accession to ensure that

the foundational principles of the EU are upheld (Carp 2014). After the creation of the

CVM, the concept of the rule of law began to take on a diﬀerent meaning throughout the

Union because it has had to be applied to diﬀerent legal systems in member states where

democratic values developed at diﬀerent rates. Moreover, crises emerged around the idea

of the rule of law within the Union itself, and the EU became divided over fundamental

values. For example, the situation in Hungary and Poland has profoundly impacted the

enlargement of the EU in the WB based on concerns over the erosion of democratic norms

and the rule of law. Both countries have faced criticism for their governments’ attempts to

undermine judicial independence, restrict the freedom of the media, and weaken checks

and balances (Dominguez and Sanahuja 2023; Razin and Sadka 2023), in contradiction

with the Union’s fundamental value and in conﬂict with EU institutions. e term

“enlargement fatigue” (Szołucha 2010) has even spread among Europeanists to explain

that the EU is no longer ready—nor able—to accept new members; this fatigue could

in turn overwhelm EU processes and institutions while also undermining the economic

prospects of the Union. Additionally, many member states have expressed dissatisfaction

with the eﬀectiveness of the acquis. e fact that the WB countries have not historically

upheld the rule of law has hindered the expectation that previous acquis conditions could

eﬀectively transform the process of Europeanization in these countries. Hence for the ﬁrst

time, the EU Council deemed the rule of law to be fundamental to the accession process

for WB countries, a departure from its strategy in previous enlargements.

In 2011, in response to diﬃculties in Romania and Bulgaria, the EU Commission

adopted the “new approach” that foresees that Chapter 23, which focuses on “Judiciary

and Fundamental Rights,” and Chapter 24, which focuses on “Justice, Freedom, and

Security,” will be opened early in membership talks. e new approach also mandates the

EU Commission to monitor the assumed obligations and track the record of candidate

states in these two areas during the entire negotiation process, also mandating that

negotiations can only end when chapters 23 and 24 have been closed (Wunsch 2018).

e overall pace of the talks is, thus, determined by the progress made on these two

chapters (Nozar 2012). It is understood that the issues these two chapters cover “should

be tackled in the accession process and the corresponding chapters opened accordingly

based on action plans, as they require the establishment of a convincing track record”

(European Commission 2011, 5). e new approach extends the negotiation process

on chapters 23 and 24 and introduces for the ﬁrst time interim benchmarks in addition

to the existing opening and closing benchmarks. e interim benchmarks are linked to

key elements of the acquis. Generally, opening benchmarks entails key preparatory steps

for future alignment—such as strategies and action plans—and for the fulﬁllment of

contractual obligations that mirror acquis requirements. In contrast, closing benchmarks

focuses on legislative measures, administrative or judicial bodies, and the implementation

of the acquis. e interim benchmarks added in the case of WB countries aim to further

guide the reform process and keep it on track. ey are designed to ensure continuous

and veriﬁable progress, focusing on how well new institutions function, how independent

the judicial system is, and how eﬀective anti-corruption measures are. Unlike traditional

Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s Europeanization

benchmarks that only set start and end points, interim benchmarks provide measurable

indicators of progress at various stages of the negotiation process (Tilev 2020; Blockmans

2014). is ensures that reforms are not simply initiated but also sustained and eﬀectively

implemented. Furthermore, for the ﬁrst time, local stakeholders and civil society

organizations are involved in the negotiations and their monitoring, which enhances

transparency and accountability and ensures that reforms are rooted in the local context.

By the time the new methodology had been adopted in 2011, Croatia was already in the

process of concluding negotiations and preparing to sign its accession treaty. erefore, it

was too late to implement the new approach and ﬁrmly anchor the rule of law there. Since

Montenegro had been at the time only in the process of opening negotiations, in eﬀect

it became the ﬁrst candidate country to negotiate with the EU under the new approach

(Wunsch 2018). By 2020, all 33 chapters of the acquis that applied to Montenegro would

be opened, and three were even provisionally closed. However, the pace of negotiations

has been slow since 2017, with no additional chapters closing.

Theoretical Approaches to Europeanization for the Implementation

of the Rule of Law

Europeanization is not in itself a theory; it is a phenomenon, which a number of

theoretical approaches have sought to explain (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004;

Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfenning 2015). e theoretical perspectives often used in

Europeanization studies have deﬁned the various mechanisms by which the EU inﬂuences

and places conditions on candidate countries to meet EU requirements. Scholars

analyzing the accession process of CEE countries have distinguished between two main

explanations of the mechanisms of Europeanization (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier

2004). Europeanization can be driven on the one hand by the EU and on the other hand

by domestic factors. Furthermore, when candidate countries adapt to EU norms, they

do so based on two institutional logics: the “logic of consequence,” which derives from

“rationalist institutionalism,” and “the logic of appropriateness,” which emanates from

“constructivist institutionalism” (March and Olsen 1989, 160-162).

Rationalist institutionalism, often referred to as “rational institutionalism,” focuses

on the impact of EU conditionality on candidate countries and addresses how clearly

these conditions are articulated. is theoretical approach assumes that rational actors

engage in strategic interactions to maximize their power, utility, and welfare under

given circumstances. Moreover, the “logic of consequence” indicates that the candidate

countries’ cost-beneﬁt calculations can be manipulated by the EU through external

incentives. us, the EU sets rules and norms, which candidate countries must adopt; and

the primary strategy through which the EU enforces the adoption and implementation of

these rules and norms in target countries is “reinforcement by reward” (Schimmelfennig

and Sedelmeier 2004). Research on the eﬀectiveness of conditionality in CEE and WB

countries has shown that rationalist institutionalism based on the “logic of consequence”

PALEVIQ, Edina

has not been successful at solving problems arising in the area of the rule of law. Many

factors have reduced the overall credibility of conditionality as a path to membership:

determinacy of EU conditions, the speed of reward (EU membership), the domestic

cost of adopting EU rules, as well as the role of veto players, such as private and public

domestic actors. e second mechanism—constructivist institutionalism—is based on

the “logic of appropriateness” and focuses on “norm socialization,” which leads both the

government and the general population in the candidate country to positively identify

with the EU and consider the rules promoted by the EU as legitimate and appropriate.

Constructivism, in this context, entails the mutual construction of identities through

interaction. us, all domestic actors are likely to openly accept behavioral changes and

internalize EU norms through “social learning” and through the development of multiple

soft skill mechanisms, which include intergovernmental interactions and transnational

processes involving societal actors. erefore, Europeanists have posited that the

constructivist model is more functional that the rationalist model, as it leads candidate

countries to better integrate by successfully transforming their institutions and changing

the mentality of domestic actors, with long-lasting eﬀects on society (Checkel 2005;

Elbasani 2013; Keil 2013). However, the two approaches must inﬂuence each other in

order for the transformation to materialize. Diagram 1 conceptualizes how rationalist

institutionalism—a top-down approach where rules are set by the EC—combines with

constructivist institutionalism. It shows that both approaches impact each other and lead

candidate countries to not only meet but also internalize EU conditions at the national

level, hence reaching the standards set by the EU.

Diagram 1. e Europeanization Process

Source : e author

Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s Europeanization

Discrepancies often emerge between the planning, adoption, implementation, and

evaluation phases of new measures. e benchmarks set by the EC at the very beginning

of the negotiations are often not suﬃciently concrete to help a candidate country meet

those demands. e limited availability of clear and unambiguous rules—i.e., the “hard

acquis,” which includes interim benchmarks—makes it diﬃcult for candidate countries to

identify precisely which reforms they need to adopt. is is especially true under Chapter

23, which focuses on “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights.”

Montenegro must meet 83 interim benchmarks: 45 under Chapter 23 and 38 under

Chapter 24. Closing these chapters’ overall benchmarks can only happen once the

interim benchmarks have been satisfactorily met. To meet the conditions set by the EU,

Montenegro has prepared strategic and action plans, which were approved by the EC.

However, the fulﬁllment of EU conditions and benchmarks can best be achieved through

“social learning.” According to this constructivist approach, social actors, such as domestic

stakeholders, decision makers, and civil society, are all involved in accession negotiations,

in a bottom-up approach that ensures that the rules of the EU correspond to what people

want domestically and that the policies that comply with EU rules are sound.

The Essence of the EU Rule of Law Conditionality

Alongside the principles of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and human

rights, the rule of law is deﬁned in Article 2 of the EU Treaty. Operationally, the rule of

law is a central dimension in four distinct core areas of EU identity and activity (Magen

2016):

1. It is a fundamental value upon which the Union itself is founded;

2. it is a requirement of trust essential to the functioning of the internal market,

along with freedom, security, and justice;

3. it is a signiﬁcant element of the way in which the EU engages with the world and

envisages its role as a global actor; and

4. it is a key criterion of eligibility for EU membership.

Functionally, the rule of law performs two main tasks. First, it ensures that people in

positions of power exercise this power within the restrictive framework of well-established

public norms, rather than in an arbitrary, ad hoc, or purely discretionary manner. Second,

the rule of law manages and coordinates citizens’ behaviors and activities (Tamanaha

2012). For the rule of law to be eﬀective and long-lasting, not only must institutions be

independent from the executive branch, but society as a whole—all citizens, including the

elites in power—must internalize and identify with the law. To reach this goal, procedures

must be as transparent as possible; laws must be public and easy for citizens to access.

Furthermore, laws should be explicit, clear, and prospective, rather than retroactive.

Moreover, the drafting of laws must follow known, clear, and stable rules (Magen 2016).

PALEVIQ, Edina

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the rule of law and fundamental rights have been

increasingly the focus in the EU, particularly for integration. Citizens now expect their

government to ensure the conditions for a safe and prosperous living environment,

where their rights are protected not only against crime but also against state authorities

themselves. e rule of law has been considered an important tool to ﬁght corruption

and poverty, address democratic dysfunctions, and avoid or stop ongoing conﬂicts. ree

conditions must be met for the rule of law to emerge: the judicial system must work

eﬀectively; organized crime and corruption must be absent; and fundamental rights must

be respected (Nozar 2012). However, there is a fundamental historical diﬀerence in how

the rule of law has developed in post-communist and Western European countries. While

in most European countries the rule of law emerged conceptually before democracy did

(Fleiner and Basta 2009; Pech 2009), in post-communist countries, it came about only

in the mid-1990s, so that these countries found themselves simultaneously adopting

democracy and a liberalized market economy. During that time, the harsh political and

economic situation in some of the WB countries created an environment that allowed for

the development of criminal networks, for example those focused on cigarette smuggling

or drug and human traﬃcking. Economic gains made through illegal markets were

slowly invested in the licit economy through money laundering. Today, organized crime,

corruption, and nepotism have remained prevalent in WB societies. Moreover, judicial

administrations in these countries are often staﬀed with people who have served in previous

regimes, and thus the system lacks eﬃciency (Nozar 2012). Whereas conditionality may

produce successful results in countries with long democratic traditions and independent

institutions, it may not have the same eﬀect in countries in transition.

Reforming the Judiciary in Montenegro

e EC’s yearly reports account for almost all the obstacles to judicial independence,

freedom of expression, and organized crime and corruption in Montenegro. e purpose

of the “new approach,” based on Chapter 23 “Judicial and fundamental rights” and

Chapter 24 “Justice, freedom and security,” is to assist the country in engaging complex

reforms from the beginning of the accession process. Apart from technical aspects, such

as capacity building and legislative alignment, the closing of these two chapters would

require Montenegro to prove a track record of ﬁghting organized crime and high-level

corruption. However, Montenegro has shown to be deﬁcient in its judiciary reforms and

in protecting the freedom of expression.

Analyzing reforms pertaining to the judiciary in Montenegro is key to understanding

how the new approach has played out there. A functioning judiciary underlies the idea

of a modern state, as it is a fundamental principle and integral element of all liberal

democracies and democracy building. Montenegro has strived to start the process of EU

integration as eﬀectively as possible. erefore, the introduction of judiciary legislation

and fundamental rights in Montenegro, as well as regulations on justice, freedom,

and security that abide by EU rules have led to positive evaluations by the European

Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s Europeanization

Commission. e pressure of EU conditionality has indeed yielded improvements in

Montenegrin legislation, as the government has passed laws and established formal

institutional frameworks in line with EU rules; however, Montenegro has been unable

to extinguish certain issues within the judiciary since EU standards for judiciary reforms

emphasize the rule of law, judicial independence, and robust anti-corruption measures.

Candidate countries must ensure transparent, accountable, and politically unbiased

judicial institutions as part of the Copenhagen criteria (Kmezić 2019), which Montenegro

has not done.

After Montenegro’s independence in 2006, Montenegrin institutions started

incorporating stronger rule of law principles. For example, a judicial reform was eﬀected

between 2007 and 2012, setting out priorities for establishing a transparent employment

and promotion system among judges on the basis of objectively measurable criteria. A

new constitution was also adopted in 2007 to limit political control over the judiciary.

A law was also passed to regulate judiciary oﬃcers’ salaries and other earnings as well as

the procedure followed by the state prosecutor’s oﬃce. Furthermore, in the same year, a

law was adopted to regulate how judges sitting on the Judicial Council are to be elected.

e Judicial and Prosecutorial Council also adopted e Rules of Procedure in 2011,

establishing clearer criteria for the appointment, dismissal, evaluation, and promotion of

judges and prosecutors, as well as criteria for disciplinary proceedings concerning judges.

In particular, the new constitution stipulates that the Parliament elects the Supreme State

Prosecutor and four members of the Judicial Council (from among prominent lawyers)

by a two-third majority (55 MPs) in the ﬁrst electoral round and by an absolute majority

(49 MPs) in the second round. However, achieving this majority can often take time

because the parliamentary opposition has been divided.

Individuals holding long-term judiciary positions represent another concern in

Montenegro (European Commission 2020). For example, the President of the Supreme

Court, Vesna Medenica, was greatly criticized by non-governmental organizations

when the Judicial Council elected her for the third time in elections that were deemed

unconstitutional because they violated Article 124 (5) of the Constitution that limits that

function to two terms (Centre for Civic Education 2019). e EC explained that:

e decision of the Judicial Council to reappoint seven court presidents, including

the President of the Supreme Court, for at least a third term raises serious

concerns over the Judicial Council’s interpretation of the letter and the spirit

of the Constitutional and legal framework, which limits those appointments to

maximum two terms to prevent over-concentration of power within the judiciary

(European Commission, 5).

As a result, Vesna Medenica, who is considered to be the most powerful woman in

Montenegro, resigned from her position after a thirteen-year tenure (Vijesti, June 04,

2021).

PALEVIQ, Edina

In Montenegro, the same ruling party has been in power since 1991. e government’s

leaders who are part of this group have been able to undermine the consolidation of

independent judicial institutions and maintain control over public administrations,

the media, and the electoral process while pursuing their own interests, which include

remaining in power (Džankić and Keil 2019, 193). In 2012 and 2019, there were several

election-related corruption scandals in the country, known as the “Tape Recording

Aﬀairs.” ese scandals involved leaked recordings of conversations between members of

the ruling party. e ﬁrst recording was released at the beginning of 2013 and exposed

Zoran Jelić, the Director of the Employment Agency. On the tape, he is heard promising

jobs to four people in exchange for their votes in favor of the ruling party (Democratic

Party of Socialists, DPS) (Janković, March 07, 2017). Although the Parliament asked the

state prosecutor to investigate the aﬀair, the inquiry did not result in the prosecution or

conviction of those responsible for the corruption. e court’s decision led the largest

governmental coalition to boycott parliamentary sessions in protest. Nonetheless, the

ruling party won the 2012 parliamentary elections (MANS 2013, 18). In the end, instead

of a conviction, Zoran Jelić was promoted to the State Audit Institution, while his wife

replaced him at the Employment Agency. Another tape recording scandal, known as the

“Envelope Aﬀair,” emerged in 2019 when a video clip was posted on social media showing

Duško Knežević, one of Montenegro’s richest businessmen who owns Atlas Bank and

represents Djukanović’s ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, handing the former mayor

of Podgorica an envelope containing 97,000 Euros before the parliamentary elections

of 2016. Since this donation was not mentioned in the party’s ﬁnal campaign report, a

lawsuit against the president and chief prosecutor was initiated based on suspected money

laundering; it was also suspected that the protagonists intended to form an organized

crime group. Although this case would require an independent and eﬀective institutional

response, to date, there has been no further development in the judicial follow-up of the

alleged misuse of public funds for political party purposes.

On the one hand, these two scandals caused citizens to gradually lower their expectations

about the likelihood of a fair judiciary, and this distrust has been evidenced by nationwide

surveys conducted by the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM). In 2020,

only 39.7 percent of citizens said they trusted the judiciary, dropping from 41.9 percent in

2019 and 42.5 percent in 2018 (CEDEM 2020). On the other hand, what these scandals

also revealed is the level of corruption still existing at the heart of judicial institutions

and the strong legacy of communist rule in the administrative sector in terms of abuse of

power—under the communist regime, the executive traditionally dominated the judiciary

(Kmezić 2017). e uniqueness of Montenegrin social heritage and traditions, which are

still anchored in the tribal-Achaean model of identity founded on kinship, constitutes a

favorable terrain for the condoning of corrupt behavior. is context is inﬂuenced by the

history of a certain collective political identity in ancient Greece, where intense rivalries

and tribal aﬃliations gradually led to a broader sense of unity and political structure

(see Economou 2020; Blackburn 2012). Similarly, in Montenegro, social connections

among citizens remain inﬂuenced by the country’s history as a tribal society, of which

some traits persist, leading to interactions being often perceived through the tribal lens.

Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s Europeanization

Individuals are not seen solely as individuals but as members of a family or a tribe, and

they are recognized through their surname (see Batrićević 2023; Simic 2019). ese deep-

rooted tribal aﬃliations, local loyalties, and kinship traditions can overshadow national

laws and ethics, shaping social and political dynamics and enabling the acceptance of

corrupt practices. Indeed, kinship networks play a crucial role in social and economic

interactions in Montenegro. e immediate or extended family often functions as a

primary support system, providing assistance in times of need, for example to secure

employment opportunities. is network is so inﬂuential that it can aﬀect decision-

making processes in both personal and professional spheres, as people may prioritize

familial loyalty over merit or legal considerations. roughout Montenegro’s history, the

tribal system has stood as a form of social organization in which each tribe, or “pleme,” is

an autonomous unit with its own leadership and territory. is system has fostered a sense

of solidarity and mutual assistance among tribal members but also perpetuated rivalries

and conﬂicts among diﬀerent tribes (Cvijić 1922). Despite modernization, remnants

of this system continue to inﬂuence contemporary Montenegrin society. ese cultural

features have shaped both institutional and non-institutional arrangements (Sedlenieks

2015) and hindered the ﬁght against corruption and nepotism, making it diﬃcult to build

a merit-based employment system. Clearly, the EU determinacy has failed to account for

Montenegrin socio-historical aspects and has focused instead on the technical capacities

of the judiciary, such as judges’ training or improvements in infrastructure (Mendelski

2013). e EU top-down approach, with its focus on institution building, has failed

to sanction corrupt elites who have blocked the creation of a system that could foster

citizens’ trust in the law and institutions.

Freedom of Expression in Montenegro

Freedom of expression is a fundamental prerequisite for human rights and sustainable

democratic development. According to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, freedom of expression represents the right of every individual to hold opinions

without interference and to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,

regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through

any other media of choice” (Global Freedom of Expression 2015). Since the EU has

borrowed heavily from the Universal Declaration in its own texts, freedom of expression

has also been part of its foundational values—as noted in Article 2 of the Treaty on the

EU—and an important criteria candidate countries must fulﬁll to join the Union. In

particular, freedom of expression is required for democracy, governance, and political

accountability to improve. Under the “new approach,” accession negotiations address

freedom of expression under Chapter 23 (Judicial and Fundamental Rights), and media-

related issues are raised under Chapter 10 (Information Society and Media).

Although the acquis does not clearly deﬁne the media landscape, the term generally

pertains to the overall context in which media organizations operate, accounting for the

types of media available (such as print, broadcast, and digital), the nature of ownership

PALEVIQ, Edina

and control of media outlets, the regulatory framework governing the media, and the

conditions aﬀecting media freedom and journalistic practices. e EC has put forward

mechanisms to help candidate countries create an environment favorable to freedom of

speech and to measure improvements in this area, for example through the assessment

of whether investigative journalists risk external pressures. e EC also evaluates the

extent to which professional journalistic organizations can dialogue with the authorities

on relevant sectoral issues. ese measurable objectives are then combined with tangible

benchmarks, which gauge various other elements:

• e legislation aﬀecting the media;

• Statements made by public oﬃcials resulting in the media self-censoring;

• Physical attacks, threats, and other forms of intimidation toward journalists; or

• e transparent delivery of state aid and ﬁnancial assistance by state-owned

enterprises to the media (European Commission 2014).

Montenegro has guaranteed pluralism in its legal framework to enhance freedom of

speech and of the press, as well as the development of free media. e 2007 Montenegrin

constitution also guarantees freedom of expression in the spoken and written word,

images, and any other medium. e constitution has not only protected the freedom of

the press but has further prohibited censorship and guaranteed that people have access to

information. It has outlawed imprisonment as punishment for libel and ensured a high

level of protection for the media, committing Montenegrin institutions to interpreting

laws in light of European human rights standards. But in reality, governmental authorities

have continued to insult and harass the media and professional journalists. is hostility

has been exacerbated by a lack of eﬃciency in judicial processes, which frequently fail

to protect journalists and eﬀectively prosecute perpetrators of crimes against journalists

(Trpevska and Micevski 2018). Most attacks targeting independent or pro-opposition

journalists and professionals (Kajošević 2021) have remained unresolved cases, which

has challenged EU integration. For example, Vijesti’s investigative reporter Olivera Lakić

was shot in the foot in front of her house in Podgorica in 2018 in an attempted murder.

e attack likely stemmed from her report providing incriminating information that

threatened powerful interests. e police identiﬁed nine members of a criminal gang

in 2019 as the culprits, but no formal charges were ever ﬁled. Such attacks show how

journalists in Montenegro are intimidated when investigating corruption or other

sensitive topics. According to media reports, out of the 85 attacks perpetrated against

journalists since 2004, more than two-thirds have resulted in unresolved investigations

or no conviction.

In addition, ownership of the media is concentrated and lacks transparency in

Montenegro, which raises concerns about plurality, diversity of viewpoints, and media

political independence. In fact, media outlets are often politically controlled and

inﬂuenced, which undermines their editorial independence and leads to biased reporting.

is situation aﬀects the overall quality of journalism and erodes public trust in media

institutions. Social inclusiveness and pluralism in Montenegro’s media landscape is also

Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s Europeanization

limited by signiﬁcant barriers preventing minorities and marginalized groups from fully

participating and having their voices heard. e media regulatory framework is insuﬃcient

to address these risks eﬀectively and ensure transparency in media ownership and editorial

independence from political and economic pressures. e digital media landscape in

Montenegro mirrors the traditional media environment, with similar issues of ownership

concentration and political inﬂuence. e same risks aﬀecting traditional media also

impact digital media, highlighting the intertwined nature of these platforms (Manninen

and Hjerppe 2021). e government in oﬃce at the time of writing has promised to

strengthen the freedom of the press and improve conditions for the media and journalists.

However, the legislation has not changed, and there has been no improvement in the

investigation of violence against journalists so far. is attitude toward the media can

be attributed to the legacy of 60 years of communist rule during which the regime had

absolute control over the media (Jović 2008). When Montenegro became independent in

2006, the government focused fully on political reforms, but it has continued to use the

same authoritarian mechanisms to exercise control over the media as those used before

independence. Meanwhile, most media outlets have admitted to being at the service of

the long-ruling party and to be aﬃliated with political and economic centers. Moreover,

private media often take on a leading role in defamation campaigns against critics of the

government (Nikočević and Uljarević 2019).

Effectiveness of EU Conditionality in Montenegro

Drawing on theories of Europeanization (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2006), this

chapter has identiﬁed and explained the gap between the adoption and implementation

of rule of law reforms in Montenegro in the face of EU accession conditionality. Despite

the undeniable positive change brought about by conditionality in terms of aligning

domestic legislation with the European acquis in Montenegro, the development of

democratic institutions has remained arduous because political elites have overshadowed

the integration process and checks and balances have eroded in the context of incidences

of abuse of power that have remained unpunished. e Montenegrin political sphere still

suﬀers from clientelism, as politicians are still inﬂuenced by personal acquaintances in

their decision-making. Likewise, the highly politicized judicial system has shown deep-

rooted corruption. Both clientelism and corruption have undermined the freedom of

expression and the credibility of institutions, as the latter have remained weak and failed

to solidify lasting judicial reforms during the pre-accession phase of EU membership

negotiations.

In Montenegro, a strict application of the “new approach” to EU membership has

sought to Europeanize the country. However, the conditions the EU has imposed on

Montenegro have remained ambiguous, based on vague criteria, unclear membership

promises, and administrative ineﬃciencies, which has made progress diﬃcult to measure

(Bonomi 2020). e level of corruption and organized crime in a social and political

environment such as Montenegro’s is diﬃcult to evaluate. One solution may be to conduct

PALEVIQ, Edina

surveys to learn about the citizens’ experiences with and perceptions of corruption, but

people’s political or sensitivity biases may inﬂuence survey results. Another option might

be to analyze the existing legislative and institutional framework and decisions by law

enforcement institutions to unveil whether the incidence of crime and corruption has

increased or decreased. e introduction of the stricter new approach to EU membership

has spread skepticism across Montenegrin society because of double standards in

accession conditions. Since the new approach came into eﬀect, the EU has demanded

more from candidate countries than it had in the course of previous enlargements, so

that candidate countries must now exhibit stronger levels of attainment than some of the

current member states did at the time of their accession.

With increasing political integration within the Union itself, a small country such as

Montenegro could be quickly integrated. Unfortunately, in contradiction with its own values

about human rights and the rule of law, the EU has not held Montenegrin elites—who make

use of pro-European rhetoric—accountable. As Montenegro seeks integration into the Union,

this accountability should be strengthened through corrective measures, in particular when

the elites violate the rule of law. Such measures would constitute an essential tool to also

combat people’s skepticism about the normative power of the EU in general.

References

Batrićević, Nemanja. 2023. Tribal Politics in the Balkans: Elections and Nation-Building in

Montenegro. Europe-Asia Studies 75(7):1094-1120.

Blackburn, Stuart. 2012. “e formation of tribal identities.” In e Cambridge Companion to

Modern Indian Culture, edited by V. Dalmia and R. Sadana. Cambridge University Press.

Blockmans, Steven. 2014. EU-Turkey Relations: Turning vicious circles into virtuous ones. CEPS

Policy Brief No. 317, 26 March.

Bonomi, Matteo. 2020. From EU enlargement fatigue to ambiguity. Foundation for European

Progressive Studies (FEPS), the Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung(FES), and the Fondation Jean Jaurès

(FJJ).

Carp, Radu. 2014. e struggle for the rule of law in Romania as an EU Member State: the role

of the cooperation and veriﬁcation mechanism. Utrecht Law Review, 1-16.

Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM). 2020. “Political Public Opinion of

Montenegro.” https://www.cedem.me/en/publications/empirical-research/politacal-public-

opinion/send/33-political-public-opinion/1976-political-public-opinion-poll-august-2020.

Centre for Civic Education. 2019. “Appeal Sent by 11 Montenegrin NGOs to the Judicial

Council of Montenegro Regarding the Decision for Election to the Oﬃce of the President

of the Supreme Court and the Candidate for Election to the Oﬃce of the President of

the Basic Court in Podgorica, Bar, Plav, Rozaje and Kotor | Centre for Civic Education.”

Accessed July 25, 2021. http://cgo-cce.org/en/2019/05/31/pismo-11-nvo-u-vezi-sa-

odlucivanjem-o-prijavama-kandidatkinje-za-izbor-na-funkciju-predsjednika-vrhovnog-suda-

i-kandidata-za-izbor-na-funkcije-predsjednika-osnovnih-sudova-u-podgorici-baru-plavu-ro/#.

YPzCA0BCQ2y.

Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s Europeanization

Checkel, Jeﬀrey T. 2005. “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction

and Framework.” International Organizations 59(04):801-826.

Cvijić, Jovan. 1922. “Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje: osnove antropogeograﬁje”.

Vol. 1. Hrvatski štamparski zavod.

D’Alimonte, Roberto. 2019. ‘How the Populists won in Italy’. Journal of Democracy 30(1):114-

127.

Dallara, Cristina. 2014. Democracy and Judicial Reforms in South-East Europe. Between the EU and

the Legacies of the Past. Cham: Springer.

Dominguez, Roberto, and José Antonio Sanahuja. 2023. “International organizations are more

than states make of them.” In Handbook on Governance in International Organizations, edited

by Alistair Edgar. Edward Elgar Publishing, 326-342.

Džankić, Jelena, and Soeren Keil. 2019. “e Europeanisation of Contest States: Comparing

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro.” In e Europeanisation of the Western

Balkans. A Failure of EU Conditionality?, edited by Jelena Džankić, Soeren Keil, and Marko

Kmezić. Palgrave Macmillan, 135-156.

