Hélène Ducros, Nicole Shea, Christian Suter,
Patrick Ziltener, Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach,
and Sergio Aguilar (Editors)

Decentering European Studies

Perspectives on Europe from its Beyond

OFICINA UNIVERSITÁRIA
CULTURA ACADÊMICA Editora
World Society Foundation

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Preface
The World Society Foundation
History and Practice

Christian SUTER[1]*, Patrick ZILTENER*[2]*, and Hans-Peter MEIER-DALLACH*[3]

The aim of this preface is twofold. First, we trace the historical roots of the concept of "world society," as it pertains to the funding behind this book and the motivation of the World Society Foundation (WSF) to bring together researchers from various parts of the globe to write about Europe from their respective regional perspectives. Because Peter Heintz, the founder of the WSF, was especially influential in shaping the Foundation's approach to the making of a global society through research funding, we focus on his work. Second, we delve into the Foundation's funding activities over the last forty years. In this respect, the present volume is well inscribed in the Foundation's historical mission. Through its first "Writing Lab for Global South Scholars," of which this book is a result, the World Society Foundation has developed a new funding tool guided by the conviction that such a novel sponsoring pursuit will provide researchers from the Global South (and the Global East) better access not only to resources within the Foundation but also beyond. In support of its core purpose of strengthening research on and from a world society while also promoting a diversity of voices in scholarship, the World Society Foundation brought these different perspectives into a dialogue, in particular through the regular activities of the writing lab. This preface, therefore, serves to situate this edited volume within the historical context of the Foundation's philosophy and past research funding activity. In line with these past practices, the Foundation has gathered here researchers from different parts of the world and diverse cultural, historical, and academic contexts, who emanate from an array of disciplines and rely on a variety of theoretical and methodological bases to address topics relevant to an understanding of contemporary Europe.

From "International System" to "World Society"

Long before the notion of "globalization" went viral in the 1990s, scholars used different analytical approaches to demonstrate that binding the notion of "society" to the concept of nations based on states and placing the nation at the center of sociological

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analysis was untenable and even misleading. Certainly, the conceptualization of the world as an "international system" has had a long tradition in academic disciplines such as political science, international relations, and international law. However, the dominant perspectives have approached the international system as a simple consequence of the incidental interaction of its independent units, echoing the concept of the market in mainstream economics. Thus, the concept of "world society," which emerged in sociology in the 1960s and early 1970s, has gone beyond the "global interaction system of national societies/nation-states" (GISN) model.

Before the 1970s, only a few social theorists had developed a "beyond the GISN" perspective on the world. The idea of a "world society" was first mentioned by an expert in international law, George Schwarzenberger, in his book *Power Politics*. Schwarzenberger, who had earned his PhD at the London School of Economics with a thesis on *The League of Nations and World Order,* held a position at the London Institute of World Affairs. Addressing the rule of law of peace (and war), i.e., the creation, functioning, and transformation of international rules, Schwarzenberger adopted a sociological perspective on international law to uncover the power politics that operated behind international rules. While the first edition of *Power Politics* (1941) was subtitled "An introduction to the study of international relations and post-war planning" and, therefore, still reflected a traditional international relations perspective, this subtitle was changed in the second (1951) and third (1963) editions to "A study of international society" and "A study of world society," respectively. Drawing on Ferdinand Tönnies's distinction between "society" and "community," Schwarzenberger argued that the international system had to be conceptualized as a society, rather than as a community:

> [...] modern international society is a reality for the reason that in groups co-exist within it which are both interdependent and independent of each other [...] The bond that holds world society together is not a vague community of spiritual interests. It is power. (Schwarzenberger 1951, 251).

It is no coincidence that Scharzenberger, a German emigrant whose Jewish family had been forced to leave Germany for political reasons, conceptualized world society by turning to a pronounced interdisciplinary approach that combined international law and international relations with sociology.

A second impetus for global thinking in the 1960s-1970s goes back to Wilbert E. Moore, former president of the American Sociological Association (ASA). In his presidential address at the 1965 ASA convention, Moore (1966, 475) called upon to develop "global sociology," a "sociology of the globe, of mankind," in the face of the "growing ubiquity of similar problems and similar solutions in the world of events." He traced global thinking back to a "grand tradition" that included thinkers such as Polybius and Ibn Khaldun and assumed the unity of humankind. Since Antiquity, the metaphor of humankind as one "body" had been used frequently, e.g., in Seneca's "membra sumus corporis magni" ("we are members of a large body," cf. Motto 1955). As a student of Talcott Parsons, Moore believed that "we must rediscover super-systems" (Moore 1966, 482).

A third decisive development of the 1960s and early 1970s was the rise of various "world models" in the context of increasing global ecological risks and the boundaries placed on the planet by a dominant resource-intensive, growth-based development path, which had been pursued by most countries but in particular by those of the Global North. In his introduction to a special issue of the UNESCO *International Social Science Journal* focused on world society, Peter Heintz (1982a, 11) noted an increased interest within the scientific community for the topic of "world society," which he explained as resulting from the construction of world models, in particular economic, resource-oriented, and international relations models. The two most important world models, the first Club of Rome publication on "Limits to Growth" (Meadows et al. 1972) and the "Latin American" counter model published by the Argentine Bariloche Foundation (Herrera et al. 1976) received considerable public attention across the globe. Based on computer simulations and focused on the interactions among selected global problems (such as population density, waste, environmental deterioration, famine, poverty, and criminality), the Club of Rome's publications presented a fundamental critique of (resource-intensive) economic growth and pointed to the risks of a general collapse of the international system in the absence of a move to a more sustainable development model.

This global catastrophe scenario was criticized as neo-Malthusian by the proponents of the Bariloche model who emphasized in their social sciences-based counter-model the importance and impact of socio-structural factors such as global disparities, inequality, and over-consumption (in the Global North). Heintz, who had established the social sciences department at the Bariloche Foundation in the 1960s, maintained close contacts and research collaborations with researchers there, including with the creators of the "Latin American" world model. Although Heintz was not part of this group, his structural-theoretical, developmental-sociological approach, with its focus on global stratification, institutionalized power, and prestige, was closely related to the Bariloche model perspective.

As they interrogated world society, these three early initiatives had quite different impacts on research agendas in the social sciences and on the public debate about global issues. Schwarzenberger remained an "outsider," as his interdisciplinary approach was neither adopted nor further developed in international law, while the world models' perspectives have had a profound influence and contributed to linking development, global inequalities, and the environment more explicitly. In effect, it can be said that supporters of these models initiated, some 50 years ago, an eco-developmental agenda for global sustainability that is still robustly shaping today's public debate.

Peter Heintz's World Society Concept: Global Stratification, Development, and Tensions

Peter Heintz started using the concept of "world society" in the early 1970s. By 1966, he had been appointed as a full professor of sociology at the University of Zurich, where he had established the Sociological Institute, which became, under his guidance, one of

the most important centers of empirical social research in Switzerland. Heintz had studied economics and social sciences in Zurich, Paris, and Cologne, and spent years in South America from 1956 to 1965 after receiving his habilitation under the leadership of René König at the University of Cologne. As an expert for UNESCO, he had contributed to the institutional development of sociological research and teaching in several South American countries, notably at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Santiago de Chile and at the Bariloche Foundation in Argentina. This experience in the Global South strongly influenced his work once he returned to Europe, as can be seen not only in his macro-sociological, developmentalist (structural-theoretical) approach and his emphasis on intercultural and comparative analyses but also in his interest in sociological teaching and public sociology (see Heintz 1960).

Heintz formally introduced the concept of "world society" in 1972 through two contributions targeted at the general public; indeed, he was interested in reaching beyond the limited scholarly audience of sociologists and academics. The first article, entitled "The world society and its citizens," was published (in German) in the weekend edition of the liberal, center-left Basel-based newspaper *National-Zeitung am Wochenende* (Heintz 1972c). Two years later, he wrote a similar article, "The structural transformation of world society from the perspective of sociology," for the broader public of the University of Zurich magazine (Heintz 1974). Hence, he had already been using the term for a few years when he published in 1977 his first scientific publication explicitly addressing the topic of world society (Heintz and Obrecht 1977).

Until then, Heintz had still used terms such as "international system" or "international system of development stratification" in his scientific writings, for instance in his 1972 analysis of "Switzerland's position in the structure of the international system: A sociological analysis," (Heintz 1972a) or in the volumes "A macrosociological theory of societal systems: With special reference to the international system" (Heintz 1972b) and "The future of development" (Heintz and Heintz 1973), which constituted two of his most important scientific publications in that period. He then also started developing a global approach that went beyond the international systems perspective, emphasizing instead the structural and institutional foundations of the international system and its impact on the national and local levels. His assumption was that

> The notion of structure, i.e. institutionalized power and prestige, implies a differential distribution of chances, or even a distribution governed by different laws for different regions, as for instance, for the region of the developing countries and for that of the highly developed nations. The structure of the international system is thus conceived of as representing the distribution of nations' chances to realize the values of development (Heintz 1972a, 81).

Heintz also increasingly examined the topic of world society in his teaching, for example through university seminars he conducted from 1976 onwards, as well as a lecture series "On the sociology of world society." He also disseminated the concept

through international conferences in Zurich, e.g., at the Report on World Society and Educational Code symposium in January of 1976. Four years later, in November 1980, he organized an international seminar on Diversity and Change of World Society Images at the University of Zurich; several papers presented at that conference were published in 1982 in a special issue of UNESCO's *International Social Science Journal* (no. 34/1, 1982) under the title "Images of world society. Emerging global understanding and praxis." His research program at that time was quite ambitious, as he aimed to develop "a sociological code for the description of world society and its change."

At the center of Heintz's world society concept lies the notion of global stratification, more precisely an "international system of development stratification," which is characterized by a multi-dimensional and multi-level structure (of local, subnational, national, regional, and global levels) embedding individuals, organizations and institutions, and states into a comprehensive social reality (Suter 2005). Heintz conceptualized world society as a hierarchically structured international development system shaped by the unequal positions of individual nations on interrelated stratification dimensions such as income, education, urbanization, industrialization, and tertiarization. Heintz's structural-theoretical, developmentalist conceptualization of world society considerably differs from other world society or global society approaches developed in the 1970s, such as Niklas Luhmann's systems model (Luhmann 1982; Stichweh 2000), Ulrich Beck's (2009) world at risk approach, John W. Meyer's neo-institutionalist world polity approach (Meyer 1980; Meyer et al. 1997), or Immanuel Wallerstein's (1974) world systems theory. While the world systems theory relies primarily on global economic interactions and the world polity approach is based on political and institutional factors, Heintz emphasized the diffusion of global cultural values, norms, and societal institutions as the principal integrating forces of world society (for a more detailed discussion of the various world society approaches, see Bornschier and Lengyel 1990, Wobbe 2000, Bornschier 2002, Greve and Heintz 2005, Bauer 2014, Wittmann 2014, Suter and Ziltener 2024).

Heintz considered that the primary factors of integration and stability in world society are a consensus on the value of social and economic development and the existence of mobility channels permitting and regulating access to hierarchical positions within the multidimensional stratification system. Structural and anomic tensions constitute crucial aspects of this approach, as they are caused by incomplete status configurations or imbalances in the positions held by social actors, whether the latter are individuals or nation states. According to Heintz, structural and anomic tensions occur across different system levels within world society, that is, across global, national, regional, organizational, and individual levels. In the 1960s and early 1970s, he predicted that increasing contradictions and tensions within world society would result in a general deficit of legitimacy and in increasing tendencies toward disintegration.

In his late work, before his untimely death in 1983, Heintz focused on codes and images to describe world society and the structure and evolution of political regimes at the periphery (Heintz 1982b). Although he did not produce a specific "Zurich school" out of his research, Heintz inspired students, collaborators, and colleagues to further develop the concept of world society in the twenty-first century. *World Society and Social*

Structure, containing 38 contributions, is an example of this follow-up work (cf. Hischier et al. 1980). The most prominent of Heintz's students has been Volker Bornschier, who served as president of the World Society Foundation in the 1980s and 1990s. Bornschier analyzed the (negative) impact of foreign investment dependence on economic growth and development at the periphery of the world economy (see Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985); he also focused on state-building processes, processes of convergence and divergence in institutional orders, and societal models at the core of world society (Bornschier 1996). Other themes included the role of socio-cultural factors such as generalized trust and social capital for political and economic development (Bornschier 2004). Many other works by scholars who were students and collaborators of Peter Heintz are worth mentioning, in particular Georg P. Müller's (1988) world data handbook, Christian Suter's (1992, 1999, 2012) analysis of global sovereign debt cycles and regime change in Latin America, and Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach's research on post-socialist transformation in Eastern Europe (Meier-Dallach and Juchler 2001).

Pros and Cons of a "World Society" Approach

In a short, but remarkable text in Johan Galtung's *Festschrift* in 1980, Heintz critically reflected on the pros and cons of studying world society and developed four main arguments in favor of such endeavor. First, he argued that studying world society entails a concern with the "only truly global society," whereas national societies are, in structural terms, not global, even when they might be socially defined as such. Second, for Heintz, studying world society means to address a topic common to all social scientists, regardless of the region or culture to which they belong. This commonality is rooted in the idea that everyone can consider herself/himself to be a member of a (loose) worldwide community of social scientists. Third, Heintz advanced that studying world society is innovative, even at a time when the scale of study was modest, since this topic had been "highly neglected" by social scientists at that point. Fourth, studying world society entails understanding a "very particular type of society," which promises to be highly productive for further theory building. This particular type of society was characterized by Heintz (1980, 97) as a stateless, highly complex society without identity, i.e., a society that is not perceived as such by most of its members.

Among the reasons *not* to approach the world as a world society, Heintz mentioned the following four arguments. First, he noted that there had been little to no demand for knowledge on world society; he added, that there seemed to be no social problem related to world society that required sociological knowledge and analysis. Second, Heintz mentioned that only a small, globalized elite (made up of foreign policymakers and managers of multinational corporations) might be interested in research findings on world society; moreover, research results might strengthen the power of these elites, which would hardly be in the interest of sociology. Third, for Heintz, studying world society would be to pretend to be able to overcome the structural limitations of one's own perspective, which is always influenced by the specific place and position someone

occupies in society. Fourth, Heintz (1980) argued that data on world society were lacking; moreover, these data, like governmental statistics or media news, might be quite biased.

In conclusion, Heintz (1982a, 20) called for an exploration of the "possibilities of shaping world society on the basis of solid knowledge shared by different groups," in spite of "strong social and cultural forces" preventing such an exploration. For him, "a meaningful world society could only result from a commonly shared knowledge revealing action spaces and making people true participants in this society; without, of course, by any means denying the continued existence of antagonistic interests." It is striking that several arguments advanced by Heintz fifty years ago are still valid, such as his characterization of world society as a stateless, highly complex society without an identity. Other aspects discussed by Heintz have fundamentally changed, for instance, his observation that no social problem seems to be related to world society. Already the wave of rapidly increasing economic globalization that characterized the world between the 1980s and the early 2000s was related to the emergence of several severe global social problems (such as increasing global inequalities and social stratification, or increasing global migration). The subsequent multiple global crises—financial, economic, political, military, sanitary, social, environmental, etc.—that have marked the years since 2008 and contributed to a considerable fragmentation challenging today's world demonstrates the persistence and relevance of global social problems and the ongoing necessity of applying a world society approach.

Forty Years of Research Funding by the World Society Foundation

A review of the Foundation's forty years of research funding reveals an extensive thematic, theoretical, and methodological approach, as well as a wide disciplinary and regional diversity in the research supported, echoing the emerging structural transformations and changing images of world society over the past decades. When Heintz established the World Society Foundation in 1982, it was an important step toward strengthening and institutionalizing research on world society. The Foundation, now in its forty-third year of activity as a "world observatory" on global change has supported social sciences scholars and scientific research all over the world to reinforce the investigation into the various processes of global integration, disintegration, (re)structuring, and (re)configuration. In doing so, the Foundation has supported approximately 700 researchers from nearly 50 countries worldwide through various instruments, but in particular through the sponsorship of research projects and international conferences. Over the last few years, the Foundation has mainly promoted international conference sponsoring. Through this reorientation, the Foundation's board has intended to give better access to marginalized researchers (from the Global South and peripheral regions of Europe), who have been markedly underrepresented in the distribution of project grants. Within the framework of its conference sponsoring activity, the WSF has placed a special focus on topics of particular interest for countries of the Global South, such as the emergence of a rapidly growing middle class there (see Suter et al. 2020) or the increasing relationships among

non-core Global South countries (see Ziltener and Suter 2022), which traditionally have been neglected in the scholarship produced in core countries.

The Foundation also established the World Society Foundation Research Paper Award and, in collaboration with Nicole Shea, founded the WSF Writing Lab for Global South scholars; it has also supported (open access) publications on various world society topics, in particular for Global South scholars. The output of this funding has been substantial, as can be seen in the numerous conference presentations, journal articles, books, edited volumes, and special issues published by the supported researchers. The Foundation has also established its own book series in "World Society Studies," in which results of outstanding research projects and conference papers have been featured. Detailed information on the Foundation's past and current activities, as well as access to electronic versions of papers, chapters, and books of supported research, are available on the Foundation's website at www.worldsociety.ch.

World Society as a Code Guiding the Foundation

Within the context of increasing globalization—in particular in the fields of economic relations, communication, and global risks—research in the social sciences and public debates on global issues have considerably intensified over the past decades. Various concepts describing a so-called world society and different perspectives have developed since the 1960s and contributed to improving our understanding of global transformations. Heintz insisted on the importance of world society as the most comprehensive unit of analysis and a fundamental concept in social science. However, his approach, unlike Luhmann's systems theory and Wallerstein's world-systems approach, is not a closed and coherent theory but rather a general (sociological) code that can be used to better describe and understand events, structures, and processes occurring at the global level of world society. Heintz also indicated that every individual member of world society adopts a code or an image of this society to get oriented. The socialization process thus emphasizes immediate neighborhoods and loyalties to the family, the local community, and the nation. However, most individuals have, according to Heintz (1982a, 12), a "rather vague, unstructured, poor and inconsistent image of world society" and mostly behave with regard to the wider world "as members of national or subnational societies."

The World Society Foundation has carried on Heintz's heritage by funding research activities to reach a better understanding of global structures and transformations. Four basic principles have guided the practices and research funding of the Foundation: First, its global and transnational mission regarding research funding has led it to support research all over the world, most of the funding allocated having gone to researchers outside Switzerland and Europe. Second, the Foundation has been guided by a multi- and cross-disciplinary perspective in its support of all the disciplines, in particular in the social sciences and humanities, that address world society issues. Third, the Foundation has relied on a broad theoretical and methodological orientation in its choices for grant recipients. Fourth, the Foundation has focused on encouraging and supporting

researchers from the Global South (or peripheral regions in the Global North) in order to hear the voices of those who generally have had limited access to research funding and publication opportunities in academic journals. These guiding principles are reflected in the present book. Here, looking in from the Global South and the margins of Europe through different angles, scholars from diverse cultural backgrounds and theoretical and methodological orientations analyze ideas, images, and visions of Europe, as well as European institutions, structures, dynamics, policies, and integration and disintegration processes.

Note: A longer version of this chapter appears in Suter, Christian, Patrick Ziltener, and Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach. 2024. "Fifty Years of Research on World Society: The Zurich 'World Observatory'." In *After Globalization: The Future of World Society*, edited by Christian Suter and Patrick Ziltener. Lit. https://lit-verlag.de/isbn/978-3-643-80409-9/

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Introduction
Institutional Collaboration for Multiple Border Crossings

Hélène DUCROS[1]

This book is to be appreciated not only based on its content but also as a process entailing multi-scalar collaborations. In 2020, the Council for European Studies (CES), then homed at Columbia University, US, and the World Society Foundation (WSF), headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, came together intending to sponsor a group of scholars from the "Global South" to attend the Annual Conference of Europeanists in Iceland. The goal of the partnership was to deliberately bring into European Studies scholars who often lack the opportunity to share their research at major international conferences because they reside outside Western Europe or North America. The program was built on the premise that the diversification of voices and the decentering of the production of knowledge about Europe could only enhance our understanding of Europe and the seeking of solutions to its problems. It was also expected that the scholars able to partake in the conference would have the opportunity to craft or strengthen their own networks with other Europeanists from all parts of Europe and the world. However, because of pandemic-related health risks and limitations on traveling, the conference, like many others around the world at the time, was postponed for an indeterminate duration. Rather than stalling the program, this impediment led us to reinvent the project and transform it into a year-long digital writing workshop, using Zoom to come together "in person." Under the leadership of Nicole Shea, then Executive Director of CES, and Christian Suter, President of the WSF since 2008, this virtualization permitted even those scholars who would not have been able to come to the conference because of timing or distance—in spite of funding from WSF being granted—to fully participate, thereby expanding the anticipated geographical reach of the program.

Model for Institutional Cooperation and Individual Collaboration

The WSF-CES Writing Lab was thus born to virtually gather fellowship recipients from the Global South—and ultimately also from those countries within Europe that have been marginalized in the field of European Studies—to participate in a joint publication project. It was envisioned that scholars selected for the program would work together on

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an edited collection to be published as a book under the academic and editorial guidance of Drs. Nicole Shea and Hélène Ducros. Hundreds of applications were reviewed, and only a small group of researchers were retained, as their respective proposals for chapters seemed promising and represented an array of world regions.

Since we understood early on that an edited volume built around people rather than topics would be difficult to render coherent, the group worked in sub-groups by general affinities, whether coming from the humanities or social sciences, to create thematic convergences. Therefore, beyond the publication output and the template for successful institutional cooperation it offers, the CES-WSF Writing Lab is conceptualized as a collective knowledge production process. It is designed as a participatory space for crafting lasting bridges not only across disciplines but also across geographies and scholarly traditions that rarely intersect for reasons of distance and funding, as well as because of established exclusionary patterns and general inward-thinking in Western academia. As a result, the writing lab contributes to enhancing inclusiveness in European Studies and developing cross-continental collaborative practices in the field. As such, it expands the scope of the discipline, supporting the diffusion of research conducted by scholars at higher education institutions located outside Western Europe and North America and highlighting Europeanists who generate knowledge about Europe from without the Global North, in a reversal of established patterns of scholarly production.

"Global South" and Decentering

The first conundrum we met was how to define our purpose and scope. Although we used the term "Global South" in our call for proposals, we were fully aware of its drawback and paradoxical connotation for a project that seeks to precisely do away with the Euro-centric organization of knowledge. It also became clear to us that some of the scholars we were looking to include did not actually recognize themselves as being part of this "Global South" and, vice-versa, that some scholars we had not anticipated including attached themselves to the concept. The debate about how to name the non-Western world is not one in which we sought to directly engage, leaving it instead to the selected scholars to tackle in their discussions and writing if they wished.

In the 1950s, Alfred Sauvy (1952) used the term of "Third World" based on the idea of the French "Third Estate," describing a population with aspirations but no power—"this Third World, ignored, exploited, despised like the Third Estate, also wants to be something … Like the Third Estate, the third world has nothing and wants to be something"—and demanding a reaction from the European political class. Replaced later by a language roped into linear and Western-centric theories of development, the terminology of "development and underdevelopment" came about. Deriving from this social construction, the categorization of countries according to their level of "development," from underdeveloped to developed, emerged, further vehiculating processes of inequality that reinforced Western values and practices. Today, these terms have mostly been replaced, for example in the language used by international organizations,

by strictly economic rankings from "high income" to "low income" countries, with the consequence that these categories leave out many indicators, failing to capture key dimensions of human lives. Also to be noted is that the notion of Third World has often stuck in the linguistic habits of those very people initially represented under the term, who might use it more readily than "Global South," as we noticed in discussions with the writing lab's fellows. Some prominent scholars—among others, Patrick Bond—have further pointed to the imperfection of the "Global South" semantics and favored the term empire or periphery to designate the non-Western world, inscribing it in a historical power system. Others have refined the notion of "capitalism's peripheries," which is also recruited when explaining global power inequalities (Aalbers, Rolnik, and Krijnen 2020). Overall, the literature has highlighted that the term "Global South" "clearly fails to capture the diversity—and extreme inequality—that exists within the Global South, let alone the complexity of its links with the Global North" (Williams, Meth, and Willis 2009, 366) and increasingly with a "Global East."

What this discussion markedly demonstrates is that terms such as "Global South" or "the West" do not represent mere geographical areas but instead are intertwined with a slew of historical, political, economic, social, and spatial conditions. The terms themselves, whether "Third World," "developed/underdeveloped/developing," or "Global South" are situated within a specific approach to spatial and economic history, according to which the world has been imagined as constituted of different spheres based on particular values and ethos of modernity and democracy. In their "southern critique," Mary Lawhon and Yaffa Truelove (2020) differentiate between the South as a region and as a metaphor, while Emma Mawdsley, Elsje Fourie, and Wiebe Nauta (2019) investigate South-South relations in *Where is the South?* away from the nation-state, using instead an intersectional transversal perspective in analyzing state relations, all the while emphasizing the need to dislodge a static mode of thinking about scale. This idea has also been taken up by others promoting a multi-scalar approach and effort to decolonize postcolonial thinking, considering "ethnocentrism and sociocentrism as transideological and multiscalar phenomena" (Lopes de Souzas 2019).

Our call for proposals explicitly targeting "Global South" researchers, we were somewhat surprised to receive a good number of applications from colleagues in eastern Europe or the peripheries of Europe, which made us question our conceptualization of geographic inclusion. The fact is that scholars from these areas of the world seemed to perceive themselves as being part of a "Global South" by elimination, simply because they did not think of themselves as belonging to the "Global North," from which they found themselves excluded, as the simplistic North-South binary vision of the world has carved no space for them. Consequently, we expanded our program range to indeed include those projects emanating from what has been coined the "Global East." This "black hole" comprises "all those societies that fall somewhere between North and South – too rich to be in the South, too poor to be in the North" and "encompasses those societies that took part in what was the most momentous global experiment of the twentieth century: to create communism" (Müller 2018, 1). Hence, countries of Eastern and Central Europe offer a unique liminal context to study visions of Europe from what I would

call a European "internal outside" or an "excluded inside"—or at least discounted in many ways. Like others before, we moved beyond geographic descriptors to envisage these internal peripheries in terms of new epistemologies of marginality, rather than mere location. Thus, we extended invitations to scholars from eastern Europe to join the writing lab, based on the understanding that the "Global East" fills the void left by the all too simple Global South-Global North dichotomy and provides an additional bridge.

The discussion about what best terms are to be used to encompass and critique the unevenness in power relations and economic capacity across the world is not new. And we do not claim to bring here convincing answers in this debate. However, through our project, we have attempted to focus on enhancing inclusion where exclusion has been the norm in order to remedy some of the defects of the world order in the production of knowledge about Europe, however this world order is labeled. We also adopted the idea that to the "southern turn" in social science a necessary "eastern turn" should be embraced in Europe, as some scholars have invoked it, past economic debates and towards increasingly cultural and social concerns. For example, Oren Yiftachel, questioning European universalisms, has proposed that more emphasis be given to a "southeastern perspective," an important shift that was the topic of an event held at University College London in 2019, "TheoriSE: debating the southeastern turn in urban theories," where presenters argued that both the "'southern' and 'eastern' perspectives are crucial to challenge dominant paradigms, theories, and epistemologies that sustain global power structures of knowledge production."

The Writing Process

The Digital Writing Lab consisted in regular meetings where writing conventions were discussed and practiced in the elaboration of chapters for the present book. Along the way, we found that differences in writing (and researching) cultures could become a hurdle in the production of standard book chapters. Our challenge, as editors, was to preserve those voices we valued and wanted to hear more of in the discipline while abiding by the expectations of global academic presses. For this reason, we could not retain all the chapters that were submitted to us through the writing lab, but we hope that these scholars nonetheless benefitted from participating in the fellowship and that they ultimately found a fitting outlet for their work.

The seven chapters that comprise the book have been divided into three parts: "Constructing Europe from its Margins," "The European Union: Impact and Understanding Seen from its Outside and Periphery," and "Policy Reach: Focus on Health and Comparative Methods." Each part starts with a short text that was written collaboratively by the authors whose chapters appear in that section of the book. This exercise in collaborative writing was one more way to encourage scholars who might be located on each side of the world to work together at producing a text and to make explicit the linkages that exist between their respective research fields, in spite of linguistic

differences and professional hierarchies (some fellows were full professors, while others were PhD candidates).

Part I introduces Filiz Anlam (Turkey) and Oksana Ermolaeva (Russia, currently a scholar-at-risk outside Russia) as they delve into different ways in which the idea of Europe has been constructed from the margins of Europe. While Filiz focuses on how the Turkish media has created different versions of Europe through images and texts, Ermolaeva addresses how the very contours of Europe were locally negotiated on the ground historically at the border between Russia and Karelia, a northern region at the intersection of Russia, Finland, and Sweden. In the harsh environment of the northern frontier, borders in and out of an ill-defined "Europe" were in fact demarcated by nature, which dominated border control operations and the organization of a two-way flow of people and goods.

In Part II, "The European Union: Impact and Understanding Seen from its Outside and Periphery," Edina Paleviq (Montenegro), Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar (Brazil), and Mare Ushkovska (Macedonia) zoom in on the European Union and how the shaping it has effected on different societies and political systems has been received. Paleviq's chapter on the Europeanization of Montenegro illuminates how the EU's strict rules have shaped accession to the Union in that country and the actors involved, while Ushkovska focuses on the Visegrad countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary—to explain the social sources of EU-skepticism there, beyond the shortcut view that only political populism is to blame. Aguilar looks at EU military operations historically, creating a classification to explain how he sees the EU adapting to security uncertainties across the world.

Finally, in Part III, Qun Cui and Lisheng Dong (with Tom Christensen) and Jia Xu and Weidong Dai turn to solution-seeking through policy work and comparative methods. "Policy Reach: Focus on Health and Comparative Methods" offers two chapters comparing specific dimensions of health policy reform in China and two countries in Western Europe. The focus on health came naturally, as the writing lab went on at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. The comparison with China was also prompted by the global public health context, at a time when the world was looking at the ways in which China was trying to curb the coronavirus rapid contagion rate. Qun Cui and Lisheng Dong (in collaboration with Tom Christensen from Norway) compared healthcare reforms in China and Norway to highlight how some features of integrated care are facilitated or hindered by the social, economic, or political context. The last chapter, by Jia Xu and Weidong Dai, both from China, compares the relationship between the risk of falling into poverty and access to healthcare in Germany and China, with a focus on the COVID-19 pandemic response. Here too, the authors show that vastly different societies may yield very different prospects and health outcomes for patients but also that they may converge in unexpected ways that it can be reciprocally useful to study.

While a wide array of topics are tied together in this book, it is most important to us to dwell on the context of production, the fellows involved, the collaborative process, and the purpose of the project by which this book came about. We remain committed

to injecting European Studies with voices seldom heard and to facilitate the sharing of knowledge produced from less-represented regions and intellectual traditions in the field. The enhanced visibility of scholars from the so-called "Global South," "Global East," or generally "non Western-Europe or North America" seems key to us for the discipline to advance and to remain sensible and relevant. It is this critical engagement from Europe's outsides or margins—Europe's "beyond"—that can propel Europe into solving its many problems in the twenty-first century.

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PART I

Constructing Europe from its Margins

Introduction

Anlam FILIZ[1] *and Oksana ERMOLAEVA*[2]

Echoing historical interpretations that reveal how human mobility entails gradual transition from "Europeanness" to non-European worlds, the chapters in Part I analyze shifting symbolic constructions of "Europe" and their imprints on human materiality and landscapes. Anlam Filiz and Oksana Ermolaeva position themselves at opposing geographic standpoints, at the margins of Europe's Southern and Northern borders, thus contributing to the building of multiple and contested conceptualizations of European liminal, transitory spaces.

Part I starts with an analysis of understudied historical processes of border-making in Northern Eurasia. Focusing on persistent factors of state-building inherited from the Russian Empire by the Soviet Union, but also on regional geography, Oksana Ermolaeva's chapter uptakes an environmental historical approach to reconstruct the evolution of the Russian/Soviet imperial border in the Northern European region of Karelia. From an early-modern abstract entity defined by treaties to a heavily militarized barbed-wire fence that eliminated most possibilities of movement for people and commodities, the border is shown to embody the political and ideological divide between "East" and "West." From this historical account of border crossing in the northern regions, the analysis shifts to the European Union's southeastern borders in the contemporary era. Analyzing how a certain image of Europe has been shaped from a place that has historically been excluded from the European project, Anlam Filiz draws from the Turkish written press to demonstrate that an agreement between Turkey and the European Union regarding the refugee flow to European countries from Turkey has been a major conduit for emerging imaginations of Europe grounded in the North-South divide.

In support of the main theme of the book, these two chapters decenter Europe by revealing an array of processes by which different notions of Europe have been defined through human mobility and circulated in and out of Europe. Methodologically, Ermolaeva's and Filiz's respective chapters are further tied as they rely on non-European primary sources: rare administrative archival records and accounts by eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth century officials, as well as contemporary media articles.

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Where the two chapters contrast is through the time-periods they address, together providing a temporal depth to an understanding of the continuities and ruptures between past and present in the emergence of imaginings of Europe and "Europeanness."

