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CAPÍTULO 13.

KANT AND FOUCAULT'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND THE USE OF LANGUAGE IN THEIR WORK

Marita RAINSBOROUGH

INTRODUCTION

Kant did not make language an explicit subject of discussion in his *Critiques* and did not provide any specific concept of language philosophy. The accusation that Kant “criminally neglected the issue of ‘language’” (LÜTTERFELDS, 2004, p. 150) is an established feature in the reception of Kant’s work. On the other hand, Kant’s language is often admired for its terminological precision; stringent patterns of argumentation and linguistic metaphors. Kant’s language is viewed as a key element of his philosophical deliberations (RIBEIRO DOS SANTOS, 1985). In Foucault’s work, in contrast, language appears, on the one hand, to dissolve into the discourse and to lose its importance; on the other, he develops an ontology of language, referring to the

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endless murmuring and noise of language. Foucault's use of the language of philosophy is also striking, although very little research has been carried out into its relevance for his philosophy. This provides the central issue for this exploration – what language-philosophical considerations can be identified in the work of Kant and Foucault and what is their relationship to the themes and objectives of their philosophical concepts? Is there a relationship between language-philosophical considerations and philosophical linguistics in the work of Kant and Foucault? Is, over and above this, Foucault's referencing of Kant, in particular with regard to the theorems of critique, liberty, autonomy and the ethics of courage, also reflected in aspects of his work concerning language and in his philosophical core assumptions on language?

THE DISPLACEMENT OF LANGUAGE IN KANT'S WORK AND HIS LATENT PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

A closer examination of Kant's work reveals a speechlessness respectively an obsolescence of language in his transcendental philosophy, which persists despite the meta-critique of Hamann and Herder.¹ The preoccupation with the problems surrounding the philosophy of language in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and in his *Lectures on Metaphysics* is solely concerned with the naming function of language,² whereby language

¹ Kant was also aware of the language-philosophical views of pre-Socratic ancient philosophy on the relationship of being, thought and language and Aristotelian parallelism. According to Villers Kant's view of language even makes him "the heir to language-philosophical Aristotelianism" – at the same time, however, also its conqueror (cf. VILLERS, 1997, p. 16). Villers notes: "[T]hought no longer links ontology and language, respectively retrospectively references objects, but rather imaginative consciousness constitutes objects first as phenomena, i.e. the level of thought assimilates that of being – whereby Aristotelianism is conquered. Despite the rupturing of the static model of parallelism and the impetus of the cognitive process, Kant still continues to hold fast to the retrospective naming function of linguistic characters" (VILLERS, 1997, p. 297). The level of thought, which precedes the level of language, is, according to Kant, also constitutive for ontology (cf. VILLERS, 1997, p. 303).

² Kant (2007, 7:192) writes: "All language is a signification of thought and, on the other hand, the best way of signifying thought is through language, the greatest instrument for understanding ourselves and others." He continues: "The faculty of cognizing the present as the means for connecting the representation of the foreseen with that of the past is the *faculty of using signs*. – The mental activity of bringing about this connection is *signifying (signatio)*, which is also called signaling, of which the higher degree is called *marking*" (KANT, 2007, Anth 7:191). Kant defines the ability to name objects as going beyond linguistic ability and including miraculous signs; natural signs and arbitrary and/or artificial signs (KANT, 2007, Anth 7:192ff.). With regard to natural signs he differentiates between demonstrative, rememorative and prognostic signs. In addition to linguistic signs, arbitrary signs also include notes (tones); characters; signs of gesticulation; coats of arms; medals, etc. (KANT, 2007, Anth 7:192). The ability to name objects is concerned with indirect links by means

is viewed as an organon of thought.³ The language-mediating functions of thought are also omitted in these works. Kant excludes “language from the constitutive area” of thought and imagination, writing that “this reason, which takes precedence over language, is *speechless*” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 15); he supports the “concept of the one, pure, non-language based reason” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 289). In this context the question arises, whether there are systematic reasons for Kant’s displacement of language (cf. VILLERS, 1997, p. 5).⁴ The theory can thus be put forward that consideration of language respectively an insight into the language-mediating functions of reason would not have been without effect on the fundamentals of Kantian philosophy. “Kant did not want to confuse reality per se with the reality of language” writes Damnjanović, continuing “This is why it is unacceptable to re-write Kant’s transcendental philosophy from the linguistic point of view” (DAMNJANOVIĆ, 1990, p. 439).⁵ Villers argues that an explicit language-philosophical foundation in Kant’s philosophy would also have resolved the “*dogma of a dichotomy of receptivity and spontaneity*” and thus “the dualistic postulate of the symmetry of cognitive powers”, which does not envisage any mediating third party (VILLERS, 1997, p. 376). The problem of linking cognitive powers in Kant’s work thus remains unsolved. Kant’s strict apriority,

of additional imaginings regarding the relationship between the imagination of the object and the object. “The imagining, which is merely an instrument, used to bring forth (reproduce) another is the sign.” (KANT, 1900ff., Refl XV:334) Linguistic signs, words, are the counterparts of objects, used to facilitate imagining of the object and characterization (KANT, 2001, p. 152). They are formed freely and presuppose a productive ability of characterization. Kant views linguistic signs as marking signs (KANT, 1900ff., Vorl. ü. d. Rel., p. 205, p. 222) which also serve as means of communication (KANT, 1900ff., Refl XVI:1620).