Economides, Spyros. 2020. “From fatigue to resistance: EU enlargement and the Western

Balkans.” Dahrendorf Forum IV. LSE Ideas, 20 March.

Economou, Emmanouil M.L. 2020. “e Achaean Sympolity (389–146): e Political History.”

In e Achaean Federation in Ancient Greece. Frontiers in Economic History. Springer, 11-48.

doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-52697-9_2.

Elbasani, Arolda, and Senada Š. Šabić. 2018. “Rule of Law, Corruption and Democratic

Accountability in the Course of EU Enlargement.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (9):

1317–35.

Elbasani, Arolda, ed. 2013. European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans:

Europeanization or Business as Usual? Routledge / UACES Contemporary European Studies

25. London: Routledge.

European Commission. 2020. “Montenegro Report 2020.” https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-

enlargement/sites/default/ﬁles/montenegro_report_2020.pdf.

European Commission. 2011. “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011–2011,

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council.”

European Commission. 2014. “Guidelines for EU Support to Media Freedom and Media

Integrity in Enlargement Countries, 2014–2020.”

Fleiner, omas, and Lidija R. Basta. 2009. Constitutional Democracy in a Multicultural and

Globalized World. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.

Gateva, E. 2016. European Union Enlargement Conditionality. London: Springer.

Global Freedom of Expression. 2015. “United Nations Human Rights System - Global Freedom

of Expression.”. https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/law-standards/united-

nations-human-rights-system/. (accessed July 25, 2021).

Goetz, Klaus H., and Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling. 2008. “e Europeanisation of National

Political Systems: Parliaments and Executives.” Living Rev. Euro. Gov. 3 (2). http://www.

livingreviews.org/lreg-2008-2 (accessed July 25, 2021).

Grabbe, Heather. 2006. e EU’s transformative power. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan..

PALEVIQ, Edina

Hobolt, Sara B. 2018 “e Crisis of Legitimacy of European Institutions.” In Europe’s Crises,

edited by Manuel Castells, Olivier Bouin, Joao Caraça, Gustavo Cardoso, John ompson,

and Michel Wieviorka. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 243-268.

Hood, Christopher. 1998. e Art of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Janković, Srđan. 2017. “Afere Nisu Prepreka Za Napredak U Državnoj Službi.” Afere nisu prepreka

za napredak u državnoj službi, March 7. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crna-gora-zoran-

jelic-snimak-dri/28355897.html. (accessed July 25, 2021).

Jović, Dejan. 2008. Yugoslavia: Purdue University Press.

Kajošević, Samir. 2021. “Montenegro Mulls Tougher Penalties to Deter Attacks on Journalists.”

BIRN, March 31. https://balkaninsight.com/2021/03//montenegro-mulls-tougher-penalties-

to-deter-attacks-on-journalists/. (accessed July 25, 2021).

Kapidžić, Damir. 2020. ‘e Rise of Illiberal Politics in Southeast Europe’, Southeast European and

Black Sea Studies. 20(1):1-17. doi: 10.1080/14683857.2020.1709701.

Keil, Soeren. 2013. “Europeanization, State-Building and Democratization in the Western

Balkans.” Natl. pap. 41(3):343–53.

Kmezić, Marko. 2017. EU Rule of Law Promotion: Judiciary Reform in the Western Balkans.

Routledge.

Kmezić, Marko. 2019. EU rule of law conditionality: Democracy or ‘Stabilitocracy’promotion

in the Western Balkans? e Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: A failure of EU

conditionality?.

Lavenex, Sandra. 2004. “EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’.” Journal of European Public

Policy 11 (4): 680–700.

Magen, Amichai, and Leonardo Morlino, eds. 2009. International Actors, Democratization and the

Rule of Law. Anchoring Democracy? Routledge.

Magen, Amichai. 2016. “Cracks in the Foundations: Understanding the Great Rule of Law

Debate in the EU.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 54 (5): 1050–61.

Manninen, Ville, and Cecilia Hjerppe. 2021. Monitoring media pluralism in the digital era:

application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro,

e Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia & Turkey in the year 2020: country report:

Finland.

MANS. 2013. “Winning Elections in Montenegro: Analysis of Misuse of Public Funds and

Oﬃce in the Election Campaign.” http://www.mans.co.me/en/wp-content/uploads/

WinningElectionsInMontenegro.pdf. Policy Brief.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: e Organizational Basis of

Politics. Free Press.

Mendelski, Martin. 2013. “Does the EU Make a Diﬀerence? Judicial Reforms in South-Eastern

Europe.” In EU Enlargement and Europeanization in the Western Balkans, edited by A.

Elbasani. Routledge.

Nikočević, Damir, and Daliborka Uljarević. 2019. Stabilo-radical rhapsody in Montenegro.

In: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Oﬃce Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia,

Albania). No.7. November.

Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro’s Europeanization

Nozar, Wolfgang. 2012. e 100% union: e rise of chapters 23 and 24. Clingendael. https://

www.clingendael.org/sites/default/ﬁles/pdfs/e%20100%25%20Union.%20e%20

rise%20of%20Chapters%2023%20and%2024.pdf.

Pech, Laurent. 2009. “e Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union,”

Jean Monnet Working Paper 04/09.

Prelec, Tena. 2020. “‘Our Brothers’, ‘Our Saviours’: e Importance of Chinese Investment

for the Serbian Government’s Narrative of Economic Rebound.” Prague Security Studies

Institute.

Razin, Assaf, and Efraim Sadka. 2023. “Economic Consequences of a Regime Change:

Overview.” NBER Working Paper 31723. doi:10.3386/w31723.

Rosamond, Ben. 2019. “eorising the EU in Crisis: De-Europeanisation as Disintegration.”

Global Discourse 9(1): 31-44.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2004. “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule

Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Journal of European

Public Policy 11 (4): 661–79.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2015. “Europeanization beyond Europe.” Living Reviews in European

Governance 10(1). doi:10.14629/lreg-2015-1.

Sedlenieks, Klavs. 2015. “Buﬀer Culture in Montenegro: Bratstvo, Kumstvo and Other Kin-

Related Structures.” In A Life for Tomorrow. Social Transformations in South-East Europe,

edited by Predrag Cvetičanin, Ilina Mangova and Nenad Markovikj. Institute for Democracy

“Societas Civilis”. Skopje, 199–216.

Simic, Andrei. 2019. Montenegro: Beyond the Myth: Crises in the Balkans. edited by Constantine

Danopoulos. New York: Routledge, 113-133.

Szołucha, Anna. 2010. “e EU and enlargement fatigue: Why has the European Union not been

able to counter enlargement fatigue?” Journal of Contemporary European Research 6(1):107–

122.

Tamanaha, Brian Z. 2012. On the Rule of Law: Cambridge University Press.

Tilev, Dragan. 2020. “e new EU enlargement methodology: enhancing the accession process.”

Institute for Democracy ‘Societas Civilis.

Treib, Oliver. 2014. “Implementing and Complying with EU Governance Outputs.” Living Rev.

Euro. Gov. 9(1). doi:10.12942/lreg-2014-1.

Trpevska, Snežana, and Igor Micevski. 2018. “Indicators on the Level of Media Freedoms and

Journalists’.” Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia.

Vijesti. 2021. “Nema Zahtjeva Medenice Za Upis U Imenik Advokata.” Vijesti, June 4. https://

www.vijesti.me/vijesti/crna-hronika/544941/nema-zahtjeva-medenice-za-upis-u-imenik-

advokata. (accessed July 25, 2021).

Wunsch, Natasha. 2018. EU Enlargement and Civil Society in the Western Balkans. Cham: Springer

International Publishing.

4 Beyond Populism

Sources of EU-Skepticism in the

Visegrad Group

Mare USHKOVSKA1

Abstract: Within the European Union (EU), the Visegrad Group (Czechia, Hungary, Poland,

and Slovakia), known as the V4, has gained the reputation of being a troublemaker because of its

opposition to further European integration. Scholars have studied sovereignism among the V4

countries―which is manifest in their EU-skepticism, anti-immigration stance, and political and

social conservatism― predominantly on the premise that it stems from the inﬂuence populist

parties and their leaders have exerted on domestic audiences. is chapter contends that recent

sovereignist trends are better explained by the presence of grassroots-level discontent, as citizens’

reservations toward the EU within the Group have emerged regardless of the rise of populist

parties in the region. rough descriptive and interpretative quantitative methodologies, this

research uses EU cross-national public opinion survey data to examine the political, social, and

cultural contexts in which public attitudes toward European integration are shaped in the V4.

Findings show that, although people there want to limit the power of the EU—in alignment

with mainstream populist parties—they do not wish for their respective countries to leave the

Union, realizing that the EU provides economic beneﬁts. e study shows that people’s rejection

of immigration and multiculturalism does not depend on their support for right-wing populist

parties, instead stemming from their perceived threat of terrorism and loss of national identity.

Conclusions thus debunk the notion that it is the V4’s populist parties that create an East-West

divide in European values. Although Eastern Europeans are more conservative about social and

political matters than Western Europeans, these attitudes are unrelated to party politics.

In 2016, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared that “there is no free

Europe without nation states” (Dunai 2016). Moreover, at an event to commemorate

the Maastricht Treaty, former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker

protested that “we won’t exist as single nations without the European Union” (Reuters

2016). ese quotes illustrate the divide among European Union leaders and those of

several countries in Central Europe, which was particularly acute in the immediate

aftermath of the migrant crisis but remains a pertinent political issue today. Although

they once led the process of democratic transition following the fall of the communist

system, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, and Poland—which joined the EU at the same

time in 2004—gained the reputation of being “troublemakers” in the EU in the period

 Mare Ushkovska, International Balkan University, Skopje, Macedonia, mare.ushkovska@ibu.edu.mk.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p87-109

USHKOVSKA, Mare

following 2015 because of their nation-centric governments and rebellion against

certain common EU policies (Kajánek 2022; Zalan 2021; Végh 2018). In these four

countries―jointly known as the Visegrad Group, Visegrad Four, or V4 (Figure 1)—

concerns over the future of European integration have developed over the past decade,

as parties described as populist and Euroskeptic have become mainstream politically,

often forming governments. is study inspects whether the positions of political

leaders in the V4 countries regarding European integration correspond to the views of

their respective populations.

Figure 1. e Visegrad Group in Europe

Source: e author (MapChart)

e Visegrad Group has operated as an informal coalition within the European

Union. However, the four neighboring member states making up the group do not share

the same positions on policy, and thus do not constitute a uniform bloc. For example,

Slovakia joined the Eurozone, while the other three states have not; and V4 countries’

foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation has diﬀered. Yet, all four have

cooperated based on their shared history, cultural values, and economic and security

goals. Diplomatic intergovernmental cooperation among the V4 countries has developed

out of a desire to amplify the four countries’ respective voices within the EU and to join

forces to promote their regional positioning.

Since at least three of the V4 states are smaller than many other European states,

during the initial years of their EU membership, it was implied that they would accept

the leadership of more established and larger Western member states and adjust to the

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

expectations that were set for them from the outside. However, over time, V4 leaders have

become more vocal about EU policies, increasingly wishing to inﬂuence the future of

the EU as a whole. e migrant crisis of 2015 exposed stark diﬀerences among member

states, in particular when the V4 countries unilaterally opted to close their respective

borders and refused to comply with top-down instructions coming from the European

Commission about receiving the quota of migrants they were allocated. Furthermore, the

political leadership in each of the V4 countries has resisted proposed plans to further cede

sovereignty to EU institutions for the purpose of establishing common border control

and immigration policies.

While the EU has worked toward normalizing common regimes and shared

sovereignty and reducing state competences in several spheres, such as monetary and

immigration policy (Keating 2008), political elites in the V4 countries have often been

critical of these regimes, rejecting the idea of a federalist project led by “unelected

bureaucrats” who impose “Western” values on populations in the V4 countries. Populists

in these four nations have not, however, opposed the idea of European integration per

se but rather the neo-liberal model the EU proposes. ese populists have aimed to

shape the EU from within, so that it remains true to what they believe was its initial

function: a loose association of sovereign states collaborating on trade and economic

matters. e EU, in turn, has accused the V4 countries—particularly Hungary and

Poland—of “democratic backsliding.”

Debates about recent nationalistic tendencies in the EU have predominantly relied

on the premise that the ruling populist parties inﬂuence the general public. After all,

it is evident that these parties enjoy signiﬁcant public support in V4 countries and, in

some cases, they have even won consecutive elections there. While a number of scholars

have accepted this premise (Pirro and Van Kessel 2017; Guerra 2013; Kopecký and

Mudde 2002), this chapter proposes the argument that such analyses are too simplistic

because they do not account for intrinsic divergences in political cultures and value

systems among diﬀerent European societies, in particular when comparing established

and newer EU member states. erefore, it is both timely and relevant to investigate

public attitudes in the Visegrad Group toward European integration and to unveil the

extent to which people’s political, social, and cultural attitudes align with the stances

of their political leaders.

Scholars Blame it on the Populists

e EU has faced multiple crises in the past decade, starting with the Eurozone crisis,

which was followed by the migrant crisis and Brexit. Academic debates about how these

crises have aﬀected public support for European integration have been fruitful, both from

a theoretical (Rosamond 2019; Schimmelfennig 2018; Tosun, Wetzel, and Zapryanova

2014) and empirical perspective (Harteveld et al. 2018; Serricchio, Tsakatika, and

Quaglia 2013). Initially, scholars explored the binary division between public approval

USHKOVSKA, Mare

and disapproval of European uniﬁcation and EU membership in general (McLaren 2006;

Hooghe and Marks 2004; Gabel 1998). Later, studies explored the multidimensional and

policy-oriented aspects of people’s attitudes toward integration (De Vries and Steenbergen

2013; Stöckel 2013; Boomgaarden et al. 2011). In their seminal work, Hobolt and De

Vries (2016) diﬀerentiated between regime support (i.e., membership in the EU) and

policy support, which they deﬁned as “support for the content of collective decisions and

actions taken by EU actors” (Hobolt and De Vries 2016, 416). is notable distinction

has invited the question of whether Euroskepticism in the Visegrad Group means that

people in those countries wish an exit from the European Union.

With the rise of nation-centric politics in EU member states in recent years, most texts

on Euroskepticism have equated sovereignism with populism (Basile and Mazzoleni 2020;

Kallis 2018; De Spiegeleire, Skinner, and Sweijs 2017), thus attributing the pushback

against any incremental ceding of powers to the EU to the inﬂuence of populist parties.

In the case of the V4 countries, scholars have indeed found links between populist parties,

anti-EU narratives (Pirro and Van Kessel 2017; Guerra 2013; Kopecký and Mudde

2002), and the extent to which Euroskeptic publics vote for populist parties (Santana,

Zagorski, and Rama 2020; Treib 2014; Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2013; Lubbers

and Scheepers 2007). However, scholars have disagreed about the nature of these links.

While some scholars have argued that populist nationalism has been driven by an anti-

establishment sentiment (Lovec et al. 2019), others have refuted this ﬁnding (Santana,

Zagorski, and Rama 2020). Since Euroskeptic parties in the V4 countries have fared well

in general elections, the question arises about whether these parties have triggered certain

public attitudes vis-à-vis the EU, or vice-versa.

is chapter advances four hypotheses to investigate current patterns of public

opinions in the V4 about the EU and national interests, the relationship between these

opinions and support for populist parties in those countries, and the socio-political

factors that drive contestation within the EU.

Hypothesis 1: Most V4 citizens oppose the transfer of additional policy-making

powers to the EU and believe their respective countries would have a better future

outside the EU.

Hypothesis 2: Greater support for populist parties in V4 countries is consistent with

greater opposition to the transfer of additional policy-making powers to the EU.

Hypothesis 3: Increasing support for right-wing populist parties is consistent with

increasingly negative opinions about migrants and religious minorities.

Hypothesis 4: People in V4 countries support conservative political and social

positions more often than people in Western Europe do.

Scholars have commented on the cultural element of populism in the V4 Group:

populists depict cosmopolitan values and multiculturalism as threats to national identities,

which people previously had to defend from the inﬂuence of the Soviet Union (Krastev

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

2017). Although V4 countries have experienced negative net migration, receiving little

inward migration, research has shown that negative attitudes toward immigration are

good predictors of voting patterns there (Santana, Zagorski, and Rama 2020), because

“what matters for cultural attitudes and electoral behavior is not just the number of

migrants that [sic] arrive, but public perceptions of them…” (Norris and Inglehart 2019,

181). e conservatives in V4 countries have presented immigration as proof of the

failure of Western “multiculturalism” and a threat to the perpetuation of the Christian

world (Bluhm and Varga 2020). ese parties commonly exploit citizens’ belief that the

EU threatens people’s traditional values and cultural identities (Styczyńska 2017). us,

scholars have held populist parties in the V4 responsible for the hostile response to the

distribution of migrant quotas during the refugee crisis.

A notable development in the last decade has been the emergence of a new brand

of conservatism in V4 countries, promoted by various political leaders, think tanks

and intellectuals (Bluhm and Varga 2019; Buzogány and Varga 2018). is brand of

conservatism opposes the political centrism and social liberalism typical of most Western

European conservative parties. Political ideology in the V4 has aimed at establishing

strong state autonomy and prioritizing national interests in decision-making. Proponents

of social conservatism in the V4 have promoted the traditional family as the core of

society, re-embracing religiousness and national identity, which they see as endangered

by supranational entities (Bluhm and Varga 2020). Unlike proponents of Western

conservatism, who favor small government and oppose interventionism, proponents of

conservatism in the V4 blame the “weak” state for failing to eﬀectively promote national

interests (Buzogány and Varga 2018). ey prefer a strong, centralized government and

the pursuit of economic nationalism (Harmes 2012).

Hungary and Poland, where this type of conservatism is the most prominent, have been

dubbed “illiberal democracies” by scholars and policy-makers. e political leadership in

these two countries has challenged the norms, institutions, and principles of the EU,

not because these leaders strive toward a schism from the rest of Europe but because

they claim to stand for the real values of European civilization (Bluhm and Varga 2020).

Recent scholarship has provided a variety of explanations for this “illiberal backlash:” a

superﬁcial understanding of liberal democratic values at the time of the transition from

communism (Dawson and Hanley 2016; Bohle and Greskovits 2012; Krastev 2007); a

decade-long history of authoritarianism that has impeded the development of a true liberal

political culture (Wilkin 2018); the consequences of neoliberal capitalism (privatization,

deregulation, and the dismantling of the welfare system) that have exacerbated social

inequality (Bíró-Nagy 2017; Minkenberg 2013; Mudde 2007); and the increased political

polarization and mainstreaming of populist parties (Stanley 2017; Enyedi 2016; Palonen

2009). While these factors may all have contributed to an erosion of democracy in the V4

countries, socio-political attitudes and values among citizens there have been overlooked

as relevant factors.

USHKOVSKA, Mare

Using Survey Datasets to Contextualize EU-Skepticism

In its treatment of survey data, this study relies on quantitative descriptive and

interpretative quantitative methods. First, the descriptive method is used for bivariate

analysis to characterize the views held by the population in the V4 countries and to

assess patterns in those views using contingency tables and scatter plots. en,

interpretative analysis is used to explain attitudes that are not immediately apparent

about complex, interdependent, and diverse socio-political factors associated with

contemporary Euroskepticism. By integrating the two methods, this research extends

knowledge in the study of Euroskepticism, as it both presents the central tendency and

variability of public opinions and provides a detailed understanding of the socio-political

environment through observation. Numerical data provide precise measurements from

which conclusions are drawn about both particular cases and the region overall. However,

while this positivist approach can address the circumstances inﬂuencing public opinions

in the V4 countries about EU integration, it cannot explain the reasons behind those

circumstances. e interpretative quantitative method enables statistics to be “used to

shed light on the unobservable data generating processes that underlie observed data”

(Babones 2016, 453). is research method has been validated because it focuses on

the meaning of behavior in context (Gaskins 1994). Hence, it is particularly suitable to

highlight the factors that have strongly inﬂuenced attitudes toward the EU in the V4

countries, beyond the inﬂuence of populist parties.

Data were collected from the following survey datasets:

• 2020 Standard Eurobarometer 93: Public Opinion in the European Union

(henceforth “Eurobarometer 93”);

• 2020 Special Eurobarometer 500: Future of Europe (henceforth

“Eurobarometer 500”);

• 2020 Politico Europe Poll of Polls (henceforth “Politico”);

• 2019 Pew Research Center poll: European Public Opinion ree Decades

After the Fall of Communism (henceforth “Pew Research Center”);

• 2017 International Republican Institute Survey: Public opinion in Hungary,

Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia (henceforth “International Republican

Institute,” or IRI);

• 2017-2021 Joint Dataset of the European Values Study and World Values

Survey (henceforth “European Values Study”).

e use of primary data collected from multiple sources over four years adds value

to this study in multiple ways. First, it helps reduce the impact of potential biases in

individual surveys. Second, it makes it possible to explain trends in ways that looking at

a single dataset would not permit. ird, comparing datasets produced over four years

helps to establish consistency over time and reinforce the validity of the conclusions.

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

e Standard Eurobarometer is a biannual survey coordinated by the European

Commission that analyzes attitudes of EU citizens about various policy areas. For the

purpose of this research, the summer 2020 Standard Eurobarometer 93 and the special

edition of the Eurobarometer on the “Future of Europe” were considered. e survey

questions in those datasets are pertinent to understand the most recent views of V4

citizens on the state of the European Union and future European integration. Politico, as

a leading news organization, has tracked and aggregated polling data for political parties

in every country in Europe. A 2017 study by the International Republican Institute

(IRI), a nonproﬁt, nonpartisan organization conducting polls in transition democracies

in Europe, is particularly relevant as it is the only recent, large-sample public opinion

survey focused on the Visegrad Group on questions of identity, politics, and relations

with the EU. Similarly, the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan fact tank that conducts

opinion polls and social science research, has produced a dataset allowing for a multi-

country comparative analysis. Finally, the European Values Study is a unique, large-scale,

cross-national, and longitudinal survey sampling the opinions and values of adults across

European countries.

Understanding Public Opinion about the EU and Societies in V4

Countries

Utilitarian Relationship with the EU (Hypotheses 1 and 2)

Respondents in the IRI poll indicated the loss of independence and sovereignty as one

of the greatest costs of EU membership. Majorities in Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary

believe that the EU is an association of sovereign states and that it has little connection to

individual citizens, so that citizens’ loyalty rests with their respective states rather than the

EU. Poland is the only country where a plurality says that there should be loyalty to the

EU because the EU grants rights and beneﬁts to EU citizens. Poles express a high degree

of attachment to the EU (Eurobarometer 93), as do large segments of the Hungarian and

Slovak populations. Yet 63 percent of Czechs do not feel any attachment to the Union,

accounting for the large standard deviation from the V4 mean (Table 1). Additionally,

most Czechs and Slovaks are neutral about the EU, with over a third of them thinking

the EU is a waste of funds.

USHKOVSKA, Mare

Table 1: Attachment to and Trust in the EU in the V4 Countries

Visegrad Group

Hungary Czechia Slovakia Poland Mean Standard

Deviation

ink citizens owe loyalty to

the EU (%) 35 41 45 49 42.50 5.17

ink citizens owe loyalty

to their respective states, not

the EU (%) 51 56 54 42 50.75 5.36

Feel attachment to the EU

(%) 70 35 59 73 59.25 14.94

Do not feel attachment to

the EU (%) 28 63 40 25 39.00 14.95

Trust the EU (%) - EB93 53 35 45 56 47.25 8.14

Do not trust the EU (%) -

EB93 40 56 46 32 43.50 8.76

Trust the EU (%) – EVS 41.4 25 53 45.5 41.23 10.25

Do not trust the EU (%) –

EVS 53.4 69 44 47.6 53.50 9.56

Sources: International Republican Institute, Eurobarometer 93 and European Values Study

When it comes to trusting the EU, the Eurobarometer 93 reveals that opinions are

split across the V4. e European Values Study paints a bleaker picture, as shown in Table

1: in three out of four V4 countries, distrust in the EU is more than thirteen percentile

points higher than what is recorded in the Eurobarometer 93. Moreover, people in V4

countries express an even lower level of trust in their national institutions, indicating

general skepticism about governing elites.

erefore, it comes as a relative surprise that data from both the Eurobarometer

500 and the Pew Research Center show that a majority in all V4 countries sees EU

membership as generally a positive thing. is favorable view has to do with citizens

associating the EU with freedom of movement for people, goods, and services

(Eurobarometer 93 2020). For 70 percent or more of citizens in all V4 countries,

the two greatest beneﬁts they get from the EU are the ﬁnancial aid they receive and

access to the common market and border-free travel (IRI 2017). Hence, economic

considerations drive people’s approval of the EU in part, with majorities across the V4

saying their national economies have been strengthened because of EU membership

(Pew Research Center 2019). Exhibiting a utilitarian approach toward the EU, most

respondents agree that the interests of their respective countries are best served by

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

maintaining strong relations with the EU (IRI 2017) and disagree that a better future

outside the EU is possible (Eurobarometer 93 2020).

Table 2: Views on National Interests and the EU in V4

Visegrad Group

Hungary Czechia Slovakia Poland Mean Standard

Deviation

Do not want more decisions

taken at the EU level 63 75 73 69 70.00 4.58

Agree their country’s

interests are best served by

maintaining strong relations

with the EU (%)

61 46 63 69 59.75 8.47

Say EU membership has

strengthened the national

economy (%)65 51 58 71 61.25 7.50

Do not think their country

would have a better future

outside the EU (%)61 48 57 52 54.50 4.92

ink their country would

have a better future outside

the EU (%)31 42 33 39 36.25 4.44

Sources: International Republican Institute, Pew Research Center and Eurobarometer 93

Overwhelmingly, citizens in all V4 countries reject that additional realms of decisions

be placed under EU authority. A good number of respondents in Czechia and Slovakia

would like to see fewer decisions made at the EU level within the next ten years. ose

people say that they are in favor of the EU but do not support the way the EU has

functioned until now. In contrast, most Hungarians and Poles prefer to preserve the

existing arrangement rather than increase the powers of the EU (Eurobarometer 500

2020). Majorities in each country, however, agree that future global challenges will be

best addressed if shared by national and EU-level governance (Eurobarometer 500 2020).

Hypothesis 1, which states that “Most V4 citizens oppose the transfer of additional policy-

making powers to the EU and believe their respective countries would have a better future

outside the EU,” is thus not supported by evidence. While it is true that people in the V4

do not favor increased EU powers, they also do not feel that the EU undermines national

interests in V4 countries; instead, they believe that future collaboration between their

respective states and the EU will be beneﬁcial.

e question remains as to whether the opposition to the jurisdiction of the EU being

expanded is related to the inﬂuence of populist parties. Table 3 presents the cumulative

percentage of voters who have indicated a preference for one of these parties in Hungary

(Fidesz and Jobbik), Czechia (ANO and SPD), Slovakia (OLANO, Sme Rodina, and

USHKOVSKA, Mare

L’SNS), and Poland (PiS). e ﬁrst observation is that, except in Hungary, majorities in

V4 countries do not vote for populist parties. Hypothesis 2 states that “Greater support

for populist parties in V4 countries is consistent with greater opposition to the transfer

of additional policy-making powers to the EU.” A scatter plot provides a visualization of

the relation between the two variables and highlights that there is no positive relationship

(Graph 1). In V4 countries where there is greater popular support for populist parties,

people are less opposed to an increase in the decision power of the EU. us, Hypothesis

2 is also unsupported by the data.

Table 3: Percentage of Support for Populist Parties in V4 Countries

Visegrad Group

Hungary Czechia Slovakia Poland

Support populist parties (%) 56 36 28 34

Do not support populist parties (%) 44 64 72 66

Source: Politico

Graph 1: Relationship between support for populist parties and opposition to further

transfer of decision-making powers to the EU

Source: e author

The Threat of Multiculturalism (Hypothesis 3)

Immigration is an acute concern in V4 countries, especially in the aftermath of

the contentious 2015-2016 migrant crisis in Europe. In the V4 countries, views on

immigration have been generally impacted by the fact that incoming migrants and

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

refugees are culturally and religiously diﬀerent from the majority of the population

there. e Pew Research Center survey reveals that, among all surveyed countries, the V4

countries have the largest percentage of respondents with an unfavorable view of Muslims

(see Table 4). is ﬁnding starkly contrasts with results from several Western European

countries, such as Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and France, where between 68 and

72 percent of respondents had a positive view of Muslims.

Table 4: Views on Globalization and Muslims in V4 Countries

Visegrad Group

Hungary Czechia Slovakia Poland

Have unfavorable view of Muslims (%) 58 64 77 66

See terrorism as the main threat to their way of life

(%) 28 33 35 31

ink globalization has beneﬁtted their family (%) 46 54 54 42

ink globalization has hurt their family (%) 54 46 46 31

ink globalization is an opportunity for economic

growth (%) 70 58 47 63

ink globalization threatens their country’s identity

(%) 56 63 58 45

Source: Pew Research Center, International Republican Institute and Eurobarometer 93

Data from the same survey also show that, while support for (right-wing or centrists)

populist parties corresponds to greater anti-Muslim sentiments in Western European

countries, populist parties are not a determinant variable for this trend in V4 countries.