1 The Environment in (B)order-Making and Border Crossing in Russian Karelia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Century

Oksana ERMOLAEVA[1]

Abstract: For some time before the COVID-19 pandemic, borders seemed to lose importance, although it was still clear that the world remained highly bordered. In Europe, the reestablishment of strict border controls in response to the pandemic resulted in increased pressures on the environment, the resurgence of global neo-imperialism, and stricter governance of energy resources. The object of this chapter is to explore the historic entanglement between the environment and international border-making by examining the strategies used to bring order to these frontier zones—a process I call "(b)order-making." The chapter is based on research on Karelia, a North-Western borderland between the European Union and Russia. Of current geopolitical significance to Finland, Sweden, and Russia, Karelia has constituted a complex space where geopolitical considerations have prevailed over environmental concerns.

At the Crossroad of a Challenging Physical Geography and Geopolitical Context

As the longest national frontier in the world, the Russian border extends through a great variety of environmental and climatic zones, from the Arctic tundra to forests and steppes. It separates Russia from twelve countries, traversing some 20,000 kilometers across eight time zones (Werth 2021, 623-44) with altitudes ranging from below sea level to heights of over 5,000 meters. In this physical context, Karelia has long been a watershed between the East and European West, as it has also constituted one of the oldest religious and cultural divides on the Eurasian continent. Karelia's first international demarcation originates in the 1323 Noteborg Treaty between the Catholic kingdom of Sweden and the Orthodox principality of Novgorod. Until 1809, Karelia remained a contested region in the many Russo-Swedish wars, and its external border with Finland is currently the longest Russian border with the EU: 798 kilometers.

Based on the most salient elements of its landscape, Karelia is often called a "land of lakes, forests, and marshes" (Entsiklopedicheskyi slovar Brockhausa I Efrona 1899, 24).

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Indeed, on most of its territory, the Karelian Republic offers an undulating plain showing pronounced marks of glacier activity, and the land's wavy surface reveals traces of ancient mountains. More than 49 percent of the area is still wooded (the main tree species being pines and fir), and 23 percent of its surface is covered with water: over 60,000 lakes, 27,000 rivers, and approximately 6,500 swamps. Karelia's climate is temperate continental with some maritime features. Temperatures and precipitations respectively average –8.3°C and 48mm in January and 13.3°C and –80mm in July (Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation). Throughout its history, Karelia has been the site of extensive population movements—some voluntary and temporary, others coerced and permanent—with legal and illegal trade becoming a permanent feature of cross-border contacts. Moreover, cultural anthropologists and historians have considered that the region has played an important role in the process of Finnish identity-building (Paasi 1996, 6-23).

In past centuries, multiple obstacles arose in the successive attempts at delimiting a clear and stable international border for Karelia. In examining different dimensions of border-making in the region, this study first focuses on the environment to account for the demanding physical and climatic features of the region, which had an effect on mapping the early modern border and controlling it during later periods. Second, the chapter defines environmental entanglements in the Russian imperial attempts to control transborder trafficking from the eighteenth to early twentieth century and explains the active involvement of local community networks in using the borderline to fit their needs. Third, this research analyzes the changes and continuities in border control strategies and illegal cross-border encounters in the region caused by the shift from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Empire, focusing in particular on the role of nature.

Comparing the role of the environment in (b)order-making projects and border-crossing patterns in the Karelian territory in imperial and Soviet Russia adds to the scholarship in "environmentally oriented" Russian/Soviet border studies. In the last two decades, international scholars have inclined toward a more nuanced treatment of imperial legacies in the Soviet context, focusing on "persistent factors," which include imperial ideas and myths, as well as population management techniques, which the Bolsheviks inherited from the Russian Empire upon their accession to power in 1917 (Lieven 2000; Hirsch 2005; Lohr 2012; Rieber 2015). The Russian Empire also left behind lengthy porous frontiers, relative economic backwardness, and cultural alienation in peripheral areas, the latter finding themselves having more in common with the states neighboring them than with the imperial center (Rieber 2015). Thus, this chapter builds on this history to contextualize some of these findings and approaches within the specific environmental and cultural contours of the Karelian borderland.

Beyond the scope of previous studies devoted to the North-Western Russian imperial/early Soviet borders, the chapter also seeks to expand research on the diplomatic intricacies of border demarcations (Rupasov and Chistikov 2007), border operations, and cross-border trafficking of peoples and goods (Katajala 2012; Selin 2016), as well as on the changing conceptualizations of the early modern border between Russia and Sweden (Kokkonen 2011, 66-71; Tolstikov 2015, 31-55; Katajala 2017, 177-190) and cross-

cultural transborder influences during imperial/Soviet times (Vihavainen et al. 1999; Ilukha 2012; Vitukhnovskaya 2006, 2021). Scholarly pursuits have provided useful insights into the northwestern borders within the framework of the Barents region's colonization (Olsson 2016), the circumpolar interstate encounters and rivalry over borders and indigenous transborder communities (Zaikov and Nilesen 2012), and the rival imperial/national/political projects targeting the populations in the northwestern borderlands (Vituhnovskaya 2006, 2021). However, existing works on the economy of border control in Karelia have generally overlooked long-term impacts of the natural landscape in (b)order-making and border control (Bazegsky 1998; Agamirzoev 2012; Chernyakova and Chernyakov 2016). Thus, the current study differs from the existing scholarship because it introduces the environmental dimension and incorporates it as a main factor of analysis.

Exploring Historical Transborder Practices Through the Archives

This study draws on a wide array of published and unpublished sources—primarily from the National Archives of Karelia—including a variety of pre-revolutionary collections from the end of the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century. Materials from the Olonets viceroyalty board (1784-1796), Olonets gubernia administration (1801-1922), the city of Padansk Chancellory (1776-1779), and the Archangelsk customs administration illustrate changing economic border regimes and the role of the environment in illegal cross-border transactions. To explore border controls and transborder practices during the early Soviet period (1920s), this research makes extensive use of the following:

- correspondence between the GPU AKSSR (Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie Avtonomnoi Karelskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki [State Political Administration of the Autonomous Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic]) and Karelian customs institutions;
- reports on the "situation with the contraband," composed both by the GPU and customs administrators; and
- contraband legal cases filed during the 1920s against the local borderland peasantry, stored in the archives of the Karelian District Customs Inspection Department.

Out of this large volume of documents, records of legal actions against the local population in particular have never before been analyzed. Additionally, this study relies on materials from the manuscripts collection of the Scientific Historical Archive (at the St-Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and the Russian State Archives of Economics.

An Early Modern Border: A Civilizational Divide in a Contact Space

In Karelia—and in the Russian Northwest in general—natural borders emerging out of the local landscape played an important role in the early formation of contested external and internal administrative frontiers. Located along the dividing line between the Atlantic and Arctic oceans, borders in that region were largely influenced by the split of a vast watershed into several water basins that laid the ground for some of Karelia's administrative units (*Granitsy i kontaktnye zony* 2008). Regarding the international frontiers in the region, the first official border between Russia and Sweden was demarcated as a result of the Orekhovetskii (Noteborg) peace treaty in 1323. This treaty divided ethnic Karelians between, on one side the Western Karelians, who today constitute a regional and cultural subgroup of ethnic Finns, and on the other side the Eastern Karelians, who nowadays comprise the population of the Karelia and Tver regions (Utkin 2003). For centuries, inaccuracies in border demarcation served as a pretext for both Russian and Swedish territorial claims, border violations, and interstate violence, which subsisted even after peace treaties were signed.

In 1595, a new treaty established the boundaries of villages on both the Swedish and Russian sides according to fishing water lines. Following the later Treaty of Stolbovo (1617), the Russo-Swedish border was set in reference to taxation (based on which villages paid taxes to Korela/Kexholm, which belonged to Sweden, and which villages paid taxes to the Olonets region, which belonged to Russia). However, adjustments were made after this treaty. Indeed, only then did a long "border line"—a border in the modern sense—arose. Several hundred kilometers of border were thus cut through the forests in the early 1620s. The new border spread from the Gulf of Finland to the shore of Lake Ladoga, at the latitude of modern day North Karelia. This border was physically maintained by "borderland peasants" on both sides (Kokkonen 2011, 68). Maintenance consisted in the removal of tree growth from the clearing and was placed under the supervision of Swedish and Russian border commissars throughout the 1600s. In these border zones, the local peasantry had to control cross-border traffic, and local municipalities were allowed to settle border conflicts independently (Kokkonen 2011, 67). A number of successive treaties would ensue to further settle the border. For example, under the Treaty of Uusikaupunki (Swed. *Nystad*), concluded in 1721, the border was drawn straighter and more linear in shape, as it was made to simply cut through villages, individual farms, parishes, and local entities, without consideration for local or regional conditions (Kokkonen 2011, 69). Later on, additional treaties (in 1809 and 1917) reinstituted the border as it had existed under the 1617 treaty.

In spite of these various treaties, for centuries, the Russo-Swedish border, including its Karelian strip, remained barely marked in the landscape. Border markers and border posts were used to show the official boundary as it had been ratified not only through the treaties, but also via certain religious rites. No matter the kind of marking, the border always allowed the free passage of people and goods in both directions (Kokkonen 2011, 67; Katajala 2017, 188). For example, according to the 1595 agreement, the eastern border was marked only at its most significant points, generally within reach of major thoroughfares, so as to make it quite clear to passersby where the border ran in the district

and what usufructuary rights existed there. Most of the markers consisted of natural features that stood out in the landscape, such as rock faces, large boulders, bodies of water (rivers, lakes, springs, or pools), watershed areas, and sometimes even peatlands. All these were highly suitable as border markers, as they could not be interfered with by human action (i.e., moved or destroyed) (Kokkonen 2011, 67).

In 1617, records account for possibly two major border markers separating the Swedish from the Russian territory. The first one was the Varashev's Stone (*Variskivi*), which rose from the waters of Ladoga Lake near the village of Manssila. However, when the border was redrawn in 1721, that marker lost significance (Sudakov 2003). The second marker, which stood on an old trade route along the beach of Ladoga Lake in the village of Virtelä, would be seriously damaged later in the eighteenth century. It was not before the nineteenth century that new border markers (*pogranichnye stolby)* were installed, set at regular intervals in attempts to make the border distinctly visible in the boreal cover. Despite periodic attempts to mark the administrative border in the course of the nineteenth century, by the beginning of the twentieth century most sections of the border had become invisible again to local residents, with trees and bushes growing over them. Archival sources from the late 1920s recount massive unauthorized transborder passages by peasants across the "fence" (*izgorod*) that had been installed near some parts of the Soviet-Finnish border in Karelia earlier in the nineteenth century (NARK. F. P-378. Op. 4. D. 25/568. P. 220).

Scholars working on the early modern history of this Northern border have described it as a "sieve-like frontier." Indeed, starting in the thirteenth century, the Karelians were actively involved in trading with the West, through the water routes of Ladoga Lake, as well as from the Eastern shore of the Gulf of Bothnia. By the seventeenth century, petty trade (*raznosnaya torgovlya*) with Finland provided a major source of income for the majority of borderland populations in Russian Karelia (Katajala 2007). However, populations on each side of the border faced different material conditions—with people on the Finnish side faring much better economically—which resulted in a rather one-way (from Russia to Finland) transborder flow of peddlers. In Swedish Finland, these transient characters sold a typical assortment of box trade. Residents of the Kem District (Northern Karelia), for example, imported tobacco, meat, and hemp and exported fox, beaver and ermine furs, silver, tea, and coffee (Chernyakova and Chernyakov 2016). The enormous volume of cross-border trade had tremendous importance in local life, so much so that the head of the Olonets viceroyalty, Gavrila Derzhavin, became concerned with estimating its scale as early as 1860 (Derzhavin 1860).

Seasonality and Imperial Control from the Late 1700s to the Early Twentieth Century

The first border guards and customs posts along the Russo-Swedish border in Karelia were established in the eighteenth century, first on the Swedish side (in 1723) and then on the Russian side, reflecting the spirit of eighteenth century mercantilist economic policies. The first experiment with the systematic presence of a military guard occurred

with the closing of Sweden's eastern border by the Swedish government in 1770–1772, which led to the installation of a regular guard post, as part of the so-called "Plague Chain," during the plague pandemics in Russia. It was subsequently removed in 1772, when information reached Sweden from St. Petersburg that the plague was no longer considered a threat in Russia (Kokkonen 2011, 70). In 1782, Catherine the Great addressed an order to the governors-general in borderland regions "On the establishment of a chain of customs border posts and guards" to eliminate the clandestine smuggling of goods (Semyonov 1859, 63). After that date, the administration of Russian Karelia—Arkhangelsk and Olonets Governor-General Timofei Tutolmin—launched a project to create customs posts along the entire Russo-Swedish border strip in Karelia. This line extended for 500 verst (about 550 km) from the Swedish Lapland border to the village of Porosozero, located at the intersection of the Viborg and St. Petersburg provinces. Controlling the border in the context of a difficult terrain became a challenge for imperial authorities, because it required controlling passages not only on land but also on multiple water paths.

The area adjacent to the border on the Russian side included 40 lakes, while on the Finnish side this number reached 47, with uncountable rivers cutting across the border. These lakes and rivers, heavily packed with large stones, offered dangerous but navigable ways for the local peasantry to get to and across the border (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D. 1/12). Semen Annenkov, an active member of the statistical committee of the Karelian Olonets province in 1886, wrote that

> The landscape of this border space is generally mountainous, covered with forests and dotted with wetlands, lakes, and swamps, endowing this country with a harsh, gloomy character. It is impossible to describe all transborder routes, as in winter their directions through frozen marshes and lakes depend entirely on the decisions of the travelers, who become unaccountable (Annenkov 1886).

Based on observations made in both summer and mid-winter during two consecutive border inspection expeditions (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D. 1/12), summary reports identified that the main challenge in controlling the border was the blocking of local land trails and water routes leading to Sweden. Solutions were proposed (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D 1/12. P. 16). For example, after his 1782 summer expedition, Pyotr Yablonsky, an Assistant Customs Director from St. Petersburg (Unter-Zollner), recommended the installation of an elaborate chain of 26 customs outposts (*tamozhennye zastavy*), which would be located at a discrete distance from the border. However, his proposal did not include the provision of convenient tracks leading to these border posts (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D 1/12. P. 40a). Later, in 1785, when deciding on the location of the customs chain between the "Swedish Kingdom and Russian Karelian Guberniya," the Olonets viceroyalty board inclined towards a much more expedient "mid-winter" project, which had been proposed by the Olonets zemstvo Court Assessor Major Ivan Skornyakov after his own expedition. His project envisioned the installation of controls at the border itself. As a result of various reports, the customs chain that was implemented in 1785-1786

consisted of one customs station, two customs outposts (*tamozhennye zastavy*), and eleven border outposts (*strazhi*) (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D 1/12. P. 39). Customs outposts were border stations that operated permanently. They were complemented by smaller but more numerous border outposts (*strazhi, or storozhevye zastavy*) with staff usually ranging from two to four. When equipped with horses, these outposts were sometimes called *verkhovye strazhi*. However, in Karelia, it was more common to use boats, although some stations located in marshy areas operated only in winter when the water was frozen and boats were thus not in use (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D 1/12. L. 29-39).

The principle of expediency, *kazennyi interes,* became a major factor not only in the customs planning and installation, but also in providing customs chain outfitted with staff and vessels. The only way for customs officer to control waterways was to inspect them by boats, which the peasantry also used widely for illegal border crossings. In response to recommendations about avoiding "unnecessary expenses," the Viceroyalty Board refused to block several popular waterways that led directly to the border and were actively used by local people for unauthorized crossings (NARK, F. 2. Op. 61, D. 1/12. P. 38). While boats used at the outposts were generally few and old, in Northern Karelia, rowers were recruited among the local peasantry, providing them with an income, which alleviated the necessity for the residents of these settlements to engage in illegal cross-bordering for business.

Long before the customs chain was installed, people resisted border crossing regulations in the area. As early as the 1770s, an extremely remote and under-staffed isolated customs station was located 200 *verst* from the border, near the village of Yushkozero of Panozero pogost (church yard), in the Olonets viceroyalty of Northern Karelia. Unable to force peasants to abide by the new regulations and to pay crossing fees, the customs guards robbed and beat the people they caught (NARK. F. 652. Op. 3. D. 5). A Customs Head Manager responded to multiple complaints from peasants about administrative abuses by noting that

> "With the spaces along local borders being uncovered by the outposts of this customs, in summer time they travel through the lakes, marshes, and rivers, and their route is even easier in winter: they manage to pass through large masses of snow and almost unpassable forests, so in every location of this border strip, the peasants have ample places to hide from us" (NARK. F. 652. Op. 3. D. 2/23. L. 28).

Frequent "border regime" issues broke out into open strife. For example, people who reported to authorities that their neighbors were engaged in contraband had their houses looted or burned (Kapusta 2000, 46). In winter 1776, to address the problem of customs ineffectiveness, a corporal who was dispatched with three soldiers to inspect peasant traders travelling from Novgorod to Archangelsk reported that peasants "turned into the forest through their secret paths three *verst* before the Yushkozero, and our repetitive efforts to catch them from the forestry ambushes failed" (NARK. F. 652. Op. 3. D. 5).

After the customs chain installation, the local peasantry continued to cross the border *en masse*. In the summer, these peasants travelled through hidden forest pathways and marshes, or they skillfully maneuvered their small wooden boats through river stones. During the winter, when lakes and rivers froze, it was impossible to control the countless convenient transborder routes people used by carts or simple skies (*snegostupi*) (Arkhiv SpbIIRAN. Coll. 15. D. 285. L. 103). Therefore, seasonality remained a crucial factor in cross-border encounters. Sometimes, "watery" or "icy" landscapes not only provided varying transborder aquatic routes but also divided the populations across neighboring provinces. For example, the famous Egyptinkorpi swamp (stretching from the Kuopio Province in Finland deep into Russian Karelia) could not be navigated during the summer months, temporarily shutting down a popular transborder connection (Annenkov 1886). Some areas adjacent to the border became fully unpassable off-season, temporarily erasing transborder paths and in effect "shutting" down the border (NARK. F. P - 689. Op. 1. D. 8/81. P. 123).

Paradoxically, some villages located further away from the border, such as Svinaya Gora, were important sites for customs or border guard outposts in one unrealized border project, based on mid-summer border inspection (NARK. F. 2. Op. 61. D 1/12. P. 40). Until the end of the 1920s, these outposts remained major "contraband settlements" (NARK. F. P-382. Op. 1. D. 21/466). Beginning at the end of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century, the provincial administration would attempt to strengthen the sections of the Russian-Swedish border that were unprotected, but local budget constraints unavoidably hampered these efforts (NARK, F. 396, Op. 1. D. 29. Pp. 32-58). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a high-ranking prosecutor in the Olonets Governorate administration became greatly concerned with the inability to control heavy contraband traffic and proposed to position a strategic chain of border outposts, so "the smugglers would only have few daylight hours to cross the border through overgrown trails and marshlands." However, his plan was never approved by the governorate for implementation, most probably because it was too costly (Arkhiv SPbIIRAN. Collection 115. D. 285. P. 208).

The 1809 Friedrichsham Peace Treaty, concluding the Finnish War (1808-1809) between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Russian Empire, added ceded eastern Swedish provinces to the latter. To the Grand Duchy of Finland were also added the Russian eighteenth century conquests of parts of Karelia and Savonia (also known as Old Finland) in 1812, as Viborg County. This situation lasted until 1917 and transformed the previous external border in Karelia into an administrative dividing line. Most customs institutions were dismantled at that time (PSZ RI. Vol. XXX. № 22838. P. 1808). By the middle of the nineteenth century, only the Archangelsk administration's customs offices still functioned in Northern (Belomorsk) Karelia (Agamirzoev 2003, 8), and their functions were actually strengthened in order to better detect and detain revolutionaries, propagandists, and unreliable elements of all kinds after the Polish uprising of 1830, which had significantly raised imperial concerns over border security in general (NARK. F. 589. Op. 1. D. 1/1; 1/ 2).

Still, contradictory imperial regulations on transborder trade with the Grand Duchy of Finland (1809-1917) remained in place, as customs and border outposts were ineffective in handling an unimpeded flow of peddlers from Eastern Karelia to Finland who refused to obey the legal regulations of trade *(korobeiniki)* (NARK. F. 277. Op. 1. D. 30/23. P. 2-4). Legislations included a January 1824 order strictly limiting border crossings to established border and customs outposts, as did an order from June, 12, 1830, on trading at Finnish fairs. The latter order also banned trade without permits. In reality, however, in Karelia, Finns welcomed peddlers, sometimes even hiding them from the police in spite of the threat of court sentences and heavy fines (Bazegsky 1998). Moreover, illegal inflows of Finnish goods increased significantly in winter, when rugged Karelian boreal forests and marshes froze (Agamirzoev 2019). In 1898, Konstantin Djakonov, a manager at the Soroka customs outpost (*zastava*), in his letters to the head of Archangelsk customs, complained that "the local police officers do nothing, considering that this is a secondary issue and none of their concern. And again, what can one constable (*yruadnik*) do in Karelia if all of Karelia uses Finnish contraband?" (NARK. f. 277. Op. 1. D. 30/23. P. 2-4).

"Mastering Nature" in Soviet Border-Making: Political Divides, Imperial Legacies, and Northern Encounters

The shift from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union had a tremendous effect on how state borders were conceptualized and secured. Concerns over security in protecting the socialist project from capitalist encirclement led to a number of radical changes in the management of border controls. Before the revolution of 1917, the Division of the Separate Border Guards Corps (*Otdelnyi korpus pogranichnoi strazhi*) of the Russian Empire had come under the control of the Department of Customs Duties and Fees, headed by the Ministry of Finance officials. This change of jurisdiction made border-making the responsibility of an economic agency. However, at the very beginning of the establishment of Soviet authority, Felix Dzerzhinsky, the Chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), proclaimed that "the border is a political divide, and a political body must protect it." Therefore, starting in 1920, the protection of the Soviet border came under the governance of a Special Division of the Cheka, which was renamed in September 1922 as the State Political Administration (GPU). At the same time, the Border Guards of the USSR (*Pogranichnye voiska SSSR*) were placed under the aegis of the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs).

When Finland gained independence from Russia in 1917, its 1245.6 kilometer-long border with Russian Karelia was confirmed as a boundary between two sovereign states (NARK. F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 6/ 27. P. 74). However, as with all other Soviet borders, the turmoil of the civil war meant that the demarcation line was porous, almost unguarded, and open to frequent violations. In the Finnish historiography, the conflict over the territories of Eastern Karelia has been defined as plagued with multiple "wars for kindred peoples" (*heimosodat*), which were fought between 1918 and 1922. Inspired by Finnish

nationalistic ideology, Finnish right-wing radicals and nationalist activists sought to unite the Finno-Ugric peoples in Finland, Russia, and Estonia by expanding Finland's borders to the east. As a consequence of these military operations, a large part of the borderland population of Northern Karelia fled to Finland in attempts to save their lives amidst the chaos and atrocities generated by the war. According to some estimates, out of the 12,479 Karelian refugees *(karbezhentsy)* who left Russian Karelia in 1921-1922, 11,239 went to Finland (Repukhova 2015, 3243-3253), which amounted to six percent of the Russian Karelian population in the 1920s. A total of 6,000 to 8,000 Karelians returned home, and approximately 5,000 remained in Finland (Takala 2016, 137-138). The establishment of the national Soviet republic (Karelian Labor Commune) in 1920 (later renamed as the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) as a neighbor of "bourgeois" Finland opened a new page in the history of the embattled northern frontier.

Like in all their early initiatives that sought to control and transform the natural environment, the Soviets lacked human and financial resources when operating in the Karelian region. In their descriptions of the geographical obstacles facing border control, the Soviet GPU and customs administrators stressed the extreme length of the border (1,320 km), prevailing harsh climatic conditions, and rugged terrain combining water, marshes, and boreal forests (NARK. F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. P. 78). They noted that by 1927, the border remained invisible, concealed under the cover of heavy forest growth (NARK. F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. P. 74). The need for regular on-site inspections was a challenge for border control mid- and high-ranking Soviet officials, who had to innovate as a result. In the 1920s, the majority of customs and border guard outposts were located in remote border villages. The border controllers complained that they lacked the necessary transportation infrastructure. Moreover, winter inspections could only occur by horseback on frozen rivers and lakes through a system of tract-country and water communication ways (NARK. F. P-544. Op. 2. D. 4/68. P. 83). In 1922, in spite of its length, the Karelian part of the Soviet-Finnish border featured only nine customs outposts, each with a staff of two to four officials, and a general customs office in Petrozavodsk (ibid). The deployment logic of customs institutions along the Finnish land border almost duplicated that of the imperial project, leaving long strips of the border completely unguarded and ample space for unauthorized border crossings. Thus, the switch to a new political administration overseeing the border initially did not change much in practice. The shift was merely bureaucratic.

Soviet administrators tended to generally miscalculate the impact of the harsh climate and problematic terrain in large-scale border policy. For example, the repatriation of Karelian refugees after the 1923 amnesty disregarded local conditions in favor of Soviet security concerns. Instead of implementing the initial plans of organizing the transfer of refugees through the Beloostrov border crossing and customs (on the Karelian Isthmus), Northern Karelian border crossing sites were used, since those were closer to the refugees' former homelands. However, these border posts could not process large influx of repatriates and collapsed. In 1924, at a temporarily customs outpost (tampost) in Olanga, groups of 30-40 refugees had to wait their turn for days in freezing cold without any medical assistance. These repatriations put a heavy physical and psychological strain not

only on the refugees but also on the customs officers and border guards (NARK. F. P-380. Op. 1. D. 1/1. P. 10-17).

Throughout the 1920s, Soviet administrators continued to report that is was completely impossible to control illegal border crossings and mass smuggling. Moreover, these numerous hidden transborder paths through boreal forests and across waterways were only known to local people and changed with the seasons (NARK. F. P-378, Op. 4, D. 6. P. 29. P. 65). In 1927, according to GPU KASSR reports, all inhabitants of borderland villages, including teenagers, were in one way or another engaged in smuggling. Contraband circulated along the unprotected parts of the border, usually in winter, transported by cart or sleigh (NARK. F. P- 378. Op. 4. D. 1/1. P. 10-17). A large share of these goods was then traded at smuggling bases and barter stations (*hutora*) on the Finnish side.

In front of environmental and logistical impediments, the only measures able to counteract smugglers remained limited to "periodic raids by border patrols, planning ambushes along the most likely illegal border crossing routes, irregular searches in villages suspected of housing contraband or identified in intelligence provided by informers" (NARK. F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. P.79). When smugglers failed, it was most often only after they had crossed the border coming in from Finland, as there was a greater chance of being intercepted by the GPU along well-worn tracts leading from the border to the villages (NARK. F. P-382. Op. 1. D. 24/539. P. 22). However, the yearly volume of confiscated contraband remained relatively insignificant along the Karelian border, especially in comparison with that in the marine districts of Murmansk and the Karelian Isthmus (NARK. F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. P. 79). This disparity can be explained by the level of poverty on both sides of the lengthy and remote Karelian Soviet-Finnish border. Also, Soviet control over transborder trade in Murmansk and at the Karelian Isthmus was difficult because smugglers were much better equipped and mobile than law enforcers there.

It is in this historical context that after 1917, a new professionalized cross-border network arose. Replacing the traditional informal smuggling peddlers (*korobeiniki*) a new category of "border people" emerged in the Russian Northwest. These were self-exilés and expatriates, some of them trained ideologically and militarily. In parallel, the peasants living at the edges of the Karelian borderland continued to engage in regular massive border crossings for trade purposes, most of the time successfully evading Soviet border outposts and customs institutions. They took advantage of the inhospitable and challenging environment using unique survival traditions inherited from their ancestors. In the face of the harsh climatic conditions and isolation, which were aggravated by delays in regular food and commodities deliveries, persistent housing shortages, and unsuitable living and working conditions, border guards and custom officials often lost morale or fell ill (NARK. F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. P. 55). As a result, throughout the 1920s, while the appeals from the central government for "combatting contraband" became more pressing, local Karelian customs officials and border guards were unwilling to address the problem seriously and preferred to send fake or blank reports that denied the existence of contraband trafficking at their respective locations.

At the end of the 1920s, the New Economic Policy (NEP) that had been implemented in 1921 was replaced by a Stalinist command economy. The effects on the border were the emergence of stricter security measures, an increased number of border guards, and the dismantlement of most existing customs institutions. In the following decade, massive repression operations were aimed at "cleansing" border zones as part of a broad militaristic mobilization strategy in preparation for future wars (Takala 2016; Repukhova 2017), and only few counterintelligence agents remained.

From the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union: Continuity in Border Control Failure

Russian territorial borders remained vague or nonexistent until the late nineteenth century (Werth 2021, 623-44). Imperial authorities struggled in controlling the border, in particular because of the environment. Their bureaucratic ineptitude and underfinancing were met with local indigenous practices and knowledge about the regional landscape and its seasonal transformations. But even when they did take the environment into account, as the Yablonsky's project did, Russian imperial bureaucrats opted for the most expedient border controls. They disregarded border inspection reports, discounting the local environment and natural landscape as a factor in illegal cross-border trade, which remained a necessity for the local population to subsist. An important shift from Russian imperial to Soviet attempts to regulate and discipline the border fit into a wider ideological context of ruptures and continuities within broad Russian/Soviet state-building projects. What made the Russian Communist experiment unique and radically different from traditional market capitalism was that political economy had a pivotal role in the aspirations to simultaneously reshape the environment and human beings (Weiner 2000; Josephson et al. 2013). Communist infusion in revolutionary practices led to an approach to the environment that combined technocratic statism and militaristic modernization, which led to ecocide during the time of "High Stalinism" (Bruno 2017).

"Classical" Soviet border protection during that time was meant to fully isolate populations to "seal" them off from the outside world. Although this model was eventually enforced through brutal repressive measures from the mid-1930s on, before then the country's newly established North-Western borders remained non-functional for a combination of financial and environmental constraints. Local Soviet republican administrators (the heads of the GPU KASSR and customs officials) admitted they could not overcome the challenging northern landscape and climate and prevent illegal transborder trade with the meager resources they had. As this chapter demonstrates, despite new, "politicized" border protection policies, Soviet border controllers continued to rely on past imperial arrangements, thus creating "continuity in failure," reinforced by severe budget constraints, bureaucratic ineptitude, and local communities that successfully exploited difficult physical terrains. As a result, until the 1930s, the geographical and climatic characteristics of the border strip remained a major factor influencing the operational modalities of the border and the specifics of cross-border

economic interactions. These characteristics contributed to the implementation of a unique border regime in which state power was dispersed and border control regulations were replaced with survival practices by all who participated in (b)order-making, whether controllers or local population.

If we consider the level of control at the frontier as a barometer of Bolshevik power in the borderlands during the 1920s, the latter was extremely weak, reflecting acute regime insecurity. After that time, this state of affairs became unacceptable under the context of Stalinist securitization. Hence, starting in the second half of the 1930s, the Soviet regime, apart from engaging in mass scale deportations from the Soviet Karelian borderland areas, paid greater attention to stiffening border controls. It did so by increasing the number of border guards, organizing mobile military patrols and supplying them with highly trained German shepherd dogs, and instituting a highly restricted border zone, which was illuminated at night by powerful searchlights. Additionally, the number of Soviet border guards went from 70,822 in December 1932 to 86,559 in August 1937 (Pogranichnye voiska 1973).

Still, well into the twentieth century, the environment continued to be a factor in the ways in which borders were contested, fought for, and administered in the USSR. For example, Karelian environmental conditions heavily impacted the "Winter War" between the Soviet Union and Finland, which lasted from November 1939 to March 1940. In this fight, too, the border area continued to be a major challenge, as Soviet tanks simply could not operate in the harsh terrain pocked with basalt outcroppings and extensive marshlands that turned into "a frozen hell" during the winter months. As a result, the Red Army paid a heavy death toll, with its principal battles fought in extremely severe long-lasting frosts, in many cases at forty degree below zero centigrade (Kilin 2012, 23). It was only in February 1940 that Soviet forces managed to penetrate the Finns' defensive Mannerheim Line across the Karelian Isthmus. Changes in the border during the Winter War, as well as during the Second World War (called the "Continuation War" in Russia), entailed cartographic modifications and large-scale population movements in 1940, 1941, and 1944. Modifications in territorial lines prompted the installation of new control devices—such as electric fences—to detect smuggling, refugees, or defectors. From 1945 onwards, most sections of the border were completely closed to all forms of traffic, including cross-border tourism and transport. During the Cold War, successful illegal border crossings from the Soviet Union to Finland still occurred, as people continued to use the environment to their benefit, proving that the idea of a totally "sealed" border remained a chimera even at that time (Laine 2014; Scott 2023).

Today, European border areas are still at the forefront of an "East vs. West" divide, reflecting much anxiety in interstate relations on the continent. In 2015-2016, asylum seekers travelling to Northern Norway and Finland through the Russian Federation caused the Finnish government to fear for its border security (Piipponen and Virkkinen 2017, 518-533), resulting in the temporary closing of two border crossing points for anyone not Finnish, Russian, or Belarusian. At the height of the European "migration crisis," over 5,000 asylum seekers entered Norway and 1,700 entered Finland through the three Northernmost border crossing points from Russia (Piipponen and Virkkinen

2017, 530). As recently as the winter of 2023, the wave of migrants from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa coming into Finland was considered by officials there to be the result of deliberate policies by Russia. In the context of deteriorating interstate relations between Russia and Finland and the latter's accession to NATO, the border was completely closed on the Finnish side. In both these cases, the peak number of people crossing over the border occurred in winter, with a majority of migrants choosing to cross the border on bicycles. These waves of migrants impacted international geopolitics and interstate relations, proving again an ephemeral, inefficient, and unpredictable border control in this northern region at the margins of Europe. Past border regimes can help in a critical understanding of not only transnational diplomatic systems but also environmental entanglements on the edges of modern Europe.