³ “And this separation of the levels of being, thought and speech; of cognition, thought and language simultaneously creates the problem of connecting or mediating between the three levels. Kant attempts to solve this problem by *subordinating language* to thought and cognition. Transcendental philosophy puts consciousness not only before ontology, but also before language. These can only be conceived of as proxies, as counterparts” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 13f.).

⁴ Villers writes on this subject: “Kant, however, must, for reasons which are inherent in the system, exclude dynamic language because he could otherwise no longer guarantee the apodictic natural necessity which he demands, and above all because he would otherwise be in danger (because of his psychologizing of ontology) of losing the world” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 6). Villers thus contradicts Dimitrios Markis’ theory of an “after-effect of the collective unconsciousness of our philosophical language in Kant’s work” (MARKIS, 1982, p. 113). De Mauro, in contrast, supports the theory of an “extraordinary” silence and a “systematic” silence, which Villers references to support his arguments (cf. DE MAURO, 1982, p. 48). De Mauro (1982, p. 51) writes: “Kant understood that it was no longer possible [...] to emphasize the creative function of speech and, at the same time, to insist on the authority of a trans-historical reason whose understanding would have had to result from the historical forms of language.”

⁵ Damnjanović cites Liebrucks (1968) as an example of this attempt.

based on logic and independent of language, is intended to ensure reliable cognition independent of linguistic skill and to create an epistemological foundation. Historicisation via language would have contradicted Kant's concern to create an ahistorical foundation of cognition and morality. Kant's philosophy of the self is a further systematic reason for the neglect of language in Kantian philosophy. Damnjanović comments in this context: "[I]n order to remain true to his transcendental philosophy of the self, Kant was forced to do without the position of a language philosophy of the 'we'; language as a determining feature of human nature. As a result, language remained a non-issue in Kant's work" (DAMNJANOVIĆ, 1990, p. 441). Villers notes "that transcendental philosophy was required to exclude dynamic language if it did not want to destroy its own foundations" (VILLERS, 1997, p. 379).⁶

On the other hand, a latent philosophy of language is apparent in Kant's work. Within the scope of Kant's deliberations it is possible to identify the topics of language; the language of philosophy – also with regard to his own philosophy; 'transcendental grammar';⁷ an ethics of language and a politics of language, which is interrelated in particular to the demand for truthfulness, and language-pragmatic, communicative, rhetorical⁸ and literary-aesthetic impetuses. For example, the audience and the public sphere play a crucial role within the context of the Kantian philosophy of Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*); their importance is also reflected in the genres selected by Kant, such as journalistic essays; pamphlets; experiments;⁹ observations;¹⁰ contracts; critiques;¹¹ etc. In addition to this, content-related

⁶ See also Damnjanović (1990, p. 441): "[H]e did not want to make either language as reality or consciousness as a fundamental being absolute because he wanted to retain reality as an unrecognizable instance of objects in themselves and sensuality (*Anschauung*) as an instance which has equal precedence and rights to understanding and reason."

⁷ General, universal grammar is subordinated to logic. It represents a grammar "which contains nothing more than the mere form of language in itself" (KANT, 1900ff., Log IX, p. 12f.). Transcendental grammar encompasses "the reason of human language" (KANT, 2001, Lectures on Metaphysics, p. 78).

⁸ Despite disparaging comments on rhetoric in *Critique of Judgement* (cf. KANT, 2000, KU B 216f.) it is possible to identify a rhetorical focus in Kant's philosophy, e.g. in the dialogical impetus of dialectics.

⁹ "The experiment is the German form of the essay. A free form of exploration" (GOETSCHEL, 1990, p. 30).

¹⁰ "Observations and experiments are the common denominator of experimentalism" (GOETSCHEL, 1990, p. 59). Goetschel argues that there are similarities to travelogues, with "the required non-specificity appropriate to the literary genre" (GOETSCHEL, 1990, p. 59).

¹¹ "The *Critique* thus represents a new philosophical literary genre, whose form-historical role in its whole effect is hardly to be envisaged" (GOETSCHEL, 1990, p. 17).

aspects of Kantian philosophy such as the ‘as-if’; the ideal; schematism; symbols and analogies exhibit a language-philosophical dimension. Of particular significance for Kant’s philosophy is, as illustrated by Ribeiro dos Santos, also his use of metaphors in his philosophical language and – seen in general terms – the latent metaphorology which is a distinctive feature of Kant’s philosophy overall.¹² As posited by Villers, Kant develops “his latent philosophy of language” in particular “in the form of a *latent metaphoricality*” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 381).