As Graph 2 demonstrates, both supporters and non-supporters of populist parties in

V4 countries have a highly unfavorable view of Muslims. For example, in Hungary

and Czechia, majorities among both those who vote and do not vote for the governing

parties Fidesz and ANO 2011 have this negative perception. Furthermore, in Slovakia

and Poland, anti-Muslim sentiments are even more widespread among those who do not

support populist parties.

USHKOVSKA, Mare

Graph 2: Percentage of people who have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims in their

country

Source: Pew Research Center

Graph 3 is a visual rendition of the relationship established in Table 3 between anti-

Muslim sentiment and support for right-wing populist parties. Contrary to expectations,

this graph shows a downward trend and negative correlation, which means that as people

increasingly support populist parties, their views about Muslims are less negative. Such

results can be explained by the data that show that majorities in all V4 countries have

expressed unfavorable opinions of Muslims, whereas, with the exception of Hungary,

populist parties have been supported by minorities. If the support, or lack thereof, for

populist parties does not account for anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim opinions in V4

countries, the question then becomes, what other societal factors do?

Graph 3: Relationship between anti-Muslim sentiments and support for right-wing

populist parties

Source: e author

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

e Eurobarometer 93 shows that, in 2020, leaders in all V4 countries identiﬁed

immigration as the most important EU-related issue, while the economic situation was

considered as most concerning by EU members as a whole. IRI survey data from 2017 also

show immigration and terrorism in the EU as either the ﬁrst or second greatest concern

for people in V4 countries, implying a perceived link between increasing numbers of

immigrants and an increase in terrorism. When the same survey asked what was most

likely to threaten their way of life and their children’s future, most respondents in Poland,

Czechia, and Slovakia chose terrorism, extremism, and political violence. In Hungary,

this response received the second largest share of support. e 2020 Eurobarometer on

the Future of Europe supports these ﬁndings: while 20 EU member states listed either

climate change or health risks as the main global challenges for the future of the EU,

people in three out of four of the V4 countries pointed to terrorism as the greatest threat.

Poland was an outlier with 50 percent of respondents choosing risks related to health as

the main issue, likely inﬂuenced by the context of the coronavirus pandemic.

Graph 4: Relationship between anti-Muslim sentiments and perception of terrorism as

the key threat to existing way of life

Source: e author

e upward trend line in Graph 4 illustrates that there is a positive correlation

between people seeing terrorism as a main threat and their unfavorable opinions of

Muslims. When asked about globalization, V4 citizens were divided (IRI 2017), as can

be seen in Table 4. Globalization was seen as an opportunity for economic growth by

most respondents in all V4 countries, but the largest percentage of V4 citizens also felt it

threatened their identity (Eurobarometer 500). Graph 5 demonstrates that when more

people in the V4 countries perceive that globalization threatens their country’s identity, it

corresponds with an increase in their negative perceptions of Muslims.

USHKOVSKA, Mare

100

Graph 5: Relationship between anti-Muslim sentiments and perception that

globalization threatens a country’s identity

Source: e author

In conclusion, people in V4 countries do hold negative views of migrants and religious

minorities. However, there is no link between these views and support for right-wing

populist parties, since these views have been expressed by a majority of both supporters

and non-supporters of populist parties. us, hypothesis 3—that an increase in support

for right-wing populist parties corresponds with an increase in negative opinions about

migrants and religious minorities—is not corroborated. Instead, people’s unfavorable

opinions about migration, and in particular about Muslims migrating to Europe, is

related to the perceived threat of terrorism and the loss of national identity.

Disparate Attitudes and Values (Hypothesis 4)

e report by the Pew Research Center includes an exploration of political party

favorability in EU member states. It unveils that preferences diverge across regions. In

Western European countries, left or center-left political parties enjoy greater public

support, whereas the more conservative or right of center a party is, the less favorably it is

ranked. e exact opposite appears to be true in Eastern and Central European countries.

roughout that region, center-right or populist right-wing parties receive the most

positive reviews. Data from the European Values Study are slightly less conclusive. On a

scale of self-reported political leanings, the largest share of respondents in each country

position themselves at the center (see Table 5). Yet, the means in Poland and Hungary are

6.2 and 6.1 respectively, the highest in the EU.

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

101

Table 5: Socio-political Values Expressed in Select EU Countries

Visegrad Group Western Europe

Hungary Czechia Slovakia Poland Germany Nether-

lands France Sweden

Self-reported

political leaning (on

a scale from 1=left to

10=right)

6.1 5.6 5.6 6.2 4.9 5.6 5.1 5.5

Do not want

homosexuals as

neighbors (%) 37 20 37 28 8 3.6 8 2.4

Agree that

homosexual parents

are as good parents as

others (%)

23 40 16 12 60 66 53 74.5

Believe they have a

duty to society to

have children (%) 41 55 45 43 24 3.6 23 8

Agree that abortion

is justiﬁable (on a

scale from 1=never to

10=always)

4.9 6.1 5.3 3.8 6 7 6.8 8.2

Self-report as religious

(%) 53 32.4 69 83 52 42 40.5 27

Source: European Values Study

Table 6: Socio-political Values Expressed in Select EU Countries (Mean and

Standard Deviation)

Visegrad Group Western Europe

Mean Standard

Deviation Mean Standard

Deviation

Self-reported political leaning (on a scale from

1=left to 10=right) 5.88 0.28 5.28 0.29

Do not want homosexuals as neighbors (%) 30.50 7.09 5.50 2.54

Agree that homosexual parents are as good

parents as others (%) 22.75 10.71 63.38 7.90

Believe they have a duty to society to have

children (%) 46.00 5.39 14.65 8.99

Agree that abortion is justiﬁable (on a scale

from 1=never to 10=always) 5.03 0.83 7.00 0.79

Self-report as religious (%) 59.35 18.84 40.38 8.90

Source: e author

USHKOVSKA, Mare

102

Simply accounting for political leanings is not suﬃcient to assess societal and

ideological diﬀerences across EU countries. Public attitudes about certain issues that

concern family and society, such as LGBT rights, abortion, and religion, among others,

also shed light on how conservative or liberal a society is. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate that the

populations of V4 countries and Western Europe diﬀer in certain social views and values

they hold. When asked whether they would want homosexuals as neighbors, between

20 percent and 37 percent of respondents in V4 countries answered in the negative, for

under 10 percent in most Western European countries. Similar diﬀerences in opinions

can be observed for the question of whether homosexual parents are as good parents as

others, whether citizens have a duty to society to have children, and whether abortion is

justiﬁable. Notably, the Czechs standout from the group, as their views on the issues of

homosexual parents and abortion are closer to the European average.

Two trends emerge from the data. First, people in V4 countries hold more conservative

social and political values than people in Western Europe. is ﬁnding supports

Hypothesis 4. Second, conservatism is not uniformly expressed among the populations

of V4 countries. Instead, conservatism exists on a spectrum, as demonstrated by the

high standard deviation in the V4 group’s mean for variables such as people’s level of

religiousness and opinions about same-sex parenthood. is standard deviation primarily

results from the gap between public attitudes in Czechia and Poland, which indicates that

Czechia is the most socially liberal of all the V4 countries, while Poland is positioned as

the most socially conservative in the group.

Sources of Worldviews in the Visegrad Group

Euroskeptic but not Anti-EU

Much of the literature on Euroskepticism has explained sovereignism and nationalism

in the V4 countries as a product of the inﬂuence of populist parties, which promote

Euroskepticism. is chapter shows that reservations toward the EU among the

populations of the V4 exist independently from that pressure. Survey indicators unveil

that Czechia is the most Euroskeptic of the V4 countries, while Poland is the most pro-

EU. Contrary to expectations, citizens of Hungary and Poland, whose governments

have been criticized for leading the opposition to the “ever closer Union,” are the most

favorable to the EU out of the V4 countries. In contrast, the public in Slovakia and

Czechia appears to be more reticent in its optimism about the Union.

A general lack of trust in the government and institutions drives wariness about

the actions of the EU. Yet, the case of the V4 demonstrates that EU-skepticism is not

equivalent to anti-EU sentiment. A clear majority in each V4 state is in favor of the EU,

but about half of the citizens there feel that the European project needs to be rethought

and changes need to occur in implementation (IRI 2017; Eurobarometer 500 2020). In

all of the V4 countries, only a minority wishes to see an increase in the scope of decisions

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

103

made at the EU level in the future. e issue of relative power between member states also

plays a role in how willing people are to accept a greater range of competences granted

to the EU. On the one hand, large Western countries, especially Germany and France,

have a disproportionate inﬂuence in setting the EU’s agenda. On the other hand, smaller

member states, mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, have beneﬁtted from economic

integration, as the single market, the free movement of people, and multifaceted

cooperation on a regional level have strengthened their development. However, the fact

that they have comparatively less inﬂuence on EU matters has prompted people there to

resist additional power transfers from national to EU institutions. Gaining independence

from the controlling inﬂuence of the Soviet Union in the 1990s was a historic feat for

Central and Eastern European nations. us, they have remained wary of propositions

that would lead to a renouncement of this hard-earned independence. As one recent

study has demonstrated, even in Germany, which is a substantial driver of EU policies,

concerns over loss of sovereignty has resulted in increased Euroskepticism (Yordanova et

al. 2020). It follows that Euroskepticism in V4 countries is connected to the perceived

need to protect national interests within the EU rather than to an appetite for the break-

up of the EU. erefore, the analysis here supports the thesis that Euroskepticism in V4

countries is only a “soft” Euroskepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002).

Immigration and Nation

e diﬀerence in worldviews between East and West among EU member states

has become visible on matters related to immigration and multiculturalism. During

the migrant crisis, the V4, as well as other Central and Eastern European countries,

have been among the most vocal in opposing the proposed mandatory quota system

for accepting migrants. Compared to other European countries, the V4 states are more

homogenous ethnically and linguistically, which has certainly played a role in shaping

people’s socio-political views there. In the tradition of the nineteenth-century German

romanticists, who spearheaded the uniﬁcation of all German states under the concept

of Volk—a homogenous cultural entity based on nationhood that rests on linguistic and

ethnic elements (Pﬂanze 1966)—nationality in most of Central and Eastern Europe has

been deﬁned in terms of a shared ancestry rooted in the feeling of belonging to a common

ethnicity and language group. is understanding constitutes a primordialist conception

of the nation, where the nation predates the state and is solely a cultural entity, rather

than a political construct (Dawisha 2002).

According to this understanding of the nation, nation-states diﬀer from other

forms of political entities such as multinational states, city-states, or empires, in which

identity is shaped through the prism of citizenship (Haas 1997). For example, in the

United Kingdom and France, nationhood has emerged out of people’s loyalty to a state

or a monarchical authority, in line with Rousseauist philosophy and a constructivist

conception of the state, which both hold that nations are communal aﬃliations based on

subjective psychology rather than on objective biology (Dawisha 2002). Hence, “a nation

USHKOVSKA, Mare

104

exists when a signiﬁcant number of people in a community consider themselves to be a

nation” (Seton-Watson 1977, 5). According to civic nationalism, as represented by the

United Kingdom and France, the existence of the state is a prerequisite for the process of

nation-building; and heterogeneous ethnic and linguistic groups can unite because they

accept a single civic identity.

In contrast to civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism has developed out of a reverence

for the cultural separateness of peoples. Consequently, for the ethnically, religiously,

and linguistically homogeneous V4 countries, suggesting that populations of diﬀerent

origins should settle in and integrate into one society and nation contradicts the very

understanding of national belonging as a culturally exclusive process. Likewise, the V4’s

perspective is at odds with the open borders’ context inside the EU, the EU’s motto—

“United in diversity”—and the concept of a supranational European citizenship and

identity. It is not within the scope of this research to explore the divergence between

the two conceptualizations of the nation in greater detail, but it is important to note

that the debate has remained as relevant in modern European politics as it was in the

nineteenth century (Hutchinson and Smith 1994; Smith 1992; Brubaker 1992; Renan

1990). is research ascertains, however, that globalization-driven multiculturalism

has been perceived as a threat to national identities and security in V4 countries in the

contemporary era, suggesting that the pushback against harmonizing certain EU-wide

migration and asylum policies will continue in the years ahead.

Conservatism in V4 Countries

e ﬁndings of this study suggest that people in the V4 countries lean to the right

politically but that these countries do not constitute a uniform bloc when it comes to

attitudes and values; indeed, some countries within the group are shown to be more

liberal than others. Nevertheless, a clear East-West “value gap” emerges when comparing

the views held by people in the V4 to those held by people in Western member states,

notably on the issue of religion and social issues such as abortion and LGBT rights.

Yet, about half of V4 citizens have stated that they perceive their values as being similar

to those held by people in Western Europe (IRI 2017), which demonstrates that there

is dissonance in the way EU citizens approach “European values.” In the EU, these

values generally encompass liberal ideals. Indeed, the “common values” described in

the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union include

freedom, solidarity, democracy, and the rule of law. e Charter also promotes respect

for cultural and religious diversity, prevents discrimination based on religion and sexual

orientation, and defends other principles that have all shaped the legal system of the EU.

However, the eastward enlargement of the EU since 2004 has resulted in a pluralism of

worldviews and values across member states. us, while some politicians refer to Europe’s

Christian heritage when speaking about European values, others mean secularism and

multiculturalism.

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

105

Hungary’s and Poland’s respective historical contexts have led to a conservative

wave in those two countries in recent years (Bluhm and Varga 2020). Leftist parties

in Central and Eastern Europe have often derived from the former ruling communist

parties. erefore, people in these regions make diﬀerent mental associations about leftist

parties than in other parts of Europe. For example, in Western countries with a history of

laissez-faire capitalism and rigid social class hierarchy, the political left has challenged the

conservative status quo during the last few decades. In contrast, in Central and Eastern

Europe, it was the political right that brought a wave of societal changes to challenge

the leftist establishment in the post-1989 transition period. Furthermore, the seed of

conservatism has always been present in these societies; it was simply suppressed during

the communist era. After the fall of communism, that seed was cultivated to slowly

lead to electoral success and mainstreaming. Hence, what we are witnessing today is a

“conservative renaissance” (Bluhm and Varga 2020).

Waning Trust in Times of Crises

Support for the EU among people of the Visegrad Group has been multidimensional.

e citizens of V4 countries have had reservations about certain EU policies based on

their perceptions of national interest in their respective countries. As a consequence,

people in the V4 group support political leaders who have contested many aspects of

the European project; but at the same time these citizens hold positive views of the EU

overall. Studies on Euroskepticism have tended to attribute rising sovereignism in V4

countries to the success of populist parties, without considering that these countries have

prioritized diﬀerent policies in European integration and that societal conservatism is a

source of this rising trend. us, this chapter counters scholars who have claimed that the

public pushback against the incremental ceding of powers to EU-level decision-making

can be attributed to the inﬂuence of populist parties.

Among the V4 countries, Euroskepticism appears to be most prominent in Czechia,

while people in Poland are the most EU-enthusiastic. Data also show that general

skepticism about and distrust in governing institutions, both at national and EU levels,

exist in all V4 countries. However, citizens there are more open than their governments

in the tackling of challenges pertaining to foreign policy and migration at both the EU

and national level. In each V4 country, most people agree that although some sovereignty

might be lost, the interests of their respective countries are best served in the context of

EU membership because of the economic gains membership brings. Hence, while not

fully content with the direction in which the Union is headed, people in V4 countries

are not anti-EU. is ﬁnding reaﬃrms the distinction Hobolt and De Vries (2016) have

posited between regime and policy support.

Together, the V4 countries do not constitute a unanimous voice among EU member

states, as they are divided on many issues. Each of the four countries included in the V4

has its own political environment and policy positions. However, when comparing the

USHKOVSKA, Mare

106

V4 to Western EU member states, regional commonalities become apparent. is study

concludes that the social and political values held by the citizens of the Visegrad Group are

more conservative than those of Western Europeans and that this discrepancy indicates

that an East-West gap in the understanding of “shared European values” is anchored

not only among political elites but also among citizens. A majority of people in the

overwhelmingly ethnically homogeneous Visegrad Group countries have a negative view

of immigration and multiculturalism, which they believe bring the threat of terrorism and

erode national identity. Such positions cannot be attributed to the inﬂuence of right-wing

populist parties. In fact, these views are held equally by supporters and non-supporters

of populist parties. is ﬁnding, thus, posits that it is based on grassroot reactions that

during the 2015-2016 crisis the V4 countries rejected the EU migrant quota policy.

e COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine are likely to have a further impact

on Euroskepticism trends in V4 countries. On the one hand, V4 citizens could divert

their concerns away from migration and toward security issues in the health sector, which

has already been the case in Poland, according to the Eurobarometer 500. EU-wide eﬀorts

to overcome the pandemic and respond to Russia’s military actions could become points

of convergence for member states. On the other hand, the legacies of the COVID-19

crisis, potential disagreements over foreign policy among member states, and emerging

crises linked to the economy or the energy sector may further weaken the public’s trust

in the governing bodies of the EU and boost nationalism in Europe. ese trends echo

those Europe already faced during the Eurozone and migrant crises, which enhanced

people’s support for the national state. Research is needed to investigate how those novel

circumstances will impact people’s support for EU institutions in the Czech Republic,

Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.

References

Babones, Salvatore. 2016. “Interpretive Quantitative Methods for the Social Sciences.” Sociology

50(3):453–69.

Basile, Linda, and Oscar Mazzoleni. 2020. “Sovereignist wine in populist bottles? An

introduction.” European Politics and Society 21(2):151–62.

Bíró-Nagy, András. 2017. “Illiberal Democracy in Hungary: e Social Background and Practical

Steps of Building an Illiberal State.” In Illiberal democracies in the EU: e Visegrad Group and

the Risk of Disintegration, edited by Pol Morillas. CIDOB Edicions.

Bluhm, Katharina, and Mihai Varga. 2020. “Conservative Developmental Statism in East Central

Europe and Russia.” New Political Economy 25(4):1–18.

Bluhm, Katharina, and Mihai Varga, eds. 2019. New Conservatives in Russia and East Central

Europe. Routledge.

Bohle, Dorothee, and Béla Greskovits. 2012. Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery. Cornell

University Press.

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

107

Boomgaarden, Hajo, Andreas Schuck, Matthijs Elenbaas, and Claes de Vreese. 2011. “Mapping

EU Attitudes: Conceptual and Empirical Dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU Support.”

European Union Politics 12 (2): 241–66.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Harvard University

Press.

Buzogány, Aron, and Mihai Varga. 2018. “e ideational foundations of the illiberal backlash in

Central and Eastern Europe: the case of Hungary.” Review of International Political Economy

25(6):811–28.

Dawisha, Adeed. 2002. “Nation and Nationalism: Historical Antecedents to Contemporary

Debates.” International Studies Review 4 (1): 3–22.

Dawson, James, and Sean Hanley. 2016. “What’s Wrong with East-Central Europe? e Fading

Mirage of the Liberal Consensus.” Journal of Democracy 7: 20–34.

De Spiegeleire, Stephan, Clarissa Skinner, and Tim Sweijs. 2017. e Rise of Populist Sovereignism:

What It Is, Where It Comes From, and What It Means for International Security and Defense.

Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

De Vries, Catherine, and Marco Steenbergen. 2013. “Variable Opinions: e Predictability

of Support for Uniﬁcation in Mass European Publics.” Journal Political Marketing 12 (1):

121–41.

Dunai, Marton. 2016. “Hungary’s Orbán rejects ‘Sovietization’ by Brussels, defends nation state.”

Reuters, October 23. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-idUSKCN12N0PJ.

Enyedi, Zsolt. 2016. “Paternalist populism and illiberal elitism in Central Europe.” Journal of

Political Ideologies 21 (1): 9–25.

European Commission. 2020. Standard Eurobarometer 93: Public Opinion in the European Union.

European Parliament and European Commission. 2020. Special Eurobarometer 500: Future of

Europe.

European Values Study. 2020. Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2021 Dataset - Variable Report

(Documentation/Tables). Version: November 2020 (v.1). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne and

JD Systems Institute.

Gabel, Matthew. 1998. Interest and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion and

European Union. University of Michigan Press.

Gaskins, Suzanne. 1994. “Integrating Interpretive and Quantitative Methods in Socialization

Research.” Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 40 (3): 313-33.

Guerra, Simona. 2013. Central and Eastern European Attitudes in the Face of Union. Palgrave

Macmillan.

Haas, Ernst. 1997. Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress: e Rise and Decline of Nationalism.

Cornell University Press.

Harmes, Adam. 2012. “e rise of neoliberal nationalism.” Review of International Political

Economy 19 (1): 59–86.

Harteveld, Eelco, Joep Schaper, Sarah L. de Lange, and Wouter van der Brug. 2018. “Blaming

Brussels? e Impact of (News about) the Refugee Crisis on Attitudes towards the EU and

National Politics.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 56: 157– 77.

Hobolt, Sara, and Catherine de Vries. 2016. “Public Support for European Integration.” Annual

Review of Political Science 19 (1): 413–32.

USHKOVSKA, Mare

108

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2004. “Does identity or economic rationality drive public

opinion on European integration?.” PS: Political Science and Politics 37 (3): 415–20.

Hutchinson, John, and Anthony D. Smith, eds. 1994. Nationalism. Oxford University Press.

International Republican Institute. 2017. Public opinion in Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic

and Slovakia. https://www.iri.org/sites/Default/Files/Four_Country_Full_Presentation_

May_24_2017.Pdf.

Kajánek, Tomáš. 2022. “e Migration Strategies and Positions on the EU Migration and Asylum

Agenda: Evidence from the Visegrad Group Countries”. Journal of Liberty and International

Aﬀairs 8 (3): 202–19.

Kallis, Aristotle. 2018. “Populism, Sovereigntism, and the Unlikely Re-Emergence of the

Territorial Nation-State.” Fudan Journal of the Humanitites and Social Sciences 11: 285–302.

Keating, Michael. 2008. “European Integration and the Nationalities Question.” Revista

Internacional de los Estudios Vascos 3:7–28.

Kopecký, Petr, and Cas Mudde. 2002. “e Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on

European Integration in East Central Europe.” European Union Politics 3: 297–326.

Krastev, Ivan. 2007. “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? e Strange Death of the Liberal

Consensus.” Journal of Democracy 18: 56–63.

Krastev, Ivan. 2017. After Europe. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Lovec, Marko, Ana Bojinović Fenko, Jure Požgan, Stellamarina Donato, and Živa Broder. 2019.

Populism and attitudes towards the EU in Central Europe. Faculty of Social Sciences.

Lubbers, Marcel, and Peer Scheepers. 2007. “Explanations of Political Euro-Scepticism at the

Individual, Regional and National Levels.” European Societies 9 (4): 643–69.

McLaren, Lauren. 2006. Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration. Palgrave

Macmillan.

Minkenberg, Michael. 2013. “From Pariah To Policy-maker? e Radical Right in Europe, West

and East: Between Margin and Mainstream.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 21

(1): 5–24.

Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2019. Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian

Populism. Cambridge University Press.

Palonen, Emilia. 2009. “Political polarisation and populism in contemporary Hungary.”

Parliamentary Aﬀairs 62 (2): 318–39.

Pew Research Center. 2019. European Public Opinion ree Decades After the Fall of Communism.

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/10/Pew-Research-

Center-Value-of-Europe-report-FINAL-UPDATED.pdf

Pﬂanze, Otto. 1966. “Nationalism in Europe, 1848-1871.” e Review of Politics 28 (2): 129–43.

Pirro, Andrea, and Stijn van Kessel. 2017. “United in Opposition? e Populist Radical Right’s

EU Pessimism in Times of Crisis.” Journal of European Integration 39 (4): 405–20.

Politico. “Poll of Polls.” 2021. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls. Accessed May 20,

2021.

Renan, Ernest. 1990. “What is a Nation.” In Nation and Narration, edited by Homi Bhabha.

Routledge.

Beyond Populism: Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

109

Reuters. 2016. “European nations will disappear unless they unite, Juncker says.”

Reuters, December 9 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-future-juncker-

idUSKBN13Y1MW.

Rosamond, Ben. 2019. “eorizing the EU in Crisis: De-Europeanization as Disintegration.”

Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Aﬀairs and Applied Contemporary

ought 9 (1): 31–44.

Santana, Andrés, Piotr Zagórski, and José Rama. 2020. “At odds with Europe: explaining populist

radical right voting in Central and Eastern Europe.” East European Politics 36 (2): 288–309.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2018. “European integration (theory) in times of crisis. A comparison of

the euro and Schengen crises.” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (7): 969–89.

Serricchio, Fabio, Myrto Tsakatika, and Lucia Quaglia. 2013. “Euroscepticism and the Global

Financial Crisis.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51: 51–64.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. 1977. Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the

Politics of Nationalism. Westview Press.

Smith, Anthony D. 1992. “Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative

Perspective.” In inking eoretically about Soviet Nationalities, edited by Alexander J. Motyl.

Columbia University Press.

Stanley, Ben. 2017. “Populism in central and Eastern Europe.” e Oxford Handbook of Populism

1: 140–58.

Stöckel, Florian. 2013. “Ambivalent or indiﬀerent? Reconsidering the structure of EU public

opinion.” European Union Politics 14 (1): 23–45.

Taggart, Pau, and Aleks Szczerbiak. 2002. “Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and Party Systems:

Party Based Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe.”

Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3 (1): 23–41.

Tosun, Jale, Anne Wetzel, and Galina Zapryanova. 2014. “e EU in Crisis: Advancing the

Debate.” Journal of European Integration 36 (3): 195–211.

Treib, Oliver. 2014. “e Voter Says No, but Nobody Listens: Causes and Consequences of

the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European Elections.” Journal of European Public Policy

21(10):1541–54.

Végh, Zsuzsanna. 2018. “From Pro-European Alliance to Eurosceptic Protest Group? e case of

the Visegrad Group.” European Policy Analysis 2018 (7):1–12.

Werts, Han, Peer Scheepers, and Marcel Lubbers. 2013. “Euro-Scepticism and Radical Right-

Wing Voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social Cleavages, Socio-Political Attitudes and

Contextual Characteristics Determining Voting for the Radical Right.” European Union

Politics 14 (2): 183–205.

Wilkin, Peter. 2018. “e Rise of ‘Illiberal’ Democracy: e Orbánization of Hungarian Political

Culture.” Journal of World-Systems Research 24 (1): 5–42.

Yordanova, Nikoleta, Mariyana Angelova, Roni Lehrer, Moritz Osnabrügge, and Sander Renes.

2020. “Swaying Citizen Support for EU Membership: Evidence from a Survey Experiment of

German Voters.” European Union Politics 21 (3): 429–50.

Zalan, Eszter. 2021. “Visegrád ‘trouble-makers’ celebrate 30 years together”. EUobserver. February

18. https://euobserver.com/political/150969.

110

111

5 European Union’s Military

Operations

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to

Face Security (Dis)Order

Sergio AGUILAR 1

Abstract: To improve its capacity at managing crises, the European Union (EU) has sought to

broaden its security and defense identity since the 1990s, deploying thirteen military operations

and missions. Like other world powers, the EU has adapted its foreign policy to changing

circumstances and strategic and economic interests. As the EU has enlarged and deepened its

integration, questions arise about how its common foreign and security policies have evolved over

time and whether these policies have expressed long-term interests or have constantly adapted to

novel circumstances. is chapter discusses the reality of EU military engagement overseas through

the lens of the complexity theory. e study confronts the aims presented in oﬃcial EU narrative

with practices on the ground through data collected in primary and secondary sources that highlight

that the adaptive approach has led to three phases of modiﬁcation in EU military operations and

capabilities, as the EU attempts to become a global security provider: ambition during the ﬁrst

decade of the Common Security and Defense Policy, contraction between 2009 and 2016, and

adjustment in today’s new global order. Conclusions suggest that not only is the EU’s institutional

ambition of collective engagement in overseas operations in constant tension with the preferences

and interests of its member states, but that EU operations are challenged by a changing global (dis)

order necessitating constant adaptation.

What the European Union (EU) calls “crisis management operations” emerged

as a pragmatic response to security challenges it faced. e EU has striven to develop

its capacity for independent military action since the late 1990s, when the European

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was ﬁrst launched (it was renamed as the Common

Security and Defense Policy - CSDP in 2009). Since 2003, the EU has conducted thirty-

six missions and operations in twenty countries. Twenty-three of these actions have been

civilian missions and thirteen have been military operations and missions.

e EU deﬁnes military operations as interventions with an executive mandate, while

military missions consist of interventions with a non-executive mandate. e choice of

intervention type depends on the nature of the crisis at stake. Operations involve actions

that replace the host country’s actions, while missions imply that the EU only supports

 Sergio Aguilar, Sao Paulo State University (UNESP), Brazil, sergio.aguilar@unesp.br.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p111-129

AGUILAR, Sergio

112

the host country in an advisory capacity (Council of the EU 2014). Moreover, the EU has

developed various military operations and missions (also referred to as “peace operations”

in this chapter). e “European Union Force” (EUFOR) is a ground force, while naval

forces fall under the jurisdiction of the “European Union Naval Force” (EU NAVFOR);

and “training missions” stand for “European Union Training Mission” (EUTM) (Council

of the EU 2018). Additionally, military interventions have ranged from advisory missions

involving fewer than a dozen experts to large-scale operations deploying thousands

of military personnel. However, although the EU aims at becoming a global security

provider, the actual importance of EU military operations and missions can be questioned.