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2 Constructing the Idea of Europe through Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016 EU-Turkey Refugee Deal

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Abstract: This chapter tracks how seven Turkish-language news media have covered the EU-Turkey "Refugee Deal" announced in 2016. Using media content as a lens to understand how the idea of Europe is constructed in its periphery, the study identifies themes in the portrayal of Europe, at once pictured as a place of refuge but also as an immoral bargainer betraying its own values. Engaging in the ways in which Europe and the European Union are often conflated in Turkish news media, the study shows that while Europe frequently appears as a haven of progressive values—a place of comfortable living that refugees want to reach at all cost, risking even death—the European Union is regularly represented as an unethical political entity that excludes non-white populations. As an alternative to the conventional approach used by scholars in European studies who examine non-Europeans as constructed "Others," this research focuses on the representation of Europe from its margins by positioning the Turkish media as an actor in the shaping of a global image of Europe. Thus, this shift encourages a reconceptualization of actors in the peripheries and outside of the continent as actively contributing to the construction of a global vision of Europe.

Changing Representations of Europe

Images of Europe have been constructed by actors within the continent, but also by those located at its peripheries and outside of Europe. The very idea of Europe has developed in opposition to an "Other" when Europeans came together to fight Muslims and Ottomans and as they colonized the Americas (Chin 2017). However, the idea of a coherent European identity weakened in the course of the twentieth century, first in the aftermath of both world wars, then when the continent received large numbers of immigrants (Pagden 2002, 1). Nonetheless, the founding of the European Union revived an idea of unity, although the United Kingdom recently leaving the Union and the inconsistent responses to the "refugee crisis" among EU countries have shattered this harmonious image.

Turkey is considered to be at the margins of Europe (Keyder 1993, 2006), not only because it is geographically situated at the edge of the continent but also because it has long been construed as a proximate cultural "Other" through which a European identity

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has been formed (Robins 2003). Whether Turkey is part of the Global South or the Global North is also debated, for example by Stephen Haug (2021) who places Turkey at the boundary of the two spheres. While a member of the OECD, an organization consisting mostly of wealthy Global North countries, Turkey opposes the Global North's dominance of the world; it is "both Southern and Northern or neither Southern nor Northern" (Haug 2021, 2020). Focusing on how a European identity is constructed there brings close attention to how various actors at the margins of the continent, precisely because of their liminal position, have challenged images of Europe created at its core and thus have actively contributed to the reshaping of Europe. This chapter adds to the literature on Europeanness by placing these peripheral actors at the center of European studies. It analyzes an image of Europe constructed through the coverage of the 2016 "Refugee Deal" in the media in the Turkish-language by examining articles published in seven news sources with different political leaning between 2016 and 2018. Through a qualitative document analysis that involves a reflective thematic analysis (Morgan 2022), the chapter identifies themes related to the image of Europe. This research helps reconsider European image-building as an active, ongoing process involving actors located outside the usual center of the continent. This imagining has been produced not only in relation to the exclusion of Europe's "Others" from its imagined unity, but also in connection to how these "Others" have constructed Europe's image.

The 2016 EU-Turkey Deal

In the ten years following the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, 6.6 million Syrians sought refuge internationally (UNHCR n.d.). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described this situation as "the world's largest refugee crisis in decades" (n.d.). As the crisis grew, large numbers of Syrians and other nationals fled to Turkey to in turn seek asylum in Europe. To end this flow, the European Commission established a joint action plan with Turkey in October 2015. Consequently, the European Union (EU) and the Turkish state declared in March 2016 that they had made an agreement to "end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU" (Council of the EU 2016). According to this agreement, formally known as the "EU-Turkey Statement" and frequently referred to as the "EU-Turkey Refugee Deal," Turkey was to prevent unauthorized migration to the EU from within its territory, and the EU gained the right to send back "irregular migrants" who came through Turkey (Council of the EU 2016). In return, Turkey would receive financial assistance to sustain the lives of asylum seekers within its own borders. Moreover, Turkish citizens would benefit from certain visa liberations, and the process of Turkey's accession to the EU would be accelerated (Council of the EU 2016). On the one hand, many Europeans understood this agreement, made in the context of the "European Refugee Crisis," as a necessary step to protect European borders. On the other hand, various pro-migration activists, academics, and journalists regarded it as a "dirty deal," since the agreement aimed at keeping "unwanted migrants" outside Europe in return for monetary and political benefits to Turkey. The situation of

Syrian refugees in Turkey thus came to reflect the tension between the values framed as European values and the reality of European politics. The idealized image of Europe as a haven of human rights was indeed challenged in major ways in the aftermath of the Syrian Civil War.

Constructing the Idea of Europe

Scholars have shown that the idea of Europe has been unstable throughout its history and constantly reshaped (Chin 2017; Pagden 2002; van der Dussen and Wilson 1995). This reshaping has been evident in the ways in which the various meanings of Europeanness have been varied and contested. As Oriane Calligaro (2017) has shown, even the Council of Europe's and EU's conceptualization of European culture have been at odds. Europeanness has been celebrated as a glue binding the EU, yet the meaning of Europe is not the same for all member states. It is rather continuously negotiated (Calligaro 2013). In fact, Europeanness has been constructed from multiple perspectives, including "moral universalism, post-national universalism, cultural particularism and pragmatism" (Delanty 2002, 345). In particular, researchers have analyzed varying images of Europe in relation to the EU, describing the EU—commonly perceived to be founded on European unity—as "a fragile construction" (Guibernau 2011, 31).

There have been an array of obstacles in the creation of a coherent European identity uniting the peoples of the EU, including economic difficulties and differing opinions about the role of European "elites and the masses" (Guibernau 2011, 41). In their article comparing Bulgarian and British children's idea of Europeanness and the relationship between understandings of Europe and the EU, Slavtcheva-Petkova and Mihelj (2012) demonstrated that the meanings children attribute to Europe varied depending on their own political context. British children tended to define Europe in geographical terms rather than as a political entity and were more likely to define themselves as European than Bulgarian children were (ibid). Half a decade after Slavtcheva-Petkova and Mihelj's study, Great Britain voted to exit the EU in what came to be known as the Brexit referendum. "Anti-immigration and anti-establishment sentiments" among lower-class British citizens (Hobolt 2016, 1259) and "Britons' weak sense of European identity" (Carl et al. 2018) were identified as some of the reasons leading to the exit vote. Brexit shows that even in core EU countries, people have different understandings of Europeanness and attitudes toward the Union. As populism has been rising across Europe, the legitimacy of the EU continues to be questioned throughout the continent (McNamara 2019).

Scholars have analyzed how the idea of Europe has been negotiated in the presence of such differences and obstacles. However, Thomas Risse (2005), for example, shows that such national differences do not necessarily hinder the formation of an overarching idea of Europeanness. For him, Europeanness is rather merged into national identities. The diversity within Europe is also recognized and praised. Moreover, the "unity in diversity" discourse of the EU has been implemented to strengthen European cohesion in various projects such as the European Landscape Convention (Sassatelli 2009). The

idea of a common European heritage has also been mobilized to form a united identity (van der Waal et al. 2022). Nevertheless, scholars have warned that various constructions of Europeanness that do not take into consideration the multicultural and multiethnic composition of Europe runs the risk of manufacturing an exclusionist, white, Christian community (Amin 2004). The selectiveness of European identity-building is reflected, for example, in European memory politics (Sierp 2020). For instance, the idea of Europeanness is built on memories of "the Holocaust and National Socialism as well as Stalinism," but Europe is reluctant to remember its colonial and imperial past (Sierp 2020, 686). However, the formation of the EU and relatedly of a European identity are, in fact, intertwined with this past. Indeed, several European states had colonies when the European Economic Community was founded (Sierp 2020, 687-688). As Aline Sierp (2020) argues, recognizing this past would not necessarily be destructive for the idea of Europe but could help build a strong "European political identity" instead (699-700). Similarly, Margriet van der Waal and colleagues (2022) ask if European heritage construction can be imagined as "a space of exchange, flow and entanglement where Europeanness is defined as inclusive and pluralistic" rather than as "an exclusive and singular identity" (163). In her article questioning how the EU has built a European identity in relation to how it differentiates itself from countries in its periphery—including Turkey—Bahar Rumelili (2004) also shows the potential for creating a European identity that differentiates itself from the Other but does not position the Other as its antinomy. Therefore, the current diversity within the EU, enhanced by a history of migration and Europe's relationships with actors outside of its core, makes analyzing constructions of the idea of Europe at its margins a fruitful task.

Researching the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal

When examining various aspects of the Refugee Deal, scholars have analyzed the legal basis and implications of the agreement (Lehner 2019), its effects on EU-Turkey relations (Paçacı Elitok 2019), its utilization in international politics (Demiryontar 2021), and the validity of framing Turkey as a "Safe Third Country" where refugees can be resettled (Şimşek 2017). Anchored in but shifting the focus away from this legal and political framework, this chapter builds on media analysis scholarship to analyze how the deal has been covered in the Turkish media and understand how the idea of Europe has been constructed in its periphery through this coverage. Scholars have analyzed media representations to unearth how social issues have been shaped by the media, which themselves reproduce or challenge existing power relations. Indeed, the production and reception of media discourses are situated in their political, material, and social contexts (Hall 2006). Within media representation studies, the way migrants and migration policies have been represented has drawn particular attention (Bradimore and Bauder 2012; Danso and McDonald 2001; Fryberg et al. 2017; Gale 2004; Kavaklı 2018; KhosraviNik 2009; Musolff 2015). While these representations stem from the public's attitudes toward migrants and official policies, they also in turn influence attitudes

and regulations (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Fryberg et al. 2017; Kavaklı 2018; Poynting et al. 2001) in a feedback loop effect. While past studies have mostly concentrated on the effects of media representations in the very country in which these media are based, this chapter goes an extra step to focus instead on how representations in the Turkish media have challenged certain understandings of Europe and contributed to the reformulation of the idea of Europe generally and elsewhere.

Researchers have analyzed the media coverage of the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal in different contexts. Futák-Campbell and Pütz (2021), for example, point to the changing discourses about refugees in German media to explain Germany's shift from a willingness to receive Syrian asylum seekers at the beginning of the crisis to its approval of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, which limits the number of asylum seekers accessing Germany. Kavaklı (2018) examined how the agreement between the EU and Turkey has been covered in the Turkish online press by analyzing what prominent "actors" and "frames" appeared in three popular Turkish newspapers within four months of the EU-Turkey Statement (266). For Kavaklı (2018), the deal has been framed in terms of:

1. "Visa liberation," which has been promised to Turkey by the EU;
2. The idea that the deal did not adequately help refugees;
3. Legal and ethical problems inherent to the agreement;
4. The idea that the agreement was harmful to Turkey; and
5. The difficulty of implementing the agreement.

Thus, Kavaklı's study shows the framing of the deal in relation to its effects on refugees and on Turkey. These studies have anticipated that media discourses shape public opinion and policy-making and contribute to understanding the specific ways in which the media influence the political climate. This chapter utilizes this scholarship but shifts the focus to consider media coverage as a site where an image of Europe is created.

Turkish Media Coverage of the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal

Drawing on Turkish-language media products published between 2016 and 2018, this research identifies themes in articles produced before and after the declaration of the deal in March 2016. The selected media are wide-ranging in terms of political leaning, whether on the left, in the center, or on the right. This choice gives rise to a wide range of perspectives:

1. *Cumhuriyet* is a long-established newspaper founded in 1924 that is read by a secular audience and is known for its oppositional columnists and news pieces (Mert Elmas and Paksoy 2020, 187; İnce and Koçak 2018, 1976);
2. *Diken* is an independent online "non-mainstream critical news outlet" (Ertuna 2023, 545) whose name literally means "thorn." Its founder describes the mission of the journal as "being the thorn in the [Turkish] media" (Simavi n.d.);

3. *NTV.com.tr* is a private (Doğuş Media Group) news website owned by the TV channel NTV. It is one of the most visited news websites in Turkey, with almost 10 million visitors per month in 2018 (Alp and Turan 2018, 9);
4. *Sabah* is a privately owned (Turkuvaz Holding) newspaper, known to have close ties to the Turkish government (Mert Elmas and Paksoy 2020, 187; İnce and Koçak 2018, 1976);
5. *Sözcü* is a privately owned (Estetik Yayıncılık A.Ş. [joint stock company]), nationalist-leaning newspaper that is one of the most widely read newspapers in Turkey and publishes some oppositional news pieces (Mert Elmas and Paksoy 2020, 187; İnce and Koçak 2018, 1976);
6. *Habertürk.com* is a privately owned (Ciner Group) internet news medium connected to a TV channel; and
7. *T24* is an independent online "non-mainstream critical news outlet" (Ertuna 2023, 545).

For each source, I conducted online searches using keywords in Turkish that included the name of the news source along with the following words and phrases: "European Union," "refugee," and "agreement." Included in the study were 46 online news and opinion pieces from *Cumhuriyet*, 67 from *Diken*, 25 from *NTV.com.tr*, 29 from *Sabah*, 58 from *Sözcü*, 24 from *Habertürk.com,* and 73 from *T24,* all published between 2016 and 2018. Placing the articles in relation to the socio-political context of publication, recurring themes were identified. This qualitative method, based on the interpretation of the researcher, is advantageous in this case in that it provides a deep understanding of the texts in relation to the context in which they were produced. Different lenses can be used to address the emerging conceptualizations of Europe in this media coverage, such as disunity and inconsistency in Europe, as reflected in the multiplicity of opinions among Europeans regarding the agreement at stake and the changes in European policy toward migrants. Michael Patton (1990) places interpretation, and thus the creation of meaning, at the center of qualitative analysis. He points to the role of qualitative studies in going beyond exploring an issue and "extending and deepening the theoretical propositions and understandings that have emerged from previous field studies" (193-194). Using a qualitative approach to document analysis and utilizing reflexivity to identify themes, I did not start with pre-existing codes in mind but let the themes emerge as I read the documents closely and repeatedly (Morgan 2022, 73). I concentrated on the content that portrayed Europe, using interpretation and "subjectivity [of the researcher as] a resource» (Morgan 2022, 73). In this study, only articles that went beyond factual information and instead reported an assessment of or provided an evaluation of the agreement were analyzed to unveil how the media treated 1) the role of both the European Union and Turkey in finalizing the deal and 2) the consequences of the deal for Europe, Turkey, and displaced populations. Several themes emerged:

1. Europe as a destination;
2. The agreement between Turkey and the EU as immoral "bargaining;" and
3. Betrayed "European values."

Europe as a Destination Continent

The theme of fleeing to Europe emerged frequently in conjunction with the conceptualization of Europe as a continent that asylum seekers want to reach even at the risk of death. For example, an article on the news website of the TV channel connected to *NTV* (2017a) published after the deal was signed explained that asylum seekers found alternative ways to reach Europe, such as the maritime route from North Africa to Italy and Spain. While the article referred to a "journey to hope," it also mentioned that the agreement had made it difficult for all asylum seekers to flee to Europe through Turkey. The news source *Diken* often formulated its headlines to convey asylum seekers' unwillingness to be held in Turkey and their demand to stay within European countries: "Refugees are in resistance: no to Turkey!" (Diken 2016a). The rejection of the EU-Turkey deal was a recurrent theme in *Diken* as well. For instance, one article (Diken 2016b) featured powerful imagery by the Demirören News Agency and information previously conveyed by the British Daily Telegraph to describe how one Afghan and two Pakistani asylum seekers had filed a complaint with the European Court of Justice asking to invalidate the agreement between Turkey and the EU. One photo in particular showed children and protesters holding banners written in English:

- "Don't send back to Turkey;"
- "Help us no back to Turkey;"
- "We want not war;"
- "Freedom;"
- "No Turkey;" and
- "Better to die here than go back to Turkey" (Diken 2016b).

In yet another picture, readers saw a close-up of a sleeping baby wearing a hat where the words "no Turkey" appeared (Diken 2016b).

The EU as an Immoral Bargainer

After meeting with representatives of the EU in Brussels to discuss the agreement, the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu, stated that the agreement constituted a "Kayserian bargain" (Cumhuriyet 2016a). This expression refers to the Turkish city of Kayseri, a place where traders bargained over merchandise historically. This vocabulary suggested that the Turkish team had gotten what they wanted after

skillful negotiations—possibly at the expense of the interests of the EU. Hence, following Davutoğlu's comment, the Turkish media frequently defined the negotiations leading to the EU-Turkey Statement as a "bargain-making" endeavor (*pazarlık*). However, in contrast to Davutoğlu's praise about the negotiations, opposition media have used that same phrase to criticize the agreement and suggest that the EU in fact had the upper hand over Turkey and that the deal was nothing more than a "bargain for embarrassment" (Cumhuriyet 2016b). Other media also deployed the phrase to point to the unequal power relationship between Turkey and the EU in the deal-making process. The negotiations have been described as resulting from Turkey having the "courage of ignorance," and a journalist insisted that the real bargainer from Kayseri was in fact Brussels (Topçu 2016). The media have also discussed how this unequal relationship played out in the outcomes of the negotiations. *Sözcü*, for example, published an interview with Şükrü Elekdağ, a Turkish politician and former diplomat, in which he warned of the difficulties awaiting Turkey as a consequence of the agreement (Dündar 2016). In particular, the politician evoked that the funds the EU is to pay to Turkey would not suffice to manage a refugee flow of about 3 million Syrians into Turkey. Moreover, the promises made by the EU, such as visa exceptions for Turkish people, have also been described as extremely difficult to fulfill, if not impossible (Dündar 2016).

The immoral position of the EU has also been noted in terms of the exclusionary consequences on non-white populations. Elekdağ even compared the current situation to the Nazi era. He conceived of the deal as "the relapse of the abhorrent European disease called racism" and likened "the hatred towards Muslims and Turks in Germany" to "the [hatred] against Jews during the Nazi era" (Dündar 2016). Thus, Elekdağ presented the deal not only as a political decision but as a symptom of racism that prevented Syrians—mostly non-white and Muslim—from leaving Turkey and kept them at bay at the borders of the EU. The media cited international experts who found the agreement to be unlawful, such as Elizabeth Ferris (from Georgetown University), who referred to the agreement as a fiasco violating the law and an illustration of Ankara's and Berlin's failing morality (T24 2016). Likewise, *Habertürk* cited Amnesty International Refugee Rights coordinator Volkan Görendağ, who posited that the deportation of refugees back to Turkey was unlawful (Timurhan 2016).

Betraying "European Values"

The Turkish news media have focused on how the Turkey-EU Deal has challenged the loyalty of the EU towards its own foundational principles, which are frequently framed as "European values," including in the fields of refugee rights and legal ethics. *Cumhuriyet* cited Turkey's then main opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who declared that not only did the agreement turned Turkey into a buffer zone, but that it also caused Europe to violate "its own values and rules" (Cumhuriyet 2016c). An article on *NTV* (2017b) drew on the Turkish version of the German news outlet *Deutsche Welle* to cover discussions about a planned agreement between Libya and the EU, comparing it to the EU-Turkey

Deal and citing the suggestion of Oxfam, a collection of charity organizations fighting poverty, that such an agreement would contradict "the core values of Europe" (NTV 2017b). *Sabah* mentioned that a member of the European Parliament for Portugal, Ana Gomes, said that, as a European, she felt "ashamed of the EU's refugee policy" and that the way in which the EU had handled the crisis "betrayed Europe's foundational values" (Sabah 2018).

A Self-Contradicting Europe

In its review of articles produced by media outside the EU about the Turkey-EU refugee agreement, this chapter reveals how a certain image of Europe has been constructed that both reinforces and contradicts the idealization of the continent as a defender of human rights. News coverage about asylum seekers trying to flee to European countries presents Europe as a place to be. Yet, in discussions regarding "European values," Turkish-language media tend to construct the EU as ambivalent and inconsistent. The reluctance of the EU to let asylum seekers come to Europe through legal means and to protect their rights, as well as the failure of the EU's bureaucracy to fulfill its obligations toward Turkey, were frequently used to criticize the EU for not upholding European values.

The Turkish media showed how the EU in fact had betrayed its own values, echoing news pieces about the "bargain" to depict the negotiations leading up to the agreement. In the deal-making process, the EU appeared on the one hand to neglect the rights of asylum seekers and on the other hand to mislead Turkey in believing that it would benefit from the deal. As a consequence, critical journalists have presented the agreement as antithetical to the image of Europe as a champion of human rights. However, at the same time as these Turkish media condemned EU policies, they also supported the ideals of Europeanness. These two facets in media coverage demonstrated not only that the idea of "Europe" and the EU have become intertwined but also that Europe has emerged as an idealized haven for human rights that fails its own ideals in practice. In contrast, Turkey was shown to embody some of these ideals because it has protected refugee rights and hosted the largest number of asylum seekers in the world. Thus, although people have regularly risked their lives to reach Europe as a place to build a good life, the continent has also been associated with immorality and deceitfulness.

The liminal position Turkey holds in relation to Europe enables such ambivalent depictions. As scholars have shown (Ahıska 2003; Ahıska 2010; Heper 2006; Keyder 1993; Rumelili 2008), Turkey's identity has been constructed and negotiated in relation to Europe both as it has striven to be a part of Europe and as it has sought to differentiate itself from Europe. Even as the contours of Turkey's Otherness in relation to Europe have been continuously reconstructed in relation to political developments (Ertuğrul and Yılmaz 2017), this position remains a defining feature of the relationship between the two entities. That Europe is both an object of desire and of criticism is reflected in the Turkish media's simultaneous praise for European values and criticism of the EU for not upholding these values. A similar ambivalence exists towards the deal in the European

media. For example, in their analysis of the coverage of the refugee crisis in the Greek, German, and British press, Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti (2016) find that the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal was one of the leading topics in European media in 2016 and show that the interpretation of the deal as a necessary agreement indicates skepticism against Turkey in relation to whether the agreement will actually be implemented. Similar to the way the deal was covered in the Turkish media, in the European press the deal was often framed as "controversial," and its legal basis was questioned (Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti 2016, 273-275). Sharp criticisms of European migration politics similar to those in the Turkish-language coverage of the deal can be found in European media as well. *Deutsche Welle*, for example, quoted Imogen Sudbury from the International Rescue Committee labelling the deal as "a stain on EU rights record" (Wesel 2021). The Turkish case shows how such globally echoing criticisms of EU migration policy were constructed in the periphery of Europe through local frameworks such as the expression of "bargaining." This critical depiction from the margins of Europe helped emphasize the transactional nature of the agreement and provided a critical approach to the deal.

Constructing the Idea of Europe from its Periphery

When referring to the "Refugee Deal," the Turkish-language news media have constructed Europe as a place where human rights are at once protected and violated, also framing the negotiation process as "a bargain" in which both sides have neglected the rights of the displaced. Europe has been depicted as having failed its idealized image and humanistic principles. Due to its bureaucratic inefficiency, the EU has been described as lacking adequate planning in implementing the agreement, while Turkey has been portrayed as having been deceived by a seemingly cunning EU, for example when it comes to the level of compensation it would receive, which many in the Turkish media deemed to be insufficient in return for such large sacrifices.

The ways in which Europe has been defined from its periphery demonstrates not only that the very idea of Europeanness is not static but also that its core is challenged precisely by its periphery. Indeed, this conceptualization of what it means to be "European" shifts according to different perceptions of Europe, and these perceptions are influenced by the political contexts from which they emanate. Turks have long been perceived as "Other" in Europe, and this perception has helped Europeans unite. Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987, but the process has still not reached a conclusion. In effect, Europe has excluded Turkey institutionally and discursively, although it remains a candidate for EU membership. Yet, from its peripheral position, Turkey has induced some questioning and shaping of the very idea of Europe (Morozow and Rumelili 2012), challenging various assumed binaries such as Global South/Global North, East/West, and center/periphery. The critical coverage of the 2016 Turkey-EU Deal by Turkish language-media parallels Turkey's role as an external challenger of Europe in the political arena (Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva 2022). Turkey has, for example, questioned the legitimacy of European political presence in Africa and the Balkans on ethical grounds (Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva 2022, 1824).

Turkey's peripheral position might well be the source of its ability to pose such challenges. Contrasting with the institutional memory politics of the EU that is shaped by an amnesia of the colonial and imperial past of Europe (Sierp 2020), Turkey recalls Europe's colonial history as it disputes European politics (Aydın-Düzgit and Noutcheva 2022). Such voices from the margins of Europe could help reevaluate the idea of Europe and whether an inclusive Europeanness can be imagined that does not build itself on imagining the actors outside of its core as potential threats (Rumelili 2004).

Note: All translations from Turkish are by the author.

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PART II

The European Union Impact and Understanding Seen from its Outside and Periphery

Introduction

Edina PALEVIQ[1]*, Mare USHKOVSKA*[2]*, and Sergio AGUILAR*[3]

The ways in which the European Union interacts with its member states and the countries outside the bloc as a supranational political power can be analyzed at different levels: internal, regional, and global. In this book that aims to decentralize knowledge production about Europe, this section assembles works by Global South/Global East authors to incorporate perspectives and expertise from outside the EU. The three chapters that follow add value by presenting diverse external perceptions of Union politics and functioning and by casting new light on issues the EU has had to face recently.

Since the 1990s, the EU has sought to play a more assertive role in global affairs and has come to be recognized as an important actor in the international community. However, as its goals have expanded, so have challenges. Central to these contemporary concerns are the integration of the bloc, the enlargement process, and the role of the EU in European and international security. The authors in Part II tackle these interconnected issues from multiple angles and illustrate how the EU's internal cohesion impacts its external influence by addressing the efficacy of the EU's conditionality in the enlargement process, the dynamics and challenges of the transference of power from national to Union institutions, and finally the evolution of EU's military operations and missions overseas. Edina Paleviq examines the effectiveness of EU conditionality in Montenegro's EU accession process, arguing that, after almost two decades, "Europeanization" has failed at producing successful results beyond the mere norm adoption phase. Mare Ushkovska then discusses contemporary internal EU dynamics, explaining the dissonance that exists among EU member states in the final stage of European integration by a clash of worldviews among the populations of member states. Finally, Sergio Aguilar considers the reality of EU peace operations, arguing that the Union constantly adapts its overseas engagement in response to changes in both internal and external environments and the challenges these contexts pose.

The three chapters in this section present diverse methodological approaches. Paleviq combines a normative and empirical process, as she tests the EU's external demands (rule adoption) through the content of rules and laws in the judicial sector and freedom of expression, at the same time as she discusses routine issues visible in the media and

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reports by non-governmental organizations about implementation. Ushkovska uses the quantitative descriptive method and interpretative quantitative method to analyze social patterns and attitudes inside member states that may be associated with contemporary Euroskepticism. Finally, Aguilar grounds his qualitative analysis on insights from complexity theory and quantitative data to discuss how EU military operations and missions respond and adapt to changes in their operating environment.

This part of the book addresses the EU from three interconnected perspectives: as a bloc (focusing on internal dynamics and cohesion), as a normative power (considering its influence on candidate states), and as a player in the international security system (analyzing its influence as a global power). Importantly, these chapters explore EU policy processes based on their outcomes, rather than on their proposed commitments. Furthermore, together they address an array of internal challenges: the lack of enlargement credibility in the EU; the sources of contemporary internal contestations about the EU's values, multiculturalism, and immigration policy; and the difficulties the EU has encountered in accomplishing its ambitions in the international security field.

The topics covered provide useful insights, as the chapters navigate through the EU political and social context and emphasize dynamics that operate not only within the EU but also in its relation with its outside and periphery. The three chapters capture up-to-date accounts of some of the latest developments in conditionality, integration, and military actions abroad. In addition, they provide wide-ranging sub-themes relating to the public's distrust toward the EU, the lack of consensus among EU member states, values and policy priorities in the European project, the credibility of EU projects, and the capacity of the EU to make a difference abroad. Finally, the authors in this part of the book offer a diverse knowledge base that is balanced and informative in their attempt to shed light on the EU from an outside.

3 Confronting Rule Adoption and Implementation in Montenegro's Europeanization

Edina PALEVIQ[1]

Abstract: Montenegro is a frontrunner in the EU accession process, and yet it is stagnating and even backsliding in terms of democracy and the rule of law. A question arising is whether the EU's conditionality—under its new methodology, known as the "new approach"—regulating the EU accession process effectively strengthens democratic institutions there. This chapter argues that so far this approach has not worked successfully in Montenegro beyond the norm adoption phase for three main reasons: a lack of clarity about EU conditionality, the presence of long-ruling elites, and a specific national political culture. Through Europeanization theories, this research tests two areas in rule of law promotion: judiciary reform and freedom of the press. Based on a normative approach, the content of rules and laws in the judicial sector and freedom of expression are studied to challenge the EU's external demands (rule adoption) empirically, by discussing the regular obstacles mentioned in the media and in reports by non-governmental organizations (implementation). In particular, the political and social context in which these dynamics operate is emphasized. Conclusions show that, while EU conditionality has brought an undeniably positive change in Montenegro and has successfully led to the adoption of new laws, implementing democratic institutions remains arduous since political elites overshadow integration. At the same time, checks and balances have eroded in the face of unpunished abuse of power. The study speaks to debates on Europeanization and ways to strengthen the rule of law along with EU standards in candidate member states and provides useful solutions to the failures of EU conditionality.

Montenegro is a small European, Mediterranean country located on the Balkan Peninsula, which does not often appear at the forefront of international news, except in 2017 when US President Donald Trump inconsiderately pushed past former Montenegrin Prime Minister Duško Marković at a NATO Summit. With an area of 13,812 square kilometers and approximately 650,000 inhabitants, Montenegro was part of the former Yugoslavia before the latter was dismantled in 1992. That year, Montenegro, Serbia, and the Kosovo province joined to become the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was further renamed in 2003 as Serbia (at the time, it included Kosovo, until that country declared its independence in 2008) and Montenegro. When in 2006 Montenegro became a fully independent state following a referendum, its government started to gear its foreign policy towards EU integration and full Union membership. Today, Montenegro is considered to be part of the "Western Balkan" (WB) countries, which includes Montenegro, Serbia,

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Kosovo, the Republic of North Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—all countries that hold a perspective for EU accession but are not yet EU members. In 2003, at a summit in Thessaloniki where the government representatives of the EU member states came together, the WB countries received assurance from the European Council that membership was on the horizon for them. However, over two decades have passed since the EU accession process has started in those countries. Moreover, over the years, the European Commission (EC) has proposed a number of enlargement methodologies for the WB, so that the credibility of an imminent EU membership is slowly diminishing in the region.

The Copenhagen criteria, established by the European Council in June 1993, outline the necessary conditions for countries to become EU members. These criteria are divided into three main categories: political policy, economic policy, and acceptance of the *acquis communautaire*. The political criteria are focused on institutional stability, as to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. The economic criteria demand the presence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Acceptance of the *acquis communautaire* involves the ability to take on the obligations EU membership entails, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. The *acquis* thus represents the main body of EU conditionality, as set by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993. It includes all rights and obligations that are binding on all EU member states, contained in the primary law of the EU treaties, secondary law—all legal acts, such as regulations and directives—and the judgments of the Court of Justice, as well as all international treaties on EU matters. The *acquis* is divided into up to 35 different "chapters" for the purpose of membership negotiations between the EU and a candidate country (33 for Montenegro). The progress made in the accession process is measured by the number of chapters that have been opened and provisionally closed. A chapter is "opened" when the European Commission (EC), together with a candidate country, scrutinizes each policy field with respect to the conditions lined up under that particular chapter. When the EC deems that the conditions have been met, the chapter can be "closed," which is an indicator of success for government officials in the candidate country. EU officials in the Directorate General for Enlargement and desk officers working in EU delegations in candidate countries monitor the implementation progress in each negotiation chapter throughout the year. Their evaluations are published by the EC as annual reports to show both improvements and remaining shortcomings in each candidate country. Furthermore, even when chapters are fully closed, membership is not necessarily guaranteed, as closed chapters may be reopened in the course of negotiations. Strictly speaking, the contents of the *acquis* aim at the "core goals" of Europeanization, such as the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law. The latter especially constitutes a key conditionality imposed on candidate countries.

In the WB, EU enlargement and the power of the EU to bring about transformation there or within the Union itself have increasingly been questioned. Although the WB countries have taken robust steps towards EU integration, there has been no concrete indication about when any of them could access membership. This stagnation has been two-sided and based on various factors. On the one hand, the EU has lacked the ambition

to make the changes necessary for new members to join. This shortcoming does not come as a surprise, since the Union has been marked by many crises in recent years, such as the financial and economic crisis, the migration and refugee crisis (Hobolt 2018), the rise of populism (D'Alimonte 2019) and Euroscepticism, EU disintegration (Rosamond 2019), and more recently the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Thus, among other issues, the capacity of the Union and its institutions to accept new members is likely to remain a problem in itself. On the other hand, the enlargement process has been hampered by the inability of the WB countries to meet the accession criteria set by the EU. And since "the EU is politically not ready to enlarge, while the prospective candidates are politically not ready to accede" (Economides 2020, 2), a dilemma has arisen, bringing uncertainty and raising doubts among decision-makers in the WB, with a number of them even turning their backs on the European path and preparing for other alternatives. In particular, powerful non-Western third party actors such as Russia, China, Turkey, and the Gulf states have been increasingly present in the region to support WB countries in various spheres, from economics to religion (see Prelec 2020). These circumstances may lead to changes in the balance of power among international actors and in geostrategic stability. While conditionality has been a long-standing aspect of EU accession processes, it is considered "new" in the context of this study due to its evolving application and the increasing emphasis on specific policy areas such as the judiciary and freedom of expression in recent years. This evolution reflects a more nuanced and rigorous approach tailored to address contemporary challenges in candidate countries.