Linguistic imagery plays an important role at various points of Kant’s philosophy, serving above all to illustrate abstract theoretical elements. In the case of schematism the focus is on the application of reason-related terms to phenomena, which, a priori, goes hand in hand with the processing of illustrative material based on principles. The image generated in the schema illustrates the term, not the object itself (KANT, 1900ff., Rel VI, p. 65 Note). The process of subsumption presupposes transcendental schemata, processes of the purely productive power of imagination as a mediating third party (KANT, 1998, KrV B 177), which enables respectively creates a corresponding image for a term (KANT, 1998, KrV B 180).¹³ The receptivity of sensuality and the spontaneity of reason participate equally in the cognitive process, whereby ideas are subsumed under terms and terms are substantiated. Although the Kantian schema is considered in pre- and non-linguistic terms and remains linked to the visual metaphor for characterization of the cognitive process, which is significant to the history of philosophy, Villers argues that it still exhibits a latent language, displaying a link to language and a linguistic immediacy

¹² Villers writes on Kant’s latent philosophy of language: “The reconstruction of Kant’s latent philosophy of language, which reveals the hidden language of the transcendental philosophical concepts of the power of imagination, the schema and the intellectual ideal and in particular, however, Kant’s latent metaphoricality in his theoretical elements of symbolic hypotyposis and the aesthetic ideal, has, over and above this, yet to demonstrate that not even a Kant has succeeded in completely ‘ignoring’ the role of language (the third Aristotelian level) in the cognitive process and that this displaced but virulent linguistic term threatens to transform his apriority of the intellect into a reason with origins and organization based in language” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 6f.).

¹³ “Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical concept, rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain general concept. The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit *in concreto*” (KANT, 1998, KrV A 141). Schemata of categories can, in contrast to (purely) empirical terms, not be imagined as images. This is nothing but a pure synthesis, “a rule of unity according to concepts in general” (KANT, 1998, KrV A 142).

of the images, which Herder already grants him (HERDER, 1881, p. 125). In the chapter “On beauty as a symbol of morality” in Paragraph 59 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* the term ‘symbol’ is developed and must be viewed as a further element of the latent language of Kantian philosophy. Symbolization allows concepts of reason to be illustrated aesthetically. It is, in addition to schematization, another form of hypotyposis.¹⁴ The symbol is an indirect illustration of a term, whereby symbolization is achieved by means of analogy. Kant’s view of analogy differentiates between a category analogy, which references the conformity of the characteristics and distinguishing features of a category, however also bears the risk of circular reasoning, and a qualitatively understood relationship analogy, which is based on the relationship between reasons and consequences. Kant (KU B 448ff.; Rel VI, p. 65 Note), however, strongly warns against arriving at conclusions based on the analogy. Analogies cannot, argues Kant, communicate objective cognition; they serve solely to illustrate. Likewise, the symbol has only an illustrative function.¹⁵

In addition to the symbol Kant’s work also assigns an important mediating function to the aesthetic attribute. The aesthetic attribute, the aesthetic presentation of an aesthetic idea, which in turn serves an idea of reason, causes the power of imagination to think further than if stimulated merely by a term, whereby the mind is enlivened; in other words, it experiences a creative impulse (cf. KANT, 2000, KU 5: 313ff., § 49). Villers writes in this context: “Since, however, the power of imagination thus sets the ability to have intellectual ideas, reason, in motion (cf. KU B 194), the formation of aesthetic ideas leads ‘indirectly also to cognition’ (KU B 198)” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 359). Correspondingly, the intellectual ideal is contrasted with an ‘ideal of sensuality’ respectively an ‘ideal of the power

¹⁴ “All **hypotyposis** (presentation, *subjecto sub adspectum*), as making something sensible, is of one of two kinds: either **schematic**, where to a concept grasped by the understanding the corresponding intuition is given *a priori*; or **symbolic**, where to a concept which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment proceeds in a way merely analogous to that which it observes in schematization, i.e., it is merely the rule of this procedure, not of the intuition itself, and thus merely the form of the reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the concept” (KANT, 2000, KU, 5:351, § 59)

¹⁵ “The symbol of an idea (or a concept of reason) is a representation of the object by analogy, i.e., by the same relationship to certain consequences as that which is attributed to the object in respect of its own consequences, even though the objects themselves are of entirely different kinds [...]. In this way I can indeed have no theoretical knowledge by analogy, and such as it is necessary for reason to think” (KANT, 2002, FM XX, p. 280).