Given its population (447.7 million inhabitants), economic weight (one fourth of the

world’s GDP), and military resources (1,521,000 troops in active service and 14 percent

of the global defense budget in 2020) (EC 2020; IISS 2021; SIPRI 2021), the Union

has sought to play an important role in international security. However, it appears that

EU aspirations have not met operational reality in terms of military operations and

missions. Indeed, a “capability–expectation gap” (see Hill 1993) has emerged between

the expectation of the EU and its apparent inﬂuence in global military interventions.

is chapter assesses past and present EU military operations and missions to analyze the

role the EU plays as an international security provider. e focus on military engagement

excludes an examination of other ways in which the EU also engages internationally (e.g.,

through civilian missions and diplomatic actions). Nonetheless, analyzing military action

remains particularly useful in evaluating the EU as an international security actor.

In practice, the EU started getting involved militarily in 1992, when the Petersberg

Declaration set a range of military actions and functions the EU would undertake. ese

included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and the sending of combat

forces to manage crises (WEU 1992). ese tasks were later incorporated into the Treaty

of the European Union in 1997. To fulﬁll its military functions, the EU has developed

policies, strategies, structures, decision-making and ﬁnancing procedures, capabilities,

and legal and operational tools. ese tools have included, among others, the European

Security Strategy (ESS) (EU 2003a), the Headline Goals (Council of the EU 2004),

and the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) (EU 2016), the latter arising later than the other

instruments. Frameworks for permanent relations between the EU and NATO (known

as the “Berlin Plus arrangements”) (EU 2003b) and with the UN (UN 2003) were also

established to support EU military deployments.

e EU’s military involvement overseas, as well as its performance in security and

defense, have attracted considerable academic scrutiny and generated an extensive

literature. Studies have assessed the EU’s success and failure as a conﬂict manager

(Kronenberger and Wouters 2004; Diez et al. 2006; Tocci 2007; Whitman and Wolﬀ

2010), as well as its ambitions and achievements (Giegerich 2008) and its credibility

and eﬀectiveness (e.g., Tardy 2015a; Hyde-Price 2018). Research has also targeted the

EU’s transatlantic links (Posen 2006; Howorth and Menon 2009; Giegerich 2010),

its relations with NATO (Mace 2004; Ulriksen et al. 2004; Duke 2008) and the UN

(Charbonneau 2009), and the discrepancies between the rhetorical aims and interests

of the EU, its stated goals, and the instruments it uses in practice (Tocci 2009). Adding

European Union’s Military Operations:

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

113

to this scholarship, this chapter draws on the complexity theory to explore military

operations and explain how the EU has adapted to changes in the security environment,

as well as the challenges this environment presents. Complex systems arise when a set

of elements or units become interconnected, so that changes taking place in individual

units or in the way units interact eﬀect changes in other parts of the system. Moreover,

such systems exhibit their own properties and behaviors (Jervis 1997). eir open nature

creates dynamics that must be explained in terms of internal logics and relationships

with the environment. Interconnectivity indicates that each individual element exists in

relation to the others; thus, each part of the system is aﬀected and inﬂuenced, at any time,

directly or indirectly, by at least one other part of the system (Ricigliano 2012). Moreover,

interconnectivity leads to emergence, which explains both how the elements of the system

interact with each other to maintain themselves and how new structures, forms, and

functions are generated by these interactions (Williams and Hummelbrunner 2010). e

new structures, forms, and functions in turn interact with, and causally impact, the parts

from which they emerged. Additionally, when small changes in any part of a system—or

in a system’s environment—produce large changes throughout that system, nonlinearity

is observed. Finally, complex systems potentially adapt according to feedback, since the

way they respond is conditioned by both past and present situations (Wight 2015). When

uncertainty and unpredictability prevail, systems manage through an adaptive process in

which resilience plays an important role. Resilience is “the ability of a system to resist,

absorb, recover from, or adapt to (adverse) changes in condition” (Cavelty and Giroux

2015, 211) while retaining essentially the same function, structure, and identity (Walker

et al. 2004). erefore, resilience also entails persistence (the capacity to remain in an

original state), adaptability (the capacity to adjust responses to changing external drivers

and internal processes), and transformability (the capacity to create a new domain when

conditions make the existing system untenable, thus moving it towards a new system)

(Gunderson 2000; Folke 2006; Scheﬀer 2009; Folke et al. 2010). Drawing on these key

assertions of complexity theory, this chapter aims to unveil how and why the EU has

moved in certain ways in the ﬁeld of military operations and missions.

I argue that since their inception, EU military operations and missions have been

guided by tensions between the role the Union wants to play in the ﬁeld of international

security and the dynamics of both the Union itself and the international system. Moreover,

in terms of military operations and missions, the EU has dealt with these tensions

through an adaptive approach that encompasses diﬀerent phases, which are successively

characterized by ambitious expansion, contraction, and adjustment. To substantiate

this argument, I use qualitative analysis of quantitative data based on primary and

secondary sources. Data were collected from the EU’s Global Engagement project (Di

Mauro et al. 2017), EEAS factsheets, and publicly available information regarding these

operations and missions, with a focus on context, size, mandate, region of operation,

duration, risks involved, and budget allocated. ese elements were chosen to examine

the nature of military deployments that took place between 2003 and 2020. Additional

data were collected from various oﬃcial speeches and documents about the EU’s military

engagement. Drawing parallels between intentions and reality, I demonstrate that the

AGUILAR, Sergio

114

EU has often engaged militarily overseas through an adaptive approach and that this

engagement has not matched its ambition, nor the expectation of the international

community. In its military operations and missions, the EU has adapted to changes

within the Union as well as to external dynamics in three phases. During the ﬁrst phase

(1999-2009), the EU created the necessary conditions for its broader commitment to

international security issues. During the second phase (2010-2016), a contraction can

be observed, which was due to obstacles the Union faced when acting on its intentions.

When additional challenges arose, especially in the international system, the European

bloc then moved to a third phase of adjustment (2017-today).

Phase I (1999-2009): Ambitions - Adapting to a New Security

Environment

e ﬁrst phase of EU military operations and missions coincides with Javier Solana’s

term as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy—today’s

High Representative for the Foreign Aﬀairs and Security Policy (hereinafter “High

Representative”)—from 1999 to 2009. One key characteristic of complex systems is that

they adjust their responses to the challenges posed by both external drivers and internal

processes. In the 1990s, the EU was formally established by the Maastricht Treaty, after

which it initiated an enlargement and economic integration process. On the one hand,

the unprecedented period of peace and stability in Western Europe led to an enthusiastic

narrative: the EU “[had] never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (EU 2003a).

On the other hand, Europe’s inability to manage conﬂicts on its neighbors’ soil became

evident, for example during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia (Hyde-Price 2018). is

inability contributed to the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration in 1998, which focused

on the EU’s need to “have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible

military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to

respond to international crises” (CVCE 1998). e following year, the European Council

underlined its determination to develop an autonomous capacity in order to carry out

military operations in response to international crises (European Parliament 1999). As

a consequence, the Headline Goal was approved at the Helsinki Summit (December

1999), which planned for the development of a self-sustained military force of up to

50,000–60,000 individuals able to undertake the full range of tasks set in the Petersberg

Declaration (Council of the EU 1999). At the same time, outside Europe, the UN’s

revision process on peacekeeping seemed to indicate that regional organizations would

assume an increasing role as security providers (see UN 2000). Moreover, the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US, followed by the invasions of Afghanistan and

Iraq and the US’s “war on terror,” inﬂuenced the EU in its defense apparatus and its

role in international security. Hence, High Representative Javier Solana, initiated the

European Security Strategy. Although this document was a policy paper rather than a

strategic plan, it nevertheless outlined principles about how the Union should respond

to international crises, and it set out guidelines for addressing threats, ensuring safety

European Union’s Military Operations:

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

115

in the countries bordering Europe and committing to an international order based on

multilateralism (EU 2003a). As a result, key institutions were established, such as the

Political and Security Committee (2000)—responsible for the CSDP—the Military

Committee (2001), and the Military Staﬀ (2001), charged with providing strategic advice

to the High Representative.

As a complex system, the EU has organized itself to face internal and external security

and defense challenges. During phase I, it created new processes and institutional bodies

within the bloc to allow greater proactivity in the military ﬁeld. Furthermore, past

experiences, especially those emanating from other organizations such as the UN and

NATO, led the EU to develop guidelines for crisis management centered on the ability

to combine civilian and military instruments (Juncos 2020): the “made in Europe crisis

management” (Türke 2016). In the EU, there was enthusiasm about the bloc playing a

major role in international security, and this positive outlook was seen in the European

Security Strategy, which indicated that the EU was particularly well equipped to respond

to multi-faceted security situations (EU 2003a). Moreover, the High Representative

asserted that the Union was suited to carry out actions drawing on “a mixture of civilian,

military, economic, political and institution-building tools” (Solana 2007, 2), as opposed

to purely military operations.

In this context, the EU showed relentless activism in terms of military operations

and missions during that period: six military operations were deployed between

2003 and 2008. Table 1 indicates that most operations took place in Africa (four)

and the Balkans (two), where troops operated under executive mandates that focused

on implementing agreements as well as stabilizing situations, protecting civilians,

delivering humanitarian aid, and ﬁghting against piracy. When it started, EUFOR

Althea was the largest operation in scope (7,000 troops); Artemis, EUFOR Congo,

and Atalanta included approximately 2,000 troops; and EUFOR Chad/CAR involved

approximately 3,300 troops. e operations generally have not lasted long. With the

exception of Atalanta and Althea, which are still ongoing, other operations lasted only

two to twelve months. Consequently, the security impact of these various operations

was also short-lived in host countries. Notably, Althea replaced the NATO Stabilization

Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the military implementation of the

Dayton Agreement that ended the war in the former Yugoslavia. Atalanta was a naval

operation deployed to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery

oﬀ the Somali coast. Moreover, in general, these EU operations were low-risk (with

the exception of Artemis) because deployment occurred in permissive environments

(Fiott 2020), i.e., in places “in which friendly forces anticipate[d] no obstructions to,

or interference with, operations” (UK 2017, 8). ey also beneﬁtted from only modest

budgets (with the exception of EUFOR Chad/CAR).

AGUILAR, Sergio

116

Table 1: Phase I Operations

Common

costs*

Low

€ 4.7 million

Low

€ 7 million

Intermediate

€ 81.8 million

Low

€ 16.7 million

High

€ 99.2 million

Intermediate

€ 59.6 million

Source: e author based on Di Mauro et al. 2017 and EEAS 2021a. * All data until 2020.

Risk

Low

High

Low

Intermediate

Low

Size (total)*

Small - 400

Intermediate

-1,807

Large (7,000)

Intermediate

(2,500 in 2007)

Intermediate

-2,259

Intermediate

-3,300

Intermediate

-1,943

Type

Post conﬂict

stabilization

Peacekeeping

Post conﬂict

stabilization

Peacekeeping

Combat piracy

Duration

(Months)*

193

145

Mandate

Implementation

of agreement

(Limited executive

tasks)

Stabilization

Implementation of

agreement

Stabilization

(Support response

to violence)

PoC

Deliver

humanitarian aid

Fight against

piracy

Geographic

Area

Western

Balkans

(FYROM)

Subsahara

DRC (Bunia)

Western

Balkans (BiH)

Subsahara

DRC

(Kinshasa)

Subsahara

East Chad/

Northeast CAR

Horn of Africa

Period

2003

2004- now

2006

2008-2009

2008 – now

Operation /

Mission

CONCORDIA

ARTEMIS/DRC

ALTHEA/BiH

EUFOR DR

Congo

EUFOR Chad/

RCA

EU NAVFOR -

Atalanta

European Union’s Military Operations:

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

117

e narrative of the EU about these operations further reinforced the Union’s

positive outlook about these ﬁve years of improvement in terms of its capacity to manage

conﬂicts. Furthermore, the EU’s hybrid intervention format that combines military

and civilian actions would become a model for other regionally led peace operations

(see Hardt 2009). e ambition that characterizes Phase I was echoed in the 2007

Constitutional Treaty that expanded the Petersberg tasks by including operations such as

joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue interventions, military advice and

assistance, conﬂict prevention and peace-keeping, and the deployment of combat forces

in crisis management. All these facets of intervention were seen as contributing “to the

ﬁght against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism

in their territories” (EU 2007, article 28 B). Moreover, a solidarity clause prescribed the

obligation for member states to provide “aid and assistance by all the means in their

power” when any “member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory” (EU

2007, article 28A.7).

In spite of the positive outlook, examining EU operations more closely reveals

that certain of these interventions were conducted to test or prove the EU’s capacity

to act autonomously, while others were understood as the prerogative of individual

member states (Gegout 2005; Griﬃn 2007). “Cosmetic operations,” such as EUFOR

DRC (Haine and Giegerich 2006), or “bridge operations” were those connected to

more complex operations such as EUFOR Chad/CAR (Tardy 2015b). Another set of

operations were presented as being part of an eﬀort to simply support UN operations

on the ground (e.g., Artemis and EUFOR Congo). Certain operations such as

Artemis and EUFOR RDC did not unveil much about the Union’s capacity to act

as a global security provider, as they “did not demonstrate any major advances in EU

military capacities for active engagement” (Griﬃn 2007, 40). In these cases, political

expectations did not match the capacity of the military forces deployed, nor the range

of obstacles on the ground (Murphy 2011). Since complex systems can absorb and

adapt to adverse situations, these shortcomings led the EU to adjust so it could retain

its goals, structures, and functions regarding military operations and missions. is

adjustment came in the shape of contraction.

Phase II (2010-2016): Contracting to Adapt to Reality

e second phase (2010-2016) covers the duration of Catherine Ashton’s term

(December 2009 – October 2014) and part of Federica Mogherini’s term (November

2014 – November 2019) as the function of High Representative. During that time,

the EU sought to enhance its ability to deploy joint forces when and where necessary;

to that eﬀect, European countries committed themselves alongside NATO operations

(in Afghanistan, for instance) and ad hoc coalitions (for example, in Iraq). ese

involvements diverted resources and attention away from the CSDP (Engberg 2021).

Furthermore, the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis led several nations to implement cost-cutting

measures that restricted the overall operational capability of the armed forces and

AGUILAR, Sergio

118

contributed to the decision by member states to adopt a lower proﬁle on security and

defense issues at the EU level (Moser 2015).

Within the EU, security and defense policy rests quasi-exclusively with member

states, and the decision to get involved (or not) in military operations is made by

governments according to national perceptions and interests (see Youngs 2008; Moser

2015). For example, EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUNAVFOR Sophia occurred because

the former was aimed at ﬁghting pirates who threatened European trading interests in

the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden and the latter addressed the migrant crisis

that impacted European countries at the time (European Parliament 2020). During

that period, there was constant divergences among the “big three” (Germany, France,

and the United Kingdom) regarding preferences and priorities in military engagement

(see Howorth 2003; Longhurst and Miskimmon 2007; Wagnsson 2010). Tensions

also emerged among member states because some pushed for large-scale, sophisticated

operations (e.g., France) and others were reticent to use military force at all (e.g.,

Germany and Scandinavian countries) (Moser 2015), supported EU autonomy, or

were more inclined towards NATO intervention rather than EU involvement (Engberg

2021). Moreover, initial military objectives encompassed in the Helsinki Headline

Goal failed, in spite of a new deadline being set to 2010 (Engberg 2021). In 2007,

Solana emphasized that a rapidly deployable force—the Battlegroup—was “not just

a concept but already a reality” and that it was necessary to develop the capacity “to

act quickly and robustly where needed” (Solana 2007). However, the Battlegroup was

never deployed and was consequently reduced to a third of what was originally planned

(Whitman and Wolﬀ 2012).

During Phase I, even with the initial impetus and optimistic narrative, the EU

had faced tensions and shortcomings, which led it to adapt in Phase II, during which

EU military engagement contracted in practice. Although six new operations and

missions were deployed between 2010 and 2016, an important shift occurred. Indeed,

most of these interventions involved non-executive mandates and focused on training,

monitoring, mentoring, and advising. ey also minimized risks and costs since only

the EUFOR RCA in the Central African Republic and the maritime operation in the

Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Sophia) functioned under executive mandates, which

means that they took over for the host nations. While they were both directed at African

territories (the sub-Saharan region, the Horn of Africa, and Central Africa), EUFOR

RCA aimed at stabilizing a conﬂict and EUNAVFOR Sophia targeted human smuggling

and traﬃcking. Table 2 shows that the missions conducted during Phase II tended to last

longer than Phase I operations but were quite more limited in scope. Only EUNAVFOR

Sophia operated with more than a thousand troops. Even the Althea operation, still

on-going in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was reduced to 600 troops in 2012 (Keil and

Perry 2015). Moreover, budgets remained modest—with the exception of the support

allocated to EUTM-Mali—and the operations and missions ran in permissive and low

risk environments.

European Union’s Military Operations:

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

119

Table 2 – Phase II Operations

Common

costs*

Intermediate

€ 60.9 million

High

€ 105.9 million

Low

€ 30.6 million

Low

€ 7.9 million

Low

€ 18.9 million

Low

€ 43.6 million

Source: e author based on Di Mauro et al. 2017 and EEAS 2021a. * All data until 2020.

Risk

Low

Intermediate

Low

Size (total)*

Small - 125

Small - 570

Small – 700

Small – 70

Intermediate

1,666

Small - 170

Type

Post conﬂict

stabilization

Post conﬂict

stabilization

Peacekeeping

Post conﬂict

stabilization

Combat

human traﬃc

Post conﬂict

stabilization

Duration

(Months)*

119

Mandate

Training

Non executive

Training

Non executive

Stabilization

Advisory and

training

Non executive

Fight against

human smuggling/

traﬃc

Advisory and

training

Non executive

Geographic Area

Horn of Africa

Subsahara – Mali

Subsahara – CAR

(Bangui)

Subsahara – CAR

Mediterranean

Libya

Subsahara – CAR

Period

2010 – now

2013 – 2024

2014 – 2015

2015 – 2016

2015 – 2020

2016 - now

Operation /

Mission

EUTM

Somalia

EUTM-Mali

EUFOR RCA

EUMAM RCA

EUNAVFOR

MED - Sophia

EUTM RCA

AGUILAR, Sergio

120

e ambition of the EU for activism in military deployment did not last much longer

than the duration of Phase I. In fact, during that time, actions were generally ad hoc and

tentative, and they met strategic objectives with diﬃculty (Coelmont 2012). Moreover,

after “brisk activity in the Solana era, the [CSDP] almost came to a standstill” (Moser

2015, 12). During Phase I, the EU had failed to accomplish its military goals, leading

people to perceive its external actions (military and civilian missions and operations

and diplomatic activities) as isolated and uncoordinated. Phase II inherited these

shortcomings. High Representative Catherine Ashton stated that it was “not enough

to chase and deter pirates, not enough to try and do development when there is no

security, not enough to try and provide economic support without a stable government.”

Consequently, it became necessary for the EU to adopt a comprehensive approach (EEAS

2012) to recover from adversity and retain its original intention of becoming a global

security provider. erefore, during Phase II, military missions were prioritized over

operations and the strategy shifted toward a “comprehensive approach.” As a result, new

military strategies were launched in 2011 in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, and in

2012 an EU inter-institutional working group was established to develop this approach

and solve the consistent problem posed by isolated initiatives.

us, during Phase II, the EU attempted to adjust its responses to the same external

and internal shifts and challenges that it had faced during Phase I. It also injected

consistency across its external military action. However, the Union missed opportunities

to act coherently on several occasions, for example in the crises that followed the Arab

Spring in Libya and Syria. Lack of consensus to the possible launch of a civilian mission

or military operation resulted in non-response from the EU. In Libya, for example,

some EU member states opted to act under the NATO framework (Moser 2015).

Moreover, the fact that the French government failed to incite EU forces to participate in

counterterrorism operations in the Sahel in 2013 (Engberg 2021) showed how diﬃcult

it was to get support from member states for substantial deployments. Consequently,

Ashton favored a comprehensive approach that combined “elements of foreign policy

(diplomacy, trade, aid and military and non-military instruments) and clearly prefer[red]

conﬂict prevention over armed intervention” (Moser 2015, 13). Her stance, however,

would not be taken up by her successor, Federica Mogherini, who instead worked on yet

a new strategy. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy report (Merket 2015) was published and

opened another adjustment phase.

Phase III (2017-Today): Adjusting to a Changing Global (Dis)order

e third phase has included the half-term of Federica Mogherini (2017 –

November 2019) and Josep Borrell’s current term (December 2019 – today) in the

role of High Representative. In Phase III, there has been a lack of consensus about

objectives, principles, and methods among member states, which have not all been

willing to participate in military interventions. is lack of consensus has led the

international standing of the EU to deteriorate. Moreover, increased instability in

European Union’s Military Operations:

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

121

Africa and the Middle East has created security problems for Europe (e.g., terrorist

attacks on European soil and the migration crisis) and emphasized the importance of

border security. In addition, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists

in eastern Ukraine in 2014 indicated EU’s diﬃculty in dealing with conﬂicts outside

its strict borders. ese new circumstances gave rise to a new era of adaptation for the

EU. Indeed, the 2016 EU Global Strategy and Council Conclusions on Security and

Defense (Council of the EU 2016) opened a new phase of adjustment in which the EU

attempted to redeﬁne its military ambition of being an independent actor in security

and defense. us, the EU Global Strategy set three overarching aims for EU action. It

was advanced that ﬁrst, the EU must respond to external conﬂicts and crises. Second, it

must build the capability and capacity of its external partners. And third, it is expected

to protect itself and its citizens (EU 2016).

e discourse has also been adapted. As the euphoria exhibited in Phase I waned,

the idea of unprecedented peace, prosperity, democracy, and absence of war came under

question (Engberg 2021). At the same time, Europe’s external context showed that

the EU would not keep contracting its security and defense action as it had done

during Phase II. In fact, the EU Global Strategy states that “an appropriate level of

ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace

and security within and beyond its borders” (EU 2016, 9). is assertion resulted from

the understanding that the security environment had deteriorated so much that the

Union had to make stronger eﬀorts to defend its territory and citizens. Phase III thus

has reinforced this necessity through a signiﬁcant shift of power distribution in a global

order that had become multipolar and was undermined by Russia, China, and the

Trump ﬁrst presidency in the US, as well as the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the

Union. e new discourse emphasized the EU’s need for a “credible, cooperative and

reliable power” (Mogherini 2017). Warning that Europe was standing “on the edge of

a precipice” and should “wake up” in order to think “itself strategically as a geopolitical

power,” French president Emmanuel Macron insisted that European countries could

“no longer rely on America to defend NATO allies” (e Economist 2019). Hence, in

order to resist adverse conditions and retain its original goals, the EU has responded by

transforming itself along a new trajectory. In practice, what this means is that during

Phase III the EU has broadened its ambition beyond crisis management and capacity

building to include hybrid threats, cybersecurity, and border management, among

other new facets of intervention (Council of the EU 2016). To achieve these objectives,

EU oﬃcials reviewed the EU Requirements Catalogue, establishing the Military

Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and creating new instruments such as the

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the EU’s Co-ordinated Annual Review

on Defense (CARD), the European Defense Fund (EDF), and the Strategic Compass

process. ese new instruments seek to consolidate the European security and defense

architecture by enhancing the Union’s capabilities for joint planning, development,

procurement, and operational, while also fostering a defense industrial base.

In terms of military engagement overseas during the adjustment process of Phase

III, the EU has remained involved in ﬁve ongoing military operations and missions.

AGUILAR, Sergio

122

Only one new maritime operation (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) was deployed in the

Mediterranean, in replacement of EUNAVFOR Sophia. With the exception of EUFOR

Althea, all Phase III operations and missions have focused on Africa. Furthermore,

as Table 3 demonstrates, these mostly small-scale operations (with the exception of

EUNAVFOR Atalanta) have ran in a permissive environment and relied on modest or

intermediate-size budgets (with the exception of EUTM-Mali). In 2020, six military

operations and missions (EEAS 2021a) went on, among which only naval operations

had an executive mandate.

Table 3: Phase III Operations

Operation /

Mission Period Geographic

Area Mandate Size (total)* Risk Common

costs*

EUNAVFOR

MED - IRINI 2020 -

now

Mediterranean

Libya

Implement UNSC

arms embargo

against Libya Small - 600 Low

Low

€ 837,800

(initial)

EUTM RCA 2016 -

now Subsahara –

RCA

Advisory and

training

Non executive

Small - 170 Low

Low

€ 43.6

million

EUTM-Mali 2013 –

2024 Subsahara –

Mali

Training

Non executive Small - 570 Low

High

€ 105.9

million

EUTM

Somalia 2010 –

now Horn of Africa Training

Non executive Small - 125 Low

Intermediate

€ 60.9

million

EU NAVFOR

- Atalanta 2008 –

now Horn of Africa Fight against piracy Intermediate

-1,943 Low

Intermediate

€ 59.6

million

ALTHEA/BiH 2004-

now Western

Balkans (BiH) Implementation of

agreement Small - 600 Low

Intermediate

€ 81.8

million

Source: e author based on Di Mauro et al. 2017 and EEAS 2020, 2021a. * All data until 2020.

At the time of writing, this last adjustment phase is ongoing, and the EU is facing

more challenges than it has made achievements. Unfortunately, its new instruments

(PESCO, CARD, EDF, and the Strategic Compass) have not yet led “to any tangible

shift in the Union’s capability base or readiness for deployment” (Fiott 2020, 3). Brexit in

particular has created a new challenge for future EU military engagement overseas. e

UK had been one of the most important providers of economic and military resources

within the EU, so that its exit from the Union enhanced the role of France and Germany

in decisions about military operations. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic and its

consequences have deﬁed the capacity of the EU to accelerate military activity and achieve

the level of ambition set out by the EU Global Strategy. e adjustment has seemingly

been moving towards a prioritization of internal defense over international security. In

European Union’s Military Operations:

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

123

this sense, the low proﬁle of military operations and missions likely will remain. However,

the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Paciﬁc, which was launched in April 2021,

acknowledged the importance of a meaningful European naval presence in the Indo-

Paciﬁc in the future, among other objectives in security and defense (EEAS 2021b).

e Strategy sets out priority areas for cooperation including in security and defense.

Concrete actions have included joint naval exercises conducted by EUNAVFOR Atalanta

with partners, the launch of EUTM-Mozambique, a coordinated maritime presence

in the North-West Indian Ocean, and EU-funded thematic projects with a regional

outreach in maritime information, counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, maritime security,

and crisis management, among other foci (EEAS 2024c). is regional presence indicates

that high-proﬁle overseas military operations are still a priority. Whereas EU leaders had

been thinking about how to resolve the ambiguity of EU military operations, a new and

shocking event posed new challenges.

e invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 alarmed the EU,

especially because it happened at a moment when Europe was grappling with limited

military capabilities, a lack of technological innovation, and an inadequate defense

industrial base (Polyakova et al. 2023). rough the Versailles Declaration of March

2022, EU member states decided to reinforce the EU’s defense capabilities and

signiﬁcantly increase defense spending. ey also agreed on greater investment in the

capabilities necessary to conduct a full range of missions and operations (EU 2022).

High Representative Joseph Borrell reinforced the need for the renaissance of the

European defense industry, which is not adequately prepared to meet the challenges

of the Ukraine war (EEAS 2024d). e dark scenario of insecurity and geostrategic

competition will surely further strain the Union, especially in high-politics ﬁelds, such

as security and defense. On the one hand, the war in Ukraine could foster EU solidarity

and push the bloc beyond intergovernmentalism and toward a deep defense integration.

On the other hand, the respective postures of Russia and the EU in the current crises

could also encourage individualistic decisions by member states on certain issues, such

as domestic defense expenditure and military capabilities.

e EU has shown to be reactive in its foreign and security policy (Riddervold and

Cross 2019). e Russian aggression on Ukraine may lead to new policy developments

in response to the crisis. e Strategic Compass approved in 2022, only a few weeks

after the Russian invasion constitutes an ambitious plan to strengthen the EU’s security

and defense policy by 2030. It aims to improve the EU’s ability to act decisively in

crises and transform the bloc into a more capable security provider (EEAS 2024b).

e war in Ukraine has instilled further urgency into these eﬀorts, and the EU has

swiftly implemented many of the goals set in its 2024 strategic plan (EEAS 2024a).

By adopting a more inward gaze in terms of defense, the EU would make military

operations and missions a secondary priority. us, the war in Ukraine could be a

turning point and inaugurate a new phase of EU military engagement outside or on

the margins of Europe.