The main challenges currently facing the EU are the backsliding of democracy and the rule of law and human rights violations in parts of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), especially in Hungary and Poland (see Kapidžić 2020). This slipping back of democratic ideals has taken place despite the fact that the EU, through heavy conditions, induced various reforms and transformed the CEE accession candidates into modern EU member states (Gateva 2016). EU conditionality constitutes a set of rules and norms set by the EC for candidate countries to implement as a pre-condition to membership. These rules and norms are key instruments through which the EU has sought to foster the promotion of human rights, democratization, and "good governance," as well as improve democratic reforms, the market economy, and legal structures in candidate countries. The relapse in democratic values has been observed in the CEE but also WB countries. The effects of EU conditionality on candidate states have been criticized in both CEE (Dallara 2014; Magen and Morlino 2009) and WB countries. Researchers have argued that promoting the rule of law has only led to superficial reforms in the WB (Elbasani and Šabić 2018) and that formal and informal political leaders have continued to control the state and maintained their private economic interests and grip on political power (Kmezić 2017; Dallara 2014).

Building on these critiques about WB countries in general, this chapter assesses the effectiveness of EU conditionality in Montenegro, focusing in particular on the effectiveness of the EU's "new approach" in strengthening the rule of law. This new methodology, which prioritizes chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom, and security)—known as the "fundamental chapters" for their critical role in the accession process—mandates that these chapters be the first to be opened and the last to be closed in

EU accession negotiations. Montenegro currently ranks higher than all other WB countries in meeting EU accession standards, thus providing a significant case study for evaluating the impact of these reforms. This chapter engages in the ways in which this new strategy might strengthen the rule of law in Montenegro but argues that, so far, conditionality has not worked successfully beyond the norm adoption phase. In reality, institutions and legislations have been harmonized, in line with EU norms, in areas such as the rule of law, human rights, and freedom of expression, but major problems have emerged in implementation. At fault are a lack of clarity in EU demands but also a lack of genuine dedication to reforms on the part of Montenegrin political leaders, who do not have a sincere and principled commitment to Europeanization, which they use instead as a pretext for political gain. These leaders have indeed benefitted from their long-ruling presence, which has created a specific national political culture that hinders the implementation and internalization of EU values and norms across Montenegrin society.

The WB countries that expect EU accession are often lumped together in the literature on Europeanization, but there has been a dearth of studies specifically devoted to Montenegro's accession process. Moreover, scholars have undertheorized the relationship between the effort of the EU to strengthen democracy and the rule of law through its conditionality and implementation in the WB candidate countries. This study focuses on Montenegro as the front-runner in the accession process to test two areas in the promotion of the rule of law: judiciary reform under Chapter 24 and freedom of expression under Chapter 23 of the *acquis communautaire* (*acquis*), i.e., the negotiation chapters. Chapter 24 covers different dimensions of organized crime—such as human and drug trafficking—terrorism, borders and Schengen-based rules, migration, asylum, judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, and customs and police cooperation. Chapter 23 covers the judiciary, the fight against corruption, and fundamental rights—including freedom of expression and the rights of EU citizens. For negotiations about EU accession to begin, candidate countries must show that these freedoms and rights are present domestically. The areas covered in chapters 23 and 24 are also usually reviewed in the European Commission progress reports, where the rule of law performance lag—which measures the fundamental aspects of institutions such as the independence of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and organized crime, and the freedom of expression—is regularly highlighted. By focusing on Montenegro, this chapter also contributes to the discussion on Europeanization and the strengthening of the rule of law along EU standards in other new candidate member states. It paves the way for further research on the credible future of EU enlargement. Indeed, analyzing the experience of Montenegro independently from that of other WB countries provides useful solutions to the failures of EU conditionality overall.

Drawing from two Europeanization theories, namely rationalist institutionalism (which sees Europeanization as driven by the EU) and constructivist institutionalism (which sees Europeanization as driven by candidate states), this study highlights the gap between rule adoption and implementation to show that there is a lack of commitment on both the EU's and Montenegro's side; this gap has caused stagnation in Montenegro's integration process. Furthermore, the demonstration combines two methodological

threads. First, based on rationalist institutionalism, the normative approach is used to analyze the content of the rule of law in both the judicial sector and freedom of expression to test the EU's external requirements for rule adoption. Second, based on constructivist institutionalism, the chapter empirically evaluates the ways in which rules are implemented and internalized through an examination of national media content and reports by non-governmental organizations on the integration process.

A Conceptual Analysis

The term "Europeanization" was first used in the 1980s and since then has usually described the impact of European integration and governance on EU member states (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Treib 2014). Since the 1990s, when the EU began to promote general principles of political order such as democracy, human rights, and a functioning rule of law in post-communist countries (Lavenex 2004, 695), the concept has gained popularity among Europeanists. The transfer of EU general principles has led to the further use of the concept of Europeanization within candidate countries and the rise of a separate sub-field in Europeanization research. This new realm of inquiry has entailed an examination of the EU's influence on national domestic politics in candidate (and potential candidate) countries and of the instruments the EU uses to promote rule compliance there.

Thus, the concept of Europeanization has been used to measure the influence of the EU on domestic politics in both member states and candidate countries. At times, it has also been understood as a short cut for modernization (Hood 1998). In this sense, it is the *outcome* of transformation processes that is being measured in a particular country's policies or institutions. Moreover, Europeanization has also been described as the process of rule adaption and a framework for domestic interactions in individual countries. In line with these approaches, Europeanization is understood here as a politically driven process in which EU institutions, rules, and policy-making influence domestic legal systems, institutional mechanisms, and the formation of a collective cultural identity in EU candidate states. One core requirement of Europeanization rests on the commitment to adopt the *acquis*. While full implementation and enforcement of the *acquis* occur during the accession negotiations, national government bodies must demonstrate a willingness to align their policies with EU criteria as part of the candidacy process.

During the previous enlargements of 2004 and 2007, EU conditionality brought about great progress in the effectiveness of governance in CEE countries. Nevertheless, problems such as corruption and organized crime came to light after some countries gained membership. For example, Romania's and Bulgaria's accession highlighted the challenges of ensuring sustained rule of law reforms, as both countries faced significant difficulties in addressing corruption and the lack of judicial independence, which persisted post-accession. These hurdles led the EU to implement the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) to monitor and support reforms by providing a structure for the continuous evaluation of progress made on these issues. This new tool underscored the

importance of maintaining rigorous oversight even after formal accession to ensure that the foundational principles of the EU are upheld (Carp 2014). After the creation of the CVM, the concept of the rule of law began to take on a different meaning throughout the Union because it has had to be applied to different legal systems in member states where democratic values developed at different rates. Moreover, crises emerged around the idea of the rule of law within the Union itself, and the EU became divided over fundamental values. For example, the situation in Hungary and Poland has profoundly impacted the enlargement of the EU in the WB based on concerns over the erosion of democratic norms and the rule of law. Both countries have faced criticism for their governments' attempts to undermine judicial independence, restrict the freedom of the media, and weaken checks and balances (Dominguez and Sanahuja 2023; Razin and Sadka 2023), in contradiction with the Union's fundamental value and in conflict with EU institutions. The term "enlargement fatigue" (Szołucha 2010) has even spread among Europeanists to explain that the EU is no longer ready—nor able—to accept new members; this fatigue could in turn overwhelm EU processes and institutions while also undermining the economic prospects of the Union. Additionally, many member states have expressed dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the *acquis.* The fact that the WB countries have not historically upheld the rule of law has hindered the expectation that previous *acquis* conditions could effectively transform the process of Europeanization in these countries. Hence for the first time, the EU Council deemed the rule of law to be fundamental to the accession process for WB countries, a departure from its strategy in previous enlargements.

In 2011, in response to difficulties in Romania and Bulgaria, the EU Commission adopted the "new approach" that foresees that Chapter 23, which focuses on "Judiciary and Fundamental Rights," and Chapter 24, which focuses on "Justice, Freedom, and Security," will be opened early in membership talks. The new approach also mandates the EU Commission to monitor the assumed obligations and track the record of candidate states in these two areas during the entire negotiation process, also mandating that negotiations can only end when chapters 23 and 24 have been closed (Wunsch 2018). The overall pace of the talks is, thus, determined by the progress made on these two chapters (Nozar 2012). It is understood that the issues these two chapters cover "should be tackled in the accession process and the corresponding chapters opened accordingly based on action plans, as they require the establishment of a convincing track record" (European Commission 2011, 5). The new approach extends the negotiation process on chapters 23 and 24 and introduces for the first time interim benchmarks in addition to the existing opening and closing benchmarks. The interim benchmarks are linked to key elements of the *acquis*. Generally, opening benchmarks entails key preparatory steps for future alignment—such as strategies and action plans—and for the fulfillment of contractual obligations that mirror *acquis* requirements. In contrast, closing benchmarks focuses on legislative measures, administrative or judicial bodies, and the implementation of the *acquis.* The interim benchmarks added in the case of WB countries aim to further guide the reform process and keep it on track. They are designed to ensure continuous and verifiable progress, focusing on how well new institutions function, how independent the judicial system is, and how effective anti-corruption measures are. Unlike traditional

benchmarks that only set start and end points, interim benchmarks provide measurable indicators of progress at various stages of the negotiation process (Tilev 2020; Blockmans 2014). This ensures that reforms are not simply initiated but also sustained and effectively implemented. Furthermore, for the first time, local stakeholders and civil society organizations are involved in the negotiations and their monitoring, which enhances transparency and accountability and ensures that reforms are rooted in the local context.

By the time the new methodology had been adopted in 2011, Croatia was already in the process of concluding negotiations and preparing to sign its accession treaty. Therefore, it was too late to implement the new approach and firmly anchor the rule of law there. Since Montenegro had been at the time only in the process of opening negotiations, in effect it became the first candidate country to negotiate with the EU under the new approach (Wunsch 2018). By 2020, all 33 chapters of the *acquis* that applied to Montenegro would be opened, and three were even provisionally closed. However, the pace of negotiations has been slow since 2017, with no additional chapters closing.

Theoretical Approaches to Europeanization for the Implementation of the Rule of Law

Europeanization is not in itself a theory; it is a phenomenon, which a number of theoretical approaches have sought to explain (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfenning 2015). The theoretical perspectives often used in Europeanization studies have defined the various mechanisms by which the EU influences and places conditions on candidate countries to meet EU requirements. Scholars analyzing the accession process of CEE countries have distinguished between two main explanations of the mechanisms of Europeanization (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Europeanization can be driven on the one hand by the EU and on the other hand by domestic factors. Furthermore, when candidate countries adapt to EU norms, they do so based on two institutional logics: the "logic of consequence," which derives from "rationalist institutionalism," and "the logic of appropriateness," which emanates from "constructivist institutionalism" (March and Olsen 1989, 160-162).

Rationalist institutionalism, often referred to as "rational institutionalism," focuses on the impact of EU conditionality on candidate countries and addresses how clearly these conditions are articulated. This theoretical approach assumes that rational actors engage in strategic interactions to maximize their power, utility, and welfare under given circumstances. Moreover, the "logic of consequence" indicates that the candidate countries' cost-benefit calculations can be manipulated by the EU through external incentives. Thus, the EU sets rules and norms, which candidate countries must adopt; and the primary strategy through which the EU enforces the adoption and implementation of these rules and norms in target countries is "reinforcement by reward" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Research on the effectiveness of conditionality in CEE and WB countries has shown that rationalist institutionalism based on the "logic of consequence"

has not been successful at solving problems arising in the area of the rule of law. Many factors have reduced the overall credibility of conditionality as a path to membership: determinacy of EU conditions, the speed of reward (EU membership), the domestic cost of adopting EU rules, as well as the role of veto players, such as private and public domestic actors. The second mechanism—constructivist institutionalism—is based on the "logic of appropriateness" and focuses on "norm socialization," which leads both the government and the general population in the candidate country to positively identify with the EU and consider the rules promoted by the EU as legitimate and appropriate. Constructivism, in this context, entails the mutual construction of identities through interaction. Thus, all domestic actors are likely to openly accept behavioral changes and internalize EU norms through "social learning" and through the development of multiple soft skill mechanisms, which include intergovernmental interactions and transnational processes involving societal actors. Therefore, Europeanists have posited that the constructivist model is more functional that the rationalist model, as it leads candidate countries to better integrate by successfully transforming their institutions and changing the mentality of domestic actors, with long-lasting effects on society (Checkel 2005; Elbasani 2013; Keil 2013). However, the two approaches must influence each other in order for the transformation to materialize. Diagram 1 conceptualizes how rationalist institutionalism—a top-down approach where rules are set by the EC—combines with constructivist institutionalism. It shows that both approaches impact each other and lead candidate countries to not only meet but also internalize EU conditions at the national level, hence reaching the standards set by the EU.

Diagram 1. The Europeanization Process



Source : The author

Discrepancies often emerge between the planning, adoption, implementation, and evaluation phases of new measures. The benchmarks set by the EC at the very beginning of the negotiations are often not sufficiently concrete to help a candidate country meet those demands. The limited availability of clear and unambiguous rules—i.e., the "hard *acquis*," which includes interim benchmarks—makes it difficult for candidate countries to identify precisely which reforms they need to adopt. This is especially true under Chapter 23, which focuses on "Judiciary and Fundamental Rights."

Montenegro must meet 83 interim benchmarks: 45 under Chapter 23 and 38 under Chapter 24. Closing these chapters' overall benchmarks can only happen once the interim benchmarks have been satisfactorily met. To meet the conditions set by the EU, Montenegro has prepared strategic and action plans, which were approved by the EC. However, the fulfillment of EU conditions and benchmarks can best be achieved through "social learning." According to this constructivist approach, social actors, such as domestic stakeholders, decision makers, and civil society, are all involved in accession negotiations, in a bottom-up approach that ensures that the rules of the EU correspond to what people want domestically and that the policies that comply with EU rules are sound.

The Essence of the EU Rule of Law Conditionality

Alongside the principles of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and human rights, the rule of law is defined in Article 2 of the EU Treaty. Operationally, the rule of law is a central dimension in four distinct core areas of EU identity and activity (Magen 2016):

1. It is a fundamental value upon which the Union itself is founded;
2. it is a requirement of trust essential to the functioning of the internal market, along with freedom, security, and justice;
3. it is a significant element of the way in which the EU engages with the world and envisages its role as a global actor; and
4. it is a key criterion of eligibility for EU membership.

Functionally, the rule of law performs two main tasks. First, it ensures that people in positions of power exercise this power within the restrictive framework of well-established public norms, rather than in an arbitrary, *ad hoc,* or purely discretionary manner. Second, the rule of law manages and coordinates citizens' behaviors and activities (Tamanaha 2012). For the rule of law to be effective and long-lasting, not only must institutions be independent from the executive branch, but society as a whole—all citizens, including the elites in power—must internalize and identify with the law. To reach this goal, procedures must be as transparent as possible; laws must be public and easy for citizens to access. Furthermore, laws should be explicit, clear, and prospective, rather than retroactive. Moreover, the drafting of laws must follow known, clear, and stable rules (Magen 2016).

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the rule of law and fundamental rights have been increasingly the focus in the EU, particularly for integration. Citizens now expect their government to ensure the conditions for a safe and prosperous living environment, where their rights are protected not only against crime but also against state authorities themselves. The rule of law has been considered an important tool to fight corruption and poverty, address democratic dysfunctions, and avoid or stop ongoing conflicts. Three conditions must be met for the rule of law to emerge: the judicial system must work effectively; organized crime and corruption must be absent; and fundamental rights must be respected (Nozar 2012). However, there is a fundamental historical difference in how the rule of law has developed in post-communist and Western European countries. While in most European countries the rule of law emerged conceptually before democracy did (Fleiner and Basta 2009; Pech 2009), in post-communist countries, it came about only in the mid-1990s, so that these countries found themselves simultaneously adopting democracy and a liberalized market economy. During that time, the harsh political and economic situation in some of the WB countries created an environment that allowed for the development of criminal networks, for example those focused on cigarette smuggling or drug and human trafficking. Economic gains made through illegal markets were slowly invested in the licit economy through money laundering. Today, organized crime, corruption, and nepotism have remained prevalent in WB societies. Moreover, judicial administrations in these countries are often staffed with people who have served in previous regimes, and thus the system lacks efficiency (Nozar 2012). Whereas conditionality may produce successful results in countries with long democratic traditions and independent institutions, it may not have the same effect in countries in transition.

Reforming the Judiciary in Montenegro

The EC's yearly reports account for almost all the obstacles to judicial independence, freedom of expression, and organized crime and corruption in Montenegro. The purpose of the "new approach," based on Chapter 23 "Judicial and fundamental rights" and Chapter 24 "Justice, freedom and security," is to assist the country in engaging complex reforms from the beginning of the accession process. Apart from technical aspects, such as capacity building and legislative alignment, the closing of these two chapters would require Montenegro to prove a track record of fighting organized crime and high-level corruption. However, Montenegro has shown to be deficient in its judiciary reforms and in protecting the freedom of expression.

Analyzing reforms pertaining to the judiciary in Montenegro is key to understanding how the new approach has played out there. A functioning judiciary underlies the idea of a modern state, as it is a fundamental principle and integral element of all liberal democracies and democracy building. Montenegro has strived to start the process of EU integration as effectively as possible. Therefore, the introduction of judiciary legislation and fundamental rights in Montenegro, as well as regulations on justice, freedom, and security that abide by EU rules have led to positive evaluations by the European

Commission. The pressure of EU conditionality has indeed yielded improvements in Montenegrin legislation, as the government has passed laws and established formal institutional frameworks in line with EU rules; however, Montenegro has been unable to extinguish certain issues within the judiciary since EU standards for judiciary reforms emphasize the rule of law, judicial independence, and robust anti-corruption measures. Candidate countries must ensure transparent, accountable, and politically unbiased judicial institutions as part of the Copenhagen criteria (Kmezić 2019), which Montenegro has not done.

After Montenegro's independence in 2006, Montenegrin institutions started incorporating stronger rule of law principles. For example, a judicial reform was effected between 2007 and 2012, setting out priorities for establishing a transparent employment and promotion system among judges on the basis of objectively measurable criteria. A new constitution was also adopted in 2007 to limit political control over the judiciary. A law was also passed to regulate judiciary officers' salaries and other earnings as well as the procedure followed by the state prosecutor's office. Furthermore, in the same year, a law was adopted to regulate how judges sitting on the Judicial Council are to be elected. The Judicial and Prosecutorial Council also adopted *The Rules of Procedure* in 2011, establishing clearer criteria for the appointment, dismissal, evaluation, and promotion of judges and prosecutors, as well as criteria for disciplinary proceedings concerning judges. In particular, the new constitution stipulates that the Parliament elects the Supreme State Prosecutor and four members of the Judicial Council (from among prominent lawyers) by a two-third majority (55 MPs) in the first electoral round and by an absolute majority (49 MPs) in the second round. However, achieving this majority can often take time because the parliamentary opposition has been divided.

Individuals holding long-term judiciary positions represent another concern in Montenegro (European Commission 2020). For example, the President of the Supreme Court, Vesna Medenica, was greatly criticized by non-governmental organizations when the Judicial Council elected her for the third time in elections that were deemed unconstitutional because they violated Article 124 (5) of the Constitution that limits that function to two terms (Centre for Civic Education 2019). The EC explained that:

> The decision of the Judicial Council to reappoint seven court presidents, including the President of the Supreme Court, for at least a third term raises serious concerns over the Judicial Council's interpretation of the letter and the spirit of the Constitutional and legal framework, which limits those appointments to maximum two terms to prevent over-concentration of power within the judiciary (European Commission, 5).

As a result, Vesna Medenica, who is considered to be the most powerful woman in Montenegro, resigned from her position after a thirteen-year tenure (Vijesti, June 04, 2021).

In Montenegro, the same ruling party has been in power since 1991. The government's leaders who are part of this group have been able to undermine the consolidation of independent judicial institutions and maintain control over public administrations, the media, and the electoral process while pursuing their own interests, which include remaining in power (Džankić and Keil 2019, 193). In 2012 and 2019, there were several election-related corruption scandals in the country, known as the "Tape Recording Affairs." These scandals involved leaked recordings of conversations between members of the ruling party. The first recording was released at the beginning of 2013 and exposed Zoran Jelić, the Director of the Employment Agency. On the tape, he is heard promising jobs to four people in exchange for their votes in favor of the ruling party (Democratic Party of Socialists, DPS) (Janković, March 07, 2017). Although the Parliament asked the state prosecutor to investigate the affair, the inquiry did not result in the prosecution or conviction of those responsible for the corruption. The court's decision led the largest governmental coalition to boycott parliamentary sessions in protest. Nonetheless, the ruling party won the 2012 parliamentary elections (MANS 2013, 18). In the end, instead of a conviction, Zoran Jelić was promoted to the State Audit Institution, while his wife replaced him at the Employment Agency. Another tape recording scandal, known as the "Envelope Affair," emerged in 2019 when a video clip was posted on social media showing Duško Knežević, one of Montenegro's richest businessmen who owns Atlas Bank and represents Djukanović's ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, handing the former mayor of Podgorica an envelope containing 97,000 Euros before the parliamentary elections of 2016. Since this donation was not mentioned in the party's final campaign report, a lawsuit against the president and chief prosecutor was initiated based on suspected money laundering; it was also suspected that the protagonists intended to form an organized crime group. Although this case would require an independent and effective institutional response, to date, there has been no further development in the judicial follow-up of the alleged misuse of public funds for political party purposes.

On the one hand, these two scandals caused citizens to gradually lower their expectations about the likelihood of a fair judiciary, and this distrust has been evidenced by nationwide surveys conducted by the Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM). In 2020, only 39.7 percent of citizens said they trusted the judiciary, dropping from 41.9 percent in 2019 and 42.5 percent in 2018 (CEDEM 2020). On the other hand, what these scandals also revealed is the level of corruption still existing at the heart of judicial institutions and the strong legacy of communist rule in the administrative sector in terms of abuse of power—under the communist regime, the executive traditionally dominated the judiciary (Kmezić 2017). The uniqueness of Montenegrin social heritage and traditions, which are still anchored in the tribal-Achaean model of identity founded on kinship, constitutes a favorable terrain for the condoning of corrupt behavior. This context is influenced by the history of a certain collective political identity in ancient Greece, where intense rivalries and tribal affiliations gradually led to a broader sense of unity and political structure (see Economou 2020; Blackburn 2012). Similarly, in Montenegro, social connections among citizens remain influenced by the country's history as a tribal society, of which some traits persist, leading to interactions being often perceived through the tribal lens.

Individuals are not seen solely as individuals but as members of a family or a tribe, and they are recognized through their surname (see Batrićević 2023; Simic 2019). These deep-rooted tribal affiliations, local loyalties, and kinship traditions can overshadow national laws and ethics, shaping social and political dynamics and enabling the acceptance of corrupt practices. Indeed, kinship networks play a crucial role in social and economic interactions in Montenegro. The immediate or extended family often functions as a primary support system, providing assistance in times of need, for example to secure employment opportunities. This network is so influential that it can affect decision-making processes in both personal and professional spheres, as people may prioritize familial loyalty over merit or legal considerations. Throughout Montenegro's history, the tribal system has stood as a form of social organization in which each tribe, or "pleme," is an autonomous unit with its own leadership and territory. This system has fostered a sense of solidarity and mutual assistance among tribal members but also perpetuated rivalries and conflicts among different tribes (Cvijić 1922). Despite modernization, remnants of this system continue to influence contemporary Montenegrin society. These cultural features have shaped both institutional and non-institutional arrangements (Sedlenieks 2015) and hindered the fight against corruption and nepotism, making it difficult to build a merit-based employment system. Clearly, the EU determinacy has failed to account for Montenegrin socio-historical aspects and has focused instead on the technical capacities of the judiciary, such as judges' training or improvements in infrastructure (Mendelski 2013). The EU top-down approach, with its focus on institution building, has failed to sanction corrupt elites who have blocked the creation of a system that could foster citizens' trust in the law and institutions.

Freedom of Expression in Montenegro

Freedom of expression is a fundamental prerequisite for human rights and sustainable democratic development. According to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, freedom of expression represents the right of every individual to hold opinions without interference and to "seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of choice" (Global Freedom of Expression 2015). Since the EU has borrowed heavily from the Universal Declaration in its own texts, freedom of expression has also been part of its foundational values—as noted in Article 2 of the Treaty on the EU—and an important criteria candidate countries must fulfill to join the Union. In particular, freedom of expression is required for democracy, governance, and political accountability to improve. Under the "new approach," accession negotiations address freedom of expression under Chapter 23 (Judicial and Fundamental Rights), and media-related issues are raised under Chapter 10 (Information Society and Media).

Although the *acquis* does not clearly define the media landscape, the term generally pertains to the overall context in which media organizations operate, accounting for the types of media available (such as print, broadcast, and digital), the nature of ownership

and control of media outlets, the regulatory framework governing the media, and the conditions affecting media freedom and journalistic practices. The EC has put forward mechanisms to help candidate countries create an environment favorable to freedom of speech and to measure improvements in this area, for example through the assessment of whether investigative journalists risk external pressures. The EC also evaluates the extent to which professional journalistic organizations can dialogue with the authorities on relevant sectoral issues. These measurable objectives are then combined with tangible benchmarks, which gauge various other elements:

- The legislation affecting the media;
- Statements made by public officials resulting in the media self-censoring;
- Physical attacks, threats, and other forms of intimidation toward journalists; or
- The transparent delivery of state aid and financial assistance by state-owned enterprises to the media (European Commission 2014).

Montenegro has guaranteed pluralism in its legal framework to enhance freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the development of free media. The 2007 Montenegrin constitution also guarantees freedom of expression in the spoken and written word, images, and any other medium. The constitution has not only protected the freedom of the press but has further prohibited censorship and guaranteed that people have access to information. It has outlawed imprisonment as punishment for libel and ensured a high level of protection for the media, committing Montenegrin institutions to interpreting laws in light of European human rights standards. But in reality, governmental authorities have continued to insult and harass the media and professional journalists. This hostility has been exacerbated by a lack of efficiency in judicial processes, which frequently fail to protect journalists and effectively prosecute perpetrators of crimes against journalists (Trpevska and Micevski 2018). Most attacks targeting independent or pro-opposition journalists and professionals (Kajošević 2021) have remained unresolved cases, which has challenged EU integration. For example, Vijesti's investigative reporter Olivera Lakić was shot in the foot in front of her house in Podgorica in 2018 in an attempted murder. The attack likely stemmed from her report providing incriminating information that threatened powerful interests. The police identified nine members of a criminal gang in 2019 as the culprits, but no formal charges were ever filed. Such attacks show how journalists in Montenegro are intimidated when investigating corruption or other sensitive topics. According to media reports, out of the 85 attacks perpetrated against journalists since 2004, more than two-thirds have resulted in unresolved investigations or no conviction.

In addition, ownership of the media is concentrated and lacks transparency in Montenegro, which raises concerns about plurality, diversity of viewpoints, and media political independence. In fact, media outlets are often politically controlled and influenced, which undermines their editorial independence and leads to biased reporting. This situation affects the overall quality of journalism and erodes public trust in media institutions. Social inclusiveness and pluralism in Montenegro's media landscape is also

limited by significant barriers preventing minorities and marginalized groups from fully participating and having their voices heard. The media regulatory framework is insufficient to address these risks effectively and ensure transparency in media ownership and editorial independence from political and economic pressures. The digital media landscape in Montenegro mirrors the traditional media environment, with similar issues of ownership concentration and political influence. The same risks affecting traditional media also impact digital media, highlighting the intertwined nature of these platforms (Manninen and Hjerppe 2021). The government in office at the time of writing has promised to strengthen the freedom of the press and improve conditions for the media and journalists. However, the legislation has not changed, and there has been no improvement in the investigation of violence against journalists so far. This attitude toward the media can be attributed to the legacy of 60 years of communist rule during which the regime had absolute control over the media (Jović 2008). When Montenegro became independent in 2006, the government focused fully on political reforms, but it has continued to use the same authoritarian mechanisms to exercise control over the media as those used before independence. Meanwhile, most media outlets have admitted to being at the service of the long-ruling party and to be affiliated with political and economic centers. Moreover, private media often take on a leading role in defamation campaigns against critics of the government (Nikočević and Uljarević 2019).

Effectiveness of EU Conditionality in Montenegro

Drawing on theories of Europeanization (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2006), this chapter has identified and explained the gap between the adoption and implementation of rule of law reforms in Montenegro in the face of EU accession conditionality. Despite the undeniable positive change brought about by conditionality in terms of aligning domestic legislation with the European *acquis* in Montenegro, the development of democratic institutions has remained arduous because political elites have overshadowed the integration process and checks and balances have eroded in the context of incidences of abuse of power that have remained unpunished. The Montenegrin political sphere still suffers from clientelism, as politicians are still influenced by personal acquaintances in their decision-making. Likewise, the highly politicized judicial system has shown deep-rooted corruption. Both clientelism and corruption have undermined the freedom of expression and the credibility of institutions, as the latter have remained weak and failed to solidify lasting judicial reforms during the pre-accession phase of EU membership negotiations.

In Montenegro, a strict application of the "new approach" to EU membership has sought to Europeanize the country. However, the conditions the EU has imposed on Montenegro have remained ambiguous, based on vague criteria, unclear membership promises, and administrative inefficiencies, which has made progress difficult to measure (Bonomi 2020). The level of corruption and organized crime in a social and political environment such as Montenegro's is difficult to evaluate. One solution may be to conduct

surveys to learn about the citizens' experiences with and perceptions of corruption, but people's political or sensitivity biases may influence survey results. Another option might be to analyze the existing legislative and institutional framework and decisions by law enforcement institutions to unveil whether the incidence of crime and corruption has increased or decreased. The introduction of the stricter new approach to EU membership has spread skepticism across Montenegrin society because of double standards in accession conditions. Since the new approach came into effect, the EU has demanded more from candidate countries than it had in the course of previous enlargements, so that candidate countries must now exhibit stronger levels of attainment than some of the current member states did at the time of their accession.

With increasing political integration within the Union itself, a small country such as Montenegro could be quickly integrated. Unfortunately, in contradiction with its own values about human rights and the rule of law, the EU has not held Montenegrin elites—who make use of pro-European rhetoric—accountable. As Montenegro seeks integration into the Union, this accountability should be strengthened through corrective measures, in particular when the elites violate the rule of law. Such measures would constitute an essential tool to also combat people's skepticism about the normative power of the EU in general.

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4 Beyond Populism
Sources of EU-Skepticism in the Visegrad Group

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Abstract: Within the European Union (EU), the Visegrad Group (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), known as the V4, has gained the reputation of being a troublemaker because of its opposition to further European integration. Scholars have studied sovereignism among the V4 countries—which is manifest in their EU-skepticism, anti-immigration stance, and political and social conservatism— predominantly on the premise that it stems from the influence populist parties and their leaders have exerted on domestic audiences. This chapter contends that recent sovereignist trends are better explained by the presence of grassroots-level discontent, as citizens' reservations toward the EU within the Group have emerged regardless of the rise of populist parties in the region. Through descriptive and interpretative quantitative methodologies, this research uses EU cross-national public opinion survey data to examine the political, social, and cultural contexts in which public attitudes toward European integration are shaped in the V4. Findings show that, although people there want to limit the power of the EU—in alignment with mainstream populist parties—they do not wish for their respective countries to leave the Union, realizing that the EU provides economic benefits. The study shows that people's rejection of immigration and multiculturalism does not depend on their support for right-wing populist parties, instead stemming from their perceived threat of terrorism and loss of national identity. Conclusions thus debunk the notion that it is the V4's populist parties that create an East-West divide in European values. Although Eastern Europeans are more conservative about social and political matters than Western Europeans, these attitudes are unrelated to party politics.

In 2016, Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared that "there is no free Europe without nation states" (Dunai 2016). Moreover, at an event to commemorate the Maastricht Treaty, former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker protested that "we won't exist as single nations without the European Union" (*Reuters* 2016). These quotes illustrate the divide among European Union leaders and those of several countries in Central Europe, which was particularly acute in the immediate aftermath of the migrant crisis but remains a pertinent political issue today. Although they once led the process of democratic transition following the fall of the communist system, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, and Poland—which joined the EU at the same time in 2004—gained the reputation of being "troublemakers" in the EU in the period

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following 2015 because of their nation-centric governments and rebellion against certain common EU policies (Kajánek 2022; Zalan 2021; Végh 2018). In these four countries—jointly known as the Visegrad Group, Visegrad Four, or V4 (Figure 1)—concerns over the future of European integration have developed over the past decade, as parties described as populist and Euroskeptic have become mainstream politically, often forming governments. This study inspects whether the positions of political leaders in the V4 countries regarding European integration correspond to the views of their respective populations.