of imagination' (KANT, *Vorl. Ü. d. philos. Rel.*, S. 3 in VILLERS, 1997, p. 359).¹⁶ The analogy is once again of crucial significance with regard to the transcendental. In this context Kant views the aesthetic idea as the counterpart to the idea of reason (KANT, 2000, KU, 5:314), which is generated by the intellect, an important characteristic respectively power of mind of the genius. It can be identified particularly in poetics and rhetoric. As already the case for the symbol, the aesthetic attribute – both reference the analogy – is an expression of Kant's metaphorical view of language. Moral law is an aspect of Kant's practical reason which represents a practical schema for a metaphorical process of symbol formation (KANT, KpV:122; KpV:124 in VILLERS, 1997, p.361).¹⁷ Viewed in the context of Kant's latent metaphorology, the Kantian 'as if', a considering of something to be true in cases in which a conviction cannot be grounded either by reason or by rationality, but where the demands of practical reason only remain visible if the conviction can be maintained, is of crucial significance. The 'as if' is a manifestation of the area of indistinguishability, in which it is impossible to know whether something is real or not, whereby the use of terms; the illustration of facts; thought and human action are affected. The 'as if' is, however, more than just a mere fiction. The 'as if' refers in particular to the regulative ideas of God and the immortality of the soul, underpinning human morality.

Kant's pragmatism of language,¹⁸ language ethics and his politics of language, which are linked in particular to the demand for truthfulness and include communicative, rhetorical and literary-aesthetic impulses, furthermore demonstrate the significance of his latent philosophy of

¹⁶ Kant cites the 'ideal of beauty' and the 'ideal of felicity' as examples. In this context he is referring not to terms but rather to beliefs (cf. VILLERS, 1997, p. 359). They cannot, however, generate any new concept: "The ideals of beauty are neither so creative that they could stimulate the formulation of a new concept, nor can they be unambiguously likened to an existing term, for which reason they are also 'only improperly' (KrV B 598) called ideals – on some occasions Kant disparagingly refers to these 'creatures of the imagination' (KrV B 598) as 'chimaera' (*Vorl. ü. d. Metaph.* p. 42)" (VILLERS, 1997, p. 360).

¹⁷ Villers writes in this regard "Thus even the categorical imperative proves to be an application of analogue metaphorical substitution: the practical law is formed analogously to natural law; 'subject' to the form of physical principles of morality" (VILLERS, 1997, p. 361). He continues: "Kant's latent metaphorology thus shows itself to be the mediating link between his theoretical and his practical philosophy (cf. KU B 259)" (VILLERS, 1997, p. 361).

¹⁸ Precise analysis of the language-pragmatic level of Kant's philosophy is an area of research which has still to be explored.

language at the socio-political level. For example, the audience and the public sphere thus play a crucial role within the context of the Kantian philosophy of Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*). Kant censures eloquence respectively rhetoric as the art of persuasion. When referring to them, Kant writes of a ‘deceitful art’ used to achieve own advantages (KANT, 1900ff., 5:527f. Note). In contrast to this, Kant’s concern is with dialogue in the Socratic sense and with Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) as an encouragement to use one’s own reason. Within the scope of the role of scholar, the individual should express public criticism of institutions, doctrines, etc. Kant argues that there is an unconditional imperative of truthfulness, which does not exclude the possibility of error but most certainly that of the lie (KANT, 1900ff., 8:421; 6:429) In this context his principal focus is on the pragmatic dimension of human interaction. “Pragmatic is the cognition which can be generally used in society” (KANT, 1900ff., Refl 1482, 15:660; cf. also 9:455; 25:856; 25:1210). The pragmatic aspect promotes “what *he* [the human being] as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself” (KANT, 2007, 7:119; cf. 7:246; 7:189; 7:214). The use of language is considered here in its socio-political, in particular critical, dimension, which in Kant’s philosophy of history primarily takes on a Utopian dimension through its cosmopolitan impulses and its tendency toward *Perpetual Peace*. Here, the legal-juridical use of language, as is clear in the essay *Toward perpetual peace* (1795), is of particular significance with regard to the negotiation of the contracts between states intended to promote further development of human beings as a race, in the final instance also from a moral perspective. In addition to this, Kant’s belief in progress, which extends beyond the individual and the social, is validated by his natural-teleological premises. Kant’s metaphoricity is linked, viewed as a whole, not only to certain theoretical elements of his philosophy such as symbol, attribute, analogy etc., but rather equally represents – among other things also by means of the metaphors which he uses in his philosophical language – the key to more profound access to the Kantian philosophical system, extending to his politically focused language pragmatism, which must be viewed in particular in the context of his philosophy of history.