AGUILAR, Sergio

124

Adapting to New Trajectories

Since 1999, the EU has made notable eﬀorts to improve its military capabilities

in reaction to crises and has shown the rest of the world its willingness to become an

inﬂuential global security provider. Consequently, the Union has developed its capacity

to carry out military operations and missions through diﬀerent rounds of initiatives.

But, in spite of some positive results, discrepancies have arisen between the goals of

the EU and its concrete action. Although member states generally exhibit signiﬁcant

collective economic power and military capabilities, the absolute weight of the EU

in international security remains weak and the impact of its operations and missions

on the ground has been marginal. Looking at EU practices of military engagement

overseas through the complexity theory helps delineate the EU’s adaptive approach.

Changes in the international system and internal environment in the aftermath of

the Cold War led the Union to advance normatively and structurally as to launch

several military operations in the Solana era. But the actions of the EU during this

ambitious phase and the internal and external environments at the time resulted in a

contraction phase (2010-2016) that allowed the Union to keep its military operations

and missions running while also rendering its external actions more coherent. e

contraction provoked debates about the Union’s actual capacity to accomplish the goals

it previously envisioned, as well as about the behavior it should adopt to adapt to the

shifts of an increasingly complex world.

EU leaders learned from past experiences and were able to adjust by creating new

ambitions and instruments for the EU to remedy the problems it had faced in previous

phases and to seek solutions to emerging challenges. During the last two decades, decisions

to engage in military operations and missions were led by an adaptive approach, which

transformed the EU. New domains of stability were created, and the EU took a new

trajectory to retain its initial aim of being a relevant security provider. Until today, EU

military engagement has not reached the level that was initially expected, at least in the

eyes of the public situated outside Europe. But the shortcomings should not necessarily

trigger pessimism. In fact, the complexity theory allows for an optimistic perspective

on the future since it indicates that contingent events bring about opportunities for

developing new strategies, structures, skills, and norms (see Kavalski 2015). In terms

of security and defense, optimism becomes even more necessary in light of Russia’s

aggression against Ukraine. Remembering Jean Monnet’s assertions that Europe was

“built up through crises” and that “it would be the sum of the solutions brought to

these crises” (Commission of the European Communities 1989), the EU is certainly

likely to continue to resist, evolve, and adapt. As the world becomes ever more complex,

the EU will keep transforming its military operations and missions in the face of new

challenges.

European Union’s Military Operations:

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

125

References

Cavelty, Myriam, and Jennifer Giroux. 2015. “e Good, the Bad, and the Sometimes Ugly:

Complexity as Both reat and Opportunity in National Security.” In World Politics at the

Edge of Chaos: Reﬂections on Complexity and Global Life, edited by Emilian Kavalski. State

University of New York Press.

Charbonneau, Bruno. 2009. “What Is So Special about the European Union? EU–UN

Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa.” International Peacekeeping 16 (4): 546–61.

Coelmont, Jo. 2012. An EU Security Strategy: An Attractive Narrative. Egmont Institute. http://

aei.pitt.edu/34875/1/SPB34.pdf.

Commission of the European Communities. 1989. Jean Monnet: Proceedings of Centenary

Symposium organized by the Commission of the European Communities: Brussels, 10 November

1988. Oﬃce for Oﬃcial Publications of the European Communities.

Council of the EU. 1999. “13619/1/99 REV 1. Annex IV,” December 8. https://www.consilium.

europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20European%20Council%20-20Annex%20IV%20

of%20the%20Presidency%20Conclusions.pdf.

Council of the EU. 2004. Headline Goal 2010. 6309/6/04. May 4.

Council of the EU. 2014. European Union Concept for EU-led Military Operations and Missions.

December 19.

Council of the EU. 2016. “Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy

in the Area of Security and Defence.” November 14. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/

media/22459/eugs-conclusions-st14149en16.pdf.

Council of the EU. 2018. EUMC Glossary of Acronyms and Deﬁnitions Revision 2017. February

21.

CVCE (Centre virtuel de la connaissance sur l’Europe). 1998. “Joint Declaration Issued at the

British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, December 3–4.” http://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_

st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936fc8e9bc80f24f.html.

Diez, omas, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert. 2006. “e European Union and Border

Conﬂicts: e Transformative Power of Integration.” International Organization 60 (3):

563–93.

Di Mauro, Danilo, Ulrich Krotz, and Katerina Wright. 2017. EU’s Global Engagement: A

Database of CSDP Military Operations and Civilian Missions Worldwide: Codebook: Version 2.0.

2003-2017. European University Institute.

Duke, Simon. 2008. “e Future of EU–NATO Relations: A Case of Mutual Irrelevance

rough Competition?” Journal of European Integration 30 (1): 27–43.

EC (European Commission). Eurostat. 2020. “EU Population in 2020: Almost 448 Million.”

Newsrelease 111/2020, July 10.

EEAS (European External Action Service). Delegation of the EU to Turkey. 2012. “Ashton

Highlights Foreign Policy Achievements and Visions for the Coming Year.” June 9. https://

www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eeas-news/ashton-highlights-foreign-policy-achievements-and-vision-

coming-year-3450.

EEAS (European External Action Service). 2020. “EUNAVFOR MED – IRINI.” https://www.

operationirini.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/factsheet_eunavfor_med_irini_070520.pdf.

AGUILAR, Sergio

126

EEAS (European External Action Service). 2021a. “#EUinAction.” https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/

security-defence-crisis-response/88365/euinaction_en.

EEAS (European External Action Service). 2021b. EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Paciﬁc.

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/ﬁles/eu-indo-paciﬁc_factsheet_2021-04_v.5.pdf.

EEAS (European External Action Service). 2024a. Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of

the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/ﬁles/

documents/2024/StrategicCompass_2ndYear_Report_0.pdf.

EEAS (European External Action Service). 2024b. “A Strategic Compass for Security and

Defence”. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en.

EEAS (European External Action Service). 2024c. EU Indo-Paciﬁc Strategy. https://www.eeas.

europa.eu/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/2024/EU%20Indo-paciﬁc%20FS-01-24-V3_0.pdf.

EEAS (European External Action Service). 2024d. “e War against Ukraine and European

Security.” January 23. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/war-against-ukraine-and-european-

security_en.

Engberg, Katarina. 2021. A European Defence Union by 2025? Work in Progress. Swedish Institute

for European Policy Studies.

EU (European Union). 2003a. A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

EU (European Union). 2003b. “e Berlin Plus Agreement.” https://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/

about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm.

EU (European Union). 2007. “Treaty of Lisbon.” Oﬃcial Journal of the European Union 50 (C

306/01), December 17.

EU (European Union). 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy

for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.

EU (European Union). 2022. Versailles Declaration. Versailles, March 11. https://www.consilium.

europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf.

European Parliament. 1999. Cologne European Council 3–4 June: Conclusions of the Presidency,

Annex III. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm#an3.

European Parliament. 2020. CSDP Missions and Operations. Directorate General for External

Policies of the Union. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603481/

EXPO_IDA(2020)603481_EN.pdf.

Fiott, Daniel. 2020. “As you were? e EU as an evolving military actor.” In e CSDP in 2020:

e EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence, edited by Daniel Fiott. Publications

Oﬃce of the European Union.

Folke, Carl. 2006. “Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems

analyses.” Global Environmental Change 16 (3):253–67.

Folke, Carl, Stephen R. Carpenter, Brian Walker, Marten Scheﬀer, Terry Chapin, and

Johan Rockström. 2010. “Resilience thinking: Integrating resilience, adaptability and

transformability.” Ecology and Society 15 (4). http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/

art20/.

Gegout, Catherine. 2005. “Causes and Consequences of the EU’s Military Intervention in the

Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation.” European Foreign Aﬀairs Review 10

(3):427–43.

European Union’s Military Operations:

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

127

Giegerich, Bastian. 2008. “EU Crisis Management: Ambitions and Achievements.” e Adelphi

Papers 48 (397): 15–34.

Giegerich, Bastian. 2010. “Military and Civilian Capabilities for EU-led Crisis-Management

Operations.” Adelphi Series 50 (414): 41–58.

Griﬃn, Christopher. 2007. “France, the United Kingdom, and European Union Capacities

for Military Action in Africa.” Paper presented at the Sixth Pan-European Conference on

International Relations, Turin, September 12–15. http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/ﬁles/

events/turin/Griﬃn-france_the_united_kingdom,_and_eu_capacities_-_christopher_griﬃn.

pdf.

Gunderson, Lance H. 2000. “Ecological resilience: in theory and application.” Annual Review of

Ecology and Systematics 31: 425–439.

Haine, Jean-Yves, and Bastian Giegerich. 2006. “In Congo, a cosmetic EU operation.” e New

York Times, June 12. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/12/opinion/12iht-edhaine.1954062.

html.

Hardt, Heidi. 2009. “Rapid response or evasive action? Regional organization responses to peace

operation demands.” European Security 18 (4): 383–415.

Hill, Christopher. 1993. “e Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s

International Role.” Journal of Common Market Studies 31 (3): 305–328.

Howorth, Jolyon, and Anand Menon. 2009. “Still Not Pushing Back.” Journal of Conﬂict

Resolution 53 (5): 727–744.

Howorth, Jolyon. 2003. “France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis.” Survival: Global Politics

and Strategy 45 (4): 173–192.

Hyde-Price, Adrian. 2018. “e Common Security and Defence Policy.” In e Handbook of

European Defence Policies and Armed Forces, edited by Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss. Oxford

University Press.

IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2021. e Military Balance. Routledge.

Jervis, Robert. 1997. System Eﬀects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton University

Press.

Juncos, Ana. 2020. “Beyond civilian power? Civilian CSDP two decades on.” In e CSDP

in 2020: e EU’s legacy and ambition in security and defence, edited by Daniel Fiott.

Publications Oﬃce of the European Union.

Kavalski, Emilian. 2015. World politics at the edge of chaos: Reﬂections on complexity and global life.

State University of New York Press.

Keil, Soeren, and Valery Perry. 2015. State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Routledge.

Kronenberger, Vincent, and Jan Wouters, eds. 2004. e EU and Conﬂict Prevention. TMC Asser

Press.

Longhurst, Kerry, and Alister Miskimmon. 2007. “Same Challenges, Diverging Responses:

Germany, the UK and European Security.” German Politics 16 (1): 79–94.

Mace, Catriona. 2004. “Operation Concordia: developing a ‘European’ approach to crisis

management?” International Peacekeeping 11 (3): 474–90.

Merket, Hans. 2015. “e EU’s comprehensive approach.” In e EU as a security actor in Africa:

In-depth study, edited by Dick Zandee. Clingendael Monitor.

AGUILAR, Sergio

128

Mogherini, Federica. 2017. “Foreword by High Representative.” In European Union Common

Security and Defence Policy: Missions and Operations: Annual Report 2017, edited by European

Union External Action.

Moser, Carolyn. 2015. “Peace-Europe’s Polyphonic Promise.” Max Planck Research 2: 10–15.

Murphy, Ray. 2011. “Post-UN Withdrawal: An Assessment of Peacekeeping in Chad.” Irish

Yearbook of International Law 4 (5): 3–28.

Polyakova, Alina, Edward Lucas, Mathieu Boulègue, et al. 2023. A New Vision for the Transatlantic

Alliance: e Future of European Security, the United States, and the World Order after Russia’s

War in Ukraine. Center for European Policy Analysis.

Posen, Barry R. 2006. “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?”

Security Studies 15 (2): 149–86.

Ricigliano, Robert. 2012. Making Peace Last: A toolbox for sustainable peacebuilding. Paradigm

Publishers.

Riddervold, Marianne, and Mai’a K. Cross. 2019. “Reactive power EU: Russian aggression and

the development of an EU arctic policy.” European Foreign Aﬀairs Review 24 (1): 43–60.

Scheﬀer, Marten. 2009. Critical transitions in nature and society. Princeton University Press.

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). 2021. “World military spending rises

to almost $2 trillion in 2020.” April 26. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2021/

world-military-spending-rises-almost-2-trillion-2020.

Solana, Javier. 2007. “From Cologne to Berlin and beyond - Operations, institutions and

capabilities.” Address at Conference, Berlin, January 29. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/

default/ﬁles/EUISSFiles/ESDP-from_Cologne_to_Berlin-SOLANA.pdf.

Tardy, ierry. 2015a. “CSDP in Action: What Contribution to International Security?” EUISS

Chaillot Paper 134, May. EUISS.

Tardy, ierry. 2015b. “EUFOR RCA: tough start, smooth end.” ISS Alert 17, March. EUISS.

e Economist. 2019. “e future of the EU: Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO

is becoming brain-dead.” e Economist, November 7. https://www.economist.com/

europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead.

Tocci, Nathalie. 2007. e EU’s Role in Conﬂict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the European

Neighbourhood. Routledge.

Tocci, Nathalie. 2009. “Firm in Rhetoric, Compromising in Reality: e EU in the Israeli–

Palestinian Conﬂict.” Ethnopolitics 8 (3): 387–401.

Türke, András I. 2016. “e Deﬁciencies, Mistakes and Contradictions of the New EU Foreign

and Security Strategy. Evolution or Devolution? From the ‘Solana Paper’ to the ‘Mogherini

Paper’.” CERPESC Analysis, December 20.

Ulriksen, Ståle, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace. 2004. “Operation Artemis: the shape of

things to come?” International Peacekeeping 11 (3): 508–525.

UK (United Kingdom). 2017. “Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/17 - Joint eatre Entry.” London:

MOD.

UN (United Nations). 2000. “Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping

Operations.” Document A/55/305–S/2000/809. New York, August 21. https://www.un.org/

documents/ga/docs/55/a55305.pdf.

European Union’s Military Operations:

e Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

129

UN (United Nations). 2003. “Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management.”

New York, September 24.

Wagnsson, Charlotte. 2010. “Divided power Europe: normative divergences among the EU ‘big

three.’” Journal of European Public Policy 17 (8): 1089–105.

Walker, Brian, C. S. Holling, Stephen R. Carpenter, and Ann Kinzig. 2004. “Resilience,

adaptability and transformability in social–ecological systems.” Ecology and Society 9 (2):

article 5. https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/.

WEU (Western European Union), Council of Ministers. 1992. “Petersberg Declaration.” Bonn,

June 19. https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/16938094-bb79-41ﬀ-951c-

f6c7aae8a97a/publishable_en.pdf.

Whitman, Richard, and Stefan Wolﬀ. 2012. “e European Union as a global conﬂict manager:

capabilities and context in an interdependent world.” In e European Union as a Global

Conﬂict Manager, edited by Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolﬀ. Routledge.

Whitman, Richard, and Stefan Wolﬀ, eds. 2010. e European Neighbourhood Policy in

Perspective: Context, Implementation, and Impact. Palgrave.

Wight, Colin. 2015. “eorizing International Relations: Emergence, Organized Complexity,

and Integrative Pluralism.” In World Politics at the Edge of Chaos: Reﬂections on Complexity and

Global Life, edited by Emilian Kavalski. State University of New York Press.

Williams, Bob, and Richard Hummelbrunner. 2010. Systems Concepts in Action: A practitioner’s

toolkit. Stanford University Press.

Youngs, Richard. 2008. “Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-platitude?”

Journal of European Integration 30 (3): 419–37.

130

PART III

Policy Reach: Focus on Health and

Comparative Methods

133

Introduction

Qun CUI 1, Lisheng DONG 2, and Jia XU 3

e two chapters in this section aim to answer a broad research question from an

international perspective: to what extent does integrated healthcare policy reform

impact policy design and people’s living conditions? Integrated healthcare reforms have

aimed at addressing global concerns about the consequences of the demographic and

epidemiological transitions, taking into account the increased threat of fragmented

healthcare service delivery and mounting healthcare expenditures. rough a comparative

lens, the chapters here focus on the Chinese and European welfare states to address

why integrated healthcare reform is key, the diﬀerent reform paths taken, and their

policy outcomes. e chapters provide new insight into―and social recognition of―

the speciﬁc social policy ﬁelds that currently aﬀect the directions taken in healthcare

policy development globally and the populations at risk for sliding into poverty based

on access to healthcare. ese issues were already relevant before COVID-19 and have

remained so during the pandemic. Together, the two chapters also present deviations

regarding the deﬁnition of policy integration. e chapter on the “Relationship between

Poverty Risk and Access to Healthcare in Germany and China during the COVID-19

Pandemic” focuses on policy integration of healthcare policy and long-term care policy

ﬁelds, addressing how they are integrated with regard to the risk low-income people face

of falling into poverty. e chapter “Comparing Policies and Strategies for Integrated

Care Reforms in China and Norway” centers on healthcare policy integration reform at

diﬀerent levels of medical care institutions before COVID-19 and discusses the impact

of integrated care reform on policy implementers. Both chapters use an international

comparative perspective to compare healthcare policy in China with that in Germany

and Norway, respectively.

Comparing Germany with China is particularly signiﬁcant because the two countries

share a similar social insurance regulation system and hold strong cultural values of

family solidarity; however, they experienced diﬀerent policy outcomes in the ﬁght against

COVID-19. Germany can learn from the Chinese government’s support for a ﬂexible

 Qun Cui, Qingdao Institute of Administration, China, matilda_leon@163.com.

 Lisheng Dong, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China, lsdong1955@live.com.

 Jia Xu, Anhui Normal University, Wuhu, China, xujia0550@hotmail.com.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p133-134

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and XU, Jia

134

healthcare policy scheme that lies within the structured social insurance system. is will

be important for facing issues arising in a post-pandemic world. Conversely, China can

learn from Germany’s eﬀective integration of speciﬁc policy ﬁelds to support the role of

a welfare state in poverty risk prevention. e second comparison, between China and

Norway, is also pertinent since both countries have been considered “reluctant reformers”

in integrated care reform, which has facilitated and shaped a shift in global healthcare

policy practice with pattern deviations. Moreover, both countries have implemented

reform at about the same time, the Norwegian Parliament passing a Coordination Reform

in 2012, with implementation taking place in the same year, and China unveiling and

prioritizing its multi-tier diagnosis and treatment reforms in 2015. e comparative work

in this chapter interrogates the policy rhetoric of this transition and examines areas of

divergence in reform strategies between China and Norway.

Until now, most available studies on integrated care reform have focused on comparing

OECD countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, to each other. Some studies

have sought an understanding of integrated reform in low-to-middle income countries,

but these are too diverse and fragmented to provide an overall vision of global health

policy processes. Overall, this section of the book argues not only that there is a need for

more case studies on integrated care reforms outside Europe and North America, but also

that studies that compare the strategies for integrated care reform across high-income

countries are particularly valuable. In addition, previous research has frequently proposed

service provisions, ﬁnancing, and the regulation of social policy systems as appropriate

analytical dimensions for healthcare systems or long-term care policy. However, few

studies have systematically examined the extent to which healthcare systems are linked

to the risk of low-income groups of falling into poverty. Furthermore, little is known

about the inﬂuence of diﬀerentiated levels of welfare in healthcare systems on poverty risk

conditions in low-income groups (speciﬁcally, access to healthcare services and long-term

care insurance, as well as the extent of beneﬁts). erefore, analyzing how a healthcare

system contributes to poverty risk prevention in low-income populations helps highlight

and explain diﬀering cross-national policy outcomes, especially during the COVID-19

crisis. Against this background, the second study in this section argues that low-income

people’s hypothetical poverty risk is markedly correlated to the generosity dimensions

of a healthcare system and that integration of long-term care insurance has a signiﬁcant

impact on poverty risk. e study introduces an analytical framework to examine the

hypothetical poverty risk of low-income people bound by diﬀering healthcare policy

dimensions and compares two healthcare systems that practice a similar type of social

insurance but are based on diﬀerent traditions.

135

6 Integrated Care Reforms

Comparing Policies and Strategies in

China and Norway

Qun CUI 1, Lisheng DONG 2, and

Tom CHRISTENSEN 3

Abstract: Integrated care reforms have been introduced across the globe in the face of demographic

and epidemiological transitions, increasing threats of fragmented healthcare delivery, and

mounting healthcare expenditure. Although these reforms have facilitated and shaped a shift

in global healthcare policy and practice, the pace and pattern of reform adoption have diﬀered

across various countries. Among them, both China and Norway have been considered “reluctant

reformers.” is chapter interrogates the policy rhetoric in this transition and examines areas

of divergence in reform strategies between both country. Using the structural-instrumental and

cultural-institutional perspectives, this study traces the reform process in both nations and analyzes

how China and Norway have initiated and implemented their respective integrated care reforms,

concluding that Norway’s path has been smoother that China’s due to existing formal structures

and cultural acceptance, while China has faced complex governance challenges and the risk of

symbolic implementation.

Integrated Care Reform: Exploring Convergences and Divergences

In 2009, the Chinese central government increased investment in primary healthcare

as it introduced the concept of integration in its new healthcare reform documents. is

eﬀort led to the formal launch of the “Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment Reform”

in 2015. Similarly, in Norway, the “Coordination Reform” was passed by Parliament in

2009 and implemented in 2012, aiming to improve coordination between primary and

specialist care sectors. One of the lessons learned from COVID-19 is that multi-actor and

multi-level entities, i.e., hospitals, community health centers, CDCs, home care agencies,

and nursing homes, among others, must work together to ensure public health, although

this need existed already before the pandemic. Today, in the context of demographic and

epidemiological transitions, increasingly fragmented healthcare delivery, and mounting

 Qun Cui, Qingdao Institute of Administration, China, matilda_leon@163.com.

 Lisheng Dong, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China, lsdong1955@live.com.

 Tom Christensen, University of Oslo, Norway, tom.christensen@stv.uio.no.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p135-156

136

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

healthcare expenditures, “integrated care” (IC) has become a global buzzword in policy-

making. IC aims at transforming global health delivery to make it more collaborative.

In support of this transformation, “reformists” focus on reinventing the health system

holistically to facilitate the provision of

health services that are managed and delivered in a way that ensures people receive

a continuum of health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment,

disease management, rehabilitation and palliative care services, at the diﬀerent

levels and sites of care within the health system. (WHO 2015)

IC has already driven and shaped major policies and practical changes across both

high-functioning health systems and those of middle-income countries (Kodner 2009;

World Bank 2019), demonstrating its universal applicability. However, individual

countries have acted according to their speciﬁc contexts and interests, resulting in varying

levels and speeds of engagement in IC reforms. Some countries, such as the UK, with its

primary care trusts and integrated care teams, the US, with its patient-centered medical

homes and accountable care organizations, and Sweden, with its personal coordinated

care plans, have all acted quickly to implement revolutionary changes in their health

systems; others have been more cautious, initiating reforms later and progressing more

slowly and incrementally.

IC reform entails a shift in the public sector beyond the new public management

(NPM) approach. NPM emerged in the 1980s to enhance institutional autonomy,

private sector practices, and a leaner state. It sought better performance measurement,

accountability, and market-oriented reforms to boost eﬃciency and reduce costs.

Later, in the 1990s, the concepts of governance, networks, partnerships, and trust were

embraced. us, post-NPM measures were implemented, characterized by an increased

focus on integration, networks, and horizontal coordination (Christensen and Lægreid

2007; Christensen and Lægreid 2015). In this context, integrated care reform arose to

address both medical and public management issues. Diﬀerent countries vary in their

motivations to initiate reforms, in their project design and implementation, and in their

reform outcomes.

A cross-national comparative approach allows for the unveiling of signiﬁcant

similarities across diﬀerent countries but also variations in their approach to IC. So

far, studies have only focused on comparing OECD countries among themselves, for

example Germany, the Netherlands, and England (Johri et al. 2003; Mur-Veeman et

al. 2008; Nolte et al. 2016; Baxter et al. 2018). While a few researchers have sought

to understand IC reform in low- and middle-income (LMIC) countries, conclusions

have been too scattered and fragmented to provide an overall vision of global health

policy processes (Gilson and Raphaely 2008). e scope of these studies has often been

limited to local case studies, such as the experience of tiered healthcare delivery system

in the Luohu district of Shenzhen city (China) and that of laboratory innovations in

chronic conditions in the municipality of Santo Antônio do Monte (Brazil) (Wang

137

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

et al. 2018; Mendes et al. 2019). In this chapter, we advocate for the necessity of

additional case studies in LMICs and show that comparing reform strategies in LMICs

to those in high-income countries is particularly valuable to more generally understand

IC reform rhetoric, decision-making, implementation, and results in diﬀerent socio-

economic contexts.

is research compares IC reforms in China and Norway. China, as the world’s

most populous developing country with over 1.4 billion people, faces enormous

healthcare demands and issues of resource distribution imbalance. In contrast,

Norway, a wealthy Nordic European country with a population of only about 5.4

million, beneﬁts from a highly developed healthcare system and extensive public

health experience. e vast diﬀerence in population size means that China’s challenges

are more complex and that implementation of healthcare reforms is more diverse,

while Norway, with its smaller population and less hierarchical public sector system,

can implement reforms more swiftly. Moreover, Norway has beneﬁtted from higher

levels of medical resources per capita than China. For example, in 2015, the number

of physicians per 1000 people was 1.8 in China versus 4.4 in Norway, and in 2016,

the proportion of total government spending on health was 58 percent in China

compared to 85 percent in Norway.

Regarding health insurance, both China and Norway rely primarily on social

insurance, providing most residents extensive coverage to ensure access to basic

medical services. Before 2016, China’s health insurance schemes diﬀered in rural and

urban areas, based on the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS) for rural

residents, the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), and the Urban

Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) for urban employees and residents. In

January 2016, the government uniﬁed the NRCMS and URBMI into the Urban and

Rural Resident Medical Insurance system, moving towards universal health coverage

(UHC) (Hao and Yu 2023; Liu et al. 2017; Yip et al. 2023). However, signiﬁcant

disparities in reimbursement rates remain. In Norway, all residents are covered under

the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) managed by the Norwegian Health Economics

Administration (HELFO). e health insurance system guarantees near-complete

coverage for inpatients and high coverage for outpatient care. Most private health

ﬁnancing comes from households’ out-of-pocket payments, mainly for pharmaceuticals,

dental care, and long-term care (Saunes et al. 2020).

Despite signiﬁcant diﬀerences in economic development, population size, and

medical resources between the two countries, comparing China’s and Norway’s

IC reforms is highly relevant and meaningful. Indeed, both countries face similar

challenges in terms of an aging population, high incidence of non-communicable

diseases (NCDs), and growing economic pressures. In China, the percentage of people

aged 60 years or over was 16.7 percent in 2016. In Norway, around the same time, 11

percent of the population was over seventy, a sign of “deep aging.” NCDs represent

the ﬁrst health threat, causing more than 85 percent of total deaths in both countries,

with increasing numbers of people suﬀering from chronic, complex illnesses. Moreover,

both China and Norway have sought to maximize the value of health output. In

138

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

China, the hospital-centric system is characterized by weak provider integration and

gate keeping, medical over-servicing, diagnostic tests, and high-technology services

caused by improper provider payment incentives, which are all largely responsible for

unnecessary health expenditures. In recent years, GDP growth in China has slowed

down, but cost escalation is not likely to follow suit (World Bank 2019). In contrast, in

Norway, health expenditure stood at 9.7 percent of GDP in 2014, but Bjarne Håkon

Hansen, who served as Minister of Health and Care, expressed concerns that too much

money was not well spent and indicated that the sustainability of the Norwegian

welfare system and the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme for future generations

were in jeopardy. Increasingly diverse health needs, complex medical scenarios, and

varied health risks have challenged healthcare cultures, organizations, and previously

implemented policies. Both countries have pursued IC reforms to address these issues.

China unveiled an ambitious national healthcare reform plan in 2009 that culminated

with the prioritization of a “Multi-tier Diagnosis and Treatment Reform” in 2015 when a

national scale policy experiment was started. In Norway, a national scale “Coordination

Reform” was passed by the Parliament in 2009 and implemented in 2012.

is chapter reviews the relevant literature on public management reform to establish

a theoretical basis for comparing IC reforms in China and Norway. It then analyzes the

history and process of these reforms through secondary sources such as government policy

documents, research reports, and media content. In particular, two central government

documents—China’s Policy Guidance on Promoting Multi-tier Diagnosis and Treatment

System (Guo Ban Fa, No. 70) and Norway’s e Coordination Reform: Proper treatment

at the right place and right time (Report No. 47, 2008–2009)—detail how top-level IC

institutional design must abide by certain principles, goals, paths, and evaluations. is

examination highlights useful points of convergence and divergence, analyzed through

the structural-instrumental and cultural-institutional perspectives. Finally, this chapter

includes a comparison of rhetoric, decision-making, practice, and results, conﬁrming

that while China and Norway share similar objectives and approaches in their pursuit of

integrated care reforms, they diverge signiﬁcantly in the implementation phase. China’s

main challenges are in achieving uniform reforms across the nation, with reforms incurring

the risk of becoming merely symbolic in some regions, whereas Norway’s reforms have

been smoother, relying on eﬃcient formal structures and greater cultural acceptance.

e comparison underscores the importance of balancing formal structures and cultural

factors, emphasizing that eﬀective integrated care reform requires addressing governance

issues, building mutual trust among reform agents, and ensuring active participation

from all stakeholders.