Figure 1. The Visegrad Group in Europe

Source: The author (MapChart)

The Visegrad Group has operated as an informal coalition within the European Union. However, the four neighboring member states making up the group do not share the same positions on policy, and thus do not constitute a uniform bloc. For example, Slovakia joined the Eurozone, while the other three states have not; and V4 countries' foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation has differed. Yet, all four have cooperated based on their shared history, cultural values, and economic and security goals. Diplomatic intergovernmental cooperation among the V4 countries has developed out of a desire to amplify the four countries' respective voices within the EU and to join forces to promote their regional positioning.

Since at least three of the V4 states are smaller than many other European states, during the initial years of their EU membership, it was implied that they would accept the leadership of more established and larger Western member states and adjust to the

expectations that were set for them from the outside. However, over time, V4 leaders have become more vocal about EU policies, increasingly wishing to influence the future of the EU as a whole. The migrant crisis of 2015 exposed stark differences among member states, in particular when the V4 countries unilaterally opted to close their respective borders and refused to comply with top-down instructions coming from the European Commission about receiving the quota of migrants they were allocated. Furthermore, the political leadership in each of the V4 countries has resisted proposed plans to further cede sovereignty to EU institutions for the purpose of establishing common border control and immigration policies.

While the EU has worked toward normalizing common regimes and shared sovereignty and reducing state competences in several spheres, such as monetary and immigration policy (Keating 2008), political elites in the V4 countries have often been critical of these regimes, rejecting the idea of a federalist project led by "unelected bureaucrats" who impose "Western" values on populations in the V4 countries. Populists in these four nations have not, however, opposed the idea of European integration per se but rather the neo-liberal model the EU proposes. These populists have aimed to shape the EU from within, so that it remains true to what they believe was its initial function: a loose association of sovereign states collaborating on trade and economic matters. The EU, in turn, has accused the V4 countries—particularly Hungary and Poland—of "democratic backsliding."

Debates about recent nationalistic tendencies in the EU have predominantly relied on the premise that the ruling populist parties influence the general public. After all, it is evident that these parties enjoy significant public support in V4 countries and, in some cases, they have even won consecutive elections there. While a number of scholars have accepted this premise (Pirro and Van Kessel 2017; Guerra 2013; Kopecký and Mudde 2002), this chapter proposes the argument that such analyses are too simplistic because they do not account for intrinsic divergences in political cultures and value systems among different European societies, in particular when comparing established and newer EU member states. Therefore, it is both timely and relevant to investigate public attitudes in the Visegrad Group toward European integration and to unveil the extent to which people's political, social, and cultural attitudes align with the stances of their political leaders.

Scholars Blame it on the Populists

The EU has faced multiple crises in the past decade, starting with the Eurozone crisis, which was followed by the migrant crisis and Brexit. Academic debates about how these crises have affected public support for European integration have been fruitful, both from a theoretical (Rosamond 2019; Schimmelfennig 2018; Tosun, Wetzel, and Zapryanova 2014) and empirical perspective (Harteveld et al. 2018; Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia 2013). Initially, scholars explored the binary division between public approval

and disapproval of European unification and EU membership in general (McLaren 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Gabel 1998). Later, studies explored the multidimensional and policy-oriented aspects of people's attitudes toward integration (De Vries and Steenbergen 2013; Stöckel 2013; Boomgaarden et al. 2011). In their seminal work, Hobolt and De Vries (2016) differentiated between regime support (i.e., membership in the EU) and policy support, which they defined as "support for the content of collective decisions and actions taken by EU actors" (Hobolt and De Vries 2016, 416). This notable distinction has invited the question of whether Euroskepticism in the Visegrad Group means that people in those countries wish an exit from the European Union.

With the rise of nation-centric politics in EU member states in recent years, most texts on Euroskepticism have equated sovereignism with populism (Basile and Mazzoleni 2020; Kallis 2018**;** De Spiegeleire, Skinner, and Sweijs 2017), thus attributing the pushback against any incremental ceding of powers to the EU to the influence of populist parties. In the case of the V4 countries, scholars have indeed found links between populist parties, anti-EU narratives (Pirro and Van Kessel 2017; Guerra 2013; Kopecký and Mudde 2002), and the extent to which Euroskeptic publics vote for populist parties (Santana, Zagorski, and Rama 2020; Treib 2014; Werts, Scheepers, and Lubbers 2013; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007). However, scholars have disagreed about the nature of these links. While some scholars have argued that populist nationalism has been driven by an anti-establishment sentiment (Lovec et al. 2019), others have refuted this finding (Santana, Zagorski, and Rama 2020). Since Euroskeptic parties in the V4 countries have fared well in general elections, the question arises about whether these parties have triggered certain public attitudes vis-à-vis the EU, or vice-versa.

This chapter advances four hypotheses to investigate current patterns of public opinions in the V4 about the EU and national interests, the relationship between these opinions and support for populist parties in those countries, and the socio-political factors that drive contestation within the EU.

Hypothesis 1: Most V4 citizens oppose the transfer of additional policy-making powers to the EU and believe their respective countries would have a better future outside the EU.

Hypothesis 2: Greater support for populist parties in V4 countries is consistent with greater opposition to the transfer of additional policy-making powers to the EU.

Hypothesis 3: Increasing support for right-wing populist parties is consistent with increasingly negative opinions about migrants and religious minorities.

Hypothesis 4: People in V4 countries support conservative political and social positions more often than people in Western Europe do.

Scholars have commented on the cultural element of populism in the V4 Group: populists depict cosmopolitan values and multiculturalism as threats to national identities, which people previously had to defend from the influence of the Soviet Union (Krastev

2017). Although V4 countries have experienced negative net migration, receiving little inward migration, research has shown that negative attitudes toward immigration are good predictors of voting patterns there (Santana, Zagorski, and Rama 2020), because "what matters for cultural attitudes and electoral behavior is not just the number of migrants that [sic] arrive, but public perceptions of them…" (Norris and Inglehart 2019, 181). The conservatives in V4 countries have presented immigration as proof of the failure of Western "multiculturalism" and a threat to the perpetuation of the Christian world (Bluhm and Varga 2020). These parties commonly exploit citizens' belief that the EU threatens people's traditional values and cultural identities (Styczyńska 2017). Thus, scholars have held populist parties in the V4 responsible for the hostile response to the distribution of migrant quotas during the refugee crisis.

A notable development in the last decade has been the emergence of a new brand of conservatism in V4 countries, promoted by various political leaders, think tanks and intellectuals (Bluhm and Varga 2019; Buzogány and Varga 2018). This brand of conservatism opposes the political centrism and social liberalism typical of most Western European conservative parties. Political ideology in the V4 has aimed at establishing strong state autonomy and prioritizing national interests in decision-making. Proponents of social conservatism in the V4 have promoted the traditional family as the core of society, re-embracing religiousness and national identity, which they see as endangered by supranational entities (Bluhm and Varga 2020). Unlike proponents of Western conservatism, who favor small government and oppose interventionism, proponents of conservatism in the V4 blame the "weak" state for failing to effectively promote national interests (Buzogány and Varga 2018). They prefer a strong, centralized government and the pursuit of economic nationalism (Harmes 2012).

Hungary and Poland, where this type of conservatism is the most prominent, have been dubbed "illiberal democracies" by scholars and policy-makers. The political leadership in these two countries has challenged the norms, institutions, and principles of the EU, not because these leaders strive toward a schism from the rest of Europe but because they claim to stand for the real values of European civilization (Bluhm and Varga 2020). Recent scholarship has provided a variety of explanations for this "illiberal backlash:" a superficial understanding of liberal democratic values at the time of the transition from communism (Dawson and Hanley 2016; Bohle and Greskovits 2012; Krastev 2007); a decade-long history of authoritarianism that has impeded the development of a true liberal political culture (Wilkin 2018); the consequences of neoliberal capitalism (privatization, deregulation, and the dismantling of the welfare system) that have exacerbated social inequality (Bíró-Nagy 2017; Minkenberg 2013; Mudde 2007); and the increased political polarization and mainstreaming of populist parties (Stanley 2017; Enyedi 2016; Palonen 2009). While these factors may all have contributed to an erosion of democracy in the V4 countries, socio-political attitudes and values among citizens there have been overlooked as relevant factors.

Using Survey Datasets to Contextualize EU-Skepticism

In its treatment of survey data, this study relies on quantitative descriptive and interpretative quantitative methods. First, the descriptive method is used for bivariate analysis to characterize the views held by the population in the V4 countries and to assess patterns in those views using contingency tables and scatter plots. Then, interpretative analysis is used to explain attitudes that are not immediately apparent about complex, interdependent, and diverse socio-political factors associated with contemporary Euroskepticism. By integrating the two methods, this research extends knowledge in the study of Euroskepticism, as it both presents the central tendency and variability of public opinions and provides a detailed understanding of the socio-political environment through observation. Numerical data provide precise measurements from which conclusions are drawn about both particular cases and the region overall. However, while this positivist approach can address the circumstances influencing public opinions in the V4 countries about EU integration, it cannot explain the reasons behind those circumstances. The interpretative quantitative method enables statistics to be "used to shed light on the unobservable data generating processes that underlie observed data" (Babones 2016, 453). This research method has been validated because it focuses on the meaning of behavior in context (Gaskins 1994). Hence, it is particularly suitable to highlight the factors that have strongly influenced attitudes toward the EU in the V4 countries, beyond the influence of populist parties.

Data were collected from the following survey datasets:

- 2020 Standard Eurobarometer 93: Public Opinion in the European Union (henceforth "Eurobarometer 93");
- 2020 Special Eurobarometer 500: Future of Europe (henceforth "Eurobarometer 500");
- 2020 Politico Europe Poll of Polls (henceforth "Politico");
- 2019 Pew Research Center poll: European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism (henceforth "Pew Research Center");
- 2017 International Republican Institute Survey: Public opinion in Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia (henceforth "International Republican Institute," or IRI);
- 2017-2021 Joint Dataset of the European Values Study and World Values Survey (henceforth "European Values Study").

The use of primary data collected from multiple sources over four years adds value to this study in multiple ways. First, it helps reduce the impact of potential biases in individual surveys. Second, it makes it possible to explain trends in ways that looking at a single dataset would not permit. Third, comparing datasets produced over four years helps to establish consistency over time and reinforce the validity of the conclusions.

The Standard Eurobarometer is a biannual survey coordinated by the European Commission that analyzes attitudes of EU citizens about various policy areas. For the purpose of this research, the summer 2020 Standard Eurobarometer 93 and the special edition of the Eurobarometer on the "Future of Europe" were considered. The survey questions in those datasets are pertinent to understand the most recent views of V4 citizens on the state of the European Union and future European integration. Politico, as a leading news organization, has tracked and aggregated polling data for political parties in every country in Europe. A 2017 study by the International Republican Institute (IRI), a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization conducting polls in transition democracies in Europe, is particularly relevant as it is the only recent, large-sample public opinion survey focused on the Visegrad Group on questions of identity, politics, and relations with the EU. Similarly, the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan fact tank that conducts opinion polls and social science research, has produced a dataset allowing for a multi-country comparative analysis. Finally, the European Values Study is a unique, large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey sampling the opinions and values of adults across European countries.

Understanding Public Opinion about the EU and Societies in V4 Countries

Utilitarian Relationship with the EU (Hypotheses 1 and 2)

Respondents in the IRI poll indicated the loss of independence and sovereignty as one of the greatest costs of EU membership. Majorities in Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary believe that the EU is an association of sovereign states and that it has little connection to individual citizens, so that citizens' loyalty rests with their respective states rather than the EU. Poland is the only country where a plurality says that there should be loyalty to the EU because the EU grants rights and benefits to EU citizens. Poles express a high degree of attachment to the EU (Eurobarometer 93), as do large segments of the Hungarian and Slovak populations. Yet 63 percent of Czechs do not feel any attachment to the Union, accounting for the large standard deviation from the V4 mean (Table 1). Additionally, most Czechs and Slovaks are neutral about the EU, with over a third of them thinking the EU is a waste of funds.

Table 1: Attachment to and Trust in the EU in the V4 Countries

	Visegrad Group					
	Hungary	**Czechia**	**Slovakia**	**Poland**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**
Think citizens owe loyalty to the EU (%)	35	41	45	49	42.50	5.17
Think citizens owe loyalty to their respective states, not the EU (%)	51	56	54	42	50.75	5.36
Feel attachment to the EU (%)	70	35	59	73	59.25	14.94
Do not feel attachment to the EU (%)	28	63	40	25	39.00	14.95
Trust the EU (%) - *EB93*	53	35	45	56	47.25	8.14
Do not trust the EU (%) - *EB93*	40	56	46	32	43.50	8.76
Trust the EU (%) – *EVS*	41.4	25	53	45.5	41.23	10.25
Do not trust the EU (%) – *EVS*	53.4	69	44	47.6	53.50	9.56

Sources: International Republican Institute, Eurobarometer 93 and European Values Study

When it comes to trusting the EU, the Eurobarometer 93 reveals that opinions are split across the V4. The European Values Study paints a bleaker picture, as shown in Table 1: in three out of four V4 countries, distrust in the EU is more than thirteen percentile points higher than what is recorded in the Eurobarometer 93. Moreover, people in V4 countries express an even lower level of trust in their national institutions, indicating general skepticism about governing elites.

Therefore, it comes as a relative surprise that data from both the Eurobarometer 500 and the Pew Research Center show that a majority in all V4 countries sees EU membership as generally a positive thing. This favorable view has to do with citizens associating the EU with freedom of movement for people, goods, and services (Eurobarometer 93 2020). For 70 percent or more of citizens in all V4 countries, the two greatest benefits they get from the EU are the financial aid they receive and access to the common market and border-free travel (IRI 2017). Hence, economic considerations drive people's approval of the EU in part, with majorities across the V4 saying their national economies have been strengthened because of EU membership (Pew Research Center 2019). Exhibiting a utilitarian approach toward the EU, most respondents agree that the interests of their respective countries are best served by

maintaining strong relations with the EU (IRI 2017) and disagree that a better future outside the EU is possible (Eurobarometer 93 2020).

Table 2: Views on National Interests and the EU in V4

	Visegrad Group					
	Hungary	**Czechia**	**Slovakia**	**Poland**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**
Do not want more decisions taken at the EU level	63	75	73	69	70.00	4.58
Agree their country's interests are best served by maintaining strong relations with the EU (%)	61	46	63	69	59.75	8.47
Say EU membership has strengthened the national economy (%)	65	51	58	71	61.25	7.50
Do not think their country would have a better future outside the EU (%)	61	48	57	52	54.50	4.92
Think their country would have a better future outside the EU (%)	31	42	33	39	36.25	4.44

Sources: International Republican Institute, Pew Research Center and Eurobarometer 93

Overwhelmingly, citizens in all V4 countries reject that additional realms of decisions be placed under EU authority. A good number of respondents in Czechia and Slovakia would like to see fewer decisions made at the EU level within the next ten years. Those people say that they are in favor of the EU but do not support the way the EU has functioned until now. In contrast, most Hungarians and Poles prefer to preserve the existing arrangement rather than increase the powers of the EU (Eurobarometer 500 2020). Majorities in each country, however, agree that future global challenges will be best addressed if shared by national and EU-level governance (Eurobarometer 500 2020). Hypothesis 1, which states that "Most V4 citizens oppose the transfer of additional policy-making powers to the EU and believe their respective countries would have a better future outside the EU," is thus not supported by evidence. While it is true that people in the V4 do not favor increased EU powers, they also do not feel that the EU undermines national interests in V4 countries; instead, they believe that future collaboration between their respective states and the EU will be beneficial.

The question remains as to whether the opposition to the jurisdiction of the EU being expanded is related to the influence of populist parties. Table 3 presents the cumulative percentage of voters who have indicated a preference for one of these parties in Hungary (Fidesz and Jobbik), Czechia (ANO and SPD), Slovakia (OLANO, Sme Rodina, and

L'SNS), and Poland (PiS). The first observation is that, except in Hungary, majorities in V4 countries do not vote for populist parties. Hypothesis 2 states that "Greater support for populist parties in V4 countries is consistent with greater opposition to the transfer of additional policy-making powers to the EU." A scatter plot provides a visualization of the relation between the two variables and highlights that there is no positive relationship (Graph 1). In V4 countries where there is greater popular support for populist parties, people are less opposed to an increase in the decision power of the EU. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is also unsupported by the data.

Table 3: Percentage of Support for Populist Parties in V4 Countries

	Visegrad Group			
	Hungary	**Czechia**	**Slovakia**	**Poland**
Support populist parties (%)	56	36	28	34
Do not support populist parties (%)	44	64	72	66

Source: Politico

Graph 1: Relationship between support for populist parties and opposition to further transfer of decision-making powers to the EU



Source: The author

The Threat of Multiculturalism (Hypothesis 3)

Immigration is an acute concern in V4 countries, especially in the aftermath of the contentious 2015-2016 migrant crisis in Europe. In the V4 countries, views on immigration have been generally impacted by the fact that incoming migrants and

refugees are culturally and religiously different from the majority of the population there. The Pew Research Center survey reveals that, among all surveyed countries, the V4 countries have the largest percentage of respondents with an unfavorable view of Muslims (see Table 4). This finding starkly contrasts with results from several Western European countries, such as Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and France, where between 68 and 72 percent of respondents had a positive view of Muslims.

Table 4: Views on Globalization and Muslims in V4 Countries

	Visegrad Group			
	Hungary	**Czechia**	**Slovakia**	**Poland**
Have unfavorable view of Muslims (%)	58	64	77	66
See terrorism as the main threat to their way of life (%)	28	33	35	31
Think globalization has benefitted their family (%)	46	54	54	42
Think globalization has hurt their family (%)	54	46	46	31
Think globalization is an opportunity for economic growth (%)	70	58	47	63
Think globalization threatens their country's identity (%)	56	63	58	45

Source: Pew Research Center, International Republican Institute and Eurobarometer 93

Data from the same survey also show that, while support for (right-wing or centrists) populist parties corresponds to greater anti-Muslim sentiments in Western European countries, populist parties are not a determinant variable for this trend in V4 countries. As Graph 2 demonstrates, both supporters and non-supporters of populist parties in V4 countries have a highly unfavorable view of Muslims. For example, in Hungary and Czechia, majorities among both those who vote and do not vote for the governing parties Fidesz and ANO 2011 have this negative perception. Furthermore, in Slovakia and Poland, anti-Muslim sentiments are even more widespread among those who do not support populist parties.

Graph 2: Percentage of people who have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims in their country



Source: Pew Research Center

Graph 3 is a visual rendition of the relationship established in Table 3 between anti-Muslim sentiment and support for right-wing populist parties. Contrary to expectations, this graph shows a downward trend and negative correlation, which means that as people increasingly support populist parties, their views about Muslims are less negative. Such results can be explained by the data that show that majorities in all V4 countries have expressed unfavorable opinions of Muslims, whereas, with the exception of Hungary, populist parties have been supported by minorities. If the support, or lack thereof, for populist parties does not account for anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim opinions in V4 countries, the question then becomes, what other societal factors do?

Graph 3: Relationship between anti-Muslim sentiments and support for right-wing populist parties



Source: The author

The Eurobarometer 93 shows that, in 2020, leaders in all V4 countries identified immigration as the most important EU-related issue, while the economic situation was considered as most concerning by EU members as a whole. IRI survey data from 2017 also show immigration and terrorism in the EU as either the first or second greatest concern for people in V4 countries, implying a perceived link between increasing numbers of immigrants and an increase in terrorism. When the same survey asked what was most likely to threaten their way of life and their children's future, most respondents in Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia chose terrorism, extremism, and political violence. In Hungary, this response received the second largest share of support. The 2020 Eurobarometer on the Future of Europe supports these findings: while 20 EU member states listed either climate change or health risks as the main global challenges for the future of the EU, people in three out of four of the V4 countries pointed to terrorism as the greatest threat. Poland was an outlier with 50 percent of respondents choosing risks related to health as the main issue, likely influenced by the context of the coronavirus pandemic.

Graph 4: Relationship between anti-Muslim sentiments and perception of terrorism as the key threat to existing way of life



Source: The author

The upward trend line in Graph 4 illustrates that there is a positive correlation between people seeing terrorism as a main threat and their unfavorable opinions of Muslims. When asked about globalization, V4 citizens were divided (IRI 2017), as can be seen in Table 4. Globalization was seen as an opportunity for economic growth by most respondents in all V4 countries, but the largest percentage of V4 citizens also felt it threatened their identity (Eurobarometer 500). Graph 5 demonstrates that when more people in the V4 countries perceive that globalization threatens their country's identity, it corresponds with an increase in their negative perceptions of Muslims.

Graph 5: Relationship between anti-Muslim sentiments and perception that globalization threatens a country's identity



Source: The author

In conclusion, people in V4 countries do hold negative views of migrants and religious minorities. However, there is no link between these views and support for right-wing populist parties, since these views have been expressed by a majority of both supporters and non-supporters of populist parties. Thus, hypothesis 3—that an increase in support for right-wing populist parties corresponds with an increase in negative opinions about migrants and religious minorities—is not corroborated. Instead, people's unfavorable opinions about migration, and in particular about Muslims migrating to Europe, is related to the perceived threat of terrorism and the loss of national identity.

Disparate Attitudes and Values (Hypothesis 4)

The report by the Pew Research Center includes an exploration of political party favorability in EU member states. It unveils that preferences diverge across regions. In Western European countries, left or center-left political parties enjoy greater public support, whereas the more conservative or right of center a party is, the less favorably it is ranked. The exact opposite appears to be true in Eastern and Central European countries. Throughout that region, center-right or populist right-wing parties receive the most positive reviews. Data from the European Values Study are slightly less conclusive. On a scale of self-reported political leanings, the largest share of respondents in each country position themselves at the center (see Table 5). Yet, the means in Poland and Hungary are 6.2 and 6.1 respectively, the highest in the EU.

Table 5: Socio-political Values Expressed in Select EU Countries

	Visegrad Group				Western Europe			
	Hungary	**Czechia**	**Slovakia**	**Poland**	**Germany**	**Nether-lands**	**France**	**Sweden**
Self-reported political leaning (on a scale from 1=left to 10=right)	6.1	5.6	5.6	6.2	4.9	5.6	5.1	5.5
Do not want homosexuals as neighbors (%)	37	20	37	28	8	3.6	8	2.4
Agree that homosexual parents are as good parents as others (%)	23	40	16	12	60	66	53	74.5
Believe they have a duty to society to have children (%)	41	55	45	43	24	3.6	23	8
Agree that abortion is justifiable (on a scale from 1=never to 10=always)	4.9	6.1	5.3	3.8	6	7	6.8	8.2
Self-report as religious (%)	53	32.4	69	83	52	42	40.5	27

Source: European Values Study

Table 6: Socio-political Values Expressed in Select EU Countries (Mean and Standard Deviation)

	Visegrad Group		Western Europe	
	Mean	**Standard Deviation**	**Mean**	**Standard Deviation**
Self-reported political leaning (on a scale from 1=left to 10=right)	5.88	0.28	5.28	0.29
Do not want homosexuals as neighbors (%)	30.50	7.09	5.50	2.54
Agree that homosexual parents are as good parents as others (%)	22.75	10.71	63.38	7.90
Believe they have a duty to society to have children (%)	46.00	5.39	14.65	8.99
Agree that abortion is justifiable (on a scale from 1=never to 10=always)	5.03	0.83	7.00	0.79
Self-report as religious (%)	59.35	18.84	40.38	8.90

Source: The author

Simply accounting for political leanings is not sufficient to assess societal and ideological differences across EU countries. Public attitudes about certain issues that concern family and society, such as LGBT rights, abortion, and religion, among others, also shed light on how conservative or liberal a society is. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate that the populations of V4 countries and Western Europe differ in certain social views and values they hold. When asked whether they would want homosexuals as neighbors, between 20 percent and 37 percent of respondents in V4 countries answered in the negative, for under 10 percent in most Western European countries. Similar differences in opinions can be observed for the question of whether homosexual parents are as good parents as others, whether citizens have a duty to society to have children, and whether abortion is justifiable. Notably, the Czechs standout from the group, as their views on the issues of homosexual parents and abortion are closer to the European average.

Two trends emerge from the data. First, people in V4 countries hold more conservative social and political values than people in Western Europe. This finding supports Hypothesis 4. Second, conservatism is not uniformly expressed among the populations of V4 countries. Instead, conservatism exists on a spectrum, as demonstrated by the high standard deviation in the V4 group's mean for variables such as people's level of religiousness and opinions about same-sex parenthood. This standard deviation primarily results from the gap between public attitudes in Czechia and Poland, which indicates that Czechia is the most socially liberal of all the V4 countries, while Poland is positioned as the most socially conservative in the group.

Sources of Worldviews in the Visegrad Group

Euroskeptic but not Anti-EU

Much of the literature on Euroskepticism has explained sovereignism and nationalism in the V4 countries as a product of the influence of populist parties, which promote Euroskepticism. This chapter shows that reservations toward the EU among the populations of the V4 exist independently from that pressure. Survey indicators unveil that Czechia is the most Euroskeptic of the V4 countries, while Poland is the most pro-EU. Contrary to expectations, citizens of Hungary and Poland, whose governments have been criticized for leading the opposition to the "ever closer Union," are the most favorable to the EU out of the V4 countries. In contrast, the public in Slovakia and Czechia appears to be more reticent in its optimism about the Union.

A general lack of trust in the government and institutions drives wariness about the actions of the EU. Yet, the case of the V4 demonstrates that EU-skepticism is not equivalent to anti-EU sentiment. A clear majority in each V4 state is in favor of the EU, but about half of the citizens there feel that the European project needs to be rethought and changes need to occur in implementation (IRI 2017; Eurobarometer 500 2020). In all of the V4 countries, only a minority wishes to see an increase in the scope of decisions

made at the EU level in the future. The issue of relative power between member states also plays a role in how willing people are to accept a greater range of competences granted to the EU. On the one hand, large Western countries, especially Germany and France, have a disproportionate influence in setting the EU's agenda. On the other hand, smaller member states, mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, have benefitted from economic integration, as the single market, the free movement of people, and multifaceted cooperation on a regional level have strengthened their development. However, the fact that they have comparatively less influence on EU matters has prompted people there to resist additional power transfers from national to EU institutions. Gaining independence from the controlling influence of the Soviet Union in the 1990s was a historic feat for Central and Eastern European nations. Thus, they have remained wary of propositions that would lead to a renouncement of this hard-earned independence. As one recent study has demonstrated, even in Germany, which is a substantial driver of EU policies, concerns over loss of sovereignty has resulted in increased Euroskepticism (Yordanova et al. 2020). It follows that Euroskepticism in V4 countries is connected to the perceived need to protect national interests within the EU rather than to an appetite for the break-up of the EU. Therefore, the analysis here supports the thesis that Euroskepticism in V4 countries is only a "soft" Euroskepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002).

Immigration and Nation

The difference in worldviews between East and West among EU member states has become visible on matters related to immigration and multiculturalism. During the migrant crisis, the V4, as well as other Central and Eastern European countries, have been among the most vocal in opposing the proposed mandatory quota system for accepting migrants. Compared to other European countries, the V4 states are more homogenous ethnically and linguistically, which has certainly played a role in shaping people's socio-political views there. In the tradition of the nineteenth-century German romanticists, who spearheaded the unification of all German states under the concept of *Volk*—a homogenous cultural entity based on nationhood that rests on linguistic and ethnic elements (Pflanze 1966)—nationality in most of Central and Eastern Europe has been defined in terms of a shared ancestry rooted in the feeling of belonging to a common ethnicity and language group. This understanding constitutes a primordialist conception of the nation, where the nation predates the state and is solely a cultural entity, rather than a political construct (Dawisha 2002).

According to this understanding of the nation, nation-states differ from other forms of political entities such as multinational states, city-states, or empires, in which identity is shaped through the prism of citizenship (Haas 1997). For example, in the United Kingdom and France, nationhood has emerged out of people's loyalty to a state or a monarchical authority, in line with Rousseauist philosophy and a constructivist conception of the state, which both hold that nations are communal affiliations based on subjective psychology rather than on objective biology (Dawisha 2002). Hence, "a nation

exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to be a nation" (Seton-Watson 1977, 5). According to civic nationalism, as represented by the United Kingdom and France, the existence of the state is a prerequisite for the process of nation-building; and heterogeneous ethnic and linguistic groups can unite because they accept a single civic identity.

In contrast to civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism has developed out of a reverence for the cultural separateness of peoples. Consequently, for the ethnically, religiously, and linguistically homogeneous V4 countries, suggesting that populations of different origins should settle in and integrate into one society and nation contradicts the very understanding of national belonging as a culturally exclusive process. Likewise, the V4's perspective is at odds with the open borders' context inside the EU, the EU's motto—"United in diversity"—and the concept of a supranational European citizenship and identity. It is not within the scope of this research to explore the divergence between the two conceptualizations of the nation in greater detail, but it is important to note that the debate has remained as relevant in modern European politics as it was in the nineteenth century (Hutchinson and Smith 1994; Smith 1992; Brubaker 1992; Renan 1990). This research ascertains, however, that globalization-driven multiculturalism has been perceived as a threat to national identities and security in V4 countries in the contemporary era, suggesting that the pushback against harmonizing certain EU-wide migration and asylum policies will continue in the years ahead.

Conservatism in V4 Countries

The findings of this study suggest that people in the V4 countries lean to the right politically but that these countries do not constitute a uniform bloc when it comes to attitudes and values; indeed, some countries within the group are shown to be more liberal than others. Nevertheless, a clear East-West "value gap" emerges when comparing the views held by people in the V4 to those held by people in Western member states, notably on the issue of religion and social issues such as abortion and LGBT rights. Yet, about half of V4 citizens have stated that they perceive their values as being similar to those held by people in Western Europe (IRI 2017), which demonstrates that there is dissonance in the way EU citizens approach "European values." In the EU, these values generally encompass liberal ideals. Indeed, the "common values" described in the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union include freedom, solidarity, democracy, and the rule of law. The Charter also promotes respect for cultural and religious diversity, prevents discrimination based on religion and sexual orientation, and defends other principles that have all shaped the legal system of the EU. However, the eastward enlargement of the EU since 2004 has resulted in a pluralism of worldviews and values across member states. Thus, while some politicians refer to Europe's Christian heritage when speaking about European values, others mean secularism and multiculturalism.

Hungary's and Poland's respective historical contexts have led to a conservative wave in those two countries in recent years (Bluhm and Varga 2020). Leftist parties in Central and Eastern Europe have often derived from the former ruling communist parties. Therefore, people in these regions make different mental associations about leftist parties than in other parts of Europe. For example, in Western countries with a history of *laissez-faire* capitalism and rigid social class hierarchy, the political left has challenged the conservative status quo during the last few decades. In contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe, it was the political right that brought a wave of societal changes to challenge the leftist establishment in the post-1989 transition period. Furthermore, the seed of conservatism has always been present in these societies; it was simply suppressed during the communist era. After the fall of communism, that seed was cultivated to slowly lead to electoral success and mainstreaming. Hence, what we are witnessing today is a "conservative renaissance" (Bluhm and Varga 2020).

Waning Trust in Times of Crises

Support for the EU among people of the Visegrad Group has been multidimensional. The citizens of V4 countries have had reservations about certain EU policies based on their perceptions of national interest in their respective countries. As a consequence, people in the V4 group support political leaders who have contested many aspects of the European project; but at the same time these citizens hold positive views of the EU overall. Studies on Euroskepticism have tended to attribute rising sovereignism in V4 countries to the success of populist parties, without considering that these countries have prioritized different policies in European integration and that societal conservatism is a source of this rising trend. Thus, this chapter counters scholars who have claimed that the public pushback against the incremental ceding of powers to EU-level decision-making can be attributed to the influence of populist parties.

Among the V4 countries, Euroskepticism appears to be most prominent in Czechia, while people in Poland are the most EU-enthusiastic. Data also show that general skepticism about and distrust in governing institutions, both at national and EU levels, exist in all V4 countries. However, citizens there are more open than their governments in the tackling of challenges pertaining to foreign policy and migration at both the EU and national level. In each V4 country, most people agree that although some sovereignty might be lost, the interests of their respective countries are best served in the context of EU membership because of the economic gains membership brings. Hence, while not fully content with the direction in which the Union is headed, people in V4 countries are not anti-EU. This finding reaffirms the distinction Hobolt and De Vries (2016) have posited between regime and policy support.

Together, the V4 countries do not constitute a unanimous voice among EU member states, as they are divided on many issues. Each of the four countries included in the V4 has its own political environment and policy positions. However, when comparing the

V4 to Western EU member states, regional commonalities become apparent. This study concludes that the social and political values held by the citizens of the Visegrad Group are more conservative than those of Western Europeans and that this discrepancy indicates that an East-West gap in the understanding of "shared European values" is anchored not only among political elites but also among citizens. A majority of people in the overwhelmingly ethnically homogeneous Visegrad Group countries have a negative view of immigration and multiculturalism, which they believe bring the threat of terrorism and erode national identity. Such positions cannot be attributed to the influence of right-wing populist parties. In fact, these views are held equally by supporters and non-supporters of populist parties. This finding, thus, posits that it is based on grassroot reactions that during the 2015-2016 crisis the V4 countries rejected the EU migrant quota policy.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine are likely to have a further impact on Euroskepticism trends in V4 countries. On the one hand, V4 citizens could divert their concerns away from migration and toward security issues in the health sector, which has already been the case in Poland, according to the Eurobarometer 500. EU-wide efforts to overcome the pandemic and respond to Russia's military actions could become points of convergence for member states. On the other hand, the legacies of the COVID-19 crisis, potential disagreements over foreign policy among member states, and emerging crises linked to the economy or the energy sector may further weaken the public's trust in the governing bodies of the EU and boost nationalism in Europe. These trends echo those Europe already faced during the Eurozone and migrant crises, which enhanced people's support for the national state. Research is needed to investigate how those novel circumstances will impact people's support for EU institutions in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.