In his work Kant devotes particular care to the explanation of terms by exploring the implicit meanings of words which, in order to improve their use, require clarification with regard to terminological precision. The creation of new words is not at the heart of the Kantian enterprise. Philosophical language which develops, refines and increasingly struggles with thought – often in antagonistic confrontations – to achieve refining presentations of complex, innovative thought in hierarchalizing thought complexes and system-forming structures, frequently in a dispute with other philosophical arguments which are relevant to it in the specific context. In this context, Kant's language demonstrates a challenging, dense, in some cases seemingly hermetic character. In his strivings to achieve precision Kant focuses in particular on mathematics. Mathematics and philosophy, however, are in many regards so different that philosophy should not attempt to imitate mathematics.¹⁹ With regard to metaphysics and transcendental philosophy Kant lays claim to a scientific character which is reflected in his philosophical language. In his metaphoricality, which in addition to its function of providing explanation and simplifying understanding by means of imagery, also serves to express new ideas and interrelationships, Kant references various fields such as biology, chemistry and law.

LANGUAGE IN THE WORK OF KANT AS VIEWED BY FOUCAULT

Foucault attributes a prominent role to language in Kant's philosophy, thus indirectly contradicting the theory that Kant disregards language in his work. In his genealogical exploration of *parrhesia*²⁰ Foucault draws attention to Kant's form of critical *parrhesia* and its significance, undertaking an interesting analysis of Kantian philosophy in terms of the aspect of 'drama' of the discourse in the context of an exploration of

¹⁹ "That mathematics walks on the ground of the sensual, since reason can construct its own terms, i.e. present them a priori in a consideration and thus recognize objects a priori; philosophy in contrast undertakes an expansion of the cognition of reason by means of mere terms, which are unable to present an object as if it were physical, did not occur to the metaphysicists as a world of difference with regard to recognition of the possibility of cognition a priori and representing an important task" (KANT, 1900ff., FM, V 3, p. 85 ff.).

²⁰ *Parrhesia* as 'frank talking' can also deteriorate into 'random speech', meaning that its development per se is closely interconnected with critique; with speech which is more than rhetoric and requires courage, as it originated in 4th BC Greece, primarily as a criticism of democracy (cf. FOUCAULT, 2011, p. 2ff., p. 35).

philosophical truthfulness (cf. FOUCAULT, 2012, p. 97).²¹ When doing so, Foucault places himself and Kant in the tradition of *parrhesia*, which began in antiquity and is closely connected to the intent of philosophy.²² In this context Foucault attempts to continue the Kantian project of Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) in a modified form.

In conclusion, given the movement which swung critical attitude over into the question of critique or better yet, the movement responsible for reassessing the *Aufklärung* enterprise within the critical project whose intent was to allow knowledge to acquire an adequate idea of itself—given this swinging movement, this slippage, this way of deporting the question of the *Aufklärung* into critique—might it not now be necessary to follow the opposite route? (FOUCAULT, 2007, p. 66f.).

Critique today should, argues Foucault, lead to Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), whereby the question of cognition must be subordinated to this goal. Although Foucault interprets the relationship between *Aufklärung* and critique in Kant's work in a narrow, one-dimensional manner, its Enlightenment impetus is, however, of special significance for the understanding of Foucault's philosophical objective and is closely related to Foucault's referencing of the terms 'immaturity' – a lack of will; 'autonomy' – a lack in the relationship to the self; and 'liberty' in the sense of a practised experience in Kant's work (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 28f.). Foucault writes "In the condition of majority, reasoning and obedience are disconnected" (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 36). He continues "*Aufklärung*, on the contrary, gives freedom the dimension of the greatest publicity in the form of the universal, and it maintains obedience only in this private role, let's say in this particular, defined individual role within the social body" (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 37). The relationship of critique of the issue of power and rulership in Foucault's work becomes clear in the following quotation:

²¹ Foucault writes: "In this way I think one could make an analysis of the dramatics of true discourse and its different forms: the prophet, the seer, the philosopher, the scientist" (FOUCAULT, 2012, p. 69).

²² Foucault comments in this regard: "The history of philosophy, in short, as movement of *parrhesia*, as redistribution of *parrhesia*, as varied game of truth-telling, philosophy envisaged thus in what could be called its allocutionary force" (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 350).

And if it is necessary to ask the question about knowledge in its relationship to domination, it would be, first and foremost, from a certain decision-making will not to be governed, the decision making will, both an individual and collective attitude which meant, as Kant said, to get out of one's minority. A question of attitude (FOUCAULT, 2007, p. 67).