Public Management Reform Theory: Understanding Cross-countries

Convergences and Divergences

Over the past four decades, there have been two waves of public management

reforms: new public management (NPM) and post-NPM. Scholars have debated

139

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

extensively on the degree of convergence and divergence of these reforms worldwide.

Some have supported the convergence thesis, which proposes that such processes

are underway in diﬀerent countries (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Kettl (2005) has

described the NPM movement as “striking” because of the number of nations that

have taken up the reform agenda in such a short time and because of how similar

their basic strategies have been. Halligan (2007) has advanced that post-NPM trends

have emerged and that commonalities represent an “emergent” or “new model.” In

contrast, other scholars have argued for the divergence thesis, highlighting hybridity

and complexity, and suggested that the process is messier and more varied than a simple

shift to either NPM or post-NPM. One compelling factor is that public management

reform goes through diﬀerent stages: talk, decision, practice, and results. “Talk” means

that an increasing number of people discuss a particular reform idea; “decision” implies

that the authorities publicly decide to adopt a particular reform; “practice” refers to the

public sector’s incorporation of the reform into daily operational practices; and “results”

are the outcomes of the actions of public agencies yielded by the reform (Pollitt and

Geert 2011). It is easier to analyze announcements and decisions than to examine

operational practices and ﬁnal outcomes, which can exaggerate the real degree of

“convergence” in public management reform internationally (Pollitt and Geert 2011).

To describe the degree of convergence and divergence, two points should be

considered. First, rhetoric and action must be separated because there are many gaps,

divisions, and outright failures that stand between the announcement of a reform

policy and the successful implementation of that policy (Pollitt 2001). Indeed, reforms

can be merely symbolic. Unlike the substantive outcomes of policy-making and policy

implementation, reform policies and programs are often presented with hype, rituals,

myths, ceremonies, metaphors, and rhetoric based on symbolic norms and values

(March and Olsen 1989; Power 1997). e use of symbols has the potential to arouse

support for reforms, but not all symbols are translated into programs, projects, or

activities leading to practice and eﬀects (Brunsson and Olsen 2018; Christensen and

Lægreid 2003). erefore, the degree of symbol-practice coupling can vary signiﬁcantly,

leading to divergences. Second, policy experimentation must be considered since it has

been a global strategy in reform-making and implementation, but the initiator and the

results of experiments can be diﬀerent. Experiments may entail spontaneous activities

from lower-level and smaller-scale organizations or sophisticated plans from top-

level government agencies. Reforms can be initiated by single institutions (hospitals),

medium-sized entities (municipalities or counties), or large units (national alliances

and countries). Complex reforms occur on multiple scales and involve numerous

experiments. Diﬀerent countries might similarly introduce policy experimentation in

the reform process, but divergences may emerge when comparing the speciﬁc actors

and results of these experiments.

Once cross-national convergences and divergences are highlighted, we draw

from the transformative approach in organization theory to analyze the complex and

dynamic reform process. Accordingly, we use the structural-instrumental and cultural-

institutional perspectives to explore how reform actors are inﬂuenced by their respective

140

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

contexts. e structural-instrumental perspective emphasizes that the formal-normative

structure of public administration inﬂuences reform processes by channeling attention

and shaping frames of reference and attitudes among the political and administrative

leadership (Christensen et al. 2016; Egeberg 2012). Reform occurs as a result of

deliberate design, collective action, and rational adjustment that alter the rules on either

a vertical or horizontal level. In a vertical multi-layer hierarchy, leaders’ control and

analytical–rational calculations are central. In a horizontal organization, compromises

are negotiated between organizations and actors with partially conﬂicting goals and

interests (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). e cultural-institutional perspective

highlights the inﬂuences of informal values and norms that are rooted in the historical and

institutional traditions of political-administrative systems. is perspective underscores

that reforms follow gradual and evolutionary institutionalization processes that reﬂect

mutual adaptation to internal and external pressures leading to the development of

unique cultural features or identities (Christensen et al. 2007; Selznick 2011). From

this perspective, divergences across countries can be tremendously aﬀected by cultural

compatibility. High compatibility and consistency across the values that underlay the

reforming and cultural traditions of a particular system lead to higher acceptance by

politicians, administrators, entrepreneurs, citizens, and other stakeholders, while low

compatibility leads to rejection, resistance, or slow and pragmatic adaptation of reforms

(Brunsson and Olsen 2018W; Christensen et al. 2008). While cultural traits are diﬃcult

to summarize, researchers have identiﬁed distinct administrative traditions—Anglo-

American, Napoleonic, Germanic, and Scandinavian—that are built into institutional

structures, procedures, and ways of thinking (Painter and Peters 2010).

Based on this public management reform theory and transformative approach,

comparative hypotheses can be elaborated. Hypothesis 1 proposes that China and

Norway are convergent in their IC symbolic rhetoric and experimentation strategies.

Both China’s centralized authoritarian system and Norway’s democratic system require

policies that eﬀectively address healthcare challenges. e easiest solution is to “borrow”

global technical remedies, especially when international institutions like the World

Health Organization (WHO) keep “selling” integrated care reform ideas and packages.

To attract domestic support for reforms and enhance reform legitimacy, political and

administrative leaders have tended to label IC reform as modern and rational and present

reforms as a path to increased equality and eﬃciency. Another solution arises from policy

experimentation. Due to the lack of uniﬁed standards, tools, paths, and mechanisms for

IC, and the need for multi-departmental and multi-level coordination, local pilot schemes

become an eﬀective experimentation strategy. In both countries, local pilot schemes can

be initiated before central policy changes and nationwide implementation, either through

the centralized control and monitoring of reform progress in China or local autonomy

and multi-party cooperation in Norway.

Although convergence is highly possible, reforms must suit the context of the

countries in which they are implemented along a wide variety of historical traditions

and political-administrative structures. erefore, hypothesis 2 proposes that China

and Norway could be divergent on IC implementation processes and outcomes.

141

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

According to the structural-instrumental perspective, reform processes in public

organizations are inﬂuenced by formal structures. China’s authoritarian one-party

system provides tighter control than Norway’s parliamentary multi-party representative

democratic system. In China, reforms are primarily implemented through top-down

vertical hierarchies emphasizing leadership control and centralization. Hence, China

could be advantaged in the acceleration of the transformative process. However, weak

coordination in China’s complex, multi-sectoral and multilevel system often hinders

implementation. Additionally, local variations can signiﬁcantly impact the eﬀectiveness

of centrally promoted measures, and the gap between promises and performances and

between rhetoric and action could be wide as to make reform appear merely symbolic

(Christensen and Lægreid 2003). In contrast, Norway’s local governments have a high

degree of autonomy that allows them to adjust policy implementation according to

speciﬁc local conditions and realities.

Furthermore, the cultural-institutional perspective provides an understanding of

cultural features, such as trust relations and informal norms, that can contribute to

successful reform paths and results. Distrust over specialization and managerialism can

bring internal resistance to IC within an agency and eventually lead to contradictions

between the oﬃcial discourse about the reform and action. It may also lead to the

failure of local experiments and missed opportunities for their diﬀusion to other

places. China’s tradition of collectivism and authority makes it easy for reforms to

gain support from politicians and administrators but challenges implementation

at the institutional level. Norway’s tradition of social democracy and cooperation

allows reforms to gain acceptance among various stakeholders, including healthcare

institutions, but the complexity of negotiation and compromise processes could lead to

slower implementation.

Discourse, Decision, Practice, and Results of Integrated Care Reform

in China and Norway

To understand how much institutional change has occurred and what pattern it has

followed, it is necessary to ﬁrst look back at China’s and Norway’s respective healthcare

reform histories in the last half-century. Figure 1 shows that both China and Norway

have oscillated between a focus on equality and eﬃciency and state and market action

in the course of healthcare reform. From the 1950s to the 1970s, China implemented

a state-run and centralized health system, which provided rather fair but ineﬃcient and

low-quality health services. In the 1980s and 1990s, when the government decentralized

certain responsibilities to lower-level administrations, individuals, and hospitals, the

supply of medical services increased but health budgets allocated by local governments

became insuﬃcient, as hospitals became proﬁt-seeking, which increased patients’ out-of-

pocket expenses. e SARS crisis in 2003 and resulting social discontent put pressure

on the government to return as the central healthcare provider, leading to the launching

of ambitious institutional reforms. One notable reform that continues to shape reforms

142

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

today was the 2009 “New Health Care Reform,” which addressed health insurance,

essential medicines, primary healthcare, and hospitals.

In Norway, a universal health insurance system was established in the late 1940s

to ensure that all citizens receive basic healthcare services. Norway’s socio-economic

context is characterized as a welfare model with heavy government investment, high

levels of access for all, and equitable and balanced healthcare services provision. In 1982,

Norway introduced the Municipal Health Care Act, which decentralized healthcare

responsibilities to municipal governments. Furthermore, early in the 2000s structural

changes were made in the delivery and organization of healthcare services (Johnsen et

al. 2006). e 2002 Hospital Reform transferred hospital management from county

governments to the central government through ﬁve new Regional Health Enterprises

(RHEs), which were granted management independence and tasked with overseeing

hospital ownership and operations. Additionally, a strict performance evaluation system

was introduced to improve hospital operations and service eﬃciency. is reform has

been interpreted as a hybrid reform, as it prescribes both centralization—by transferring

ownership from the regional level to the Ministry of Health—and decentralization—by

changing hospitals’ status from public administration bodies to autonomous health

enterprises (Laegreid et al. 2005).

Reform patterns in China and Norway have been part of a general trend in reform that

seeks to move control from state to market mechanisms, in an attempt to correct NPM-

inspired reforms and quasi-market ideas and practices to move toward more fairness and

people-centeredness. However, compared to China’s pendulum swings between state and

market, Norway’s changes have been less drastic.

Figure 1: Timeline of healthcare reform in China and Norway

143

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

Source: e authors, based on Duckett (2012); Lian (2003); Laegreid et al. (2005); and Johnsen et al. (2006).

In our comparison of IC in China and Norway we focus on discourse, decision,

practice, and results. In both countries, the healthcare system has experienced

imbalances and fragmentation between diﬀerent levels of care, so that resources and

responsibility have shifted away from hospital-based care and toward community-based

care. In China, a clear hierarchy exists across medical service tiers providers. Chinese

healthcare organizations are either hospitals or grassroots healthcare institutions.

Hospitals, in turn, comprise three levels, while grassroots healthcare institutions

constitute community-based and township health centers and clinics. Tertiary hospitals,

which beneﬁt from the best doctors and equipment are the most attractive to patients,

while community health centers are easily marginalized and neglected. In 2009, China

launched a national healthcare reform that aimed to provide aﬀordable and equitable

healthcare to all citizens. e “Opinions on Deepening the Healthcare System Reform”

was the ﬁrst document produced by the central government to articulate the concept

of integrated healthcare services. Since then, considerable resources have been diverted

into grassroots healthcare institutions to improve their status and capacity. In Norway,

the system follows a two-level model of primary and specialized healthcare with diﬀerent

sources of funding and administrative, political, and professional cultures (Romøren et

al. 2011), which makes vertical inter-organizational coordination challenging. Health

budgets and policy initiatives have been directed mainly toward specialized hospital

care, creating competition and imbalance between primary and more specialized

levels of care (Krasnik and Paulsen 2009). us, in 2003, the Wisløﬀ Committee was

appointed by the government to identify coordination problems in the Norwegian

health sector and propose practical solutions to strengthen coordination across the

whole service system (Romøren et al. 2011).

144

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

In both China’s and Norway’s reforms, the transition “talk” stage lasted for years.

It entailed assessing the fragmentation of healthcare systems and formulating a vision

for more integrated and coordinated health services, until the “decision” stage, during

which the reform framework was designed and national policies were announced. In

2015, the General Oﬃce of the State Council in China issued a central policy speciﬁcally

focused on integrated care: the “Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment Reform.” is

hierarchical care system emphasizes community health centers and encourages patients

with chronic conditions to ﬁrst seek care from a primary-level institution. A dual referral

system ensures that critical conditions are immediately addressed through high-level

hospitals before patients are referred back to the community level for rehabilitation. is

system promotes intra-level collaboration among medical institutions (General Oﬃce of

the State Council).

In Norway, the Ministry of Health and Care Services initiated the “Coordination

Reform,” which was passed by the Norwegian Parliament in June 2009 (it was formally

launched in 2012). is reform highlights that more patients should be cared for in

primary health institutions and that discharges from intensive care hospitals should

take place earlier in the care process. Recommendations are made based on the premise

that municipalities are rewarded for investing in prevention and reducing patients’ need

for specialist services. Hospitals and municipalities are encouraged to collaborate, as

patients are quickly returned from specialist care to the municipal level for follow-up care

(Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services).

Local policy experimentation plays an important role in the implementation stage

of reforms in China and Norway, as it can validate the eﬀectiveness and adaptability

of central reforms (Table 1). In China, local governments, particularly their health-

related departments, initiate implementation, focusing on governance mechanisms

that promote integration. In Norway, the Norwegian Directorate of Health and

professional and health organizations lead the process, accenting the development of

methodologies, practical tools, and service models. Before the Coordination Reform

was passed in Norway, numerous local projects had been spontaneously launched by

hospital leaders, primary healthcare authorities, and professionals such as practice

consultants and coordinators (PCs) in health enterprises (Romøren et al. 2011). In

China, policy experimentation at the regional level has also played a signiﬁcant role and

has been emphasized by the central government, which has continued to expand the

scope of policy experiments, for example by piloting various medical alliance projects

in 118 cities, two provinces, and 567 counties.

145

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

Table 1: Integrated Care Reform Pilots in China and Norway

Outcomes

By the end of October 2016, the county-level treatment rate

reached 92.24%. Recognized and promoted by the National

Health Commission. Created a model for county-level

hierarchical diagnosis and treatment.

By July 2017, 39% of the population had signed contracts

with primary healthcare teams. In September 2017, the

National Health Commission and the State Council held

a national conference in Luohu, promoting the "Luohu

model" to other regions.

Praised by President Xi Jinping. Included as a key task

in the annual medical and health system reform plan for

2021, 2022, and 2024 by the State Council. In 2021, the

National Health Commission issued a document promoting

Sanming's hierarchical diagnosis and treatment and medical

consortium construction experience, with 31 provinces

formulating corresponding implementation plans.

Well-functioning PHTs can provide good-quality primary

care and increase job satisfaction for team members.

Realization that large-scale implementation may waste

resources and create disparities.

Eﬀectively promoted cancer care system improvements.

Source: e authors

Key Measures

ree hospitals formed medical service communities

with multiple township health centers and village clinics,

integrating county, township, and village level medical

institutions. Implementation of government prepaid medical

insurance funds and public health service funds per capita in

communities, allowing internal distribution of surplus funds.

Established Luohu Medical Group with ﬁve district

hospitals, 23 community health stations, and an institute of

precision medicine. Formed six resource-sharing centers and

six administrative centers by reorganizing 29 institutions.

Recruited general practitioners nationwide with high salaries

and formed family doctor service teams to provide chronic

disease management and integrated medical care.

At the county level, hospitals and primary health institutions

joined to form county general hospitals. At the city level, the

hospital was integrated with primary health institutions to

form two city medical consortia.

Expanded general practices with the hiring of nurses.

PHTs were created that included GPs, nurses, and medical

assistants and provided home visits and high-quality services,

systematically and proactively addressing complex patient

needs in four main categories: chronic diseases, mental health,

frailty in the elderly, and developmental disorders/disabilities.

Cancer coordinators guided, coordinated, and aligned

resources throughout the cancer treatment process, focusing

on both patient-level and system-level work. e project

promoted improvements in cancer care systems by mobilizing

necessary assets and adopting a salutogenic approach.

Initiator

Tianchang

Health

Department,

Anhui Health

Commission

Sun Xizhuo,

Chief Hospital

Director

of Luohu

Medical

Group

Zhan Jifu,

Deputy Mayor

of Sanming

Norwegian

Directorate of

Health

Norwegian

Cancer Society

Motivation

Patients sought

treatment outside their

county of residence,

spending more medical

insurance funds.

District hospitals were

small and similar,

with repeated resource

investment and

stagnant development.

Rapid increase in

healthcare expenses;

medical insurance

fund deﬁcits; ﬁscal

imbalance; high medical

costs for patients; low

doctors' income.

Patients’ GP services in

need of improvement.

Growing need for

patient-centered and

coordinated care in

primary healthcare.

Local Pilot

Program

Tianchang

Medical

Consortium

(Yu et al. 2020)

Luohu Medical

Group

(Wang et al.

2018)

Sanming

Medical

Reform

Primary

Healthcare

Team (PHT)

Pilot (Abelsen

and Fosse

2024)

Cancer

Coordinator

(CC) Project

(Lie 2018)

Date

February

2015

August

2015

2012

April

2018–

March

2023

2012

Country

China

Norway

146

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

From a comparison of local-level experiments in the two countries emerge similarities

and diﬀerences; the same is true in the practical organizational models and strategies

supporting those experiments. In China, the core organizational models of the

hierarchical diagnosis and treatment reform are twofold. One model relies on the idea

of the urban medical group, usually led by tertiary public hospitals. Within this group,

collaboration takes place on issues of personnel, technology, diagnostics, prescriptions,

and services among community health service institutions, nursing homes, rehabilitation

institutions, and other entities. e other model is the county-level medical consortium,

which integrates county hospitals, township health centers, and village clinics under a

uniﬁed management. Although the degree of integration varies across both models, they

follow a hierarchical structure where stronger institutions support weaker ones (Wu et

al. 2022). Norway’s coordination reform, while also focusing on vertical integration,

involves redistributing administrative duties and cooperation across municipalities and

regional health authorities.

Moreover, to remodel a system in which patients receive the right treatment at the right

place and right time, both China and Norway have transitioned their existing payment

models to better incorporate economic incentives. China has focused on incentivizing

healthcare institutions, while Norway has targeted municipal governments. In China,

medical insurance payments transitioned from a fee-for-service (FFS) system to a pre-

payment system to guide healthcare institutions. e FFS system had led to excessive

treatments and a 44.28 percent annual growth rate in medical insurance expenditures

from 1998 to 2008. erefore, in June 2017 the central government proposed a diversiﬁed

composite payment method that included diagnosis-related group (DRG) payments for

hospitals to ensure necessary treatments and capitation payments for primary healthcare

institutions to boost community health services (Zheng and Wei 2024; Li et al. 2023).

In Norway, the healthcare system has used an activity-based funding (ABF) system,

combining capitation-based block grants and DRGs. ese mechanisms link funding

to treatment types and quantities. While they have promoted hospital eﬃciency they

have historically not provided incentives for coordination outside hospitals. To improve

this situation, new measures include municipal co-ﬁnancing (MCF) and municipal acute

units (MAUs). MCF requires municipalities to cover 20 percent of certain DRG costs,

such as hospital rehabilitation, to encourage local primary care services. MAUs manage

acute conditions locally, which results in reducing unnecessary hospital admissions and

promoting integrated care (Monkerud and Tjerbo 2016; La Rocca and Hoholm 2017).

Another point of divergence between China and Norway is that in China the reform

included administrative-led measures, with the government dominating the establishment

of medical groups. In Norway, legal and regulatory means—such as binding agreements

between municipalities and regional health authorities—were used to detail how specialist

healthcare services must decentralize outpatient clinics, expertise and knowledge transfer,

the provision of internships, and the use of general practitioners, in a two-level model that

strengthens coordination.

In reforms, the “results” phase is the most important. However, since both the

hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment Reform (China) and Coordination Reform

147

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

(Norway) were launched only a few years ago, it is too early to conclude whether China

and Norway have succeeded or failed at reducing healthcare fragmentation. Currently,

preliminary evaluation results are mixed. On the one hand, some studies show that reforms

have increased primary care utilization, improved equity, and enhanced health outcomes

for people with hypertension or diabetes. On the other hand, studies indicate some

challenges in implementation. For example, while the ratio of senior citizens with chronic

illnesses in China who signed contracts with family doctors increased from 28.33 percent

in 2015 to 75.46 percent in 2017, most people still go to the hospital for specialized care

instead of seeing their family doctor as an initial step. Moreover, coordination among

the diﬀerent actors remains insuﬃcient, and integrated care still has a long way to go.

In Norway, the reform has achieved some of its intended goals, such as fewer deaths and

hospital readmissions among the elderly, although in some municipalities collaboration

in transferring patients to hospitals has weakened (Bruvik et al. 2017) and general

practitioners have had negative experiences working with their hospital-based colleagues

(Leonardsen et al. 2018). Additionally, it is found that information and communication

technologies (ICT) infrastructure and elite medical specialties in major hospitals and

health centers may resist cooperation (Dan 2017).

Comparing the rhetoric, decision-making process, practice, and results of integrated

care reforms in China and Norway conﬁrms the hypothesis that these two countries

converge in their objectives and prospects, as well as in the adoption of experimental

approaches to reform. However, they diverge signiﬁcantly in practice, with China facing

more challenges in implementation across the national scale and a higher risks that the

reform become merely symbolic practice at the local level.

Instrumental-structural and Cultural-institutional Perspectives for IC

Reforms in China and Norway

In both China and Norway, central leaders have had a noticeable inﬂuence on

reforms. From an instrumental-structural perspective, strong hierarchical steering or

negotiating among top political and administrative leaders can accelerate reform agendas

(March and Olsen 1983). Chinese President Xi proposed “Health China 2030” in 2016,

a new national strategy and the most important political impetus for IC reform. At the

same time, a joint report by the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and three

Chinese ministries (the Ministry of Finance, National Health and Family Planning

Commission, and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security) recommended

that China establish a new model—the “People-Centered Integrated Care” (PCIC)—

to strengthen the core position of primary health services. Vice Premier Liu Yandong

considered that the recommendations would be valuable in the formulation of the “13th

Five-Year” health reform plan (Xinhua News Agency 2016), underscoring the crucial

inﬂuence international organizations have had on China’s reform agenda. In Norway, the

Minister of Health and Care in 2008, Bjarne Håkon Hansen, set coordination in health

and long-term care as his main foci and political priorities, and he engaged in working

148

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

out the new plans for the Coordination Reform very soon after taking oﬃce (Romøren

et al. 2011).

In China, although central leaders have played an important role in initiating the reform

process, implementation has occurred via complex governmental structures. Indeed, the

Chinese healthcare reform has relied on numerous cabinets and their counterparts at

the sub-central level. Some of these institutions are more inﬂuential than others. For

example, the National Health and Family Planning Commission, National Development

and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Human Resources and Social

Security oﬃce all weigh heavily on policy. e “super-department system reform” of 2018

established two additional departments to lead policy-making- the Health Commission

and Health Insurance Bureau- as IC reform in China addresses concerns about supervision,

ﬁnancial support, human resources, investment and pricing, and medical insurance.

A political and administrative structure that has diverse, overlapping, and potentially

competing organizational dimensions (Olsen 2010) can create challenges in the reform

process. To realize overall coordination in political and administrative structure, the

Chinese government established a coordinating group that gathers multiple departments

related to healthcare reform at both the central and local level. Unfortunately, because it is

only temporary, the connection between the various members of this group is quite loose.

Moreover, one government department leader might be serving in several coordinating

groups in various reform areas. e eﬀects of this mechanism have not been convincing.

An alternative would be to develop a strong political impetus at the local level; however,

policies are mostly formulated by the health department, and successes have varied across

regions. For example, the regions of Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang have had positive

reform outcome, with the support of their respective provincial party secretaries who

prioritized healthcare reform and negotiated agreements among departments and interest

groups. Findings show that collaboration is necessary among departments and multi-level

administrators for IC reform, or changes are only symbolic.

Turning to Norway, the political and administrative structure there appears less

complex, since Norway’s healthcare system is organized around primary healthcare

providers as part of the responsibility of municipalities and specialist health services

(hospitals), which are owned by the Ministry of Health. Yet, horizontal coordination

among the diﬀerent sectors can be diﬃcult to attain at the central level. For example, the

Ministry of Education and Research, responsible for planning and partially subsidizing the

education of health personnel, may conﬂict with the National Insurance Administration,

which provides signiﬁcant ﬁnancing for the activities of the health system. So, in

general, Norway is characterized by relatively low coordination levels across the internal

administrative hierarchy within each ministerial area (Lægreid et al. 2016). Because the

Minister of Health has the authority to overrule all structural decisions that have been

made at a lower level, the central government likely gives more weight to cost and quality

of specialized care than to that of primary care (Iversen et al. 2016). But in the ﬁrst wave

of the New Public Management reform, Norway adopted many formal instruments,

such as a performance management system and formal steering dialogue pathway. ese

measures have introduced more network arrangements in the shadow of the hierarchy

149

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

and have built a good foundation for agencies and ministries to merge during the second

wave of post-NPM reform. e use of cross-boundary collegial bodies, such as working

groups and project groups that transcend policy areas and administrative levels, is also

rather common in Norway (Lægreid et al. 2016).

e last factor that can be analyzed is whether IC reform was already part of the

institutional landscape in each country at stake. During the 1990s, China broke its

system of strict gatekeeping, referral, patient discharge, and handover and let healthcare

organizations make proﬁts as if they were corporations. In order for institutions to

value cooperation again, China needed to revise the design of many detailed standards,

norms, regulations, and laws. In contrast, rather than entirely rebuilding its system,

Norway only needed to improve it. Indeed, that system was already stable and

comprehensive because it already imposed limits on patients’ visits to specialists and

had developed clinical pathways.

Moreover, informal integration—based on culture—is important, as it serves as

“institutional glue” and reaches beyond formal structural boundaries (Christensen and

Lægreid 2020). is “horizontal width” (Krasner 1988) means that when actors care about

what occurs in other units within their respective organizations, collective action will be

enhanced. ree main actors have been involved in IC reform in China and Norway. First,

the “regulators” are government entities that invest in and purchase healthcare services

and manage and supervise healthcare providers. Second, the “providers” are multi-level

and multi-type healthcare organizations that provide healthcare products and services.

Finally, the “service objects” are the citizens/patients who need a variety of healthcare

products and services, including health enhancement, disease prevention, diagnosis,

treatment, disease management, rehabilitation, and palliative care. From the perspective

of the regulators, China has established a modern administrative system, but it inherited

the characteristics of “factionalism” from its long history of bureaucracy, which has caused

long-term damage in trust among administrations at diﬀerent levels of government or in

diﬀerent categories. In contrast, Norway is characterized by high level of mutual trust

and understanding across the local, regional, and central levels in the health policy sector,

which means that homogeneity in norms and values presents less of a potential conﬂict

or tension (Christensen et al. 2006). Moreover, in Norway, the relationship between

regulators and health professionals is highly professional, although political endeavors

can sometimes result in compromise solutions that are not in harmony with professional

values concerning what yields high-quality healthcare (Ahgren 2014).

In China, the ability to engage in reform has been challenged by the legacy of the

“command and control” approach, as well as by the subordinate role hospitals play

in policy-making. e current internal driving force for reform comes from local

governments rather than medical institutions themselves. Only hospitals seem to

participate in IC reform, but the top-down administrative intervention and mandatory

integration prevents most of them from implementing new policies. For example, while

all public medical institutions are administered by the government, the bargaining power

of medical institutions diﬀers. For instance, the president of a large hospital has much

more inﬂuence than the head of a community health center. is power diﬀerential

150

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

may explain why some of the policies that favor lower-level medical institutions meet

diﬃculty in implementation. By contrast, in Norway’s corporative political system,

it is quite common that various interest groups shape policy. For example, before the

government proposed its Coordination Reform, there had already been extensive rounds

of consultations with stakeholders and parliamentary debates on the issue (Pedersen

2012). In particular, medical professionals in Norway have been able to inﬂuence health

policy through their institutional integration into the state machinery (Erichsen 1995).

When examining the providers’ perspective, it appears that a competitive culture is

at the root of the Chinese health system. Although the Chinese government tried to

transfer high-quality resources from large hospitals to the grassroots level, some hospitals

siphoned oﬀ patients and medical personnel from the local community to grow even

larger. In China, there is also a lack of consensus between specialists and GPs about

how to evaluate diseases and when to refer patients. However, unbalanced power and

poor communication also exist in Norway’s two-tier model. ere, primary healthcare

professionals face a fragmented hospital system, which makes it diﬃcult for them to

know with whom to communicate or collaborate (Wadmann et al. 2009). While China’s

cultural harmony is mainly caused by competitive interest among healthcare institutions,

Norway’s is due to professional disjunction. us, in Norway, the way professionals

protect their respective domains, whether they are involved in specialist or primary

care, could limit their reciprocal understanding of actors’ needs, resulting in insuﬃcient

coordination (Colmorten et al. 2004).

ere are also cultural diﬀerences in citizens’ preferences and level of involvement

in the healthcare reform process in the two countries. In the past few decades, the

Chinese have shown to prefer seeking care at large hospitals. Because the classiﬁcation

of healthcare organizations has been based on an administrative hierarchy rather than

on medical disciplines, and because higher quality resources have been concentrated in

tertiary hospitals at the top level of healthcare organizations, patients have made rational

choices in a context in which the demand and supply of information in the health market

is extremely asymmetrical. erefore, it is anticipated that the Chinese government will

struggle to incite citizens to trust and choose community healthcare institutions. e

unequal relationship between hospitals and primary healthcare institutions also extends

into the hierarchical diagnosis and treatment reform, potentially transforming vertical

integration into a dependency relationship. In Norway, people have perceived positively

the division of responsibility and labor based on specialization among general practitioners

in clinics and specialists in hospitals. Additionally, there is no quality gap across services

in Norway. Moreover, while both China and Norway characterize the philosophy behind

IC reform as people-oriented, China, in its present stage of reform, regards citizens as

subjects to be guided. For example, the reimbursement rates for hospital services diﬀer

and favor grassroots institutions. But little has been done to create opportunities for

citizens’ participation in IC reform. In contrast, the Coordination Reform in Norway has

invited more involvement from Norwegian patients and citizens’ organizations, which

are encouraged to implement structures and systems for more cohesive patient pathways.