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5 European Union's Military Operations
The Use of an Adaptive Approach to Face Security (Dis)Order

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Abstract: To improve its capacity at managing crises, the European Union (EU) has sought to broaden its security and defense identity since the 1990s, deploying thirteen military operations and missions. Like other world powers, the EU has adapted its foreign policy to changing circumstances and strategic and economic interests. As the EU has enlarged and deepened its integration, questions arise about how its common foreign and security policies have evolved over time and whether these policies have expressed long-term interests or have constantly adapted to novel circumstances. This chapter discusses the reality of EU military engagement overseas through the lens of the complexity theory. The study confronts the aims presented in official EU narrative with practices on the ground through data collected in primary and secondary sources that highlight that the adaptive approach has led to three phases of modification in EU military operations and capabilities, as the EU attempts to become a global security provider: ambition during the first decade of the Common Security and Defense Policy, contraction between 2009 and 2016, and adjustment in today's new global order. Conclusions suggest that not only is the EU's institutional ambition of collective engagement in overseas operations in constant tension with the preferences and interests of its member states, but that EU operations are challenged by a changing global (dis) order necessitating constant adaptation.

What the European Union (EU) calls "crisis management operations" emerged as a pragmatic response to security challenges it faced. The EU has striven to develop its capacity for independent military action since the late 1990s, when the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was first launched (it was renamed as the Common Security and Defense Policy - CSDP in 2009). Since 2003, the EU has conducted thirty-six missions and operations in twenty countries. Twenty-three of these actions have been civilian missions and thirteen have been military operations and missions.

The EU defines military operations as interventions with an executive mandate, while military missions consist of interventions with a non-executive mandate. The choice of intervention type depends on the nature of the crisis at stake. Operations involve actions that replace the host country's actions, while missions imply that the EU only supports

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the host country in an advisory capacity (Council of the EU 2014). Moreover, the EU has developed various military operations and missions (also referred to as "peace operations" in this chapter). The "European Union Force" (EUFOR) is a ground force, while naval forces fall under the jurisdiction of the "European Union Naval Force" (EU NAVFOR); and "training missions" stand for "European Union Training Mission" (EUTM) (Council of the EU 2018). Additionally, military interventions have ranged from advisory missions involving fewer than a dozen experts to large-scale operations deploying thousands of military personnel. However, although the EU aims at becoming a global security provider, the actual importance of EU military operations and missions can be questioned. Given its population (447.7 million inhabitants), economic weight (one fourth of the world's GDP), and military resources (1,521,000 troops in active service and 14 percent of the global defense budget in 2020) (EC 2020; IISS 2021; SIPRI 2021), the Union has sought to play an important role in international security. However, it appears that EU aspirations have not met operational reality in terms of military operations and missions. Indeed, a "capability–expectation gap" (see Hill 1993) has emerged between the expectation of the EU and its apparent influence in global military interventions. This chapter assesses past and present EU military operations and missions to analyze the role the EU plays as an international security provider. The focus on military engagement excludes an examination of other ways in which the EU also engages internationally (e.g., through civilian missions and diplomatic actions). Nonetheless, analyzing military action remains particularly useful in evaluating the EU as an international security actor.

In practice, the EU started getting involved militarily in 1992, when the Petersberg Declaration set a range of military actions and functions the EU would undertake. These included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and the sending of combat forces to manage crises (WEU 1992). These tasks were later incorporated into the Treaty of the European Union in 1997. To fulfill its military functions, the EU has developed policies, strategies, structures, decision-making and financing procedures, capabilities, and legal and operational tools. These tools have included, among others, the European Security Strategy (ESS) (EU 2003a), the Headline Goals (Council of the EU 2004), and the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) (EU 2016), the latter arising later than the other instruments. Frameworks for permanent relations between the EU and NATO (known as the "Berlin Plus arrangements") (EU 2003b) and with the UN (UN 2003) were also established to support EU military deployments.

The EU's military involvement overseas, as well as its performance in security and defense, have attracted considerable academic scrutiny and generated an extensive literature. Studies have assessed the EU's success and failure as a conflict manager (Kronenberger and Wouters 2004; Diez et al. 2006; Tocci 2007; Whitman and Wolff 2010), as well as its ambitions and achievements (Giegerich 2008) and its credibility and effectiveness (e.g., Tardy 2015a; Hyde-Price 2018). Research has also targeted the EU's transatlantic links (Posen 2006; Howorth and Menon 2009; Giegerich 2010), its relations with NATO (Mace 2004; Ulriksen et al. 2004; Duke 2008) and the UN (Charbonneau 2009), and the discrepancies between the rhetorical aims and interests of the EU, its stated goals, and the instruments it uses in practice (Tocci 2009). Adding

to this scholarship, this chapter draws on the complexity theory to explore military operations and explain how the EU has adapted to changes in the security environment, as well as the challenges this environment presents. Complex systems arise when a set of elements or units become interconnected, so that changes taking place in individual units or in the way units interact effect changes in other parts of the system. Moreover, such systems exhibit their own properties and behaviors (Jervis 1997). Their open nature creates dynamics that must be explained in terms of internal logics and relationships with the environment. Interconnectivity indicates that each individual element exists in relation to the others; thus, each part of the system is affected and influenced, at any time, directly or indirectly, by at least one other part of the system (Ricigliano 2012). Moreover, interconnectivity leads to emergence, which explains both how the elements of the system interact with each other to maintain themselves and how new structures, forms, and functions are generated by these interactions (Williams and Hummelbrunner 2010). The new structures, forms, and functions in turn interact with, and causally impact, the parts from which they emerged. Additionally, when small changes in any part of a system—or in a system's environment—produce large changes throughout that system, nonlinearity is observed. Finally, complex systems potentially adapt according to feedback, since the way they respond is conditioned by both past and present situations (Wight 2015). When uncertainty and unpredictability prevail, systems manage through an adaptive process in which resilience plays an important role. Resilience is "the ability of a system to resist, absorb, recover from, or adapt to (adverse) changes in condition" (Cavelty and Giroux 2015, 211) while retaining essentially the same function, structure, and identity (Walker et al. 2004). Therefore, resilience also entails persistence (the capacity to remain in an original state), adaptability (the capacity to adjust responses to changing external drivers and internal processes), and transformability (the capacity to create a new domain when conditions make the existing system untenable, thus moving it towards a new system) (Gunderson 2000; Folke 2006; Scheffer 2009; Folke et al. 2010). Drawing on these key assertions of complexity theory, this chapter aims to unveil how and why the EU has moved in certain ways in the field of military operations and missions.

I argue that since their inception, EU military operations and missions have been guided by tensions between the role the Union wants to play in the field of international security and the dynamics of both the Union itself and the international system. Moreover, in terms of military operations and missions, the EU has dealt with these tensions through an adaptive approach that encompasses different phases, which are successively characterized by ambitious expansion, contraction, and adjustment. To substantiate this argument, I use qualitative analysis of quantitative data based on primary and secondary sources. Data were collected from the EU's Global Engagement project (Di Mauro et al. 2017), EEAS factsheets, and publicly available information regarding these operations and missions, with a focus on context, size, mandate, region of operation, duration, risks involved, and budget allocated. These elements were chosen to examine the nature of military deployments that took place between 2003 and 2020. Additional data were collected from various official speeches and documents about the EU's military engagement. Drawing parallels between intentions and reality, I demonstrate that the

EU has often engaged militarily overseas through an adaptive approach and that this engagement has not matched its ambition, nor the expectation of the international community. In its military operations and missions, the EU has adapted to changes within the Union as well as to external dynamics in three phases. During the first phase (1999-2009), the EU created the necessary conditions for its broader commitment to international security issues. During the second phase (2010-2016), a contraction can be observed, which was due to obstacles the Union faced when acting on its intentions. When additional challenges arose, especially in the international system, the European bloc then moved to a third phase of adjustment (2017-today).

Phase I (1999-2009): Ambitions - Adapting to a New Security Environment

The first phase of EU military operations and missions coincides with Javier Solana's term as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy—today's High Representative for the Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (hereinafter "High Representative")—from 1999 to 2009. One key characteristic of complex systems is that they adjust their responses to the challenges posed by both external drivers and internal processes. In the 1990s, the EU was formally established by the Maastricht Treaty, after which it initiated an enlargement and economic integration process. On the one hand, the unprecedented period of peace and stability in Western Europe led to an enthusiastic narrative: the EU "[had] never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free" (EU 2003a). On the other hand, Europe's inability to manage conflicts on its neighbors' soil became evident, for example during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia (Hyde-Price 2018). This inability contributed to the Franco-British St. Malo Declaration in 1998, which focused on the EU's need to "have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises" (CVCE 1998). The following year, the European Council underlined its determination to develop an autonomous capacity in order to carry out military operations in response to international crises (European Parliament 1999). As a consequence, the Headline Goal was approved at the Helsinki Summit (December 1999), which planned for the development of a self-sustained military force of up to 50,000–60,000 individuals able to undertake the full range of tasks set in the Petersberg Declaration (Council of the EU 1999). At the same time, outside Europe, the UN's revision process on peacekeeping seemed to indicate that regional organizations would assume an increasing role as security providers (see UN 2000). Moreover, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the US, followed by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the US's "war on terror," influenced the EU in its defense apparatus and its role in international security. Hence, High Representative Javier Solana, initiated the European Security Strategy. Although this document was a policy paper rather than a strategic plan, it nevertheless outlined principles about how the Union should respond to international crises, and it set out guidelines for addressing threats, ensuring safety

in the countries bordering Europe and committing to an international order based on multilateralism (EU 2003a). As a result, key institutions were established, such as the Political and Security Committee (2000)—responsible for the CSDP—the Military Committee (2001), and the Military Staff (2001), charged with providing strategic advice to the High Representative.

As a complex system, the EU has organized itself to face internal and external security and defense challenges. During phase I, it created new processes and institutional bodies within the bloc to allow greater proactivity in the military field. Furthermore, past experiences, especially those emanating from other organizations such as the UN and NATO, led the EU to develop guidelines for crisis management centered on the ability to combine civilian and military instruments (Juncos 2020): the "made in Europe crisis management" (Türke 2016). In the EU, there was enthusiasm about the bloc playing a major role in international security, and this positive outlook was seen in the European Security Strategy, which indicated that the EU was particularly well equipped to respond to multi-faceted security situations (EU 2003a). Moreover, the High Representative asserted that the Union was suited to carry out actions drawing on "a mixture of civilian, military, economic, political and institution-building tools" (Solana 2007, 2), as opposed to purely military operations.

In this context, the EU showed relentless activism in terms of military operations and missions during that period: six military operations were deployed between 2003 and 2008. Table 1 indicates that most operations took place in Africa (four) and the Balkans (two), where troops operated under executive mandates that focused on implementing agreements as well as stabilizing situations, protecting civilians, delivering humanitarian aid, and fighting against piracy. When it started, EUFOR Althea was the largest operation in scope (7,000 troops); Artemis, EUFOR Congo, and Atalanta included approximately 2,000 troops; and EUFOR Chad/CAR involved approximately 3,300 troops. The operations generally have not lasted long. With the exception of Atalanta and Althea, which are still ongoing, other operations lasted only two to twelve months. Consequently, the security impact of these various operations was also short-lived in host countries. Notably, Althea replaced the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement that ended the war in the former Yugoslavia. Atalanta was a naval operation deployed to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. Moreover, in general, these EU operations were low-risk (with the exception of Artemis) because deployment occurred in permissive environments (Fiott 2020), i.e., in places "in which friendly forces anticipate[d] no obstructions to, or interference with, operations" (UK 2017, 8). They also benefitted from only modest budgets (with the exception of EUFOR Chad/CAR).

Table 1: Phase I Operations

Operation / Mission	Period	Geographic Area	Mandate	Duration (Months)*	Type	Size (total)*	Risk	Common costs*
CONCORDIA	2003	Western Balkans (FYROM)	Implementation of agreement (Limited executive tasks)	9	Post conflict stabilization	Small - 400	Low	Low € 4.7 million
ARTEMIS/DRC	2003	Subsahara DRC (Bunia)	Stabilization	2	Peacekeeping	Intermediate -1,807	High	Low € 7 million
ALTHEA/BiH	2004- now	Western Balkans (BiH)	Implementation of agreement	193	Post conflict stabilization	Large (7,000) Intermediate (2,500 in 2007)	Low	Intermediate € 81.8 million
EUFOR DR Congo	2006	Subsahara DRC (Kinshasa)	Stabilization (Support response to violence)	4	Peacekeeping	Intermediate -2,259	Low	Low € 16.7 million
EUFOR Chad/ RCA	2008-2009	Subsahara East Chad/ Northeast CAR	PoC Deliver humanitarian aid	12	Peacekeeping	Intermediate -3,300	Intermediate	High € 99.2 million
EU NAVFOR - Atalanta	2008 – now	Horn of Africa	Fight against piracy	145	Combat piracy	Intermediate -1,943	Low	Intermediate € 59.6 million

Source: The author based on Di Mauro et al. 2017 and EEAS 2021a. * All data until 2020.

The narrative of the EU about these operations further reinforced the Union's positive outlook about these five years of improvement in terms of its capacity to manage conflicts. Furthermore, the EU's hybrid intervention format that combines military and civilian actions would become a model for other regionally led peace operations (see Hardt 2009). The ambition that characterizes Phase I was echoed in the 2007 Constitutional Treaty that expanded the Petersberg tasks by including operations such as joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue interventions, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, and the deployment of combat forces in crisis management. All these facets of intervention were seen as contributing "to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories" (EU 2007, article 28 B). Moreover, a solidarity clause prescribed the obligation for member states to provide "aid and assistance by all the means in their power" when any "member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory" (EU 2007, article 28A.7).

In spite of the positive outlook, examining EU operations more closely reveals that certain of these interventions were conducted to test or prove the EU's capacity to act autonomously, while others were understood as the prerogative of individual member states (Gegout 2005; Griffin 2007). "Cosmetic operations," such as EUFOR DRC (Haine and Giegerich 2006), or "bridge operations" were those connected to more complex operations such as EUFOR Chad/CAR (Tardy 2015b). Another set of operations were presented as being part of an effort to simply support UN operations on the ground (e.g., Artemis and EUFOR Congo). Certain operations such as Artemis and EUFOR RDC did not unveil much about the Union's capacity to act as a global security provider, as they "did not demonstrate any major advances in EU military capacities for active engagement" (Griffin 2007, 40). In these cases, political expectations did not match the capacity of the military forces deployed, nor the range of obstacles on the ground (Murphy 2011). Since complex systems can absorb and adapt to adverse situations, these shortcomings led the EU to adjust so it could retain its goals, structures, and functions regarding military operations and missions. This adjustment came in the shape of contraction.

Phase II (2010-2016): Contracting to Adapt to Reality

The second phase (2010-2016) covers the duration of Catherine Ashton's term (December 2009 – October 2014) and part of Federica Mogherini's term (November 2014 – November 2019) as the function of High Representative. During that time, the EU sought to enhance its ability to deploy joint forces when and where necessary; to that effect, European countries committed themselves alongside NATO operations (in Afghanistan, for instance) and *ad hoc* coalitions (for example, in Iraq). These involvements diverted resources and attention away from the CSDP (Engberg 2021). Furthermore, the 2008 financial crisis led several nations to implement cost-cutting measures that restricted the overall operational capability of the armed forces and

contributed to the decision by member states to adopt a lower profile on security and defense issues at the EU level (Moser 2015).

Within the EU, security and defense policy rests quasi-exclusively with member states, and the decision to get involved (or not) in military operations is made by governments according to national perceptions and interests (see Youngs 2008; Moser 2015). For example, EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUNAVFOR Sophia occurred because the former was aimed at fighting pirates who threatened European trading interests in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden and the latter addressed the migrant crisis that impacted European countries at the time (European Parliament 2020). During that period, there was constant divergences among the "big three" (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) regarding preferences and priorities in military engagement (see Howorth 2003; Longhurst and Miskimmon 2007; Wagnsson 2010). Tensions also emerged among member states because some pushed for large-scale, sophisticated operations (e.g., France) and others were reticent to use military force at all (e.g., Germany and Scandinavian countries) (Moser 2015), supported EU autonomy, or were more inclined towards NATO intervention rather than EU involvement (Engberg 2021). Moreover, initial military objectives encompassed in the Helsinki Headline Goal failed, in spite of a new deadline being set to 2010 (Engberg 2021). In 2007, Solana emphasized that a rapidly deployable force—the Battlegroup—was "not just a concept but already a reality" and that it was necessary to develop the capacity "to act quickly and robustly where needed" (Solana 2007). However, the Battlegroup was never deployed and was consequently reduced to a third of what was originally planned (Whitman and Wolff 2012).

During Phase I, even with the initial impetus and optimistic narrative, the EU had faced tensions and shortcomings, which led it to adapt in Phase II, during which EU military engagement contracted in practice. Although six new operations and missions were deployed between 2010 and 2016, an important shift occurred. Indeed, most of these interventions involved non-executive mandates and focused on training, monitoring, mentoring, and advising. They also minimized risks and costs since only the EUFOR RCA in the Central African Republic and the maritime operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Sophia) functioned under executive mandates, which means that they took over for the host nations. While they were both directed at African territories (the sub-Saharan region, the Horn of Africa, and Central Africa), EUFOR RCA aimed at stabilizing a conflict and EUNAVFOR Sophia targeted human smuggling and trafficking. Table 2 shows that the missions conducted during Phase II tended to last longer than Phase I operations but were quite more limited in scope. Only EUNAVFOR Sophia operated with more than a thousand troops. Even the Althea operation, still on-going in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was reduced to 600 troops in 2012 (Keil and Perry 2015). Moreover, budgets remained modest—with the exception of the support allocated to EUTM-Mali—and the operations and missions ran in permissive and low risk environments.

Table 2 – Phase II Operations

Operation / Mission	Period	Geographic Area	Mandate	Duration (Months)*	Type	Size (total)*	Risk	Common costs*
EUTM Somalia	2010 – now	Horn of Africa	Training Non executive	119	Post conflict stabilization	Small - 125	Low	Intermediate € 60.9 million
EUTM-Mali	2013 – 2024	Subsahara – Mali	Training Non executive	95	Post conflict stabilization	Small - 570	Low	High € 105.9 million
EUFOR RCA	2014 – 2015	Subsahara – CAR (Bangui)	Stabilization	12	Peacekeeping	Small – 700	Intermediate	Low € 30.6 million
EUMAM RCA	2015 – 2016	Subsahara – CAR	Advisory and training Non executive	16	Post conflict stabilization	Small – 70	Low	Low € 7.9 million
EUNAVFOR MED - Sophia	2015 – 2020	Mediterranean Libya	Fight against human smuggling/ traffic	66	Combat human traffic	Intermediate 1,666	Low	Low € 18.9 million
EUTM RCA	2016 - now	Subsahara – CAR	Advisory and training Non executive	54	Post conflict stabilization	Small - 170	Low	Low € 43.6 million

Source: The author based on Di Mauro et al. 2017 and EEAS 2021a. * All data until 2020.

The ambition of the EU for activism in military deployment did not last much longer than the duration of Phase I. In fact, during that time, actions were generally *ad hoc* and tentative, and they met strategic objectives with difficulty (Coelmont 2012). Moreover, after "brisk activity in the Solana era, the [CSDP] almost came to a standstill" (Moser 2015, 12). During Phase I, the EU had failed to accomplish its military goals, leading people to perceive its external actions (military and civilian missions and operations and diplomatic activities) as isolated and uncoordinated. Phase II inherited these shortcomings. High Representative Catherine Ashton stated that it was "not enough to chase and deter pirates, not enough to try and do development when there is no security, not enough to try and provide economic support without a stable government." Consequently, it became necessary for the EU to adopt a comprehensive approach (EEAS 2012) to recover from adversity and retain its original intention of becoming a global security provider. Therefore, during Phase II, military missions were prioritized over operations and the strategy shifted toward a "comprehensive approach." As a result, new military strategies were launched in 2011 in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, and in 2012 an EU inter-institutional working group was established to develop this approach and solve the consistent problem posed by isolated initiatives.

Thus, during Phase II, the EU attempted to adjust its responses to the same external and internal shifts and challenges that it had faced during Phase I. It also injected consistency across its external military action. However, the Union missed opportunities to act coherently on several occasions, for example in the crises that followed the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria. Lack of consensus to the possible launch of a civilian mission or military operation resulted in non-response from the EU. In Libya, for example, some EU member states opted to act under the NATO framework (Moser 2015). Moreover, the fact that the French government failed to incite EU forces to participate in counterterrorism operations in the Sahel in 2013 (Engberg 2021) showed how difficult it was to get support from member states for substantial deployments. Consequently, Ashton favored a comprehensive approach that combined "elements of foreign policy (diplomacy, trade, aid and military and non-military instruments) and clearly prefer[red] conflict prevention over armed intervention" (Moser 2015, 13). Her stance, however, would not be taken up by her successor, Federica Mogherini, who instead worked on yet a new strategy. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy report (Merket 2015) was published and opened another adjustment phase.

Phase III (2017-Today): Adjusting to a Changing Global (Dis)order

The third phase has included the half-term of Federica Mogherini (2017 – November 2019) and Josep Borrell's current term (December 2019 – today) in the role of High Representative. In Phase III, there has been a lack of consensus about objectives, principles, and methods among member states, which have not all been willing to participate in military interventions. This lack of consensus has led the international standing of the EU to deteriorate. Moreover, increased instability in

Africa and the Middle East has created security problems for Europe (e.g., terrorist attacks on European soil and the migration crisis) and emphasized the importance of border security. In addition, Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine in 2014 indicated EU's difficulty in dealing with conflicts outside its strict borders. These new circumstances gave rise to a new era of adaptation for the EU. Indeed, the 2016 EU Global Strategy and Council Conclusions on Security and Defense (Council of the EU 2016) opened a new phase of adjustment in which the EU attempted to redefine its military ambition of being an independent actor in security and defense. Thus, the EU Global Strategy set three overarching aims for EU action. It was advanced that first, the EU must respond to external conflicts and crises. Second, it must build the capability and capacity of its external partners. And third, it is expected to protect itself and its citizens (EU 2016).

The discourse has also been adapted. As the euphoria exhibited in Phase I waned, the idea of unprecedented peace, prosperity, democracy, and absence of war came under question (Engberg 2021). At the same time, Europe's external context showed that the EU would not keep contracting its security and defense action as it had done during Phase II. In fact, the EU Global Strategy states that "an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders" (EU 2016, 9). This assertion resulted from the understanding that the security environment had deteriorated so much that the Union had to make stronger efforts to defend its territory and citizens. Phase III thus has reinforced this necessity through a significant shift of power distribution in a global order that had become multipolar and was undermined by Russia, China, and the Trump first presidency in the US, as well as the United Kingdom's decision to leave the Union. The new discourse emphasized the EU's need for a "credible, cooperative and reliable power" (Mogherini 2017). Warning that Europe was standing "on the edge of a precipice" and should "wake up" in order to think "itself strategically as a geopolitical power," French president Emmanuel Macron insisted that European countries could "no longer rely on America to defend NATO allies" (The Economist 2019). Hence, in order to resist adverse conditions and retain its original goals, the EU has responded by transforming itself along a new trajectory. In practice, what this means is that during Phase III the EU has broadened its ambition beyond crisis management and capacity building to include hybrid threats, cybersecurity, and border management, among other new facets of intervention (Council of the EU 2016). To achieve these objectives, EU officials reviewed the EU Requirements Catalogue**,** establishing the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and creating new instruments such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the EU's Co-ordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), the European Defense Fund (EDF), and the Strategic Compass process. These new instruments seek to consolidate the European security and defense architecture by enhancing the Union's capabilities for joint planning, development, procurement, and operational, while also fostering a defense industrial base.

In terms of military engagement overseas during the adjustment process of Phase III, the EU has remained involved in five ongoing military operations and missions.

Only one new maritime operation (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) was deployed in the Mediterranean, in replacement of EUNAVFOR Sophia. With the exception of EUFOR Althea, all Phase III operations and missions have focused on Africa. Furthermore, as Table 3 demonstrates, these mostly small-scale operations (with the exception of EUNAVFOR Atalanta) have ran in a permissive environment and relied on modest or intermediate-size budgets (with the exception of EUTM-Mali). In 2020, six military operations and missions (EEAS 2021a) went on, among which only naval operations had an executive mandate.

Table 3: Phase III Operations

Operation / Mission	Period	Geographic Area	Mandate	Size (total)*	Risk	Common costs*
EUNAVFOR MED - IRINI	2020 - now	Mediterranean Libya	Implement UNSC arms embargo against Libya	Small - 600	Low	Low € 837,800 (initial)
EUTM RCA	2016 - now	Subsahara – RCA	Advisory and training Non executive	Small - 170	Low	Low € 43.6 million
EUTM-Mali	2013 – 2024	Subsahara – Mali	Training Non executive	Small - 570	Low	High € 105.9 million
EUTM Somalia	2010 – now	Horn of Africa	Training Non executive	Small - 125	Low	Intermediate € 60.9 million
EU NAVFOR - Atalanta	2008 – now	Horn of Africa	Fight against piracy	Intermediate -1,943	Low	Intermediate € 59.6 million
ALTHEA/BiH	2004- now	Western Balkans (BiH)	Implementation of agreement	Small - 600	Low	Intermediate € 81.8 million

Source: The author based on Di Mauro et al. 2017 and EEAS 2020, 2021a. * All data until 2020.

At the time of writing, this last adjustment phase is ongoing, and the EU is facing more challenges than it has made achievements. Unfortunately, its new instruments (PESCO, CARD, EDF, and the Strategic Compass) have not yet led "to any tangible shift in the Union's capability base or readiness for deployment" (Fiott 2020, 3). Brexit in particular has created a new challenge for future EU military engagement overseas. The UK had been one of the most important providers of economic and military resources within the EU, so that its exit from the Union enhanced the role of France and Germany in decisions about military operations. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences have defied the capacity of the EU to accelerate military activity and achieve the level of ambition set out by the EU Global Strategy. The adjustment has seemingly been moving towards a prioritization of internal defense over international security. In

this sense, the low profile of military operations and missions likely will remain. However, the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which was launched in April 2021, acknowledged the importance of a meaningful European naval presence in the Indo-Pacific in the future, among other objectives in security and defense (EEAS 2021b). The Strategy sets out priority areas for cooperation including in security and defense. Concrete actions have included joint naval exercises conducted by EUNAVFOR Atalanta with partners, the launch of EUTM-Mozambique, a coordinated maritime presence in the North-West Indian Ocean, and EU-funded thematic projects with a regional outreach in maritime information, counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, maritime security, and crisis management, among other foci (EEAS 2024c). This regional presence indicates that high-profile overseas military operations are still a priority. Whereas EU leaders had been thinking about how to resolve the ambiguity of EU military operations, a new and shocking event posed new challenges.

The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 alarmed the EU, especially because it happened at a moment when Europe was grappling with limited military capabilities, a lack of technological innovation, and an inadequate defense industrial base (Polyakova et al. 2023). Through the Versailles Declaration of March 2022, EU member states decided to reinforce the EU's defense capabilities and significantly increase defense spending. They also agreed on greater investment in the capabilities necessary to conduct a full range of missions and operations (EU 2022). High Representative Joseph Borrell reinforced the need for the renaissance of the European defense industry, which is not adequately prepared to meet the challenges of the Ukraine war (EEAS 2024d). The dark scenario of insecurity and geostrategic competition will surely further strain the Union, especially in high-politics fields, such as security and defense. On the one hand, the war in Ukraine could foster EU solidarity and push the bloc beyond intergovernmentalism and toward a deep defense integration. On the other hand, the respective postures of Russia and the EU in the current crises could also encourage individualistic decisions by member states on certain issues, such as domestic defense expenditure and military capabilities.

The EU has shown to be reactive in its foreign and security policy (Riddervold and Cross 2019). The Russian aggression on Ukraine may lead to new policy developments in response to the crisis. The Strategic Compass approved in 2022, only a few weeks after the Russian invasion constitutes an ambitious plan to strengthen the EU's security and defense policy by 2030. It aims to improve the EU's ability to act decisively in crises and transform the bloc into a more capable security provider (EEAS 2024b). The war in Ukraine has instilled further urgency into these efforts, and the EU has swiftly implemented many of the goals set in its 2024 strategic plan (EEAS 2024a). By adopting a more inward gaze in terms of defense, the EU would make military operations and missions a secondary priority. Thus, the war in Ukraine could be a turning point and inaugurate a new phase of EU military engagement outside or on the margins of Europe.

Adapting to New Trajectories

Since 1999, the EU has made notable efforts to improve its military capabilities in reaction to crises and has shown the rest of the world its willingness to become an influential global security provider. Consequently, the Union has developed its capacity to carry out military operations and missions through different rounds of initiatives. But, in spite of some positive results, discrepancies have arisen between the goals of the EU and its concrete action. Although member states generally exhibit significant collective economic power and military capabilities, the absolute weight of the EU in international security remains weak and the impact of its operations and missions on the ground has been marginal. Looking at EU practices of military engagement overseas through the complexity theory helps delineate the EU's adaptive approach. Changes in the international system and internal environment in the aftermath of the Cold War led the Union to advance normatively and structurally as to launch several military operations in the Solana era. But the actions of the EU during this ambitious phase and the internal and external environments at the time resulted in a contraction phase (2010-2016) that allowed the Union to keep its military operations and missions running while also rendering its external actions more coherent. The contraction provoked debates about the Union's actual capacity to accomplish the goals it previously envisioned, as well as about the behavior it should adopt to adapt to the shifts of an increasingly complex world.

EU leaders learned from past experiences and were able to adjust by creating new ambitions and instruments for the EU to remedy the problems it had faced in previous phases and to seek solutions to emerging challenges. During the last two decades, decisions to engage in military operations and missions were led by an adaptive approach, which transformed the EU. New domains of stability were created, and the EU took a new trajectory to retain its initial aim of being a relevant security provider. Until today, EU military engagement has not reached the level that was initially expected, at least in the eyes of the public situated outside Europe. But the shortcomings should not necessarily trigger pessimism. In fact, the complexity theory allows for an optimistic perspective on the future since it indicates that contingent events bring about opportunities for developing new strategies, structures, skills, and norms (see Kavalski 2015). In terms of security and defense, optimism becomes even more necessary in light of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Remembering Jean Monnet's assertions that Europe was "built up through crises" and that "it would be the sum of the solutions brought to these crises" (Commission of the European Communities 1989), the EU is certainly likely to continue to resist, evolve, and adapt. As the world becomes ever more complex, the EU will keep transforming its military operations and missions in the face of new challenges.

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PART III

Policy Reach: Focus on Health and Comparative Methods

Introduction

Qun CUI[1]*, Lisheng DONG*[2]*, and Jia XU*[3]

The two chapters in this section aim to answer a broad research question from an international perspective: to what extent does integrated healthcare policy reform impact policy design and people's living conditions? Integrated healthcare reforms have aimed at addressing global concerns about the consequences of the demographic and epidemiological transitions, taking into account the increased threat of fragmented healthcare service delivery and mounting healthcare expenditures. Through a comparative lens, the chapters here focus on the Chinese and European welfare states to address why integrated healthcare reform is key, the different reform paths taken, and their policy outcomes. The chapters provide new insight into—and social recognition of—the specific social policy fields that currently affect the directions taken in healthcare policy development globally and the populations at risk for sliding into poverty based on access to healthcare. These issues were already relevant before COVID-19 and have remained so during the pandemic. Together, the two chapters also present deviations regarding the definition of policy integration. The chapter on the "Relationship between Poverty Risk and Access to Healthcare in Germany and China during the COVID-19 Pandemic" focuses on policy integration of healthcare policy and long-term care policy fields, addressing how they are integrated with regard to the risk low-income people face of falling into poverty. The chapter "Comparing Policies and Strategies for Integrated Care Reforms in China and Norway" centers on healthcare policy integration reform at different levels of medical care institutions before COVID-19 and discusses the impact of integrated care reform on policy implementers. Both chapters use an international comparative perspective to compare healthcare policy in China with that in Germany and Norway, respectively.

Comparing Germany with China is particularly significant because the two countries share a similar social insurance regulation system and hold strong cultural values of family solidarity; however, they experienced different policy outcomes in the fight against COVID-19. Germany can learn from the Chinese government's support for a flexible

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healthcare policy scheme that lies within the structured social insurance system. This will be important for facing issues arising in a post-pandemic world. Conversely, China can learn from Germany's effective integration of specific policy fields to support the role of a welfare state in poverty risk prevention. The second comparison, between China and Norway, is also pertinent since both countries have been considered "reluctant reformers" in integrated care reform, which has facilitated and shaped a shift in global healthcare policy practice with pattern deviations. Moreover, both countries have implemented reform at about the same time, the Norwegian Parliament passing a Coordination Reform in 2012, with implementation taking place in the same year, and China unveiling and prioritizing its multi-tier diagnosis and treatment reforms in 2015. The comparative work in this chapter interrogates the policy rhetoric of this transition and examines areas of divergence in reform strategies between China and Norway.