Foucault argues that *Aufklärung* is linked to a particular form of critical truthfulness. Viewed in general terms, *parrhesia* is a speaking of the truth which involves a personal risk – in the mode of truthfulness, whereby the speaker himself both accepts responsibility as the subject of the statement and is also held responsible (cf. FOUCAULT, 2001, p. 13). *Parrhesia* is thus simultaneously attributed a subject-forming function in the ethical context. In Foucault's work the problem of freedom of speech "becomes increasingly related to the choice of existence, to the choice of one's way of life" (FOUCAULT, 2001, p. 85)²³ and conceived of as a personal stance with an ethical dimension.²⁴ In this context, Foucault views himself as, at the same time, being part of the tradition of Kantian *parrhesia* and its concept of ethics. The critical form of truthfulness combines with Kant's concern with Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), in which the "dimension of the public [...] is at the same time the dimension of the universal" and a "the new distribution of government of self and government of others" takes place (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 36f.). Foucault's exploration of Kant's philosophy within the scope of his focus on *parrhesia* reveals this level. In this context, argues Foucault, the drama of discourse²⁵ extends beyond

²³ Foucault continues: "And as a result, *parrhesia* is regarded more and more as a personal attitude, a personal quality, as a virtue which is useful for the city's political life in the case of positive or critical *parrhesia*, or as a danger for the city in the case of negative, pejorative *parrhesia*" (FOUCAULT, 2001, p. 85).

²⁴ Foucault views truthfulness as being fundamentally an activity which has interpersonal and communicative elements – in smaller groups; within the scope of communal life and in public life (cf. FOUCAULT, 2001, p. 108). Kant, asserts Foucault, stands in the cynical tradition of critical *parrhesia*. In contrast to Kant, Foucault takes up the Socratic idea of concern for oneself in the context of *parrhesia* to an equal extent. In Socratic *parrhesia* concern for oneself takes centre stage, also envisaging a harmony between words and deeds and viewing political and ethical *parrhesia* as interconnected. It is deemed to be the beginning of the philosophical form of *parrhesia*. *Parrhesia* has, according to Foucault, an epistemic, a political and an ethical/aesthetic dimension and must be understood as primarily practical (cf. FOUCAULT, 2001, p. 104).

²⁵ "I think it is this retroaction—such that the event of the utterance affects the subject's mode of being, or that, in producing the event of the utterance the subject modifies, or affirms, or anyway determines and clarifies his mode of being insofar as he speaks—that characterizes a type of facts of discourse which are completely different from those dealt with by pragmatics. The analysis of these facts of discourse, which show how the very event of the enunciation may affect the enunciator's being, is what we could call—removing all pathos from the word—the 'dramatics' of discourse" (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 67).

the pragmatism of discourse²⁶. In contrast to the theory of the speech act, as espoused by English pragmatists such as Austin or Searle, his primary concern is the condition of reality of statements and – in the context of exploring *parrhesia* – the ontological self-commitment of the subject via the act of speech (GROS, 2010, p. 379f.), which Foucault links overall with the concerns and history of philosophy. When doing so, the theory of ‘truthfulness’ enables Foucault to consider the dimensions of knowledge, power and subject as a whole in his philosophy, whereby it – seen from the perspective of the structure of argumentation and viewed systematically – fulfils a particularly important function.

In addition to this, in his *Introduction to Kants ‘Anthropology’*, Foucault makes language his subject of discussion, also with regard to Kant’s concept of the *Weltbürger* (world citizen). Foucault writes “He is *Weltbürger* purely and simply because he speaks. It is in the exchange of language that he manages on his own account both to attain and to realize the concrete universal. His living in the world is, originally, residence in language” (FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 102). In *Anthropology* the “value of the discourse”; the “*Tischgesellschaft*” and the “*Unterhaltung*” becomes manifest (FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 101). “There, through the transparency of a common language, a bond linking everyone has to be established; no one should feel privileged, and no one should feel isolated; everybody, whether speaking or silent, has to be present together in the shared sovereignty of speech” (FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 101). Kant’s *Anthropology* does bring any “truth anterior to language” to light (FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 102). “It is a truth that is both more interior and more complex: it is in the very movement of the exchange, and that exchange realizes the universal truth of man. [...] It is here that language takes, realizes, and rediscovers its reality; it is also here that man exhibits his anthropological truth” (FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 102f.). In its interpretation, Foucault’s emphasis on the communicative impetus of language in Kant’s *Anthropology* allows a new dimension of language in

²⁶ “What is it that we call, or anyway what we could call the pragmatics of discourse? Well, it is the analysis of what it is in the real situation of the person speaking that affects and modifies the meaning and value of the utterance. To that extent, as you can see, analyzing or locating something like a performative falls squarely in the domain of a pragmatics of discourse” (FOUCAULT, 2010, p. 67).

Kant's work to be revealed, providing a crucial supplement to the central aspect of the naming function of language, which plays a key role in the reception of Kant, even if this is in a way which Foucault overexaggerates and overemphasizes. Foucault can be credited with having drawn attention to Kant's communication-related, language-pragmatic and language-dramatic considerations and thus having expanded the view of the implications of Kant's philosophy of language. Foucault asserts that, in Kant's *Anthropology*, this is also reflected in the struggle with the German language as a philosophical language. In contrast to the *Critiques*, Latin no longer plays any significant role in *Anthropology*.²⁷ Here also Kant's concern to reach the public with his deliberations and to engage in a public philosophical dialogue – to the benefit of his project of *Aufklärung* – becomes apparent.