151

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

Balancing Structural Factors and Cultural Dynamics in Reforms

When comparing healthcare systems in China and Norway, a new paradigm of

integrated care can be deﬁned. Points of convergence emerge out of internal pressures to

reach speciﬁc objectives in these respective national health systems. Both countries have

used a similar policy rhetoric of integrated care to correct issues left over from previous

NPM reform, such as increased heterogeneity among diﬀerent healthcare organizations,

weakened traditional values supporting public service (such as equal and convenient access

to health), and fragmentation and departmental egoism in the healthcare management

system. However, it can be concluded that Norway’s path, although incremental, has been

smoother than China’s, and that China’s reform route is more complex. ere may be

strong mobilization and administrative drive in China because of formal structures, but

there is also ambiguity and discretion that lead to higher risks of regional disparity and

mere symbolic implementation.

Formal structures are not merely the backdrop for reform implementation; they

are, in fact, one of the critical factors determining the success or failure of reforms.

e instrumental-structural perspective highlights that China’s healthcare management

system is consistent with the government’s administrative management, which exhibits

a hierarchical, organized, and multi-departmental cross-management style, as well

as segmentation characteristics. China’s reforms are not only about improving the

relationship between healthcare institutions but are fundamentally about improving

collaboration among departments and delegating power from the government to healthcare

institutions, which comes with challenges. One the one hand, China’s “command and

control” approach signiﬁcantly aids pilot projects. On the other hand, the top-down

pressure also leads to symbolic implementation, where reforms appear to be in place

but are not eﬀectively executed at the grassroots level. Norway too faces challenges from

unbalanced hierarchical structures and departmentalism across its leading agencies. But

reform in Norway has beneﬁtted from the pre-existence of eﬃcient formal instruments

and institutions that have allowed the government to launch and implement IC reform

more eﬃciently than in China,

Divergence in the implementation of IC reforms in China and Norway can also be

attributed to cultural and institutional factors. Culturally, China might meet invisible

but lasting resistance to IC reform from a triangle of regulator-governments, provider-

healthcare institutions, and service objects-citizens. ere are four facets to the cultural

incompatibilities that exist between IC reform and old informal institutions in China:

the cultural legacy of a factionalist inner political-administrative system; command and

control relationships between administrators and professionals; competition among

healthcare organizations; and habitual preferences and participation level of citizens

and patients. In Norway, IC reform is more culturally accepted, as it is compatible with

historical traditions and reform path-dependency patterns that are based on a high level

of mutual trust in and understanding of the healthcare system. Hence, reform agents’

and stakeholders’ reciprocal trust has more to do with chosen strategies and the pace

of reform implementation in both China and Norway than the formal structures of

152

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

political-administrative systems that manage healthcare service provision. Comparing IC

reforms in China and Norway highlights the importance of considering both formal

structures and cultural factors in the reform process. Future reform eﬀorts should address

power relationships, governance structures, and management rules while also considering

cultural compatibility tests to build mutual trust among reform agents. is approach

may ensure that reforms are not only well designed but also eﬀectively implemented and

embraced by all actors.

References

Abelsen, Birgit, and Anette Fosse. 2024. “Team Eﬀectiveness in General Practice: Insights from

the Norwegian Primary Healthcare Team Pilot.” In Multidisciplinary Teamwork in Healthcare,

edited by Neil E. Grunberg. https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.1004545.

Ahgren, Bengt. 2014. “e Path to Integrated Healthcare: Various Scandinavian

Strategies.” International Journal of Care Coordination 17 (1–2): 52–8. https://doi.

org/10.1177%2F2053435414540606.

Baxter, Susan, Maxine Johnson, Duncan Chambers, Anthea Sutton, Elizabeth Goyder, and

Andrew Booth. 2018. “e Eﬀects of Integrated Care: A Systematic Review of UK and

International Evidence.” BMC Health Services Research 18 (1): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1186/

s12913-018-3161-3.

Brunsson, Nils, and Johan P. Olsen. 2018. e Reforming Organization: Making Sense of

Administrative Change. Routledge.

Bruvik, Frøydis, Jorunn Drageset, and Johannes Foss Abrahamsen. 2017. “From Hospitals to

Nursing Homes—e Consequences of the Care Coordination Reform.” Sykepleien forskning

12: 606–13. https://sykepleien.no/sites/default/ﬁles/pdf-export/pdf-export-62540.pdf.

Christensen, Tom, and Per Lægreid. 2003. “Administrative Reform Policy: e Challenges

of Turning Symbols into Practice.” Public Organization Review 3 (1): 3–27. https://doi.

org/10.1023/A:1023002810428.

Christensen, Tom, and Per Lægreid. 2007. “e Whole-of-Government Approach to Public

Sector Reform.” Public Administration Review 67 (6): 1059–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/

j.1540-6210.2007.00797.x.

Christensen, Tom, Per Lægreid, and Kjell Arne Røvik. 2007. Organization eory and the Public

Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth. Routledge.

Christensen, Tom, and Per Lægreid. 2015. “Performance and Accountability: A eoretical

Discussion and an Empirical Assessment.” Public Organization Review 15 (2): 207–25.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-013-0267-2.

Christensen, Tom, Per Lægreid, and Lise H. Rykkja. 2016. “Organizing for Crisis Management:

Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy.” Public Administration Review 76 (6):

887–897. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12558

Christensen, Tom, and Per Lægreid. 2020. “Coordination Quality in Central Government: e

Case of Norway.” Public Organization Review 20 (1): 145–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/

s11115-018-00434-0.

153

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

Christensen, Tom, Per Lægreid, and Inger Marie Stigen. 2006. “Performance Management and

Public Sector Reform: e Norwegian Hospital Reform.” International Public Management

Journal 9 (2): 113–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/10967490600766987.

Christensen, Tom, Lisheng Dong, and Martin Painter. 2008. “Administrative Reform in

China’s Central Government: How Much Learning from the West?” International Review of

Administrative Sciences 74 (3): 351–71. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0020852308095308.

Colmorten, Ellinor, omas Clausen, and Steen Bengtsson. 2004. “Providing Integrated Health

and Social Care for Older Persons in Denmark.” In Providing Integrated Health and Social

Care for Older Persons: A European Review of Issues at Stake, edited by K. Leichsenring e A. M.

Alaszewski. European Centre and Ashgate Publishing.

Dan, Sorin. 2017. “Coordination of Public Hospitals in Norway.” In e Coordination of

European Public Hospital Systems. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-

43428-5_7.

Duckett, Jane. 2012. e Chinese State’s Retreat from Health: Policy and the Politics of Retrenchment.

Routledge.

Egeberg, Morten. 2012. “How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective.”

In e Sage Handbook of Public Administration, 2nd ed., edited by B. Guy Peters e Jon Pierre.

Sage Publications.

Erichsen, Vibeke. 1995. “Health Care Reform in Norway: e End of the “Profession State”?”

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 20 (3): 719–37. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-

20-3-719.

Gilson, Lucy, and Nika Raphaely. 2008. “e Terrain of Health Policy Analysis in Low- and

Middle-Income Countries: A Review of Published Literature 1994–2007.” Health Policy and

Planning 23 (5): 294–307. https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/czn019.

Halligan, John. 2007. “Reintegrating Government in ird Generation Reforms of Australia

and New Zealand.” Public Policy and Administration 22 (2): 217–38. https://doi.

org/10.1177%2F0952076707075899.

Hao, Hong, and Yu Heng Yeo. 2023. “Does the Integration of Urban and Rural Health Insurance

Inﬂuence the Functional Limitations of the Middle-aged and Elderly in Rural China?” SSM-

Population Health 23: 101439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2023.101439.

Iversen, Tor, Anders Anell, Unto Häkkinen, Christian Kronborg, and orhildur Ólafsdóttir.

2016. “Coordination of Health Care in the Nordic Countries.” Nordic Journal of Health

Economics 4 (1): 41–55. https://doi.org/10.5617/njhe.2846.

Johnsen, Jan R., Vaida Bankauskaite, and World Health Organization. 2006. Health Systems in

Transition. Vol. 8, no. 1. European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. https://apps.

who.int/iris/handle/10665/107759 .

Johri, Mira, Francois Beland, and Howard Bergman. 2003. “International Experiments in

Integrated Care for the Elderly: A Synthesis of the Evidence.” International Journal of Geriatric

Psychiatry 18 (3): 222–35. https://doi.org/10.1002/gps.819.

Kettl, Donald F. 2005. e Global Public Management Revolution: A Report on the Transformation

of Governance. Brookings Institution Press.

Kodner, Dennis L. 2009. “All Together Now: A Conceptual Exploration of Integrated Care.”

Healthcare Quarterly (Toronto, Ont.) 13: 6–15. https://doi.org/10.12927/hcq.2009.21091.

154

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

Krasner, Stephen D. 1988. “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective.” Comparative Political

Studies 21 (1): 66–94. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010414088021001004.

Krasnik, Allan, and Bård Paulsen. 2009. “Reforming Primary Health Care.” In e Nordic Health

Care Systems: Recent Reforms and Current Policy Challenges, edited by Jon Magnussen, Karsten

Vrangæk and Richard B. Saltman. McGraw-Hill.

La Rocca, Antonella, and omas Hoholm. 2017. “Coordination between Primary and

Secondary Care: e Role of Electronic Messages and Economic Incentives.” BMC Health

Services Research 17: 149. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-017-2096-4.

Lægreid, Per, Ståle Opedal, and Inger Marie Stigen. 2005. “e Norwegian Hospital Reform:

Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and

Law 30 (6): 1027–64. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-30-6-1027

Lægreid, Per, Küill Sarapuu, Lise H. Rykkja, and Tiina Randma-Liiv. 2016. “New Coordination

Challenges in the Welfare State.” Public Management Review 17 (7): 927–39. https://doi.org/

10.1080/14719037.2015.1029344.

Leonardsen, Ann-Chatrin Linqvist, Lilliana Del Busso, Vigdis Abrahamsen Grøndahl, and Lars-

Petter Jelsness-Jørgensen. 2018. “Handovers in Primary Healthcare in Norway: A Qualitative

Study of General Practitioners’ Collaborative Experiences.” Health & Social Care in the

Community 26 (1): 173–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/hsc.12497.

Li, Qun, Xia Fan, and Weiyan Jian. 2023. “Impact of Diagnosis-Related-Group (DRG) Payment

on Variation in Hospitalization Expenditure: Evidence from China.” BMC Health Services

Research 23 (1): 688. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-023-09686-z.

Lian, Olaug S. 2003. “Convergence or Divergence? Reforming Primary Care in Norway and

Britain.” e Milbank Quarterly 81 (2): 305–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0009.t01-2-

00055

Lie, Nina E. K. 2018. “Providing Patient-Centered and Coordinated Care: A Qualitative Study

of Norwegian Cancer Coordinators’ Experiences of Enacting eir Role in Primary Health

Care.” PhD diss., Oslo Metropolitan University. https://hdl.handle.net/10642/6563.

Liu, Gordon G., Samantha A. Vortherms, and Xuezheng Hong. 2017. “China’s Health Reform

Update.” Annual Review of Public Health 38: 431–48. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-

publhealth-031816-044247.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olson. 1983. “Organizing Political Life: What Administrative

Reorganization Tells Us about Government.” American Political Science Review 77 (2):

281–96. https://doi.org/10.2307/1958916.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions. e Organizational Basis of

Politics. Free Press.

Mendes, Eugênio Vilaça, Rita de Cássia Bertão Cataneli, Regina Helena Arroio Nicoletti, et al.

2019. “Integrated Care in the Uniﬁed Health System of Brazil: the Laboratory for Innovation

in Chronic Conditions in Santo Antônio do Monte.” International Journal of Healthcare

Management 12 (2): 116–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/20479700.2018.1436412.

Monkerud, Lars C., and Trond Tjerbo. 2016. “e Eﬀects of the Norwegian Coordination

Reform on the Use of Rehabilitation Services: Panel Data Analyses of Service Use, 2010 to

2013.” BMC Health Services Research 16: 353. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-016-1564-6.

155

Integrated Care Reforms:

Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

Mur-Veeman, Ingrid, Arno Van Raak, and Aggie Paulus. 2008. “Comparing Integrated

Care Policy in Europe: Does Policy Matter?” Health Policy 85 (2): 172–83. https://doi.

org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2007.07.008.

Nolte, Ellen, Anne Frølich, Helmut Hildebrandt, Alexander Pimperl, Guy J. Schulpen, and

Hubertus J.M. Vrijhoef. 2016. “Implementing Integrated Care: A Synthesis of Experiences

in ree European Countries.” International Journal of Care Coordination 19 (1–2): 5–19.

https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2053434516655626.

Olsen, Johan P. 2010. Governance through Institution Building: Institutional eory and Recent

European Experiments in Democratic Organization. Oxford University Press.

Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit

is Transforming the Public Sector. Adison Wesley.

Painter, Martin, and B. Guy Peters. 2010. Tradition and Public Administration. Palgrave

Macmillan.

Pedersen, Axel West. 2012. Annual National Report 2011. Pensions, Health and Long-term Care,

Norway. Asisp (Analytical Support on the Socio-Economic Impact of Social Protection

Reforms). http://pensionreform.ru/ﬁles/4080/ASISP.%20Annual%20National%20

Report%202011%20-%20Norway.pdf.

Pollitt, Christopher. 2001. “Convergence: the Useful Myth?.” Public Administration 79 (4):

933–47. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00287.

Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2011. Public Management Reform: A Comparative

Analysis—New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State. Oxford

University Press.

Power, Michael. 1997. e Audit Society: Rituals of Veriﬁcation. Oxford University Press.

Romøren, TorInge, Dag Olaf Torjesen, and Brynjar Landmark. 2011. “Promoting Coordination

in Norwegian Health Care.” International Journal of Integrated Care 11. https://dx.doi.

org/10.5334%2Fijic.581.

Saunes, Ingrid S., Marina Karanikolos, and Anna Sagan. 2020. “Norway: Health System Review.”

Health Systems in Transition 22 (1): 1–163. World Health Organization. https://www.who.int/

publications/i/item/HiT-22-1-2020.

Selznick, Philip. 2011. Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation. Quid Pro Books.

Wadmann, Sarah, Martin Strandberg-Larsen, and Karsten Vrangbæk. 2009. “Coordination

Between Primary and Secondary Healthcare in Denmark and Sweden.” International Journal

of Integrated Care 9. https://dx.doi.org/10.5334%2Fijic.302.

Wang, Xin, Xizhuo Sun, Stephen Birch, et al. 2018. “People-centred Integrated Care in

Urban China.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 96 (12): 843. https://dx.doi.

org/10.2471%2FBLT.18.214908.

WHO (World Health Organization). 2015. WHO Global Strategy on People-centered and

Integrated Health Services: Interim Report. No. WHO/HIS/SDS/2015.6. https://apps.who.int/

iris/bitstream/handle/10665/155002/WHO_HIS_SDS_2015.6_eng.pdf.

World Bank. 2019. Healthy China: Deepening Health Reform in China: Building

High-Quality and Value-Based Service Delivery. http://gba-imhia.io/wp-content/

uploads/2019/11/9781464812637.pdf.

156

CUI, Qun, DONG, Lisheng, and CHRISTENSEN, Tom

Wu, Suxiong, Xiao Yu, and Hua Yang. 2022. “医疗卫生服务体系整合的过程、结构与治理

边界:中国实践” [e Process, Structure, and Governance Boundaries of Integrated Health

Care Systems: e Chinese Practice]. Zhejiang Academic Journal 3: 54–63. DOI: 10.16235/j.

cnki.33-1005/c.2022.03.023.

Xinhua News Agency. 2016. “‘三方五家’医改联合研究报告发布” [“ree Parties and Five

Institutions” Joint Research Report on Medical Reform Released]. Xinhua News Agency, July

22. http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-07/22/c_129170783.htm.

Yip, Winnie, Hongqiao Fu, Weiyan Jian, Jue Liu, Jay Pan, and Duo Xu. 2023. “Universal health

coverage in China part 1: progress and gaps.” e Lancet Public Health 8 (12): e1025–e1034.

https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2468-2667%2823%2900254-2.

Yu, Jianxing, Yixin Tu, and Chao Wu. 2020. “探索整合型医疗卫生服务体系的中国方

案——基于安徽、山西与浙江县域医共体的调查” [Exploring China’s Integrated Health

Care System: A Survey Based on County-Level Medical Communities in Anhui, Shanxi, and

Zhejiang]. Governance Studies no. 1, General no. 191.

Zheng, Bingwen, and Wei Wei. 2024. “中国医保支付体系改革25年：成就、问题与展望”

[25 Years of Reform in China’s Medical Insurance Payment System: Achievements, Problems,

and Prospects]. Chinese Social Security Review 8 (3): May 15.

157

7 Poverty Risk and the

Integration of Long-Term

Care in Healthcare Policy in

Germany and China During the

COVID-19 Pandemic

Jia XU 1 and Weidong DAI 2

Abstract: is chapter compares how the German and Chinese healthcare systems diﬀered in their

impact on poverty risk among low-income people during the COVID-19 pandemic. It examines

how long-term care policy in these two countries can support the population from such risk

during pandemics, arguing that the interplay of healthcare and long-term care policy with regard

to eligibility for and access to beneﬁts is crucial to protect low-income individuals from the risk of

falling into poverty.

Emergence of Poverty Risk During the COVID-19 Pandemic

In many countries, social welfare policies were enhanced in the ﬁght against the eﬀects

of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in the area of healthcare. e healthcare policy

response to the COVID-19 crisis elicited signiﬁcant discussions globally. A critical issue

in this debate has been to identify how to limit low-income people’s exposure to the risk

of poverty, focusing on healthcare insurance and medical costs. e resources accessible

to people in meeting their healthcare needs have been better deﬁned during the crisis

(e.g., Zhu et al. 2020), and the lack of access to care has been linked to people exhausting

their personal resources to face medical expenses. During the pandemic, in areas where

low-income people could barely obtain medical services, they faced the risk of poverty,

or “hypothetical poverty.” Comparisons can be useful to understand this relationship.

is chapter reviews how Germany, a conservative European welfare state, and China, an

Asian welfare state, have diﬀered in their response to COVID-19 through institutional

regulations aimed at preventing poverty risk among low-income population groups.

e chapter contributes to this book on decentering the study of Europe by providing

a comparative study between a country in Europe and a country outside of Europe and

establishing a dialogue. e new insights illuminate the ways in which social welfare

policy impacted poverty risk among low-income groups during the COVID-19 crisis.

 Jia Xu, Anhui Normal University, Wuhu, China, xujia0550@ahnu.edu.cn.

 Weidong Dai, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, China, dwd68@163.com.

https://doi.org/10.36311/2025.978-65-5954-652-7.p157-170

158

XU, Jia and DAI, Weidong

In an attempt to prevent the exposure to poverty risk of low-income population

groups during the COVID-19 pandemic, China and Germany strengthened their public

healthcare policy schemes to better cover medical-related costs, albeit with limitations.

e Chinese public healthcare system is based primarily on universal design with targeted

programs in local areas. Territories in diﬀerent provinces may deviate from these programs,

resulting in cross-regional variations that lead to diﬀering coverage of self-paid medical

cost across social groups. In China, additional beneﬁts were added to healthcare coverage

to include speciﬁc COVID-19-related expenses. As the ﬁrst country experiencing the

widespread breakout of COVID-19, China achieved early positive outcomes in its ﬁght

against the pandemic, including a cure rate of 94.3 percent nationally by early August

2020, with 70 percent of those recovering from the disease over 80 years of age (e State

Council Information Oﬃce of China 2020). However, although the Chinese healthcare

system, with its special COVID-19 policy schemes, covered all pandemic-related medical

costs for seriously infected patients, it covered only 67 percent of medical expenses for

those “not seriously infected” or only “possibly infected,” resulting in poverty risk for

low-income individuals in particular. We argue that it is China’s lack of a long-term care

(LTC) system to address healthcare needs in the context of COVID-19 infections that led

to poverty risk for the Chinese low-income population.

In contrast, the German healthcare system is characterized by the coexistence of

a public statutory health insurance (SHI) and a private healthcare insurance (PHI)

system, where both inpatient and outpatient care are covered for every diagnostic group

and for a broad array of preventive services. e German public SHI system, mostly

publicly funded, oﬀers universal health insurance coverage without upfront payments, a

comprehensive bundle of beneﬁts with comparably low cost-sharing requirements, and

good access to care beneﬁts. Compared to its European neighbors, Germany enjoyed

positive outcomes in its response to the COVID-19 crisis in 2020. However, unlike in

China, in Germany the healthcare policy did not include special schemes to speciﬁcally

cover COVID-19-related costs. Instead, the German policy treated COVID-19 medical

treatment costs as it would those related to other diseases. e German long-term care

(LTC) insurance system was administered as usual during the COVID-19 crisis, covering

the care needs of the population. We argue that the German healthcare system and its

LTC schemes were operated normally in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Studies on the impact of healthcare policy on poverty risk prevention have usually

focused on understanding the players and processes involved in organizing and supplying

health resources. For example, it has been shown that both the state and the family inﬂuence

societal power structures, (re)distribution, and welfare outcomes (Razavi 2007; Sipilä et

al. 2003; Xu 2019). Researchers have frequently assessed service provision, ﬁnancing, and

the regulation of social policy systems to analyze healthcare systems or LTC policy (Burau

et al. 2007; Wendt et al. 2009). However, few studies have systematically examined the

extent to which healthcare and LTC systems have been integrated to prevent poverty

risk among low-income groups. Furthermore, comparative knowledge is limited on the

way healthcare and LTC systems interact to produce diﬀerentiated poverty risk levels

among low-income groups during pandemic crises. Against this background, this chapter

159

Poverty Risk and the Integration of Long-Term Care in Healthcare Policy in Germany and China

During the COVID-19 Pandemic

introduces an analytical framework to examine how healthcare policy schemes inﬂuence

poverty risk among low-income people, based on a comparison between German and

China—two countries that, while anchored in diﬀerent traditions, rely on a similar

approach to social insurance. Governance in those two countries relies on diﬀerent levels

of responsibilities, which are complex, decentralized, and shared by governing bodies

at the state and local levels—especially in Germany. In the Chinese healthcare system,

provincial and municipal-level bodies compete for ﬁnancial resources from the central

government to pay for policy beneﬁts (Chen and Yuan 2021). While, the healthcare

and LTC systems are based on diﬀerent eligibility criteria of beneﬁt recipients in the two

countries, experiences in both places have shown that sometimes poverty risk cannot be

compensated for. By uncovering cross-national policy outcomes that aimed at alleviating

poverty risk during the global pandemic crisis, this chapter points to the role of healthcare

policy, in particular LTC policy, in preventing poverty for socially disadvantaged group.

We measure poverty based on the 1984 European Council decision that stated that, in

an eﬀort to combat poverty, “the poor shall be taken to mean persons, families and groups

of persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them

from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State in which they live” (EEC

1985, 24-25). For the purpose of this study, the “low income” category includes people

who earn less than the average income or pension in the working population, yet earn

more than those below the national or regional absolute poverty threshold.

Analyzing Poverty Risk in COVID-19 Healthcare Policy

is study focuses on the degree to which two countries’ healthcare policies may

have driven poverty risk among low-income people who could not meet their healthcare

needs during the COVID-19 crisis. It assesses whether LTC policy was useful in ﬁlling

the resource gap for low-income individuals by reviewing three dimensions of integrated

care policy: 1) eligibility for access to care and insurance beneﬁts; 2) monetary value of

the beneﬁts received; and 3) access to LTC beneﬁts.

e ﬁrst dimension pertains to access eligibility, which can be based on means or

need and may be speciﬁed by whether health insurance is mandatory for all or voluntary.

To measure eligibility, this study considers whether low-income people must be insured

through public or private insurance and pay contributions; it also takes into account

whether they receive beneﬁts based on their contribution level and whether they voluntarily

join the healthcare insurance scheme or must personally cover their medical costs if they

do not. e second dimension pertains to whether healthcare beneﬁts can theoretically

cover medical needs and how much low-income individuals must pay upfront to access

beneﬁts, for example, in the form of co-payments or out-of-pocket contributions. e

third dimension concerns the possibility that LTC policy might help mediate the risk that

low-income people fall into poverty. In both countries, integrating LTC and healthcare

policy enables low-income people to access LTC beneﬁts when insured. In both

countries, we examine laws, regulations, and institutional instruments such as the 2018

160

XU, Jia and DAI, Weidong

Social Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China, the 2019 National Healthcare

Security Administration national policy, the 2020 Chinese National Medical Insurance

Administration Regulations, the German Social Code Regulation (SGB V, SGB VII,

SGB VI, SGB XI), and the Federal Association for Prevention and Health Promotion

Regulations (Bundesvereinigung Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung) for the years

2019 and 2020. Furthermore, the way national policy protects people from the risk of

poverty falls into two categories: “low poverty protection” and “high poverty protection.”

In the former, the interplay between the three dimensions of an integrated policy reveals

that weakness in one dimension is not compensated by the other dimensions; thus low-

income populations are exposed to poverty risk. For example, if the healthcare beneﬁts

received are not large enough to cover medical needs, patients may be exposed to poverty

risk despite being eligible for LTC beneﬁts. Hence, low-income people’s poverty risk

could be higher if they needed LTC due to prior unmet medical care needs.

e “high poverty protection” policy ensures all three dimensions are addressed

separately to prevent poverty risk and that the interplay between the diﬀerent dimensions

does not expose low-income populations to the risk of becoming poor. For example,

healthcare policy could provide generous access to beneﬁts that are suﬃcient to cover

the cost of medical care based on needs. Moreover, integrating healthcare beneﬁts with

LTC beneﬁts could also support low-income populations that have seen their care needs

unmet in the past.

Poverty Risk in Germany and China in the Context of COVID-19

Integrated Policy Dimension 1: Eligibility to Access Services and

Benefits

e Chinese healthcare system was designed by the central government as a universal

policy system operating through targeted programs implemented at the local level (as

shown in Figure 1). Sections C.1. to C.3. of the healthcare policy represents the central

plan, while section P.1. covers targeted policy programs at the level of the provinces. e

health needs of individuals with job security and social insurance contracts are covered

through basic compulsory healthcare insurance for the employed (C.1.a.), which applies

to approximately 17.3 percent of the population. It is highly probable that individuals

with short-term or temporary employment are excluded from this insurance scheme

(Ruan et al. 2024). However, individuals can access basic healthcare insurance after

retirement (C.1.a. and C.1.b.), which concerns roughly 6.2 percent of the population

(Yi 2021). e unemployed or self-employed seeking voluntary basic health insurance

(C.1.b.) represent approximately 70 percent of the Chinese population.

In China, the basic health insurance scheme (C.1.) is contributory. Employers

contribute about 75 percent of C.1.a. funds, and employees pay the remaining 25 percent,

while non-employed individuals who are voluntarily insured under C.1.b. contribute 100

161

Poverty Risk and the Integration of Long-Term Care in Healthcare Policy in Germany and China

During the COVID-19 Pandemic

percent to this healthcare insurance scheme, or a ﬁxed amount of approximately 285

RMB/year (€36/year) (Li et al. 2020). With nearly 95 percent coverage and a 65 percent

reimbursement rate guaranteed in the provision of basic healthcare services, C.1. plays

an important role in covering the population’s medical needs. However, we argue that

citizens with ﬂexible jobs or low income—such as self-employed workers and those in

small enterprises in secondary towns—could ﬁnd themselves excluded from the basic

healthcare insurance scheme. Our ﬁndings show that the Chinese healthcare system

was adjusted to provide beneﬁts that covered COVID-19-related medical needs, for

example those of patients suddenly infected with COVID-19 and in need of medical

care, including those in low-income categories. Under sections P.1 and C.4, people with

COVID-19-related medical needs were better supported.

Figure 1: Policy framework of the Chinese healthcare system with coverage structure of

COVID-19-related medical costs

Source: e authors based on State Council Information Oﬃce of China (2020) and Song et al. (2020).