Until now, most available studies on integrated care reform have focused on comparing OECD countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, to each other. Some studies have sought an understanding of integrated reform in low-to-middle income countries, but these are too diverse and fragmented to provide an overall vision of global health policy processes. Overall, this section of the book argues not only that there is a need for more case studies on integrated care reforms outside Europe and North America, but also that studies that compare the strategies for integrated care reform across high-income countries are particularly valuable. In addition, previous research has frequently proposed service provisions, financing, and the regulation of social policy systems as appropriate analytical dimensions for healthcare systems or long-term care policy. However, few studies have systematically examined the extent to which healthcare systems are linked to the risk of low-income groups of falling into poverty. Furthermore, little is known about the influence of differentiated levels of welfare in healthcare systems on poverty risk conditions in low-income groups (specifically, access to healthcare services and long-term care insurance, as well as the extent of benefits). Therefore, analyzing how a healthcare system contributes to poverty risk prevention in low-income populations helps highlight and explain differing cross-national policy outcomes, especially during the COVID-19 crisis. Against this background, the second study in this section argues that low-income people's hypothetical poverty risk is markedly correlated to the generosity dimensions of a healthcare system and that integration of long-term care insurance has a significant impact on poverty risk. The study introduces an analytical framework to examine the hypothetical poverty risk of low-income people bound by differing healthcare policy dimensions and compares two healthcare systems that practice a similar type of social insurance but are based on different traditions.

6 Integrated Care Reforms
Comparing Policies and Strategies in China and Norway

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Abstract: Integrated care reforms have been introduced across the globe in the face of demographic and epidemiological transitions, increasing threats of fragmented healthcare delivery, and mounting healthcare expenditure. Although these reforms have facilitated and shaped a shift in global healthcare policy and practice, the pace and pattern of reform adoption have differed across various countries. Among them, both China and Norway have been considered "reluctant reformers." This chapter interrogates the policy rhetoric in this transition and examines areas of divergence in reform strategies between both country. Using the structural-instrumental and cultural-institutional perspectives, this study traces the reform process in both nations and analyzes how China and Norway have initiated and implemented their respective integrated care reforms, concluding that Norway's path has been smoother that China's due to existing formal structures and cultural acceptance, while China has faced complex governance challenges and the risk of symbolic implementation.

Integrated Care Reform: Exploring Convergences and Divergences

In 2009, the Chinese central government increased investment in primary healthcare as it introduced the concept of integration in its new healthcare reform documents. This effort led to the formal launch of the "Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment Reform" in 2015. Similarly, in Norway, the "Coordination Reform" was passed by Parliament in 2009 and implemented in 2012, aiming to improve coordination between primary and specialist care sectors. One of the lessons learned from COVID-19 is that multi-actor and multi-level entities, i.e., hospitals, community health centers, CDCs, home care agencies, and nursing homes, among others, must work together to ensure public health, although this need existed already before the pandemic. Today, in the context of demographic and epidemiological transitions, increasingly fragmented healthcare delivery, and mounting

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healthcare expenditures, "integrated care" (IC) has become a global buzzword in policy-making. IC aims at transforming global health delivery to make it more collaborative. In support of this transformation, "reformists" focus on reinventing the health system holistically to facilitate the provision of

> health services that are managed and delivered in a way that ensures people receive a continuum of health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment, disease management, rehabilitation and palliative care services, at the different levels and sites of care within the health system. (WHO 2015)

IC has already driven and shaped major policies and practical changes across both high-functioning health systems and those of middle-income countries (Kodner 2009; World Bank 2019), demonstrating its universal applicability. However, individual countries have acted according to their specific contexts and interests, resulting in varying levels and speeds of engagement in IC reforms. Some countries, such as the UK, with its primary care trusts and integrated care teams, the US, with its patient-centered medical homes and accountable care organizations, and Sweden, with its personal coordinated care plans, have all acted quickly to implement revolutionary changes in their health systems; others have been more cautious, initiating reforms later and progressing more slowly and incrementally.

IC reform entails a shift in the public sector beyond the new public management (NPM) approach. NPM emerged in the 1980s to enhance institutional autonomy, private sector practices, and a leaner state. It sought better performance measurement, accountability, and market-oriented reforms to boost efficiency and reduce costs. Later, in the 1990s, the concepts of governance, networks, partnerships, and trust were embraced. Thus, post-NPM measures were implemented, characterized by an increased focus on integration, networks, and horizontal coordination (Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Christensen and Lægreid 2015). In this context, integrated care reform arose to address both medical and public management issues. Different countries vary in their motivations to initiate reforms, in their project design and implementation, and in their reform outcomes.

A cross-national comparative approach allows for the unveiling of significant similarities across different countries but also variations in their approach to IC. So far, studies have only focused on comparing OECD countries among themselves, for example Germany, the Netherlands, and England (Johri et al. 2003; Mur-Veeman et al. 2008; Nolte et al. 2016; Baxter et al. 2018). While a few researchers have sought to understand IC reform in low- and middle-income (LMIC) countries, conclusions have been too scattered and fragmented to provide an overall vision of global health policy processes (Gilson and Raphaely 2008). The scope of these studies has often been limited to local case studies, such as the experience of tiered healthcare delivery system in the Luohu district of Shenzhen city (China) and that of laboratory innovations in chronic conditions in the municipality of Santo Antônio do Monte (Brazil) (Wang

et al. 2018; Mendes et al. 2019). In this chapter, we advocate for the necessity of additional case studies in LMICs and show that comparing reform strategies in LMICs to those in high-income countries is particularly valuable to more generally understand IC reform rhetoric, decision-making, implementation, and results in different socio-economic contexts.

This research compares IC reforms in China and Norway. China, as the world's most populous developing country with over 1.4 billion people, faces enormous healthcare demands and issues of resource distribution imbalance. In contrast, Norway, a wealthy Nordic European country with a population of only about 5.4 million, benefits from a highly developed healthcare system and extensive public health experience. The vast difference in population size means that China's challenges are more complex and that implementation of healthcare reforms is more diverse, while Norway, with its smaller population and less hierarchical public sector system, can implement reforms more swiftly. Moreover, Norway has benefitted from higher levels of medical resources per capita than China. For example, in 2015, the number of physicians per 1000 people was 1.8 in China versus 4.4 in Norway, and in 2016, the proportion of total government spending on health was 58 percent in China compared to 85 percent in Norway.

Regarding health insurance, both China and Norway rely primarily on social insurance, providing most residents extensive coverage to ensure access to basic medical services. Before 2016, China's health insurance schemes differed in rural and urban areas, based on the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS) for rural residents, the Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI), and the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) for urban employees and residents. In January 2016, the government unified the NRCMS and URBMI into the Urban and Rural Resident Medical Insurance system, moving towards universal health coverage (UHC) (Hao and Yu 2023; Liu et al. 2017; Yip et al. 2023). However, significant disparities in reimbursement rates remain. In Norway, all residents are covered under the National Insurance Scheme (NIS) managed by the Norwegian Health Economics Administration (HELFO). The health insurance system guarantees near-complete coverage for inpatients and high coverage for outpatient care. Most private health financing comes from households' out-of-pocket payments, mainly for pharmaceuticals, dental care, and long-term care (Saunes et al. 2020).

Despite significant differences in economic development, population size, and medical resources between the two countries, comparing China's and Norway's IC reforms is highly relevant and meaningful. Indeed, both countries face similar challenges in terms of an aging population, high incidence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), and growing economic pressures. In China, the percentage of people aged 60 years or over was 16.7 percent in 2016. In Norway, around the same time, 11 percent of the population was over seventy, a sign of "deep aging." NCDs represent the first health threat, causing more than 85 percent of total deaths in both countries, with increasing numbers of people suffering from chronic, complex illnesses. Moreover, both China and Norway have sought to maximize the value of health output. In

China, the hospital-centric system is characterized by weak provider integration and gate keeping, medical over-servicing, diagnostic tests, and high-technology services caused by improper provider payment incentives, which are all largely responsible for unnecessary health expenditures. In recent years, GDP growth in China has slowed down, but cost escalation is not likely to follow suit (World Bank 2019). In contrast, in Norway, health expenditure stood at 9.7 percent of GDP in 2014, but Bjarne Håkon Hansen, who served as Minister of Health and Care, expressed concerns that too much money was not well spent and indicated that the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare system and the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme for future generations were in jeopardy. Increasingly diverse health needs, complex medical scenarios, and varied health risks have challenged healthcare cultures, organizations, and previously implemented policies. Both countries have pursued IC reforms to address these issues. China unveiled an ambitious national healthcare reform plan in 2009 that culminated with the prioritization of a "Multi-tier Diagnosis and Treatment Reform" in 2015 when a national scale policy experiment was started. In Norway, a national scale "Coordination Reform" was passed by the Parliament in 2009 and implemented in 2012.

This chapter reviews the relevant literature on public management reform to establish a theoretical basis for comparing IC reforms in China and Norway. It then analyzes the history and process of these reforms through secondary sources such as government policy documents, research reports, and media content. In particular, two central government documents—China's *Policy Guidance on Promoting Multi-tier Diagnosis and Treatment System* (Guo Ban Fa, No. 70) and Norway's *The Coordination Reform: Proper treatment at the right place and right time* (Report No. 47, 2008–2009)—detail how top-level IC institutional design must abide by certain principles, goals, paths, and evaluations. This examination highlights useful points of convergence and divergence, analyzed through the structural-instrumental and cultural-institutional perspectives. Finally, this chapter includes a comparison of rhetoric, decision-making, practice, and results, confirming that while China and Norway share similar objectives and approaches in their pursuit of integrated care reforms, they diverge significantly in the implementation phase. China's main challenges are in achieving uniform reforms across the nation, with reforms incurring the risk of becoming merely symbolic in some regions, whereas Norway's reforms have been smoother, relying on efficient formal structures and greater cultural acceptance. The comparison underscores the importance of balancing formal structures and cultural factors, emphasizing that effective integrated care reform requires addressing governance issues, building mutual trust among reform agents, and ensuring active participation from all stakeholders.

Public Management Reform Theory: Understanding Cross-countries Convergences and Divergences

Over the past four decades, there have been two waves of public management reforms: new public management (NPM) and post-NPM. Scholars have debated

extensively on the degree of convergence and divergence of these reforms worldwide. Some have supported the convergence thesis, which proposes that such processes are underway in different countries (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Kettl (2005) has described the NPM movement as "striking" because of the number of nations that have taken up the reform agenda in such a short time and because of how similar their basic strategies have been. Halligan (2007) has advanced that post-NPM trends have emerged and that commonalities represent an "emergent" or "new model." In contrast, other scholars have argued for the divergence thesis, highlighting hybridity and complexity, and suggested that the process is messier and more varied than a simple shift to either NPM or post-NPM. One compelling factor is that public management reform goes through different stages: talk, decision, practice, and results. "Talk" means that an increasing number of people discuss a particular reform idea; "decision" implies that the authorities publicly decide to adopt a particular reform; "practice" refers to the public sector's incorporation of the reform into daily operational practices; and "results" are the outcomes of the actions of public agencies yielded by the reform (Pollitt and Geert 2011). It is easier to analyze announcements and decisions than to examine operational practices and final outcomes, which can exaggerate the real degree of "convergence" in public management reform internationally (Pollitt and Geert 2011).

To describe the degree of convergence and divergence, two points should be considered. First, rhetoric and action must be separated because there are many gaps, divisions, and outright failures that stand between the announcement of a reform policy and the successful implementation of that policy (Pollitt 2001). Indeed, reforms can be merely symbolic. Unlike the substantive outcomes of policy-making and policy implementation, reform policies and programs are often presented with hype, rituals, myths, ceremonies, metaphors, and rhetoric based on symbolic norms and values (March and Olsen 1989; Power 1997). The use of symbols has the potential to arouse support for reforms, but not all symbols are translated into programs, projects, or activities leading to practice and effects (Brunsson and Olsen 2018; Christensen and Lægreid 2003). Therefore, the degree of symbol-practice coupling can vary significantly, leading to divergences. Second, policy experimentation must be considered since it has been a global strategy in reform-making and implementation, but the initiator and the results of experiments can be different. Experiments may entail spontaneous activities from lower-level and smaller-scale organizations or sophisticated plans from top-level government agencies. Reforms can be initiated by single institutions (hospitals), medium-sized entities (municipalities or counties), or large units (national alliances and countries). Complex reforms occur on multiple scales and involve numerous experiments. Different countries might similarly introduce policy experimentation in the reform process, but divergences may emerge when comparing the specific actors and results of these experiments.

Once cross-national convergences and divergences are highlighted, we draw from the transformative approach in organization theory to analyze the complex and dynamic reform process. Accordingly, we use the structural-instrumental and cultural-institutional perspectives to explore how reform actors are influenced by their respective

contexts. The structural-instrumental perspective emphasizes that the formal-normative structure of public administration influences reform processes by channeling attention and shaping frames of reference and attitudes among the political and administrative leadership (Christensen et al. 2016; Egeberg 2012). Reform occurs as a result of deliberate design, collective action, and rational adjustment that alter the rules on either a vertical or horizontal level. In a vertical multi-layer hierarchy, leaders' control and analytical–rational calculations are central. In a horizontal organization, compromises are negotiated between organizations and actors with partially conflicting goals and interests (Christensen and Lægreid 2007). The cultural-institutional perspective highlights the influences of informal values and norms that are rooted in the historical and institutional traditions of political-administrative systems. This perspective underscores that reforms follow gradual and evolutionary institutionalization processes that reflect mutual adaptation to internal and external pressures leading to the development of unique cultural features or identities (Christensen et al. 2007; Selznick 2011). From this perspective, divergences across countries can be tremendously affected by cultural compatibility. High compatibility and consistency across the values that underlay the reforming and cultural traditions of a particular system lead to higher acceptance by politicians, administrators, entrepreneurs, citizens, and other stakeholders, while low compatibility leads to rejection, resistance, or slow and pragmatic adaptation of reforms (Brunsson and Olsen 2018W; Christensen et al. 2008). While cultural traits are difficult to summarize, researchers have identified distinct administrative traditions—Anglo-American, Napoleonic, Germanic, and Scandinavian—that are built into institutional structures, procedures, and ways of thinking (Painter and Peters 2010).

Based on this public management reform theory and transformative approach, comparative hypotheses can be elaborated. Hypothesis 1 proposes that China and Norway are convergent in their IC symbolic rhetoric and experimentation strategies. Both China's centralized authoritarian system and Norway's democratic system require policies that effectively address healthcare challenges. The easiest solution is to "borrow" global technical remedies, especially when international institutions like the World Health Organization (WHO) keep "selling" integrated care reform ideas and packages. To attract domestic support for reforms and enhance reform legitimacy, political and administrative leaders have tended to label IC reform as modern and rational and present reforms as a path to increased equality and efficiency. Another solution arises from policy experimentation. Due to the lack of unified standards, tools, paths, and mechanisms for IC, and the need for multi-departmental and multi-level coordination, local pilot schemes become an effective experimentation strategy. In both countries, local pilot schemes can be initiated before central policy changes and nationwide implementation, either through the centralized control and monitoring of reform progress in China or local autonomy and multi-party cooperation in Norway.

Although convergence is highly possible, reforms must suit the context of the countries in which they are implemented along a wide variety of historical traditions and political-administrative structures. Therefore, hypothesis 2 proposes that China and Norway could be divergent on IC implementation processes and outcomes.

According to the structural-instrumental perspective, reform processes in public organizations are influenced by formal structures. China's authoritarian one-party system provides tighter control than Norway's parliamentary multi-party representative democratic system. In China, reforms are primarily implemented through top-down vertical hierarchies emphasizing leadership control and centralization. Hence, China could be advantaged in the acceleration of the transformative process. However, weak coordination in China's complex, multi-sectoral and multilevel system often hinders implementation. Additionally, local variations can significantly impact the effectiveness of centrally promoted measures, and the gap between promises and performances and between rhetoric and action could be wide as to make reform appear merely symbolic (Christensen and Lægreid 2003). In contrast, Norway's local governments have a high degree of autonomy that allows them to adjust policy implementation according to specific local conditions and realities.

Furthermore, the cultural-institutional perspective provides an understanding of cultural features, such as trust relations and informal norms, that can contribute to successful reform paths and results. Distrust over specialization and managerialism can bring internal resistance to IC within an agency and eventually lead to contradictions between the official discourse about the reform and action. It may also lead to the failure of local experiments and missed opportunities for their diffusion to other places. China's tradition of collectivism and authority makes it easy for reforms to gain support from politicians and administrators but challenges implementation at the institutional level. Norway's tradition of social democracy and cooperation allows reforms to gain acceptance among various stakeholders, including healthcare institutions, but the complexity of negotiation and compromise processes could lead to slower implementation.

Discourse, Decision, Practice, and Results of Integrated Care Reform in China and Norway

To understand how much institutional change has occurred and what pattern it has followed, it is necessary to first look back at China's and Norway's respective healthcare reform histories in the last half-century. Figure 1 shows that both China and Norway have oscillated between a focus on equality and efficiency and state and market action in the course of healthcare reform. From the 1950s to the 1970s, China implemented a state-run and centralized health system, which provided rather fair but inefficient and low-quality health services. In the 1980s and 1990s, when the government decentralized certain responsibilities to lower-level administrations, individuals, and hospitals, the supply of medical services increased but health budgets allocated by local governments became insufficient, as hospitals became profit-seeking, which increased patients' out-of-pocket expenses. The SARS crisis in 2003 and resulting social discontent put pressure on the government to return as the central healthcare provider, leading to the launching of ambitious institutional reforms. One notable reform that continues to shape reforms

today was the 2009 "New Health Care Reform," which addressed health insurance, essential medicines, primary healthcare, and hospitals.

In Norway, a universal health insurance system was established in the late 1940s to ensure that all citizens receive basic healthcare services. Norway's socio-economic context is characterized as a welfare model with heavy government investment, high levels of access for all, and equitable and balanced healthcare services provision. In 1982, Norway introduced the Municipal Health Care Act, which decentralized healthcare responsibilities to municipal governments. Furthermore, early in the 2000s structural changes were made in the delivery and organization of healthcare services (Johnsen et al. 2006). The 2002 Hospital Reform transferred hospital management from county governments to the central government through five new Regional Health Enterprises (RHEs), which were granted management independence and tasked with overseeing hospital ownership and operations. Additionally, a strict performance evaluation system was introduced to improve hospital operations and service efficiency. This reform has been interpreted as a hybrid reform, as it prescribes both centralization—by transferring ownership from the regional level to the Ministry of Health—and decentralization—by changing hospitals' status from public administration bodies to autonomous health enterprises (Laegreid et al. 2005).

Reform patterns in China and Norway have been part of a general trend in reform that seeks to move control from state to market mechanisms, in an attempt to correct NPM-inspired reforms and quasi-market ideas and practices to move toward more fairness and people-centeredness. However, compared to China's pendulum swings between state and market, Norway's changes have been less drastic.

Figure 1: Timeline of healthcare reform in China and Norway





Source: The authors, based on Duckett (2012); Lian (2003); Laegreid et al. (2005); and Johnsen et al. (2006).

In our comparison of IC in China and Norway we focus on discourse, decision, practice, and results. In both countries, the healthcare system has experienced imbalances and fragmentation between different levels of care, so that resources and responsibility have shifted away from hospital-based care and toward community-based care. In China, a clear hierarchy exists across medical service tiers providers. Chinese healthcare organizations are either hospitals or grassroots healthcare institutions. Hospitals, in turn, comprise three levels, while grassroots healthcare institutions constitute community-based and township health centers and clinics. Tertiary hospitals, which benefit from the best doctors and equipment are the most attractive to patients, while community health centers are easily marginalized and neglected. In 2009, China launched a national healthcare reform that aimed to provide affordable and equitable healthcare to all citizens. The "Opinions on Deepening the Healthcare System Reform" was the first document produced by the central government to articulate the concept of integrated healthcare services. Since then, considerable resources have been diverted into grassroots healthcare institutions to improve their status and capacity. In Norway, the system follows a two-level model of primary and specialized healthcare with different sources of funding and administrative, political, and professional cultures (Romøren et al. 2011), which makes vertical inter-organizational coordination challenging. Health budgets and policy initiatives have been directed mainly toward specialized hospital care, creating competition and imbalance between primary and more specialized levels of care (Krasnik and Paulsen 2009). Thus, in 2003, the Wisløff Committee was appointed by the government to identify coordination problems in the Norwegian health sector and propose practical solutions to strengthen coordination across the whole service system (Romøren et al. 2011).

In both China's and Norway's reforms, the transition "talk" stage lasted for years. It entailed assessing the fragmentation of healthcare systems and formulating a vision for more integrated and coordinated health services, until the "decision" stage, during which the reform framework was designed and national policies were announced. In 2015, the General Office of the State Council in China issued a central policy specifically focused on integrated care: the "Hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment Reform." This hierarchical care system emphasizes community health centers and encourages patients with chronic conditions to first seek care from a primary-level institution. A dual referral system ensures that critical conditions are immediately addressed through high-level hospitals before patients are referred back to the community level for rehabilitation. This system promotes intra-level collaboration among medical institutions (General Office of the State Council).

In Norway, the Ministry of Health and Care Services initiated the "Coordination Reform," which was passed by the Norwegian Parliament in June 2009 (it was formally launched in 2012). This reform highlights that more patients should be cared for in primary health institutions and that discharges from intensive care hospitals should take place earlier in the care process. Recommendations are made based on the premise that municipalities are rewarded for investing in prevention and reducing patients' need for specialist services. Hospitals and municipalities are encouraged to collaborate, as patients are quickly returned from specialist care to the municipal level for follow-up care (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services).

Local policy experimentation plays an important role in the implementation stage of reforms in China and Norway, as it can validate the effectiveness and adaptability of central reforms (Table 1). In China, local governments, particularly their health-related departments, initiate implementation, focusing on governance mechanisms that promote integration. In Norway, the Norwegian Directorate of Health and professional and health organizations lead the process, accenting the development of methodologies, practical tools, and service models. Before the Coordination Reform was passed in Norway, numerous local projects had been spontaneously launched by hospital leaders, primary healthcare authorities, and professionals such as practice consultants and coordinators (PCs) in health enterprises (Romøren et al. 2011). In China, policy experimentation at the regional level has also played a significant role and has been emphasized by the central government, which has continued to expand the scope of policy experiments, for example by piloting various medical alliance projects in 118 cities, two provinces, and 567 counties.

Table 1: Integrated Care Reform Pilots in China and Norway

Country	Date	Local Pilot Program	Motivation	Initiator	Key Measures	Outcomes
China	February 2015	Tianchang Medical Consortium (Yu et al. 2020)	Patients sought treatment outside their county of residence, spending more medical insurance funds.	Tianchang Health Department, Anhui Health Commission	Three hospitals formed medical service communities with multiple township health centers and village clinics, integrating county, township, and village level medical institutions. Implementation of government prepaid medical insurance funds and public health service funds per capita in communities, allowing internal distribution of surplus funds.	By the end of October 2016, the county-level treatment rate reached 92.24%. Recognized and promoted by the National Health Commission. Created a model for county-level hierarchical diagnosis and treatment.
China	August 2015	Luohu Medical Group (Wang et al. 2018)	District hospitals were small and similar, with repeated resource investment and stagnant development.	Sun Xizhuo, Chief Hospital Director of Luohu Medical Group	Established Luohu Medical Group with five district hospitals, 23 community health stations, and an institute of precision medicine. Formed six resource-sharing centers and six administrative centers by reorganizing 29 institutions. Recruited general practitioners nationwide with high salaries and formed family doctor service teams to provide chronic disease management and integrated medical care.	By July 2017, 39% of the population had signed contracts with primary healthcare teams. In September 2017, the National Health Commission and the State Council held a national conference in Luohu, promoting the "Luohu model" to other regions.
China	2012	Sanming Medical Reform	Rapid increase in healthcare expenses; medical insurance fund deficits; fiscal imbalance; high medical costs for patients; low doctors' income.	Zhan Jifu, Deputy Mayor of Sanming	At the county level, hospitals and primary health institutions joined to form county general hospitals. At the city level, the hospital was integrated with primary health institutions to form two city medical consortia.	Praised by President Xi Jinping. Included as a key task in the annual medical and health system reform plan for 2021, 2022, and 2024 by the State Council. In 2021, the National Health Commission issued a document promoting Sanming's hierarchical diagnosis and treatment and medical consortium construction experience, with 31 provinces formulating corresponding implementation plans.
Norway	April 2018–March 2023	Primary Healthcare Team (PHT) Pilot (Abelsen and Fosse 2024)	Patients' GP services in need of improvement.	Norwegian Directorate of Health	Expanded general practices with the hiring of nurses. PHTs were created that included GPs, nurses, and medical assistants and provided home visits and high-quality services, systematically and proactively addressing complex patient needs in four main categories: chronic diseases, mental health, frailty in the elderly, and developmental disorders/disabilities.	Well-functioning PHTs can provide good-quality primary care and increase job satisfaction for team members. Realization that large-scale implementation may waste resources and create disparities.
Norway	2012	Cancer Coordinator (CC) Project (Lie 2018)	Growing need for patient-centered and coordinated care in primary healthcare.	Norwegian Cancer Society	Cancer coordinators guided, coordinated, and aligned resources throughout the cancer treatment process, focusing on both patient-level and system-level work. The project promoted improvements in cancer care systems by mobilizing necessary assets and adopting a salutogenic approach.	Effectively promoted cancer care system improvements.

Source: The authors

From a comparison of local-level experiments in the two countries emerge similarities and differences; the same is true in the practical organizational models and strategies supporting those experiments. In China, the core organizational models of the hierarchical diagnosis and treatment reform are twofold. One model relies on the idea of the urban medical group, usually led by tertiary public hospitals. Within this group, collaboration takes place on issues of personnel, technology, diagnostics, prescriptions, and services among community health service institutions, nursing homes, rehabilitation institutions, and other entities. The other model is the county-level medical consortium, which integrates county hospitals, township health centers, and village clinics under a unified management. Although the degree of integration varies across both models, they follow a hierarchical structure where stronger institutions support weaker ones (Wu et al. 2022). Norway's coordination reform, while also focusing on vertical integration, involves redistributing administrative duties and cooperation across municipalities and regional health authorities.

Moreover, to remodel a system in which patients receive the right treatment at the right place and right time, both China and Norway have transitioned their existing payment models to better incorporate economic incentives. China has focused on incentivizing healthcare institutions, while Norway has targeted municipal governments. In China, medical insurance payments transitioned from a fee-for-service (FFS) system to a pre-payment system to guide healthcare institutions. The FFS system had led to excessive treatments and a 44.28 percent annual growth rate in medical insurance expenditures from 1998 to 2008. Therefore, in June 2017 the central government proposed a diversified composite payment method that included diagnosis-related group (DRG) payments for hospitals to ensure necessary treatments and capitation payments for primary healthcare institutions to boost community health services (Zheng and Wei 2024; Li et al. 2023). In Norway, the healthcare system has used an activity-based funding (ABF) system, combining capitation-based block grants and DRGs. These mechanisms link funding to treatment types and quantities. While they have promoted hospital efficiency they have historically not provided incentives for coordination outside hospitals. To improve this situation, new measures include municipal co-financing (MCF) and municipal acute units (MAUs). MCF requires municipalities to cover 20 percent of certain DRG costs, such as hospital rehabilitation, to encourage local primary care services. MAUs manage acute conditions locally, which results in reducing unnecessary hospital admissions and promoting integrated care (Monkerud and Tjerbo 2016; La Rocca and Hoholm 2017). Another point of divergence between China and Norway is that in China the reform included administrative-led measures, with the government dominating the establishment of medical groups. In Norway, legal and regulatory means—such as binding agreements between municipalities and regional health authorities—were used to detail how specialist healthcare services must decentralize outpatient clinics, expertise and knowledge transfer, the provision of internships, and the use of general practitioners, in a two-level model that strengthens coordination.

In reforms, the "results" phase is the most important. However, since both the hierarchical Diagnosis and Treatment Reform (China) and Coordination Reform

(Norway) were launched only a few years ago, it is too early to conclude whether China and Norway have succeeded or failed at reducing healthcare fragmentation. Currently, preliminary evaluation results are mixed. On the one hand, some studies show that reforms have increased primary care utilization, improved equity, and enhanced health outcomes for people with hypertension or diabetes. On the other hand, studies indicate some challenges in implementation. For example, while the ratio of senior citizens with chronic illnesses in China who signed contracts with family doctors increased from 28.33 percent in 2015 to 75.46 percent in 2017, most people still go to the hospital for specialized care instead of seeing their family doctor as an initial step. Moreover, coordination among the different actors remains insufficient, and integrated care still has a long way to go. In Norway, the reform has achieved some of its intended goals, such as fewer deaths and hospital readmissions among the elderly, although in some municipalities collaboration in transferring patients to hospitals has weakened (Bruvik et al. 2017) and general practitioners have had negative experiences working with their hospital-based colleagues (Leonardsen et al. 2018). Additionally, it is found that information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure and elite medical specialties in major hospitals and health centers may resist cooperation (Dan 2017).

Comparing the rhetoric, decision-making process, practice, and results of integrated care reforms in China and Norway confirms the hypothesis that these two countries converge in their objectives and prospects, as well as in the adoption of experimental approaches to reform. However, they diverge significantly in practice, with China facing more challenges in implementation across the national scale and a higher risks that the reform become merely symbolic practice at the local level.

Instrumental-structural and Cultural-institutional Perspectives for IC Reforms in China and Norway

In both China and Norway, central leaders have had a noticeable influence on reforms. From an instrumental-structural perspective, strong hierarchical steering or negotiating among top political and administrative leaders can accelerate reform agendas (March and Olsen 1983). Chinese President Xi proposed "Health China 2030" in 2016, a new national strategy and the most important political impetus for IC reform. At the same time, a joint report by the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and three Chinese ministries (the Ministry of Finance, National Health and Family Planning Commission, and Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security) recommended that China establish a new model—the "People-Centered Integrated Care" (PCIC)—to strengthen the core position of primary health services. Vice Premier Liu Yandong considered that the recommendations would be valuable in the formulation of the "13th Five-Year" health reform plan (Xinhua News Agency 2016), underscoring the crucial influence international organizations have had on China's reform agenda. In Norway, the Minister of Health and Care in 2008, Bjarne Håkon Hansen, set coordination in health and long-term care as his main foci and political priorities, and he engaged in working

out the new plans for the Coordination Reform very soon after taking office (Romøren et al. 2011).

In China, although central leaders have played an important role in initiating the reform process, implementation has occurred via complex governmental structures. Indeed, the Chinese healthcare reform has relied on numerous cabinets and their counterparts at the sub-central level. Some of these institutions are more influential than others. For example, the National Health and Family Planning Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security office all weigh heavily on policy. The "super-department system reform" of 2018 established two additional departments to lead policy-making- the Health Commission and Health Insurance Bureau- as IC reform in China addresses concerns about supervision, financial support, human resources, investment and pricing, and medical insurance. A political and administrative structure that has diverse, overlapping, and potentially competing organizational dimensions (Olsen 2010) can create challenges in the reform process. To realize overall coordination in political and administrative structure, the Chinese government established a coordinating group that gathers multiple departments related to healthcare reform at both the central and local level. Unfortunately, because it is only temporary, the connection between the various members of this group is quite loose. Moreover, one government department leader might be serving in several coordinating groups in various reform areas. The effects of this mechanism have not been convincing. An alternative would be to develop a strong political impetus at the local level; however, policies are mostly formulated by the health department, and successes have varied across regions. For example, the regions of Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang have had positive reform outcome, with the support of their respective provincial party secretaries who prioritized healthcare reform and negotiated agreements among departments and interest groups. Findings show that collaboration is necessary among departments and multi-level administrators for IC reform, or changes are only symbolic.

Turning to Norway, the political and administrative structure there appears less complex, since Norway's healthcare system is organized around primary healthcare providers as part of the responsibility of municipalities and specialist health services (hospitals), which are owned by the Ministry of Health. Yet, horizontal coordination among the different sectors can be difficult to attain at the central level. For example, the Ministry of Education and Research, responsible for planning and partially subsidizing the education of health personnel, may conflict with the National Insurance Administration, which provides significant financing for the activities of the health system. So, in general, Norway is characterized by relatively low coordination levels across the internal administrative hierarchy within each ministerial area (Lægreid et al. 2016). Because the Minister of Health has the authority to overrule all structural decisions that have been made at a lower level, the central government likely gives more weight to cost and quality of specialized care than to that of primary care (Iversen et al. 2016). But in the first wave of the New Public Management reform, Norway adopted many formal instruments, such as a performance management system and formal steering dialogue pathway. These measures have introduced more network arrangements in the shadow of the hierarchy

and have built a good foundation for agencies and ministries to merge during the second wave of post-NPM reform. The use of cross-boundary collegial bodies, such as working groups and project groups that transcend policy areas and administrative levels, is also rather common in Norway (Lægreid et al. 2016).