By emphasizing the communicative and, in particular, the language-dramatic aspects in Kant's work, Foucault's reception of Kant's philosophy represents a shift respectively a reinterpretation vis-à-vis the Kant interpretations which complain about the disregard of language in Kant's work and/or which only speak of an implicit philosophy of language in his work. Language in Kant's work is given a central significance by placing both the philosophical intention and the concept of the function of philosophy in Kant's work and also Kant's struggle to develop his own philosophical language at the centre of the discussion. Over and above this, Foucault's particular emphasis when referencing Kant's *Anthropology* is less on the naming function of language than on its communicative aspect. He argues that language is of fundamental importance for Kant. Foucault presents Kant's overall philosophy as a language-philosophical project of truthfulness in the form of critique with an ethical-political dimension.

²⁷ "In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant is even embarrassed by his German, and considers it a limitation" (FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 98). Foucault continues "That philosophical reflection broke away from the universality of the Latin form in this way is important. Henceforth, philosophical language would see that it was possible to locate its place of origin, and to define its field of exploration within a given linguistic system" (FOUCAULT, 2008, p. 100).

LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE AND THE MURMURING OF LANGUAGE IN THE WORK OF MICHEL FOUCAULT

Foucault assumes that there is an ocean of language, which determines meanings at the discourse level and excludes the unspeakable; language thus extends beyond the sovereignty of individual speech and is based on historically differing formation systems²⁸ and formation rules, for example with regard to statement modalities.²⁹ The discursive focuses on the exclusion of the language of madness, which Foucault emphasizes in his deliberations concerning literature – e.g. on Roussel as an alternative source of thought. This language represents an epistemological counter-discourse which, as an unpredictable entity, can turn its attention to what has previously been excluded and left unsaid. Madness³⁰ represents a form of linguistic transgression. Literary forms of language can come close to the language of madness; literature is thus of particular significance. In this context, the boundlessness of language in contrast to discourse, whose purpose is to avert the dangerous aspects of language, becomes clear. Limitation of language must be considered in relationship to, for example, institutional issues of power and is supported by dispositive processes.

In his ontology of language, in which he explores language independently of its reference and signification function, Foucault presupposes a space of language which opens up; an emptiness of language; an endless murmuring and the phenomenon of the self-manifestation of language. This also reveals its existential dimension, which is characterized by a mirror reflection of death and desire. The experience of the interior and exterior, which necessitates an area of

²⁸ The language of antiquity must thus be viewed as general grammar in the sense of a representation of existence, as Foucault argues in *The Order of Things* (FOUCAULT, 2002).

²⁹ “If the only site for language is indeed the solitary sovereignty of “I speak,” then in principle nothing can limit it-not the one to whom it is addressed, not the truth of what it says, not the values or systems of representation it utilizes. In short, it is no longer discourse and the communication of meaning, but a spreading forth of language in its raw state, an unfolding of pure exteriority” (FOUCAULT, 2000, p. 148).

³⁰ Madness, for Foucault, is more than an anthropological category used to label a certain mental state; over and above this, it defines the relationship of speaking to the non-significant existence of language. The emptiness of language must also be assumed in the context of literary language; a self-implication and self-referentiality of language, which, in the creative act, becomes a ‘meaningful discourse’. The figure of duplication and self-reflection is, in particular, an indication of the non-significant existence of language. This represents a form of speech which becomes lost in itself, only articulating language in and for itself. Literature thus also encompasses the questioning and rejection of language.

signification, requires rules which are based on a defining discourse and refers to the observation of the discursive order of language. The external space is not constituted by clear borders but rather shifts in a permanent process of boundary-setting and transgression. The issue at hand is the relationship of non-significant speech to the existing discursive order, which, in Foucault's work, represents the beginning of the shift from the ontology of language to the analysis of discourse in the sense of an archaeology of knowledge, whereby the existence of language represents the blind spot of the historical formation of knowledge formed by epistemes respectively epistemic coherence principles and discursive formation rules, etc. The occupation with the ontology of language results in an epistemic focus of his philosophical thought.

There is a further aspect of the philosophy of language which is linked to the self-concern of the subject, concerned with the development of an individual way of life. In his historical exploration of *parrhesia*, which presupposes a personal stance in the sense of ethics and can be viewed as a self-technique of truthfulness, and the self-concern which is connected to it, Foucault develops an ethic respectively an aesthetic of the self which is concerned with the self-formation of the subject by means of self-technologies outside of but not independent of power relationships. The critical stance of truthfulness demonstrates the relationship between speech and self-formation and thus language as a means of subjectification. Reading and writing are of key significance within the scope of this process. In this regard Foucault – taking Kant as his starting point – emphasizes critique and Enlightenment in the context of a specific way of life.