Unlike its Chinese counterpart, the German healthcare system did not adapt to

speciﬁcally address the COVID-19 pandemic and simply retained its pre-pandemic

design. In its original form, the German system provides the population with universal

coverage through a broad beneﬁts package and low cost-sharing requirements. Healthcare

beneﬁts are generous, and costs are not considered a barrier to access. Disparities in

accessing healthcare services across rural and urban areas are negligible, thanks to a past

reform that promoted the development of healthcare services in rural areas. Consequently,

not only do low-income individuals enjoy wide access to public healthcare but so do their

families, resulting in lower levels of catastrophic healthcare expenditure in this group in

Germany than in most other European countries (OECD 2020). Low-income people’s

162

XU, Jia and DAI, Weidong

access to care is less restricted in Germany than it is in China. Moreover, the German

system also ensures that all family members, even those with no income at all, are granted

equal access to health services, and at no cost to them. Table 1 depicts the system of

mandatory enrolment in healthcare insurance in Germany. In comparison, the Chinese

healthcare system provided speciﬁc programs targeting COVID-19 medical related costs;

however, these beneﬁts were temporary, applied only to sick individuals, and did not

cover family members. Hence, in China most low-income people were exposed to the risk

of poverty during the pandemic, especially in cases where family members—such as very

young or older individuals—were sick. It is clear that the German system provided more

comprehensive access than the Chinese system, and German low-income families faced a

lesser level of poverty risk than the Chinese population during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 1: Low-income people’s eligibility for healthcare services

Means-

tested/ need-

tested

Mandatory or

voluntary Requirements to access

beneﬁts under the policy Can family member

be included (pay extra

or not?)

Germany Need-tested Mandatory Pay contribution; gain

equal access to healthcare

services.

Yes, if beneﬁciary has

children or non-

working spouse. Do

not pay extra.

China Need-tested Less mandatory +

more voluntary Pay contribution into the

voluntary system: access to

healthcare services depends

on career description and

social position.

No, family members

pay separately when

they need healthcare

insurance.

Sources: e authors based on Schönbach (2018) and Liu (2021).

Integrated Policy Dimension 2: Monetary Value of Benefits Received

Healthcare policy in China allows for variations in the way health insurance is

delivered across diﬀerent provinces. e policy has been applied so that people receive

diﬀerent levels of healthcare beneﬁts based on where they live. During the COVID-19

pandemic, a non-contributory temporary assistance scheme (P.1., Figure 1) under the

authority of local governments supported low-income individuals who were unable to

aﬀord health insurance and ﬁnd themselves exposed to poverty risk because they cannot

pay for medical care (Chinese General Oﬃce of the State 2015). us, the P.1. scheme

was meant to protect these citizens from shortages in medical resources in the face of

the pandemic. is scheme was ﬁnanced by local governments at the provincial level

(Chinese State Council 2020), and the extent to which medical costs were covered

depended on the level of economic development in the particular regions. erefore, in

relatively poor regions, P.1. often failed to protect low-income groups from poverty risk

for lack of ﬁnancial resources. In regions with higher socio-economical conditions, P.1.

led to successes in protecting low-income groups from the risk of falling into poverty.

163

Poverty Risk and the Integration of Long-Term Care in Healthcare Policy in Germany and China

During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Furthermore, whether the state paid non-covered COVID-19-related medical

expenses beyond the public healthcare coverage relates to poverty risk among low-

income people in China. e Chinese healthcare system developed a “ﬁreﬁghter” policy

scheme—C.4., or “the state pays”—to address COVID-19-related costs for people who

were not insured under the original four schemes of the healthcare system. However, the

overall policy structure did not appropriately serve low-income individuals without basic

healthcare insurance, such as day laborers, since these individuals can only access the

voluntary healthcare policy scheme.

In contrast, the German healthcare system is mostly publicly ﬁnanced and thus does

not require patients to make upfront payments; therefore, few people in Germany report

unmet medical needs, even among low-income groups (Kalánková et al. 2021). A dense

network of healthcare facilities and numerous nurses and physicians guarantee the high

availability of services across the country (Potter 2019). us, ﬁnancial safety nets and the

comparatively low share of patients who incur out-of-pocket health expenses contribute

to providing the population of Germany with strong ﬁnancial protection.

In Germany, the general rules, rights, and values pertaining to healthcare are set

out in national legislation—the German Social Code Book, or “SGB V”—and in the

constitution, while services are executed at the state level or are delegated to corporatist

bodies, such as private healthcare providers. e SGB V mandates that health insurance

should “maintain, restore or improve health” (§1), to which end “care is to be provided

that reﬂects needs, is uniform and aligned with the generally recognized state of medical

knowledge” (§70). Although not stated as an explicit goal, the German constitution

requires that people live in equivalent conditions throughout the country and be treated

equally (i.e., in non-discriminatory fashion). Under these regulations, German healthcare

policy oﬀers relatively comprehensive protection for low-income populations, and the

beneﬁt package is need-oriented. To oﬀset expenditures, citizens pay a relatively small

share of costs—for example for doctor’s visits—in addition to their healthcare insurance

contributions; but they gain from universal healthcare services. However, we found

that citizens with pre-existing conditions were excluded from coverage and that this

system could indeed be less welcoming to those with pre-existing or long-lasting health

problems. Nevertheless, this limitation has not prevented COVID-19 patients from

accessing medical services on the basis of medical need (see Table 2), even if the German

healthcare system did not create new policy schemes to speciﬁcally address COVID-19

treatment, as China did.

In contrast to low-income people in Germany, Chinese low-income groups must pay

high out-of-pocket medical costs even when they are covered under either public or private

insurance. Diﬀering signiﬁcantly from the German scheme, China’s system requires that

nearly 90 percent of outpatient service costs, whether incurred in hospitals or clinics, be

covered by patients themselves. e Chinese healthcare system covers inpatient medical

costs on the basis of a deductible threshold; costs under the threshold must be borne by

the patient. Furthermore, out-of-pocket payments may be higher than estimated cost

because the Chinese healthcare system only covers the cost of certain medicines, so that

not all prescriptions fall under the policy. e list of medicines that are covered is renewed

164

XU, Jia and DAI, Weidong

every year based on new regulations, and the gap between medical needs and medical

coverage remains.

In summary, in China, low-income groups face higher poverty risk because they are

required to pay out-of-pocket for certain diseases. However, this conclusion does not

apply to COVID-19-related medical costs, which have been mostly covered by the state,

except in the case of low-income individuals without any basic health insurance. We

present a summary comparison of the beneﬁts in China and Germany in Table 2.

Table 2: Beneﬁts that low-income individuals can access

Extent to which healthcare

policy beneﬁts cover

medical needs

Level of individual

compensation to receive

beneﬁts

Co-payment or out-of-

pocket costs

Germany Need-based;

Comprehensive medical

needs can be fulﬁlled.

Patient rights are well-

protected and noticed.

Smaller contribution to

doctor visit fee;

Compensate the gap

between pre-existing

medical costs and

contribution to private

healthcare insurance.

Individuals must pay €10

per quarter for doctor’s

visits. ey do not pay if

they do not visit the doctor

that quarter. e deductible

depends on the private

insurance plan to which the

individual subscribes.

China Need-based;

60%-85% of medical costs

are covered

Patient rights are protected

but unnoticed.

15%—40% of medical

costs (i.e., the portion of

costs uninsured by social

healthcare insurance).

Relatively high out-of-

pocket payments into

the system; patients pay

signiﬁcant portion of

medical costs.

Sources: e authors based on Grossmann et al. (2023); Schönbach (2018); Yip et al. (2019); e State

Council Information Oﬃce of China (2020); and Liu (2021).

Oﬀering broad coverage under the public healthcare insurance scheme, the German

system remains more comprehensive than the Chinese system with regard to beneﬁts.

Furthermore, in Germany, family members who are not part of the job market, such as

non-working spouses, are also insured under the public healthcare insurance scheme,

which enhances the prevention of poverty risk. In contrast, in China, low-income groups

must pay at least 15 percent of medical costs in addition to out-of-pocket expenses for

dependent family members requiring medical services, regardless of their healthcare

insurance contribution. Moreover, the extent to which this group may access healthcare

insurance beneﬁts is open for debate. Observers are often under the impression that the

Chinese policy protects people against absolute poverty by oﬀering nearly free medical

care. Our ﬁndings support that, in reality, low-income groups are not poor enough to

beneﬁt from the free healthcare beneﬁts package. Instead, these groups experience income

insecurity and medical resource scarcity, and they are exposed to relatively higher poverty

risk than they would be under the German system.

165

Poverty Risk and the Integration of Long-Term Care in Healthcare Policy in Germany and China

During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Integrated Policy Dimension 3: Access to LTC benefit

Given the proven long-lasting health consequences of COVID-19—particularly for

older individuals and those with pre-existing conditions such as diabetes and high blood

pressure—we analyze how long-term care insurance (LTCI) compensates low-income

patients’ LTC needs resulting from a COVID-19 infection after initial medical treatment.

We argue that acute medical and LTC needs should both be considered together during

pandemics, since they are often linked and indistinguishable. It is therefore useful to

understand how healthcare systems have integrated LTC in both countries to best cover

healthcare needs resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Our ﬁndings are that the German LTCI system compensates people for their LTC

needs. In principle, the German LTCI covers everyone insured under it. Moreover, it

is compulsory for privately insured people to be covered by private LTCI (§1 sent. 2).

erefore, up to 99 percent of the people residing in Germany are covered under public

or private LTCI (Kickbusch et al. 2017), essentially making the LTCI a universal system

(eobald and Ozanne 2016). Moreover, employers and employees contribute equally

into the system, although the state pays contributions for low-income individuals; and

non-employed individuals can be co-insured through the main earner of the household

of which they are part. Hence, at the policy level, the German healthcare system and

its LTCI are well integrated and need-tested. As a result, low-income people can access

generous LTC and medical services when they have mixed (i.e., short-term medical and

LTC) needs resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

In comparison, the Chinese LTC system has shown weaknesses in the way it is

fragmented and less generous in its LTC coverage. In response, the central government

has targeted LTC needs in low-income groups and has attempted to establish a dependent

LTCI since 2016, which is especially relevant in the context of COVID-19. As a result,

approximately 49 cities in China had established pilot LTCI plans by 2020. However,

LTCI remains very selective and fragmented, with stark regional disparities. Participation

in the pilot LTCI plans has been only voluntary, and people are not eager to contribute

because they believe they have enough coverage as is. e key issue in China is that the

concept of LTC remains only vaguely deﬁned, and the policy has been designed to target

only older adults with disabilities. Moreover, although in principle, everyone covered by

health insurance is included in the LTCI scheme, both remain merely voluntary. Statistics

reveal that up to 23 percent of older adults—most of whom have a disability or chronic

disease—were insured under the Chinese LTCI (Chinese Ministry of Civil Servant 2019)

until the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. Although people were initially not required to

contribute to the LTCI system, after a few of years of implementation, a small fee became

mandatory as part of people’s regular health insurance. Moreover, the state pays the share

of low-income people’s contributions only if they are already covered under the state’s

health insurance. To date, there is no evidence that the Chinese LTCI has covered LTC

needs resulting from COVID-19 infection in low-income groups. In fact, even in LTCI

pilot cities, only a small number of older low-income people have received LTC services

166

XU, Jia and DAI, Weidong

based on severe long-term disability (Cai et al. 2021; Chen and Fang 2021). e Chinese

long-term insurance scheme has been unable to support this population’s needs for care.

Our ﬁndings support that in the German system, healthcare and LTCI were better

integrated than in the Chinese system during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, coverage

is mandatory in Germany, thus providing good access to care and aﬀording patients free

choice of provider and short waiting times. is is partly due to Germany’s eﬀective

infrastructure, a dense network of ambulatory care physicians and hospitals, and a

quantitatively high level of service provision. e routine medical and LTC needs of

low-income individuals are largely covered by healthcare and LTCI schemes regardless

of people’s level of income insecurity in Germany. In contrast, these schemes are only

voluntary in China. Second, the German healthcare system and LTCI oﬀer beneﬁts

separately based on clear eligibility criteria when there are mixed needs; the two systems

in eﬀect compensate for each other. However, in China, from the perspective of service

provision, these two systems operate separately, sharing only their source of ﬁnancing.

ird, both the healthcare system and LTCI have strong and separate independent

ﬁnancing sources in Germany. Within the German social insurance system, funding for

LTCI is established through contributions. Spending on public LTCI funds amounted

to €42.95 billion in 2019, with €25.8 billion spent on home care. Moreover, the

public LTCI funds paid out €2.1 billion for pension entitlements to 928,000 working-

age family members who cared for relatives in poor health. e relationship between

expenditures in cash payments and in-kind services was 70:30 in 2019, and the ratio of

cash payments to recipients and in-kind services was 84:16 (Health Ministry 2020). e

LTCI funds directly pay state-approved care providers, and the costs of diverse services are

predetermined to ensure consistent expenditure across providers and regions (eobald

and Ozanne 2016). In China, LTCI ﬁnancing comes through the healthcare insurance

fund rather than contributions (Li et al. 2020). LTCI payments to municipally approved

care services are predetermined in principle, but approval for funding for services in a

given year depends partly on the surplus in the healthcare insurance fund in the previous

year. Nevertheless, less than 30 percent of the employees’ healthcare insurance fund

surplus and less than 10 percent of the resident healthcare insurance contribution can

be transferred to the LTCI fund (Liu 2021). Fourth, the German system covers family

members of potential recipients, which protects low-income individuals from poverty

risk. It is possible to conclude that in China, medical care and LTCI are weakly integrated

and fail to address the mixed needs of the low-income population. Consequently, low-

income people might overuse medical resources for their LTC needs to compensate for

the expenses that they are unable to cover for general medical care. During a pandemic

outbreak, when medical resources are overall limited, such as during the COVID-19

crisis, poverty risk is heightened for low-income patients when they are unable to access

additional medical resources and services.

167

Poverty Risk and the Integration of Long-Term Care in Healthcare Policy in Germany and China

During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Relationship between Healthcare Policy and Poverty Risk Among

Low-income People in Germany and China During the COVID-19

Pandemic

We have demonstrated that the interplay between healthcare and LTC policy results

in diﬀerentiated poverty risk outcomes based on the way they support access for low-

income people’s access to beneﬁts. Low-income people with access to comparatively

limited healthcare beneﬁt packages or LTC beneﬁts are exposed to high poverty risk.

is risk increases the more access to care is limited. erefore, a more robust LTC policy

could alleviate poverty risk for low-income people. However, this ﬁx also depends on the

amount of healthcare beneﬁts available and whether the beneﬁt packages are generous

enough to help low-income people, in particular during crises such as the COVID-19

pandemic. Compared to the German policy, the Chinese healthcare policy generally

covers less than 85 percent of low-income people’s medical needs. Moreover, these people

have limited access to public LTC resources when they have mixed healthcare needs

(Chinese Health Ministry 2020). e Chinese LTCI has shown to be weak in its coverage

of LTC needs resulting from COVID-19 infections. Furthermore, a systematic LTCI

policy system does not exist in China; only fragmented LTCI pilot plans have operated in

some cities. Finally, when low-income people face mixed medical and LTC needs, they are

only eligible for limited LTC beneﬁts, which could lead to high poverty risk. Our ﬁndings

support that low-income people’s poverty risk varies depending on what the focus of the

policies are and show that integrating diﬀerent policy dimensions is important to protect

low-income people from poverty risk.

Our ﬁndings further indicate that neither adequate access to healthcare nor suﬃcient

beneﬁt amounts are enough by themselves to protect low-income people from poverty

risk in China; this insuﬃciency is also rooted in the fact that the healthcare and LTCI

systems do not complement each other well for people with mixed medical needs,

unlike in Germany. is was especially pertinent during the pandemic, although the

German system does not oﬀer speciﬁc coverage in the case of a global public health crisis.

Furthermore, we assessed that in welfare states, there is an attempt to decrease the risk

of poverty faced by low-income people through institutional regulations that control

eligibility levels and focus on policy integration based on needs.

is study introduces a new analytical framework for examining how diﬀerent

healthcare policies contribute to or prevent poverty risk for low-income people during

health crises such as the historical COVID-19 pandemic. Our comparative analysis

of regulations in China and Germany allows for an assessment of healthcare and LTC

policies in welfare states. Previous studies have assumed that social policy in welfare states

plays an important role in promoting social equality and in providing access to healthcare

resources. is chapter underlines that the failure to systematically consider both the way

in which diﬀerent dimensions of healthcare policy interact and the level of integration of

healthcare systems with long-term care policies is signiﬁcant in addressing poverty risk for

low-income people during health crises or pandemics.

168

XU, Jia and DAI, Weidong

Comparing Germany and China is pertinent because both countries share a similar

social insurance regulation system but have experienced diﬀerent policy outcomes

in the ﬁght against COVID-19. In addressing post-pandemic needs, China can learn

from Germany’s eﬀective integration of policy dimensions—especially when it comes to

long-term care—to protect people from poverty risk. Conversely, Germany (and other

countries) can learn from China’s integration of a temporary healthcare scheme within

the structure of its social insurance system in the face of acute public health issues, such as

a pandemic. In both countries, low-income people’s poverty risk was markedly correlated

to the receipt of social welfare beneﬁts during the pandemic, because these people bore

sudden increases in care needs and medical expenses. Hence, a generous healthcare system

in which LTCI is integrated can have a signiﬁcant impact on preventing poverty risk for

those socially disadvantaged group. Future investigations should further compare a range

of policy dimensions across diﬀerent countries, in and outside of Europe, and identify

other approaches in the prevention of social inequalities that vulnerable groups may face

during pandemics.

References

Burau, Viola Desideria, Hildegard eobald, and Robert H. Blank. 2007. Governing Home Care:

A Cross-National Comparison. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Cai, Wenjia, Chi Zhang, Hoi Ping Suen, et al. 2021. “e 2020 China report of the Lancet

Countdown on health and climate change.” e Lancet Public Health 6 (1): e64-e81. https://

www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667(20)30256-5/fulltext

Chen, Weidong, and Xiaohui Yuan. 2021. “Financial Inclusion in China: An Overview.” Frontiers

of Business Research in China 15: 1–21.

Chen, Yi., and Hanming. Fang. 2021. “e Long-Term Consequences of China’s ‘Later, Longer,

Fewer’ Campaign in Old Age.” Journal of Development Economics 151: 102664.

Chinese General Oﬃce of the State. 2015. “中国国务院办公厅关于进一步完善医疗救助制

度、全面开展重特大疾病医疗救助工作意见的通知,国办发(2015)30号” [Improving

the Medical Assistance System and Comprehensively Launching Medical Help for People

with Serious Diseases].

Chinese Ministry of Civil Servant. 2019. “民政部: 关于进一步扩大养老服务供给促进养老

服务消费的实施意见” [Guidelines to Expanding Old Age Services and Promoting Old Age

Consumption in China].

Chinese State Council. 2020. “中国国务院关于开展城镇居民基本医疗保险试点的指导意

见” [Decision on Establishing a Basic Medical Insurance System for Urban Employees].

EEC (European Economic Community). 1985. Council Decision of 19 December 1984 on

Speciﬁc Community Action to Combat Poverty. Oﬃcial Journal of the European Communities,

no. L: 24–25.

169

Poverty Risk and the Integration of Long-Term Care in Healthcare Policy in Germany and China

During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Grossmann, Beate, Uwe Prümel-Philippsen, and Inke Ruhe. 2023. “Die settingbezogene

Gesundheitsförderung und Prävention im Spannungsfeld von digitalem Fortschritt

und wertebasierter Orientierung–aus Sicht der Bundesvereinigung Prävention und

Gesundheitsförderung…” In Settingbezogene Gesundheitsförderung und Prävention in der

digitalen Transformation. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.

Kalánková, Dominika, Minna Stolt, P. Anne Scott, Evridiki Papastavrou, and Riitta Suhonen.

2021. “Unmet Care Needs of Older People: A Scoping Review.” Nursing Ethics 28 (2):

149–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/0969733020948112.

Kickbusch, Ilona, Christian Franz, Anna Holzscheiter, et al. 2017. “Germany’s expanding

role in global health.” e Lancet 390 (10097): 898–912. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-

6736(17)31460-5.

Li, Yazi, Chunji Lu, and Yang Liu. 2020. “Medical insurance information systems in

China: mixed methods study.” JMIR Medical Informatics 8 (9): e18780. https://doi.

org/10.2196/18780

Liu, Jia. 2021. “Health security and public health emergency management in China.” In Human

security in China: A post-pandemic state. Springer Singapore.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2020. OECD Health

Statistics 2020: Deﬁnitions, Sources and Methods. https://www.oecd.org/health/health-data.

htm.

Potter, Teddie. 2019. “Planetary health: e next frontier in nursing education.” Creative Nursing

25 (3): 201-7. https://doi.org/10.1891/1078-4535.25.3.201.

Razavi, Shahra. 2007. e Political and Social Economy of Care in a Development Context:

Conceptual Issues, Research Questions and Policy Options. United Nations Research Institute for

Social Development.

Ruan, Peiheng, Shuai Wang, and Feng Yun. 2024. “Social insurance law and corporate

performance in China.” International Review of Economics & Finance 94: 103374. https://doi.

org/10.1016/j.iref.2024.103374.

Schönbach, Karl H. 2018. Gesundheitsrecht SGB V/SGB XI. 2. Auﬂage. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft

Mbh & Co.

Sipilä, Jorma, Anneli Anttonen, and John Baldock. 2003. “e importance of social care.” In

e young, the old and the state: Social care systems in ﬁve industrial nations, edited by Anneli

Anttonen, John Baldock, and Jorma Sipilä. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Song, Suimin, Chunling Ma, Shujin Li, and Bin Cong. 2020. “Developing Medical Examiner

Oﬃces in China: Necessity and Administration Mode.” Strategic Study of Chinese Academy of

Engineering 22 (4): 154-60. https://doi.org/10.15302/J-SSCAE-2020.04.022

e State Council Information Oﬃce of China. 2020. Fighting Covid-19 China in Action.

Chinese People’s Press.

eobald, Hildegard, and Elizabeth Ozanne. 2016. “Multilevel governance and its eﬀects on

long-term care support.” In Long-Term Care Reforms in OECD Countries, edited by Cristiano

Gori, Jose-Luiz Fernandez, and Raphael Wittenberg. Policy Press.

Wendt, Claus, Lorraine Frisina, and Heinz Rothgang. 2009. “Healthcare system types: A

conceptual framework for comparison.” Social Policy & Administration 43 (1): 70–90.

170

XU, Jia and DAI, Weidong

Xu, Jia. 2019. Integrated research on ageing policy and poverty risk in European welfare states.

Chinese Commerce and Trade Press.

Yi, Baokang. 2021. “An overview of the Chinese healthcare system.” Hepatobiliary Surgery and

Nutrition 10 (1): 93–5. https://doi.org/10.21037/hbsn-2021-3.

Yip, Winnie, Hongqiao Fu, Angela T. Chen, et al. 2019. “10 years of health-care reform in

China: progress and gaps in Universal Health Coverage.” e Lancet 394 ( 10204): 1192–

1204. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(19)32136-1.

Zhu, Na, Dingyu Zhang, Wenling Wang, et al. 2020. “A novel coronavirus from patients with

pneumonia in China, 2019.” e New England Journal of Medicine 382 (8): 727–33.

171

Contributors’ Biographical Notes

Sergio Aguilar is Full Professor at the Sao Paulo State University (UNESP), Brazil, where

he also coordinates the International Conﬂicts Studies and Research Group. He is also

professor at the San Tiago Dantas Graduate Program in International Relations (UNESP/

UNICAMP/PUC-SP). He holds a PhD in History (UNESP), and was visiting researcher

at the Department of Politics and International Relations - University of Oxford, UK.

His research focuses on international conﬂicts, conﬂicts resolution, and peacekeeping

operations.

Tom Christensen is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Political Science, University

of Oslo. He is also Distinguished Visiting Professor at the School of Public Policy and

Administration, Tsinghua University. His main research interests relate to central civil

service and comparative public reform studies. He has contributed signiﬁcantly to major

public administration journals, co-authored several books, and has published extensively

in collaboration with Chinese scholars.

Qun Cui is Associate Professor of Public Management at the Qingdao Institute of

Administration, located in the eastern coastal region of China (since 2020). She earned

her PhD in political science from the University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

(UCASS) and was a visiting scholar at the Department of Political Science, University

of Oslo (2014-2015). Her research interests include comparative politics between China

and Europe, local politics and governance in China, crisis management in mega cities,

and public service provision such as healthcare, long-term care, and social assistance.

Weidong Dai is Professor at the School of Public Administration, Zhejiang University of

Finance and Economics. His research interests are on care policy comparative research,

global governance cross–national perspective and long-term care policy. His most recent

research has been published in “BMC Geriatrics” and “Chinese Social Security Review.”

Lisheng Dong is Professor Emeritus at the University of Chinese Academy of Social

Sciences, China. He was a visiting professor at the Department of Political Science,

University of Zurich, Switzerland, Professor of Asian Politics at the University of Tartu,

Estonia, and a Marie Curie Professorial Fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences

at the University of Glasgow, UK. He has published 23 books and 60 refereed articles

and was the 2012 co-recipient of the Pierre de Celles Award for Best Paper in Public

Administration (International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration).

His books include Public Administration eories (Palgrave, 2015), Trump and the Hidden

Empire (Springer, 2025), e Glory Trap (Palgrave, 2025), and China’s Path to Global

Status (Palgrave, 2025).

172

Hélène Ducros holds a doctorate in law and a PhD in geography from the University of

North Carolina-Chapel Hill. She studies lived space, placemaking, attachment to place,

and landscape change and perception. Her research has inquired into rural transformations

and rural-urban dynamics through an understanding of heritage preservation within

localized cultural and economic policy. She is the creator and founding editor of Global

Europe Journal (ESPOL, Université Catholique de Lille).

Oksana Ermolaeva holds a PhD degree in the history of Central and Eastern Europe

from the Central European University (Budapest, Hungary). She is a visiting researcher at

the Complutence University of Madrid, Spain, under the aegis of a grant from the Gerda

Henkel Stiftung, Dusseldorf, Germany. Among other topics, she is interested in Russian

borders during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.

Anlam Filiz is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Turkish-German University in

Istanbul. She completed her PhD in Anthropology at Emory University, USA, with a

dissertation analyzing how Turks in Berlin negotiate their cultural diﬀerence through

their labor in small businesses and through this process make themselves integral to the

workings of the German capital. Her research focuses on questions of migration, work,

globalization, temporality, and cultural diﬀerence in urban settings.

Hans-Peter Meier is a board member and former president of the World Society

Foundation, Zurich, Switzerland.

Edina Paleviq is a political scientist specializing in European integration and nationalism

in the Western Balkans. She earned her PhD from Andrássy University Budapest, where

her research examined the role of Montenegrin civil society in the EU accession process.

Her broader academic interests include Europeanization, bottom-up democratization,

and the dynamics of ethnicity and nationalism in Southeastern Europe. She has published

widely in peer-reviewed journals and edited volumes, and she currently serves as an

editorial committee member for Global Europe Journal.

Nicole Shea is Managing Partner Germany for Perrett Laver. In her role, she deeply cares

about diversifying academic leadership positions. Prior to joining Perrett Laver, she was

the Executive Director of the Council for European Studies at Columbia University.

Christian Sutter is Professor Emeritus in Sociology at the University of Neuchâtel,

Switzerland, and President of the World Society Foundation, Zurich, Switzerland. His

research areas include global studies and world society, sovereign debt, economic and

social inequalities, as well as social indicators and quality-of-life.

Mare Ushkovska is Assistant Professor of Political Sciences at the International Balkan

University in Skopje, Macedonia. She is a former visiting fellow at the EUROPEUM

Institute for European Policy in Prague, the Czech Republic. Her research interests

include contemporary nationalisms in Europe, EU integration processes, soft power, and

perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkans and Visegrad Group.

173

Jia Xu is Associate Professor of Social Policy and Public Administration at the School

of Marxism at Anhui Normal University (China). Her research interests encompass

comparative welfare state research from both cross–national and historical perspectives,

public management, poverty alleviation, and higher education teaching methods. Her

most recent research has appeared in Geriatric Nursing, the Journal of Family History, the

International Journal of Social Welfare Policy, and Social Inclusion.

Patrick Ziltener is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Zurich,

Switzerland. He was the main organizer of the World Society Foundation’s 40 years

celebration event and conference in 2022. His research interests are global/world society

studies, comparative analyses of African and Asian countries, and labor relations.

2025

Cataloging in PubliCation (CiP)

Telma Jaqueline Dias Silveira

CRB 8/7867

normalization

Janaína Celoto Guerrero de Mendonça

CRB-8 6456

Laura Akie Saito Inafuko

CRB-8 9116

Cover and diagramming

Gláucio Rogério de Morais

layout

Gláucio Rogério de Morais

graPhiC ProduCtion

Giancarlo Malheiro Silva

Gláucio Rogério de Morais

teChniCal ConsultanCy

Renato Geraldi

university WorkshoP

Laboratório Editorial

labeditorial.marilia@unesp.br

Format

16 x 23cm

PaPer

Oﬀset 150g/m²

tyPology

Adobe Garamond Pro

about the book