The last factor that can be analyzed is whether IC reform was already part of the institutional landscape in each country at stake. During the 1990s, China broke its system of strict gatekeeping, referral, patient discharge, and handover and let healthcare organizations make profits as if they were corporations. In order for institutions to value cooperation again, China needed to revise the design of many detailed standards, norms, regulations, and laws. In contrast, rather than entirely rebuilding its system, Norway only needed to improve it. Indeed, that system was already stable and comprehensive because it already imposed limits on patients' visits to specialists and had developed clinical pathways.

Moreover, informal integration—based on culture—is important, as it serves as "institutional glue" and reaches beyond formal structural boundaries (Christensen and Lægreid 2020). This "horizontal width" (Krasner 1988) means that when actors care about what occurs in other units within their respective organizations, collective action will be enhanced. Three main actors have been involved in IC reform in China and Norway. First, the "regulators" are government entities that invest in and purchase healthcare services and manage and supervise healthcare providers. Second, the "providers" are multi-level and multi-type healthcare organizations that provide healthcare products and services. Finally, the "service objects" are the citizens/patients who need a variety of healthcare products and services, including health enhancement, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment, disease management, rehabilitation, and palliative care. From the perspective of the regulators, China has established a modern administrative system, but it inherited the characteristics of "factionalism" from its long history of bureaucracy, which has caused long-term damage in trust among administrations at different levels of government or in different categories. In contrast, Norway is characterized by high level of mutual trust and understanding across the local, regional, and central levels in the health policy sector, which means that homogeneity in norms and values presents less of a potential conflict or tension (Christensen et al. 2006). Moreover, in Norway, the relationship between regulators and health professionals is highly professional, although political endeavors can sometimes result in compromise solutions that are not in harmony with professional values concerning what yields high-quality healthcare (Ahgren 2014).

In China, the ability to engage in reform has been challenged by the legacy of the "command and control" approach, as well as by the subordinate role hospitals play in policy-making. The current internal driving force for reform comes from local governments rather than medical institutions themselves. Only hospitals seem to participate in IC reform, but the top-down administrative intervention and mandatory integration prevents most of them from implementing new policies. For example, while all public medical institutions are administered by the government, the bargaining power of medical institutions differs. For instance, the president of a large hospital has much more influence than the head of a community health center. This power differential

may explain why some of the policies that favor lower-level medical institutions meet difficulty in implementation. By contrast, in Norway's corporative political system, it is quite common that various interest groups shape policy. For example, before the government proposed its Coordination Reform, there had already been extensive rounds of consultations with stakeholders and parliamentary debates on the issue (Pedersen 2012). In particular, medical professionals in Norway have been able to influence health policy through their institutional integration into the state machinery (Erichsen 1995).

When examining the providers' perspective, it appears that a competitive culture is at the root of the Chinese health system. Although the Chinese government tried to transfer high-quality resources from large hospitals to the grassroots level, some hospitals siphoned off patients and medical personnel from the local community to grow even larger. In China, there is also a lack of consensus between specialists and GPs about how to evaluate diseases and when to refer patients. However, unbalanced power and poor communication also exist in Norway's two-tier model. There, primary healthcare professionals face a fragmented hospital system, which makes it difficult for them to know with whom to communicate or collaborate (Wadmann et al. 2009). While China's cultural harmony is mainly caused by competitive interest among healthcare institutions, Norway's is due to professional disjunction. Thus, in Norway, the way professionals protect their respective domains, whether they are involved in specialist or primary care, could limit their reciprocal understanding of actors' needs, resulting in insufficient coordination (Colmorten et al. 2004).

There are also cultural differences in citizens' preferences and level of involvement in the healthcare reform process in the two countries. In the past few decades, the Chinese have shown to prefer seeking care at large hospitals. Because the classification of healthcare organizations has been based on an administrative hierarchy rather than on medical disciplines, and because higher quality resources have been concentrated in tertiary hospitals at the top level of healthcare organizations, patients have made rational choices in a context in which the demand and supply of information in the health market is extremely asymmetrical. Therefore, it is anticipated that the Chinese government will struggle to incite citizens to trust and choose community healthcare institutions. The unequal relationship between hospitals and primary healthcare institutions also extends into the hierarchical diagnosis and treatment reform, potentially transforming vertical integration into a dependency relationship. In Norway, people have perceived positively the division of responsibility and labor based on specialization among general practitioners in clinics and specialists in hospitals. Additionally, there is no quality gap across services in Norway. Moreover, while both China and Norway characterize the philosophy behind IC reform as people-oriented, China, in its present stage of reform, regards citizens as subjects to be guided. For example, the reimbursement rates for hospital services differ and favor grassroots institutions. But little has been done to create opportunities for citizens' participation in IC reform. In contrast, the Coordination Reform in Norway has invited more involvement from Norwegian patients and citizens' organizations, which are encouraged to implement structures and systems for more cohesive patient pathways.

Balancing Structural Factors and Cultural Dynamics in Reforms

When comparing healthcare systems in China and Norway, a new paradigm of integrated care can be defined. Points of convergence emerge out of internal pressures to reach specific objectives in these respective national health systems. Both countries have used a similar policy rhetoric of integrated care to correct issues left over from previous NPM reform, such as increased heterogeneity among different healthcare organizations, weakened traditional values supporting public service (such as equal and convenient access to health), and fragmentation and departmental egoism in the healthcare management system. However, it can be concluded that Norway's path, although incremental, has been smoother than China's, and that China's reform route is more complex. There may be strong mobilization and administrative drive in China because of formal structures, but there is also ambiguity and discretion that lead to higher risks of regional disparity and mere symbolic implementation.

Formal structures are not merely the backdrop for reform implementation; they are, in fact, one of the critical factors determining the success or failure of reforms. The instrumental-structural perspective highlights that China's healthcare management system is consistent with the government's administrative management, which exhibits a hierarchical, organized, and multi-departmental cross-management style, as well as segmentation characteristics. China's reforms are not only about improving the relationship between healthcare institutions but are fundamentally about improving collaboration among departments and delegating power from the government to healthcare institutions, which comes with challenges. One the one hand, China's "command and control" approach significantly aids pilot projects. On the other hand, the top-down pressure also leads to symbolic implementation, where reforms appear to be in place but are not effectively executed at the grassroots level. Norway too faces challenges from unbalanced hierarchical structures and departmentalism across its leading agencies. But reform in Norway has benefitted from the pre-existence of efficient formal instruments and institutions that have allowed the government to launch and implement IC reform more efficiently than in China,

Divergence in the implementation of IC reforms in China and Norway can also be attributed to cultural and institutional factors. Culturally, China might meet invisible but lasting resistance to IC reform from a triangle of regulator-governments, provider-healthcare institutions, and service objects-citizens. There are four facets to the cultural incompatibilities that exist between IC reform and old informal institutions in China: the cultural legacy of a factionalist inner political-administrative system; command and control relationships between administrators and professionals; competition among healthcare organizations; and habitual preferences and participation level of citizens and patients. In Norway, IC reform is more culturally accepted, as it is compatible with historical traditions and reform path-dependency patterns that are based on a high level of mutual trust in and understanding of the healthcare system. Hence, reform agents' and stakeholders' reciprocal trust has more to do with chosen strategies and the pace of reform implementation in both China and Norway than the formal structures of

political-administrative systems that manage healthcare service provision. Comparing IC reforms in China and Norway highlights the importance of considering both formal structures and cultural factors in the reform process. Future reform efforts should address power relationships, governance structures, and management rules while also considering cultural compatibility tests to build mutual trust among reform agents. This approach may ensure that reforms are not only well designed but also effectively implemented and embraced by all actors.

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7 Poverty Risk and the Integration of Long-Term Care in Healthcare Policy in Germany and China During the COVID-19 Pandemic

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Abstract: This chapter compares how the German and Chinese healthcare systems differed in their impact on poverty risk among low-income people during the COVID-19 pandemic. It examines how long-term care policy in these two countries can support the population from such risk during pandemics, arguing that the interplay of healthcare and long-term care policy with regard to eligibility for and access to benefits is crucial to protect low-income individuals from the risk of falling into poverty.

Emergence of Poverty Risk During the COVID-19 Pandemic

In many countries, social welfare policies were enhanced in the fight against the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in the area of healthcare. The healthcare policy response to the COVID-19 crisis elicited significant discussions globally. A critical issue in this debate has been to identify how to limit low-income people's exposure to the risk of poverty, focusing on healthcare insurance and medical costs. The resources accessible to people in meeting their healthcare needs have been better defined during the crisis (e.g., Zhu et al. 2020), and the lack of access to care has been linked to people exhausting their personal resources to face medical expenses. During the pandemic, in areas where low-income people could barely obtain medical services, they faced the risk of poverty, or "hypothetical poverty." Comparisons can be useful to understand this relationship. This chapter reviews how Germany, a conservative European welfare state, and China, an Asian welfare state, have differed in their response to COVID-19 through institutional regulations aimed at preventing poverty risk among low-income population groups. The chapter contributes to this book on decentering the study of Europe by providing a comparative study between a country in Europe and a country outside of Europe and establishing a dialogue. The new insights illuminate the ways in which social welfare policy impacted poverty risk among low-income groups during the COVID-19 crisis.

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In an attempt to prevent the exposure to poverty risk of low-income population groups during the COVID-19 pandemic, China and Germany strengthened their public healthcare policy schemes to better cover medical-related costs, albeit with limitations. The Chinese public healthcare system is based primarily on universal design with targeted programs in local areas. Territories in different provinces may deviate from these programs, resulting in cross-regional variations that lead to differing coverage of self-paid medical cost across social groups. In China, additional benefits were added to healthcare coverage to include specific COVID-19-related expenses. As the first country experiencing the widespread breakout of COVID-19, China achieved early positive outcomes in its fight against the pandemic, including a cure rate of 94.3 percent nationally by early August 2020, with 70 percent of those recovering from the disease over 80 years of age (The State Council Information Office of China 2020). However, although the Chinese healthcare system, with its special COVID-19 policy schemes, covered all pandemic-related medical costs for seriously infected patients, it covered only 67 percent of medical expenses for those "not seriously infected" or only "possibly infected," resulting in poverty risk for low-income individuals in particular. We argue that it is China's lack of a long-term care (LTC) system to address healthcare needs in the context of COVID-19 infections that led to poverty risk for the Chinese low-income population.

In contrast, the German healthcare system is characterized by the coexistence of a public statutory health insurance (SHI) and a private healthcare insurance (PHI) system, where both inpatient and outpatient care are covered for every diagnostic group and for a broad array of preventive services. The German public SHI system, mostly publicly funded, offers universal health insurance coverage without upfront payments, a comprehensive bundle of benefits with comparably low cost-sharing requirements, and good access to care benefits. Compared to its European neighbors, Germany enjoyed positive outcomes in its response to the COVID-19 crisis in 2020. However, unlike in China, in Germany the healthcare policy did not include special schemes to specifically cover COVID-19-related costs. Instead, the German policy treated COVID-19 medical treatment costs as it would those related to other diseases. The German long-term care (LTC) insurance system was administered as usual during the COVID-19 crisis, covering the care needs of the population. We argue that the German healthcare system and its LTC schemes were operated normally in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Studies on the impact of healthcare policy on poverty risk prevention have usually focused on understanding the players and processes involved in organizing and supplying health resources. For example, it has been shown that both the state and the family influence societal power structures, (re)distribution, and welfare outcomes (Razavi 2007; Sipilä et al. 2003; Xu 2019). Researchers have frequently assessed service provision, financing, and the regulation of social policy systems to analyze healthcare systems or LTC policy (Burau et al. 2007; Wendt et al. 2009). However, few studies have systematically examined the extent to which healthcare and LTC systems have been integrated to prevent poverty risk among low-income groups. Furthermore, comparative knowledge is limited on the way healthcare and LTC systems interact to produce differentiated poverty risk levels among low-income groups during pandemic crises. Against this background, this chapter

introduces an analytical framework to examine how healthcare policy schemes influence poverty risk among low-income people, based on a comparison between German and China—two countries that, while anchored in different traditions, rely on a similar approach to social insurance. Governance in those two countries relies on different levels of responsibilities, which are complex, decentralized, and shared by governing bodies at the state and local levels—especially in Germany. In the Chinese healthcare system, provincial and municipal-level bodies compete for financial resources from the central government to pay for policy benefits (Chen and Yuan 2021). While, the healthcare and LTC systems are based on different eligibility criteria of benefit recipients in the two countries, experiences in both places have shown that sometimes poverty risk cannot be compensated for. By uncovering cross-national policy outcomes that aimed at alleviating poverty risk during the global pandemic crisis, this chapter points to the role of healthcare policy, in particular LTC policy, in preventing poverty for socially disadvantaged group.

We measure poverty based on the 1984 European Council decision that stated that, in an effort to combat poverty, "the poor shall be taken to mean persons, families and groups of persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State in which they live" (EEC 1985, 24-25). For the purpose of this study, the "low income" category includes people who earn less than the average income or pension in the working population, yet earn more than those below the national or regional absolute poverty threshold.

Analyzing Poverty Risk in COVID-19 Healthcare Policy

This study focuses on the degree to which two countries' healthcare policies may have driven poverty risk among low-income people who could not meet their healthcare needs during the COVID-19 crisis. It assesses whether LTC policy was useful in filling the resource gap for low-income individuals by reviewing three dimensions of integrated care policy: 1) eligibility for access to care and insurance benefits; 2) monetary value of the benefits received; and 3) access to LTC benefits.

The first dimension pertains to access eligibility, which can be based on means or need and may be specified by whether health insurance is mandatory for all or voluntary. To measure eligibility, this study considers whether low-income people must be insured through public or private insurance and pay contributions; it also takes into account whether they receive benefits based on their contribution level and whether they voluntarily join the healthcare insurance scheme or must personally cover their medical costs if they do not. The second dimension pertains to whether healthcare benefits can theoretically cover medical needs and how much low-income individuals must pay upfront to access benefits, for example, in the form of co-payments or out-of-pocket contributions. The third dimension concerns the possibility that LTC policy might help mediate the risk that low-income people fall into poverty. In both countries, integrating LTC and healthcare policy enables low-income people to access LTC benefits when insured. In both countries, we examine laws, regulations, and institutional instruments such as the 2018

Social Insurance Law of the People's Republic of China, the 2019 National Healthcare Security Administration national policy, the 2020 Chinese National Medical Insurance Administration Regulations, the German Social Code Regulation (SGB V, SGB VII, SGB VI, SGB XI), and the Federal Association for Prevention and Health Promotion Regulations (Bundesvereinigung Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung) for the years 2019 and 2020. Furthermore, the way national policy protects people from the risk of poverty falls into two categories: "low poverty protection" and "high poverty protection." In the former, the interplay between the three dimensions of an integrated policy reveals that weakness in one dimension is not compensated by the other dimensions; thus low-income populations are exposed to poverty risk. For example, if the healthcare benefits received are not large enough to cover medical needs, patients may be exposed to poverty risk despite being eligible for LTC benefits. Hence, low-income people's poverty risk could be higher if they needed LTC due to prior unmet medical care needs.

The "high poverty protection" policy ensures all three dimensions are addressed separately to prevent poverty risk and that the interplay between the different dimensions does not expose low-income populations to the risk of becoming poor. For example, healthcare policy could provide generous access to benefits that are sufficient to cover the cost of medical care based on needs. Moreover, integrating healthcare benefits with LTC benefits could also support low-income populations that have seen their care needs unmet in the past.

Poverty Risk in Germany and China in the Context of COVID-19

Integrated Policy Dimension 1: Eligibility to Access Services and Benefits

The Chinese healthcare system was designed by the central government as a universal policy system operating through targeted programs implemented at the local level (as shown in Figure 1). Sections C.1. to C.3. of the healthcare policy represents the central plan, while section P.1. covers targeted policy programs at the level of the provinces. The health needs of individuals with job security and social insurance contracts are covered through basic compulsory healthcare insurance for the employed (C.1.a.), which applies to approximately 17.3 percent of the population. It is highly probable that individuals with short-term or temporary employment are excluded from this insurance scheme (Ruan et al. 2024). However, individuals can access basic healthcare insurance after retirement (C.1.a. and C.1.b.), which concerns roughly 6.2 percent of the population (Yi 2021). The unemployed or self-employed seeking voluntary basic health insurance (C.1.b.) represent approximately 70 percent of the Chinese population.

In China, the basic health insurance scheme (C.1.) is contributory. Employers contribute about 75 percent of C.1.a. funds, and employees pay the remaining 25 percent, while non-employed individuals who are voluntarily insured under C.1.b. contribute 100

percent to this healthcare insurance scheme, or a fixed amount of approximately 285 RMB/year (€36/year) (Li et al. 2020). With nearly 95 percent coverage and a 65 percent reimbursement rate guaranteed in the provision of basic healthcare services, C.1. plays an important role in covering the population's medical needs. However, we argue that citizens with flexible jobs or low income—such as self-employed workers and those in small enterprises in secondary towns—could find themselves excluded from the basic healthcare insurance scheme. Our findings show that the Chinese healthcare system was adjusted to provide benefits that covered COVID-19-related medical needs, for example those of patients suddenly infected with COVID-19 and in need of medical care, including those in low-income categories. Under sections P.1 and C.4, people with COVID-19-related medical needs were better supported.

Figure 1: Policy framework of the Chinese healthcare system with coverage structure of COVID-19-related medical costs



Source**:** The authors based on State Council Information Office of China (2020) and Song et al. (2020).

Unlike its Chinese counterpart, the German healthcare system did not adapt to specifically address the COVID-19 pandemic and simply retained its pre-pandemic design. In its original form, the German system provides the population with universal coverage through a broad benefits package and low cost-sharing requirements. Healthcare benefits are generous, and costs are not considered a barrier to access. Disparities in accessing healthcare services across rural and urban areas are negligible, thanks to a past reform that promoted the development of healthcare services in rural areas. Consequently, not only do low-income individuals enjoy wide access to public healthcare but so do their families, resulting in lower levels of catastrophic healthcare expenditure in this group in Germany than in most other European countries (OECD 2020). Low-income people's

access to care is less restricted in Germany than it is in China. Moreover, the German system also ensures that all family members, even those with no income at all, are granted equal access to health services, and at no cost to them. Table 1 depicts the system of mandatory enrolment in healthcare insurance in Germany. In comparison, the Chinese healthcare system provided specific programs targeting COVID-19 medical related costs; however, these benefits were temporary, applied only to sick individuals, and did not cover family members. Hence, in China most low-income people were exposed to the risk of poverty during the pandemic, especially in cases where family members—such as very young or older individuals—were sick. It is clear that the German system provided more comprehensive access than the Chinese system, and German low-income families faced a lesser level of poverty risk than the Chinese population during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 1: Low-income people's eligibility for healthcare services

	Means-tested/ need-tested	Mandatory or voluntary	Requirements to access benefits under the policy	Can family member be included (pay extra or not?)
Germany	Need-tested	Mandatory	Pay contribution; gain equal access to healthcare services.	Yes, if beneficiary has children or non-working spouse. Do not pay extra.
China	Need-tested	Less mandatory + more voluntary	Pay contribution into the voluntary system: access to healthcare services depends on career description and social position.	No, family members pay separately when they need healthcare insurance.

Sources: The authors based on Schönbach (2018) and Liu (2021).

Integrated Policy Dimension 2: Monetary Value of Benefits Received

Healthcare policy in China allows for variations in the way health insurance is delivered across different provinces. The policy has been applied so that people receive different levels of healthcare benefits based on where they live. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a non-contributory temporary assistance scheme (P.1., Figure 1) under the authority of local governments supported low-income individuals who were unable to afford health insurance and find themselves exposed to poverty risk because they cannot pay for medical care (Chinese General Office of the State 2015). Thus, the P.1. scheme was meant to protect these citizens from shortages in medical resources in the face of the pandemic. This scheme was financed by local governments at the provincial level (Chinese State Council 2020), and the extent to which medical costs were covered depended on the level of economic development in the particular regions. Therefore, in relatively poor regions, P.1. often failed to protect low-income groups from poverty risk for lack of financial resources. In regions with higher socio-economical conditions, P.1. led to successes in protecting low-income groups from the risk of falling into poverty.

Furthermore, whether the state paid non-covered COVID-19-related medical expenses beyond the public healthcare coverage relates to poverty risk among low-income people in China. The Chinese healthcare system developed a "firefighter" policy scheme—C.4., or "the state pays"—to address COVID-19-related costs for people who were not insured under the original four schemes of the healthcare system. However, the overall policy structure did not appropriately serve low-income individuals without basic healthcare insurance, such as day laborers, since these individuals can only access the voluntary healthcare policy scheme.

In contrast, the German healthcare system is mostly publicly financed and thus does not require patients to make upfront payments; therefore, few people in Germany report unmet medical needs, even among low-income groups (Kalánková et al. 2021). A dense network of healthcare facilities and numerous nurses and physicians guarantee the high availability of services across the country (Potter 2019). Thus, financial safety nets and the comparatively low share of patients who incur out-of-pocket health expenses contribute to providing the population of Germany with strong financial protection.

In Germany, the general rules, rights, and values pertaining to healthcare are set out in national legislation—the German Social Code Book, or "SGB V"—and in the constitution, while services are executed at the state level or are delegated to corporatist bodies, such as private healthcare providers. The SGB V mandates that health insurance should "maintain, restore or improve health" (§1), to which end "care is to be provided that reflects needs, is uniform and aligned with the generally recognized state of medical knowledge" (§70). Although not stated as an explicit goal, the German constitution requires that people live in equivalent conditions throughout the country and be treated equally (i.e., in non-discriminatory fashion). Under these regulations, German healthcare policy offers relatively comprehensive protection for low-income populations, and the benefit package is need-oriented. To offset expenditures, citizens pay a relatively small share of costs—for example for doctor's visits—in addition to their healthcare insurance contributions; but they gain from universal healthcare services. However, we found that citizens with pre-existing conditions were excluded from coverage and that this system could indeed be less welcoming to those with pre-existing or long-lasting health problems. Nevertheless, this limitation has not prevented COVID-19 patients from accessing medical services on the basis of medical need (see Table 2), even if the German healthcare system did not create new policy schemes to specifically address COVID-19 treatment, as China did.

In contrast to low-income people in Germany, Chinese low-income groups must pay high out-of-pocket medical costs even when they are covered under either public or private insurance. Differing significantly from the German scheme, China's system requires that nearly 90 percent of outpatient service costs, whether incurred in hospitals or clinics, be covered by patients themselves. The Chinese healthcare system covers inpatient medical costs on the basis of a deductible threshold; costs under the threshold must be borne by the patient. Furthermore, out-of-pocket payments may be higher than estimated cost because the Chinese healthcare system only covers the cost of certain medicines, so that not all prescriptions fall under the policy. The list of medicines that are covered is renewed

every year based on new regulations, and the gap between medical needs and medical coverage remains.

In summary, in China, low-income groups face higher poverty risk because they are required to pay out-of-pocket for certain diseases. However, this conclusion does not apply to COVID-19-related medical costs, which have been mostly covered by the state, except in the case of low-income individuals without any basic health insurance. We present a summary comparison of the benefits in China and Germany in Table 2.

Table 2: Benefits that low-income individuals can access

	Extent to which healthcare policy benefits cover medical needs	Level of individual compensation to receive benefits	Co-payment or out-of-pocket costs
Germany	Need-based; Comprehensive medical needs can be fulfilled. Patient rights are well-protected and noticed.	Smaller contribution to doctor visit fee; Compensate the gap between pre-existing medical costs and contribution to private healthcare insurance.	Individuals must pay €10 per quarter for doctor's visits. They do not pay if they do not visit the doctor that quarter. The deductible depends on the private insurance plan to which the individual subscribes.
China	Need-based; 60%-85% of medical costs are covered Patient rights are protected but unnoticed.	15%—40% of medical costs (i.e., the portion of costs uninsured by social healthcare insurance).	Relatively high out-of-pocket payments into the system; patients pay significant portion of medical costs.

Sources: The authors based on Grossmann et al. (2023); Schönbach (2018); Yip et al. (2019); The State Council Information Office of China (2020); and Liu (2021).

Offering broad coverage under the public healthcare insurance scheme, the German system remains more comprehensive than the Chinese system with regard to benefits. Furthermore, in Germany, family members who are not part of the job market, such as non-working spouses, are also insured under the public healthcare insurance scheme, which enhances the prevention of poverty risk. In contrast, in China, low-income groups must pay at least 15 percent of medical costs in addition to out-of-pocket expenses for dependent family members requiring medical services, regardless of their healthcare insurance contribution. Moreover, the extent to which this group may access healthcare insurance benefits is open for debate. Observers are often under the impression that the Chinese policy protects people against absolute poverty by offering nearly free medical care. Our findings support that, in reality, low-income groups are not poor enough to benefit from the free healthcare benefits package. Instead, these groups experience income insecurity and medical resource scarcity, and they are exposed to relatively higher poverty risk than they would be under the German system.

Integrated Policy Dimension 3: Access to LTC benefit

Given the proven long-lasting health consequences of COVID-19—particularly for older individuals and those with pre-existing conditions such as diabetes and high blood pressure—we analyze how long-term care insurance (LTCI) compensates low-income patients' LTC needs resulting from a COVID-19 infection after initial medical treatment. We argue that acute medical and LTC needs should both be considered together during pandemics, since they are often linked and indistinguishable. It is therefore useful to understand how healthcare systems have integrated LTC in both countries to best cover healthcare needs resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Our findings are that the German LTCI system compensates people for their LTC needs. In principle, the German LTCI covers everyone insured under it. Moreover, it is compulsory for privately insured people to be covered by private LTCI (§1 sent. 2). Therefore, up to 99 percent of the people residing in Germany are covered under public or private LTCI (Kickbusch et al. 2017), essentially making the LTCI a universal system (Theobald and Ozanne 2016). Moreover, employers and employees contribute equally into the system, although the state pays contributions for low-income individuals; and non-employed individuals can be co-insured through the main earner of the household of which they are part. Hence, at the policy level, the German healthcare system and its LTCI are well integrated and need-tested. As a result, low-income people can access generous LTC and medical services when they have mixed (i.e., short-term medical and LTC) needs resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

In comparison, the Chinese LTC system has shown weaknesses in the way it is fragmented and less generous in its LTC coverage. In response, the central government has targeted LTC needs in low-income groups and has attempted to establish a dependent LTCI since 2016, which is especially relevant in the context of COVID-19. As a result, approximately 49 cities in China had established pilot LTCI plans by 2020. However, LTCI remains very selective and fragmented, with stark regional disparities. Participation in the pilot LTCI plans has been only voluntary, and people are not eager to contribute because they believe they have enough coverage as is. The key issue in China is that the concept of LTC remains only vaguely defined, and the policy has been designed to target only older adults with disabilities. Moreover, although in principle, everyone covered by health insurance is included in the LTCI scheme, both remain merely voluntary. Statistics reveal that up to 23 percent of older adults—most of whom have a disability or chronic disease—were insured under the Chinese LTCI (Chinese Ministry of Civil Servant 2019) until the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. Although people were initially not required to contribute to the LTCI system, after a few of years of implementation, a small fee became mandatory as part of people's regular health insurance. Moreover, the state pays the share of low-income people's contributions only if they are already covered under the state's health insurance. To date, there is no evidence that the Chinese LTCI has covered LTC needs resulting from COVID-19 infection in low-income groups. In fact, even in LTCI pilot cities, only a small number of older low-income people have received LTC services

based on severe long-term disability (Cai et al. 2021; Chen and Fang 2021). The Chinese long-term insurance scheme has been unable to support this population's needs for care.

Our findings support that in the German system, healthcare and LTCI were better integrated than in the Chinese system during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, coverage is mandatory in Germany, thus providing good access to care and affording patients free choice of provider and short waiting times. This is partly due to Germany's effective infrastructure, a dense network of ambulatory care physicians and hospitals, and a quantitatively high level of service provision. The routine medical and LTC needs of low-income individuals are largely covered by healthcare and LTCI schemes regardless of people's level of income insecurity in Germany. In contrast, these schemes are only voluntary in China. Second, the German healthcare system and LTCI offer benefits separately based on clear eligibility criteria when there are mixed needs; the two systems in effect compensate for each other. However, in China, from the perspective of service provision, these two systems operate separately, sharing only their source of financing. Third, both the healthcare system and LTCI have strong and separate independent financing sources in Germany. Within the German social insurance system, funding for LTCI is established through contributions. Spending on public LTCI funds amounted to €42.95 billion in 2019, with €25.8 billion spent on home care. Moreover, the public LTCI funds paid out €2.1 billion for pension entitlements to 928,000 working-age family members who cared for relatives in poor health. The relationship between expenditures in cash payments and in-kind services was 70:30 in 2019, and the ratio of cash payments to recipients and in-kind services was 84:16 (Health Ministry 2020). The LTCI funds directly pay state-approved care providers, and the costs of diverse services are predetermined to ensure consistent expenditure across providers and regions (Theobald and Ozanne 2016). In China, LTCI financing comes through the healthcare insurance fund rather than contributions (Li et al. 2020). LTCI payments to municipally approved care services are predetermined in principle, but approval for funding for services in a given year depends partly on the surplus in the healthcare insurance fund in the previous year. Nevertheless, less than 30 percent of the employees' healthcare insurance fund surplus and less than 10 percent of the resident healthcare insurance contribution can be transferred to the LTCI fund (Liu 2021). Fourth, the German system covers family members of potential recipients, which protects low-income individuals from poverty risk. It is possible to conclude that in China, medical care and LTCI are weakly integrated and fail to address the mixed needs of the low-income population. Consequently, low-income people might overuse medical resources for their LTC needs to compensate for the expenses that they are unable to cover for general medical care. During a pandemic outbreak, when medical resources are overall limited, such as during the COVID-19 crisis, poverty risk is heightened for low-income patients when they are unable to access additional medical resources and services.

Relationship between Healthcare Policy and Poverty Risk Among Low-income People in Germany and China During the COVID-19 Pandemic

We have demonstrated that the interplay between healthcare and LTC policy results in differentiated poverty risk outcomes based on the way they support access for low-income people's access to benefits. Low-income people with access to comparatively limited healthcare benefit packages or LTC benefits are exposed to high poverty risk. This risk increases the more access to care is limited. Therefore, a more robust LTC policy could alleviate poverty risk for low-income people. However, this fix also depends on the amount of healthcare benefits available and whether the benefit packages are generous enough to help low-income people, in particular during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Compared to the German policy, the Chinese healthcare policy generally covers less than 85 percent of low-income people's medical needs. Moreover, these people have limited access to public LTC resources when they have mixed healthcare needs (Chinese Health Ministry 2020). The Chinese LTCI has shown to be weak in its coverage of LTC needs resulting from COVID-19 infections. Furthermore, a systematic LTCI policy system does not exist in China; only fragmented LTCI pilot plans have operated in some cities. Finally, when low-income people face mixed medical and LTC needs, they are only eligible for limited LTC benefits, which could lead to high poverty risk. Our findings support that low-income people's poverty risk varies depending on what the focus of the policies are and show that integrating different policy dimensions is important to protect low-income people from poverty risk.

Our findings further indicate that neither adequate access to healthcare nor sufficient benefit amounts are enough by themselves to protect low-income people from poverty risk in China; this insufficiency is also rooted in the fact that the healthcare and LTCI systems do not complement each other well for people with mixed medical needs, unlike in Germany. This was especially pertinent during the pandemic, although the German system does not offer specific coverage in the case of a global public health crisis. Furthermore, we assessed that in welfare states, there is an attempt to decrease the risk of poverty faced by low-income people through institutional regulations that control eligibility levels and focus on policy integration based on needs.

This study introduces a new analytical framework for examining how different healthcare policies contribute to or prevent poverty risk for low-income people during health crises such as the historical COVID-19 pandemic. Our comparative analysis of regulations in China and Germany allows for an assessment of healthcare and LTC policies in welfare states. Previous studies have assumed that social policy in welfare states plays an important role in promoting social equality and in providing access to healthcare resources. This chapter underlines that the failure to systematically consider both the way in which different dimensions of healthcare policy interact and the level of integration of healthcare systems with long-term care policies is significant in addressing poverty risk for low-income people during health crises or pandemics.

Comparing Germany and China is pertinent because both countries share a similar social insurance regulation system but have experienced different policy outcomes in the fight against COVID-19. In addressing post-pandemic needs, China can learn from Germany's effective integration of policy dimensions—especially when it comes to long-term care—to protect people from poverty risk. Conversely, Germany (and other countries) can learn from China's integration of a temporary healthcare scheme within the structure of its social insurance system in the face of acute public health issues, such as a pandemic. In both countries, low-income people's poverty risk was markedly correlated to the receipt of social welfare benefits during the pandemic, because these people bore sudden increases in care needs and medical expenses. Hence, a generous healthcare system in which LTCI is integrated can have a significant impact on preventing poverty risk for those socially disadvantaged group. Future investigations should further compare a range of policy dimensions across different countries, in and outside of Europe, and identify other approaches in the prevention of social inequalities that vulnerable groups may face during pandemics.

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Scholars gather here from places ranging from East Asia to South America to write about Europe from their respective disciplinary, national, and geographic perspectives. Looking in from the "Global South" and Europe's peripheries, they investigate an array of topics along three axes—the construction of Europe from its so-called margins, the European Union seen through an external gaze, and comparative policymaking. They use their diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds to analyze ideas, images, and visions of Europe, while relying on various theoretical and methodological orientations to scrutinize European institutions, structures, dynamics, policies, and integration and disintegration processes.

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