Foucault in contrast to Kant looks to the language of history, of social sciences and of biology. His descriptive, sober deliberations are often based on historical material; in part in the form of a document or monument, such as in the case of Herculine Barbin and Pierre Rivière, which he integrates into his work. The descriptive passages – e.g. on imprisonment and punishment practices – make large sections of the text appear to more like historical or socio-scientific writings; the philosophical sharpening and penetration of the problem under discussion is only gradually developed out of this material. Unlike Kant, Foucault is not

concerned with creating a specific philosophical language; he foregoes any claim to any particular linguistic form of philosophy. Philosophy as a process without claim to a systematizing overall view of humans and the world remains focused on facts and empirical findings, developing an access point to the formalities and mechanism behind the phenomena which is based both synchronously and diachronically on an archaeological and genealogical process and identifies and reveals principles and interrelationships – using a questing language. Foucault’s empirical starting point for his philosophical considerations reveals a high degree of openness with regard to the material used, also equally reflected in the linguistic area. Over and above this, Foucault also applies his process to philosophy itself, thus exploring, for example, historical forms of truthfulness in philosophy. On the other hand, it is also possible to identify a tendency towards the literarization of philosophical language in Foucault’s work, which is in the tradition of Nietzsche – a figurative, meandering, questing, concealing language which expresses a pleasure in the creative impetus of language itself. The metaphors employed, such as his natural metaphors, are reflections of this aspect of Foucault’s philosophy. In this context, Foucault’s tendency to integrate artistic works into the philosophical discourse, such as literary works by Roussel, Blanchot and Borges among others and visual works such as by Velasquez, Monet and Magritte, is also of significance. This proximity to the literary/artistic is related to the experimental aspect of Foucault’s philosophy and philosophical language. Philosophy as a discipline is called into question and must reinvent itself.

CONCLUSION

Kant’s ‘revolution of thought’ should, states Villers, have equally “extended to language” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 7) and his transcendental philosophical impetus of ontology should have also had consequences for the philosophy of language.³¹ Villers argues “What Kant lacks or what he shies away from is the understanding of language as a medium which has

³¹ According to Villers this should have led him to the conclusion “that his fundamental problem of linking receptivity and spontaneity was nothing more than a pseudo problem; that he must replace the thoughts behind his philosophy, the connection of sensuality and reason, with the concept of communicating a relationship to the world and thought in and by language” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 7).

always linked and communicated receptivity and spontaneity; sensuality and intellectualism; a connection to the factual and meaning” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 366). Villers poses the question “whether Kantian reason does not also have a linguistic origin which has been suppressed” (VILLERS, 1997, p. 364). He writes:

In the final analysis, these questions arising from Kant’s works can no longer be answered unambiguously; what, however, remains is the suspicion that even the highest cognitive ability, reason, could, contrary to Kant’s explicit intention, prove to be organized on the basis of language or, perhaps, even constituted on the basis of language (VILLERS, 1997, p. 365).

Foucault chooses to take the linguistic dimension and the historicizing of the a priori into consideration, attempting to close the gap which is apparent in Kant’s philosophy. Foucault can, furthermore, be credited with having drawn attention to the neglected dimension of language drama in his exploration of the question of Kant’s philosophy of language. His archaeological and, in particular, his genealogical research methods result in the emphasizing of the special form of Kantian *parrhesia*, in whose tradition he places himself, in his reception of Kant, whereby he simultaneously explores an aspect of Kantian research which has been neglected and still, today, is not paid enough attention. Foucault can thus not be accused of neglecting linguistic issues, as is the case with Kant. The New Realism movement, however, in particular still sees a tendency to relativism and a loss of the world in Foucault’s constructivist fundamental outlook.³² His discourse theoretical turnaround of Kant’s logical apriority runs the risk, avoided by Kant, of losing the world in its autonomy.³³ Even if Foucault considers the materialism of the cultural with his term of the ‘dispositive’, by foregoing the concept of the duality of nature and culture and espousing a view of nature which is equivalent to an ‘engulfing’ of

³² Foucault is, in this context, accused of neglecting the agentialism of the material and reality.

³³ Even if Foucault considers the materialism of the cultural with his term of the ‘dispositive’, by foregoing the concept of the duality of nature and culture and espousing a view of nature which is equivalent to an ‘engulfing’ of nature by culture, he fails to consider the material disposition and agential of the material. The neglect of the natural-philosophical and cosmological dimension results in a concept of the material seen solely from the cultural-philosophical viewpoint respectively to a reduction to the cultural dimension and an absolutization of the cultural.

nature by culture, he fails to consider the material disposition and agential of the material. The neglect of the natural-philosophical and cosmological dimension results in a concept of the material seen solely from the cultural-philosophical view; in a reduction to the cultural dimension and an absolutization of the cultural – a risk which Kant, among other things also by means of his often-criticized concept of language philosophy, avoided.

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